America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Quebec, September 14, 1944
Top secret

My Dear Friend, The office of Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, formerly held by General MacFarlane, is vacant. This is a British appointment. In order to have more political knowledge and experience in this post, so full of economic and political issues and so important for the welfare of the Italian people, I propose to appoint Mr. Harold Macmillan. The Supreme Allied Commander is ex officio President of the Allied Control Commission. He would in practice delegate his functions to Mr. Macmillan.

I propose to leave Mr. Macmillan his present duties as British Resident Minister at AFHQ, and British Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander. This is a simplification and reduction of British Staff.

It is proposed also that the day-to-day management of the Control Commission, apart from general political guidance (Macmillan), should be in the hands of the Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Commission, the United States representative, Mr. Stone, in whom we have great confidence. He would, if necessary, have a Lieutenant-General under him to assist in the administration and in carrying out effectively the policy. This would widen his scope and power.

I hope that these arrangements will be agreeable to you, as I should not like to make an appointment, even where it falls to me to do so, that does not work into the scheme of our close Anglo-American cooperation.

I should like to discuss with Anthony a suggestion that came up yesterday, namely, that Mayor La Guardia should pay a visit to Italy as your representative, and that while there he should be invited to attend the meetings of the Allied Control Commission. Thus he would have a chance to see that the machinery was working in the manner most beneficial to the Italians. I have a series of other proposals helpful to the Italians, on which I hope we shall be in full agreement. I would run through these with you, perhaps to-morrow, when Anthony will be here.

It is urgent to appoint Macmillan, because the post of Chief Commissioner has been vacant for two months, and I am becoming blameworthy in the matter, especially if any food shortage or needless unemployment should arise.

Yours always,
W

Draft report by CCS to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 14, 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 680

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the OCTAGON Conference

. . . . . . .

[IV. Execution of the overall strategic concept]

The War Against Japan

Overall objective in the war against Japan
We have agreed that the overall objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

Operations in the Pacific Area
We believe that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end our plans should retain flexibility, and provision should be made to take full advantage of possible developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. We propose to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against the enemy ships will be continued. Very long-range bomber operations against Japan proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from those to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practical support for the campaign in the Pacific.

Pursuant to the above, we have accepted, as a basis for planning, a course of action comprising the following schedule of major operations:

Target date Objective
15 October 1944 Talaud
15 November 1944 Sarangani Bay
20 December 1944 Leyte-Surigao Area
1 March 1945 Formosa-Amoy Area
Or
20 February 1945 Luzon

If the Formosa operation is undertaken, the following operations have been approved for planning purposes:

April 1945 Bonins
May 1945 Ryukyus
March to June 1945 China coast (Foochow-Wenchow Area)
October 1945 Southern Kyushu
December 1945 Tokyo Plain

A course of action to follow the Luzon operation, if undertaken, is under study.

In connection with the above planning, we have noted that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, will require the allocation of resources. In planning production these requirements will be borne in mind.

British participation in the Pacific
We have agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this Fleet will be balanced and self-supporting. The method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific will be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.

We have invited the British Chief of the Air Staff to put forward, as a basis for planning, an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force will be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.

Operations in Southeast Asia
We have agreed that our object in Southeast Asia is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date, it being understood that operations to achieve this object must not prejudice the security of the existing supply route to China, including the air staging base at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.

We have approved the following operations:
a. Stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China;

b. Operation DRACULA.

We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945 and with a target date of 15 March. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, it is our intention to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.

Redeployment after the end of the war in Europe
We consider that the whole problem of the redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe, including repatriation, needs combined study in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved, including personnel and cargo shipping, and to make certain that the forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theatre of war at the earliest date. We have accordingly instructed the combined staffs in consultation with the combined shipping authorities to study and report on this problem, submitting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff such questions as may require decision before completion of the study.

(NOTE: The above paragraph is dependent upon the decision on CCS 679.)

Duration of the war against Japan
We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. This date is necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11:00 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Law

Churchill wrote to Roosevelt on the morning of September 14, 1944, suggesting that he bring Law and perhaps Eden to call on the President at 11 a.m. to discuss the application to Italy of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Log indicates that only Law accompanied Churchill to this meeting, concerning which no further information has been found.

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Lord Cherwell

On September 19, in a meeting with officials of the Treasury Department in Washington, Morgenthau recounted Churchill’s violent opposition on the evening of September 13 to the “Morgenthau Plan” for the post-war treatment of Germany and then described the German discussion on the morning of September 14 as follows:

And then to my amazement, on presenting it the next morning through … Lord Cherwell – it was presented the next morning very much softened down. Mr. Churchill interrupted him and said, “I will take it.” And then we tried to set it down and we couldn’t because it wasn’t strong enough.

White, in recording a meeting between Morgenthau and Cherwell on the morning of September 15, quoted Morgenthau as saying, with reference to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on September 14, that Churchill “seemed to accept the program designed to weaken German economy.… Churchill had already spoken of diverting Germany to an agricultural state as she was in the last quarter of the 19th century.”

Memorandum by the British Paymaster-General

Quebec, 14th Sept 1944

Mr. Morgenthau said he had been discussing with Lord Cherwell his proposals on the economic disarmament of Germany and would like him to give his impressions of these.

Lord Cherwell said he had, of course, not had time to read the papers or study the proposals in detail but he was definitely attracted by the possibilities set forth. So far as he understood it the intention was to hamstring Germany’s capacity for making war by taking whatever machinery was usable from the Ruhr and other areas in which industry capable of making war-like weapons was concentrated, and handing it over to the numerous countries she had devastated. The Ruhr and perhaps the other areas in question would be then placed under an international authority which should decide whether and when and to what degree industries of this type should be allowed to be re-built there. If the Germans were deprived of the possibility of making steel on a large scale as well as certain types of chemicals and electrical machinery, she would not be in a position to produce the armaments required for modern war. She would, of course, not starve. Her exports would be reduced and she might therefore go short of certain materials. But her standard of life would still undoubtedly be higher than it had been under the Nazis – when so much national effort was put into preparations for war – even if she was unable to establish the same high standard she enjoyed for some time before that. The consequence that her export markets would become available for the UK and USA did not seem a disadvantage.

The Prime Minister said that he thought there was a good deal to be said for this approach to the problem. We were entitled to make sure Germany could not commit wanton acts of aggression and the Russians would probably in any case insist on obtaining any machinery available with which to restore the factories which Germany had ruined in her advance into Russia.

Mr. Morgenthau said that he could see no other way in which we could be sure of preventing the rearming of Germany. Great productive capacity was necessary for modern war and it could not be built up secretly. The removal of all the machinery and facilities should be undertaken as soon as possible, say, within the first six months of our troops entering the Ruhr. Thereafter this region should be put under international control which would see that it was not exploited again in the way Germany had used it to prepare the wanton acts of aggression she had committed.

The President said that he did not think it would be an undue hardship to require Germany to revert towards an agricultural status such as she had enjoyed up to the latter part of the last century. She had shown she could not be trusted with all these facilities for making weapons.

The Prime Minister said he was converted to the idea that we should explore this line of approach and see whether concrete suggestions could be worked out to ensure security and which it might be hoped would secure the approval of the United Nations.


Memorandum by the British Paymaster-General

September 14, 1944, 11:30 a.m.
Top secret

Record of conversation between the President and Prime Minister at Quebec on September 14, 1944

The Prime Minister said that when Germany was overcome there would be a measure of redistribution of effort in both countries. He hoped that the President would agree that during the war with Japan we should continue to get food, shipping, etc., from the United States to cover our reasonable needs. The President indicated assent.

He hoped also that the President would agree that it would be proper for Lend/Lease munitions to continue on a proportional basis even though this would enable the United Kingdom to set free labour for rebuilding, exports, etc., e.g., if British munitions production were cut to three-fifths, U.S. assistance should also fall to three-fifths. The President indicated assent. Mr. Morgenthau however suggested that it would be better to have definite figures. He understood that munitions assistance required had been calculated by the British at about 3½ billion dollars in the first year on the basis of the strategy envisaged before the OCTAGON Conference. The exact needs would have to be recalculated in the light of decisions on military matters reached at the Conference. The non-munitions requirements had been put at 3 billion dollars gross against which a considerable amount would be set off for reverse Lend/Lease. The President agreed that it would be better to work on figures like these than on a proportional basis.

The Prime Minister emphasized that all these supplies should be on Lease/Lend. The President said this would naturally be so.

The Prime Minister pointed out that if the United Kingdom was once more to pay its way it was essential that the export trade, which had shrunk to a very small fraction, should be re-established. Naturally no articles obtained on Lend/Lease or identical thereto would be exported [FDR: or sold for profit]; but it was essential that the United States should not attach any conditions to supplies delivered to Britain on Lend/Lease which would jeopardize the recovery of her export trade. The President thought this would be proper.

To implement these decisions the Prime Minister suggested there should be a joint committee. It was held that it would be better to appoint an ad hoc committee for this purpose on an informal basis in the first instance which could be formalized in due course. Pending its report the United States departments should be instructed not to take action which would pre-judge the committee’s conclusions, e.g., production should not be closed down without reference to Lend/Lease supplies which it might be held should be supplied to Britain. The President thought that the committee should be set up and suggested that Mr. Morgenthau should head it representing him, and that Mr. Stettinius, who had taken such a large part in Lend/Lease, should also be a member.

Tripartite luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King
Mrs. Roosevelt Mrs. Churchill
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Mr. Law
Mr. White Commander Thompson

White-Weeks meeting, afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. White Mr. Weeks
Mr. MacDougall

According to White’s memorandum regarding the Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting on the morning of September 14, the three officials named above met “later” to draft a directive establishing a committee on lend-lease matters. A memorandum by White relating to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the afternoon of September 14 indicates that the “memorandum on the creation of the lend-lease committee which had been drafted by Cherwell, Weeks and White” was ready by late afternoon on September 14.

At some time during the Second Quebec Conference White discussed with Weeks the desirability of making certain information available to the United States authorities in order to expedite a decision with respect to lend-lease to the United Kingdom. The only information found on this discussion is that contained in the verbatim minutes of a conference between British and United States officials held in Washington at 3 p.m., September 20, 1944, as follows:

Mr. WHITE: Mr. Secretary, at Quebec in the discussion I had with Mr. Weeks – I am not sure whether you were present – I indicated a number of items that the answers to which would be very helpful in expediting a decision. I don’t know whether Mr. Weeks remembers the items I mentioned. I would be glad to supply them in writing. He thought that he could, given a little time, supply sufficiently rough answers – because the nature of some of the questions weren’t sufficiently accurate.

Mr. WEEKS: You mean–

Mr. WHITE: The extent of your increase in peacetime goods, the extent of the increase in exports, increased employment, and things of that character.

Mr. TAFT: The net transfer of employable persons from war production to civilian production.

Mr. WHITE: There are about a dozen of those key questions.

The Pittsburgh Press (September 14, 1944)

JAPS REPORT U.S. RAID ON LUZON
Main island in Philippines is pounded

Attacks hint early landing attempt
By the United Press

Yanks eight miles in Germany; gain on 85-mile front

Aachen under fire of big guns; heights over city captured
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer

Casey reports from Germany –
Siegfried forts, traps crushed by Yanks in wild 12-hour battle

Roadblocks blown up, tank obstacles reduced, U.S. armor pushes on into Reich
By Robert J. Casey

She gets Transylvania –
Allies lenient with Romania

Given six years to pay $300 million

UAW lifts strike ban, vote shows

Preliminary tally to be checked

Many soldiers among 29 dead to train wreck

64 are injured in head-on crash

Hurricane roars up Atlantic Coast

Communications at Norfolk reported out

John Hay Whitney escapes Germans

U.S. casualties total 389,125

Roosevelt and Churchill extend conferences

Political problems to be discussed

Québec, Canada (UP) –
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden will join the Roosevelt-Churchill conference shortly “to discuss a broad range” of political problems which are accumulating in Europe and Asia in the wake of Allied military successes.

The announcement was made at a special news conference by a British spokesman, who said he did not know whether Secretary of State Cordell Hull would join President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in their discussions at the Québec Citadel.

Problem faced

High on the political agenda were certain to be three of the most difficult problems before the Allies.

  • The plans for occupation of Germany, the peace terms to be imposed on her and the extent to which France shall be given a share and voice in the enforcement of these terms.

  • The long-standing Polish-Russian dispute, which includes territorial matters. Eden has just completed a series of London talks with the Polish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

  • Delicate questions involving the British attitude in the Far East. The United States in the past has urged greater independence for India to remedy the somewhat lethargic role of that country in the war against Japan. running through the entire political situation in the Far East was the basic problem of how far self determination will be extended to British, French and Dutch territories now held by Japan.

Adjourn this weekend

Mr. Eden’s presence here was not expected to prolong the conference, which probably will wind up the coming weekend.

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau JR. arrived here yesterday and dined at the Citadel last night. He is here as a member of a special cabinet committee to study worldwide economic problems.

The announcement of Mr. Eden’s trip brought the official version of the conference into agreement with what observers had felt all along – that it is by no means confined to military problems, but covers a worldwide political field, too.

Many questions tackled

With U.S. troops already in Germany, Russian troops on the East Prussian border and the end of the European war deemed a virtual certainty this year, the plans for Germany were the most important of the European problems tackled by the President and Prime Minister. And they included such questions as these:

  • What zones of occupation in Germany will be assigned to the Americans, British and Russians?
  • Will the French participate in the occupation?
  • How many troops will each nation assign to this task?
  • How long will the occupation endure?
  • What changes will be made in Germany’s borders?
  • How much economic revival is Germany to be permitted?

The imminent arrival of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. was further indication that economic matters figure in the discussions. Mr. Morgenthau is a member of a Cabinet committee in Washington specifically assigned to study economic problems stemming from the war.

Screenshot 2022-06-20 213810

Simms: ‘Big Four’ session may be held soon

By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Québec, Canada –
Unless President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have inside information covering Marshal Stalin’s plans after Hitler’s fall, it seems almost certain that their meeting here will be followed by another – a Big Four conference.

I understand that the present conference is already nearing its end.

If that is the case, it not only indicates swift and excellent progress is being made, but that it is largely exploratory, rather than decisive.

Russia’s policy needed

The impression is growing here that without some definite word from Russia, regarding her policy in Asia after the collapse of Germany, no definite, overall blueprint for the Pacific and Far East can be completed.

From an authoritative source, I have the latest figures showing the disposition of Jap strength in the Oriental theater of operations. According to these, Japan now has 113 divisions of 20,000 men each, about twice the usual strength. This would make a total of 2,260,000 men.

Twenty-two divisions are in the Southwest Pacific; 15 are in Thailand-Burma; 37½ are in China; 21½ in Manchuria and 17 in Japan proper.

Japs concentrate forces

The main Jap fleet, composed of 10 battleships and subsidiaries, seems to be based on the Jap east coast, Yokohama, Formosa and the Philippines. Thirteen divisions make up the air force which, since the Americans took Saipan last July, appears to have been pulled in toward the Philippines and Formosa.

From these figures, two things stick out, first, Japan seems to be concentrating her forces nearer home on land, sea and in the air. Second, it will be a difficult job to close in on Japan proper until we obtain a good foothold on the Asiatic mainland, with an adequate harbor through which to pour in reserves and supplies.

Manchuria supplies troops

But some 59 divisions, or more than half the entire Jap Army, appear to be concentrated in China and Manchuria. These units are almost self-contained, thanks to Japan’s war industries in Manchuria. To get at, and destroy, these divisions will be no easy matter.

Traditionally, Japan has counted on tiring America out, in case of war, by barricading herself, if necessary, and forcing us to come and get her. As for Europe, Russia is the only country she ever has feared, because only Russia could get at her by land.

Everything, therefore, indicates the importance of Russia living up to the spirit of the commitments she and the Allies are now supposed to be making at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington.

Meanwhile, pending the Allied victory over the Reich and the clarification of Soviet policy in the Far East, it is difficult to see how the decisions at Québec can be more than tentative.

americavotes1944

Perkins: Lewis risks repudiation if he doesn’t back up on Roosevelt issue

Mine workers demonstrate that big boss doesn’t do all the union’s thinking
By Fred W. Perkins, Scripps-Howard staff writer

Cincinnati, Ohio –
John L. Lewis, for 25 years the boss of the United Mine Workers, today faces a choice of risking a repudiation of his political leadership or of soft-pedaling his attempts to get this big union on record against a fourth term for President Roosevelt.

The delegates to the convention here, now numbering 2,800, support their leader unanimously on economic subjects. But this unanimous support does not carry into the political field, where the miners have opinions of their own. By expressing themselves publicly, they are proving it isn’t true that John L. does all the thinking for this union, or that his control is so complete that men are afraid to express contrary opinions.

Should they risk fight?

There was to have been a sizzling anti-Roosevelt resolution, containing allegations more “startling” than any Mr. Lewis has yet voiced and it may yet come through. But overnight, the UMW boss and his straw bosses have been questioning whether to risk a floor fight that conceivably might go against Mr. Lewis, who has never suffered a conspicuous defeat in his own union. And whether to take the chance of a public row that might leave bad scars in the union and on the Lewis reputation.

John Mascaro, a delegate from Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, took over the loudspeaker system yesterday and objected to the reiteration of these anti-Roosevelt opinions, adding:

We love President Lewis for his courageous leadership, but we will not turn down the savior of humanity, the man who opened the gates to union organization, for this great union and others. That, my friends, was not done under a Republican administration.

Compromise may come

The choice of Mr. Lewis is whether to press for an outright anti-Roosevelt declaration, with a direct endorsement of Governor Dewey, or to compromise on a less savage denunciation of the Roosevelt administration. A compromise appeared most probable.

Most opinions are that it is the same among the miners as among most other labor groups: They are mostly for Mr. Roosevelt, but not as much as in 1932, 1936 and 1940.

WLB panels submit data on ‘Little Steel’ formula