Kaiser pledges support of war plant conversion
Absolutely essential to keep factories going to create needed jobs, he says
By Robert C. Elliott, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
Nye charges plot to ‘buy’ defeat
Veteran sought as foe, he says
Washington (UP) –
Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-ND) charged today that Joseph B. Keenan, former Assistant Attorney General, offered a disabled veteran of World War I $110,000 to run against him for the Republican senatorial nomination this year.
The offer, Mr. Nye charged in a Senate speech, was made in the presence of another North Dakota Senator whom he did not identify.
North Dakota’s other Senator is Republican William Langer, long a bitter foe of Me. Nye in North Dakota politics.
Mr. Nye said the offer was made Sept. 14, 1943, when the disabled veteran, Fay Dewitt of Minot, North Dakota, was in Washington en route to a national convention of disabled American war veterans.
Mr. Langer told the Senate, however, that:
The statement that J. B. Keenan ever offered anyone a single dollar to defeat the Senator from North Dakota is completely false.
Visited with Senator
Mr. Nye said Mr. Dewitt and Charles Gray of Bismarck, North Dakota, visited that day with “one of their Senators in his office.” During the conversation, Mr. Nye continued, if was said that Mr. Dewitt was affiliated, with the Masons, Elks, American Legions, Veterans of Foreign Wars and Disabled War Veterans.
The Senator, Mr. Nye said, requested that he be permitted to hold Mr. Dewitt’s membership cards for a few hours, promising to return them that evening to Mr. Dewitt’s rooms.
That evening, according to Mr. Nye, the Senator went to the hotel bringing with him a “Mr. McSheehan” or a “Mr. Keenan” who, Mr. Nye said, was “Joseph B. Keenan, native of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, resident of Cleveland, Ohio, who under Attorney General Cummings [former Attorney General Homer S. Cummings] became first Assistant Attorney General.”
‘White House connections’
Mr. Nye said Mr. Keenan, when asked his interest as a Democrat in the Republican senatorial race, said he was “a Democrat with White House connections interested in seeing Senator Nye’s defeat.”
Mr. Keenan, Mr. Nye said, offered to finance the Dewitt campaign to the extent of $110,000, of which $10,000 was to be paid on the spot.
Mr. Dewitt and his companions – who, besides Mr. Gray, included Neal E. Williams (a special Assistant Attorney General of North Dakota), Andy Nomland, Oscar Winters, and Howard Shirley (all of Grand Forks) – “administered a verbal lashing to the proposition to buy a candidate for the Senate,” Mr. Nye said.
Millett: Modernized kitchens are menace to traditions
Miss Millett begs designers to be thoughtful of family memories
By Ruth Millett
…
Networks harvest millions in campaign time
Political figures are staggering
By Si Steinhauser
Some years ago, a Pittsburgh man set aside a fund of $11 million to be spent in philanthropic endeavors while he is still alive. He is still living and seeing his money at work. The boss assigned me to ask him why he gave his millions away. His answer was quite simple:
I made that money selling dehydrated potatoes to the government for shipment overseas. It doesn’t belong to me, so I’m giving it back to the people to whom it belongs.
Yesterday we asked one of the nice young women in our office to tabulate the cost of an all-network political broadcast by President Roosevelt or Governor Dewey from Standard Rate and Data, the Bible or cost book of radio. She added up the cost of a single half hour at $50,781. Since they usually talk longer, the rate may double. If each candidate spoke only a half hour on 10 broadcasts someone would pay the networks a minimum of $1 million for radio time. That figure may be doubled by talks by vice-presidential and other candidates and single station broadcasts by state, county and municipal candidates across the country will probably add another million to network and local station treasuries.
We couldn’t ask all of the people who contribute this money to campaign treasuries why they so it so we asked our associate editor and political authority, Kermit McFarland, and he gave us quite as simple an answer as the philanthropist: “Because they want to see the man to whose campaign fund they contribute elected.”
We’re naïve about politics but there must be more than that to it. Spending $2 million to get a man a $75,000 (Mr. Roosevelt cut his pay to $25,000) job doesn’t add up.
If you like comparative figures, NBC charges $15,646 for a half hour of night time, CBS asks $15,225, the Blue Network $11,869 and Mutual $8,041.
Suppose Mr. Roosevelt were to speak on all networks and a single local station decided not to carry his talk but to substitute a local candidate’s talk or even a talk by say, Mr. Dewey, who might be in town that night.
“You go ahead and suppose Steinhauser,” said a station manager. “We could do a thing like that but we wouldn’t dare.”
Stations discussed editorial and political policies last year and decided to keep hands off because the present outmoded radio law provides that if a station gives time to one side of a controversy it must give equal time and facilities to the other side.
So say the broadcasters, according to the law, if we took time to say “We’re for Roosevelt” we would have to add “And we’re also for Dewey.”
U.S. State Department (September 12, 1944)
Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Canada |
| President Roosevelt | The Earl of Athlone | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
| Mrs. Roosevelt | Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone | |
| Admiral Leahy | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| General Marshall | Mrs. Churchill | |
| Admiral King | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Arnold | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | ||
| Field Marshal Dill |
Arnold gives the following information which apparently pertains to the dinner meeting on September 12:
That night, at a dinner with the Governor General, the question of aid to Poland came up. Several messages [had] arrived from the Russians and from Harriman relating to Polish patriots in Warsaw. General Marshall and I talked this over at length. For some time, it had been apparent that if some help was not given to the Polish patriots in Warsaw, they would be exterminated…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It gave the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Churchill, and the President something serious to think about. Could we help the Poles in Warsaw, even though we wanted to? That rather large problem was never completely solved…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
During that dinner the Prime Minister came out with new ideas about winning the war. At that particular moment he thought it a matter of vital British interest that we (including the RAF) get more planes, ships, and soldiers into the final battle of Japan as soon as we could. I told him the question of putting planes in there wasn’t quite that simple. There were not enough land masses in the Pacific Ocean to use the heavy bombers we would have available from Europe when that phase of the war was over. As a matter of fact, if we could use 1500 out of the 3500 we had in the ETO, we would be very, very lucky. Certainly, we would much rather have the B-29s, with their longer range and their heavier bomb load than we would the B-17, the B-24, the Lancaster, or the Halifax…
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Quebec, September 12, 1944
My Dear Friend, Would it be agreeable to you to discuss with me sometime today our Italian policy? I must fill up the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission, and I feel the great need of a competent politician and Minister there, like Macmillan, rather than a General. I was distressed and disquieted by the tales I heard of serious food shortages in some parts of Rome and other great towns. Unemployment looms big in Italy. We may also soon have the populous North flowing on to our hands. I was hoping we might together make up an agreeable programme for Italy, which could be announced, comprising resumption of their export trade, interchange of diplomatic representatives à la Russe, and bringing them into the area of UNRRA as co-belligerents if that can be managed. If not, some other scheme of effective relief. You spoke of La Guardia having a Mission. This also I should like to discuss with you.
The Staffs are forming their contacts this morning and browsing over the Agenda on general lines. But would it not be well to have a plenary session tomorrow where you and I can put forward the fundamentals of our future war policy. This will enable them to go ahead much more rapidly and easily.
A small point. Leathers is longing for Admiral Land. You said you were keeping him handy; but if he could come up soon, these two would be together working out their complicated affairs, while we are busy with other things, and have results ready for us at each stage.
Some of the Boniface I sent you this morning appeared to me to be of profound significance. Alexander’s battle is a hard one, but now that Clark has crashed into the centre I am hopeful of speedy results.
Yours always,
W
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Quebec, September 12, 1944
My Dear Friend, Would you let me have your views on the following suggested time-table:
- Wednesday, 13th – Plenary Meeting with Chiefs of Staff.
- Thursday, 14th, and Friday, 15th – their further discussions.
- They should report to us the evening of Friday, 15th, enabling a final Plenary to take place on Saturday, 16th.
It would probably be in conformity with, your wishes to return to Hyde Park on Saturday. If agreeable to you I would follow by Air with Clemmie early on Monday, 18th, and stay with you Monday and Tuesday. We could then have anyone necessary to wind up outstanding points. I must depart on Wednesday, 20th.
I have asked Eden to come over if possible tomorrow, so he should be here on Thursday or Friday. There are several important things to discuss with him including recognition of the French Provisional Government, as to which I am by no means convinced, I do not know whether you would require to have Hull or Stettinius for Friday, 15th.
One of the most important things I have to discuss with you is Stage II. Would Thursday, 14th, do for that? – in which case I hope you could have Morgenthau present. This matter is considered of extreme and vital importance by the British Government, for reasons which are only too painfully apparent.
Yours always,
W
The President to the Secretary of the Treasury
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Please be in Quebec by Thursday, 14 September, Noon.
The President to the War Shinning Administrator
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Please come to Quebec without delay.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State
Twentieth Day, Tuesday, September 12, 1944
Restricted
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I then told the group in the strictest confidence that Cadogan had received a cable from Churchill asking him to come to Quebec and that he had asked my advice and opinion on the matter, and whether, if he went, we would be offended. I reported that I had told him we would have no objection to his flying up and spending the evening there if he could come back the next day. There was considerable discussion as to whether we should suggest that the President ask Church ill not to call him up, but this was entirely inconclusive. The point of view was also expressed that this changed the entire character of the Quebec conference from one of a military nature to one of a political nature and it was very serious to be having a political conference without Stalin present. Incidentally I informed the group that the President had assured me that if the British called any political men to Quebec he would do likewise. (This was not done, Morgenthau being the only person called up although through special arrangements we did have Ambassador Atherton at Quebec, although he did not participate in any direct way at the meeting.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Talks During the Day With the Secretary
Early in the day I had a discussion with the Secretary on the voting procedure and also on the question of Cadogan’s being ordered to Quebec. I also told him of the possibility that Eden was coming to Quebec. Mr. Hull made the same point which was made at the American meeting by Mr. Long, that changing the character of the meeting in a political direction, and probably discussing the future of Europe without Stalin being present was quite a serious matter. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Secretary thinks that it would be most unfortunate if Cadogan goes to Quebec, not only from the point of view of our Conversations at Dumbarton but that it would throw that conference into a discussion of general diplomatic and political affairs. He asked me to do everything in my power to keep him from going.
Discussion During the Day With Cadogan
I talked privately with Cadogan and Jebb in the early afternoon … [Cadogan] inquired if Mr. Hull had heard from the President about going to Quebec and I told him he had not. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Later in the afternoon I had another private talk with him on the question of his going to Quebec. He immediately prepared a cable to his Prime Minister saying that Mr. Hull felt it would be a mistake for him to go as it would arouse all types of speculation in the press in this country. He said in the cable that if the Prime Minister felt keenly about it, he hoped he would discuss it with the President. Cadogan handed me the wire and I suggested that he take out the word “terrific.” He had originally used the expression that Hull thought it would be a terrific mistake.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Völkischer Beobachter (September 13, 1944)
Wie der Feind die Lage sieht –
Briten erwarten härteste Kämpfe
Drei unbehagliche Tatsachen für den Gegner
…
Die Konferenz in Quebec
vb. Wien, 12. September –
Wie im August 1943 treffen sich auch diesmal Roosevelt und Churchill in Quebec. Wurde dieser Tagungsort wiedergewählt, weil man Kanada, das dieser Krieg entscheidend der Saugkraft des großen Nachbarn ausgesetzt hat, auch von London aus bereits als eine Art Niemandsland zwischen Empire und USA ansieht? 1943 fanden freilich die abschließenden Gespräche in Washington statt. Es spielte die Bitte Badoglios um Waffenstillstand hinein. Man rechnete im Lager der Westmächte schon mit baldigem Kriegsende und wollte sich vor den erstrebten Besprechungen mit den Sowjets auf eine gemeinsame Marschlinie einigen.
Die Konferenzen von Moskau und Teheran haben dann allerdings gezeigt, wer im Kreise der drei großen Räuber den Ton angab. Briten und Yankees wurden völlig an die Wand gespielt, sie durften nur die salbungsvollen Deklamationen über Freiheit, Toleranz und ähnliche Deckworte für den „Frieden durch Gewalt“ liefern, erhielten „gemeinsame Entscheidung der europäischen Fragen“ versprochen und mußten sich den Termin für die Invasion diktieren lassen. Stalin verlangte sie, um seine Verbündeten machtmäßig anderweitig festzulegen, weil er sie durch den Pazifikkrieg noch nicht genügend gebunden fand. Wie er dann zu verfahren gedachte, hat sich inzwischen erwiesen.
Die gefügigen Partner Moskaus werden sich in Quebec mit der Lage auseinanderzusetzen haben, die nun besonders auf dem Balkan entstanden ist und dort, wie schon in Polen, im Zeichen einer sichtbaren Ausdehnung des bolschewistischen Machtbereiches und damit der Unterjochung all der kleinen Nationen steht, die England und die USA den Sowjets ausgeliefert haben.
An der zweiten Konferenz in Quebec nehmen die Sowjets nicht teil. Stalin ließ Roosevelt und Churchill mitteilen, er sei jetzt durch die Ereignisse an der Ostfront zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, um Zeit für derartige Besprechungen erübrigen zu können. Aber auch die Tschungking-chinesen sind einstweilen in Quebec nicht vertreten, obwohl dort einer der wichtigsten Programmpunkte der Krieg im fernen Osten ist. Roosevelt sieht sich schon aus innenpolitischen Gründen veranlasst, von Churchill eine bindende Zusäge für die britische Beteiligung an diesem Kampf mit allen verfügbaren Kräften zu erhalten, und die englische Presse beeilt sich demgemäß, zu versichern, daß den Briten diese Aufgabe nicht weniger am Herzen liege wie Roosevelt die Kriegführung in Europa.
Was den Kampf an der Westfront betrifft, so entspricht die publizistische Behandlung dieser Frage in der englisch-amerikanischen Presse anlässlich der Quebec-Konferenz mehr dem agitatorischen Bedürfnis, bereits einen Sieg vorwegzunehmen als der wirklichen Lage, die im Zeichen der sich ständig verstärkenden deutschen Abwehr und der wachsenden Schwierigkeiten steht, die sich für die Fortführung der anglo-amerikanischen Operationen ergeben. Es besteht Grund zu der Annahme, daß jetzt Roosevelt und Churchill angesichts der unermesslichen Verluste, womit sie im weiteren Verlauf des Sturmlaufes gegen die deutsche Front zu rechnen haben, eine politische Offensive ins Auge fassen werden, um nach dem Beispiel Wilsons im Jahre 1918 sich den Sieg durch Hintertüren zu erschleichen. Sie wissen genau, daß Deutschland in naher Zukunft gewichtige Trümpfe auszuspielen hat und daß für sie alles daran hängt, zu einer vorzeitigen Beendigung eines Kampfes zu gelangen, dessen Gewinnung durch Waffengewalt immer fragwürdiger werden muß.
Das deutsche Volk sieht einem Wiederaufleben der Pläne von 1943 mit dem Bewusstsein feiner unbeugsamen Moral entgegen. Es erblickt in solchen Versuchen am untauglichen Objekt nur den Beweis dafür, daß der Gegner Umwege wählen muß, weil er am Ort der militärischen Entscheidung nicht mehr mit einem Erfolg rechnen kann. Nicht nur die Erinnerung an den Betrug und Wortbruch von 1918 stärkt es in seinem Willen, diesen Kampf für Freiheit und Leben bis zum Sieg durchzufechten, sondern vor allem das Wissen um die Vernichtungspläne des Feindes, die dem Krieg das Wesen eines Ringens um Sein oder Nichtsein geben und uns eine Verknechtung zudenken, die in der Geschichte nicht ihresgleichen hätte. Alle Versuche, uns von dieser Kernfrage abzulenken und uns den Blick für die Absichten zu trüben, die unsere Gegner hegen, werden völlig ins Leere stoßen und nur dazu beitragen, unsere Entschlossenheit zum Einsatz aller Kraft für die Verteidigung des deutschen Lebens zu steigern.
vb.
Führer HQ (September 13, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
An der Westfront dauern die harten Abwehrkämpfe an den bisherigen Brennpunkten an. Zäher Widerstand unserer Truppen vereitelte feindliche Durchbruchsversuche nördlich Hasselt und aus dem Raum von Verviers in Richtung auf Aachen. In den Kämpfen der letzten Tage nördlich Luxemburg wurden 142 feindliche Panzer und Panzerspähwagen abgeschossen, 40 Panzerabwehrkanonen erbeutet oder vernichtet.
Über die obere Mosel sind amerikanische Verbände im Vorgehen auf Lunéville. Auch um Neufchâteau sind schwere Kämpfe im Gange. Der Druck des Feindes auf unsere Sicherungen zwischen Vesoul und der Schweizer Grenze hält an.
Gegen die befestigten Häfen im Westen haben sich die feindlichen Angriffe verstärkt. Der Feind griff Calais und Dünkirchen bis zu siebenmal vergeblich an. In Le Havre sind nach schwerstem Beschuss und rollenden Luftangriffen feindliche Panzer eingedrungen. Die Besatzung leistete bis zum Letzten tapferen Widerstand. Auch im Hauptkampffeld von Brest wird gegen fortgesetzte feindliche Angriffe von Truppen aller Wehrmachtteile erbittert gekämpft. Eigene Gegenangriffe warfen vor Lorient den Feind an mehreren Stellen zurück und fügten ihm erhebliche Schäden zu.
Die örtlichen Kämpfe an den Alpenpässen der französisch-italienischen Grenze dauern an. Mehrere feindliche Vorstöße wurden abgewiesen.
In Italien sind im Feber unserer überlegenen kämpfenden Nachtruppen zahlreiche feindliche Angriffe nördlich des Arno blutig zusammengebrochen. An der adriatischen Küste errangen unsere Divisionen von neuem einen vollen Abwehrerfolg gegen den zwischen Pian di Castello und Riccione vergeblich angreifenden Gegner.
Deutsche und ungarische Truppen schlugen im südlichen Siebenbürgen starke feindliche Angriffe zurück und schossen dabei eine Anzahl von Panzern ab.
Bei Sanok und Krosno halten die heftigen Angriffe der Sowjets an.
Südöstlich Warschau entbrannten heftige Kämpfe, in deren Verlauf die Sowjets, von zahlreichen Schlachtfliegern und Panzern unterstützt, einen Einbruch erzielen konnten. Weiter nördlich brachen die feindlichen Angriffe unter Verlust von 19 Panzern zusammen. Nordöstlich Ostrolenka verhinderten unsere Truppen in schweren Kämpfen unter Aufgabe von Lomscha einen auf breiter Front angestrebten Durchbruch der Sowjets.
Aus dem Raum von Raseinen, Schagarren und Bauske wird lebhaftere örtliche Kampftätigkeit gemeldet.
In Mittelfinnland versuchen die Sowjets immer wieder in unsere Absetzbewegungen hineinzustoßen. Sie mußten blutig abgewiesen werden.
Auf dem Balkan sind die Gegenmaßnahmen gegen den an die Westgrenzen Rumäniens und Bulgariens vorgehenden Feind im Gange.
Bei Tagesangriffen anglo-amerikanischer Bomberverbände auf mehrere Orte im Reichsgebiet am 12. September entstanden vor allem in Münster und München größere Schäden in Wohngebieten. Am 11. September wurde auch die Stadt Fulda betroffen.
In der vergangenen Nacht richteten sich Terrorangriffe des Feindes gegen Frankfurt am Main, Mainz und Stuttgart. Außerdem wurden Bomben auf Wiesbaden und Berlin geworfen.
In Luftkämpfen und durch Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe und der Kriegsmarine wurden 139 feindliche Flugzeuge, darunter 107 viermotorige Bomber, vernichtet.
In der Abwehrschlacht am unteren Narew haben sich die bayerische 7. Infanteriedivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant von Rappard und die Sturmgeschützbrigade 904 unter Führung von Major Türcke durch vorbildlichen Kampfgeist hervorragend bewährt. Im Panzerabwehrkampf hat sich Hauptmann Adamowitsch besonders hervorgetan.
Leutnant Voges, Kompanieführer im Grenadierregiment 11, und Stabsfeldwebel Golla, Pionierzugführer im gleichen Grenadierregiment, zeichneten sich durch besondere Tapferkeit aus.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 13, 1944)
Communiqué No. 158
LE HAVRE is now in Allied hands.
On the BELGIAN Coast, mopping-up continues between FURNES and ZEEBRUGGE.
Further progress has been made beyond the ALBERT CANAL.
North of LIÈGE, we have taken FORT ÉBEN-ÉMAEL. Forces advancing east and southeast of LIÈGE, after meeting strong resistance from German infantry, anti-tank guns, and mines in the LIMBOURG area, captured EUPEN and MALMEDY. Units crossed the German frontier east of EUPEN.
In the ARDENNES, our troops which liberated BASTOGNE, have advanced to the vicinity of CLERVAUX in northern LUXEMBOURG.
In the MOSELLE Valley, we have enlarged our bridgeheads across the river against heavy enemy resistance.
Concrete emplacements in the Seigfried Line in the neighborhood of SCHEID, some 50 miles west of KOBLENZ, were attacked by medium and light bombers yesterday. Other formations struck at a railway yard at SANKT WENDEL, artillery positions and observation posts in the BEVELAND and Dutch mainland.
Enemy transportation was attacked by fighters and fighter-bombers operating from HOLLAND to the MOSELLE River and from STRASBOURG to KARLSRUHE. Close support to our ground forces was also given by attacks on gun positions. According to reports so far received, 30 enemy aircraft were shot down and nine were destroyed in the ground. Two of our aircraft are missing.
U.S. Navy Department (September 13, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 115
Carrier-based aircraft of the Pacific Fleet shot down more than fifty enemy aircraft and destroyed more than 150 on the ground in a day-long attack against Cebu, Negros, and Panay Islands in the Philippines on September 11 (West Longitude Date). Preliminary reports are fragmentary, but it is indicated that air operations are continuing against strong enemy opposition. Several cargo ships and numerous smaller craft were sunk in the initial attacks.
Paramushiru in the Kuril Islands was bombed and strafed by search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four on September 10. Waterfront installations along the southeast coast were the principal targets and several fires were started. Each of two medium cargo ships discovered near Paramushiru suffered a direct bomb hit and both were strafed. Strafing attacks were also delivered to a number of small craft offshore. On the same day, a Navy search plane bombed Shumushu Island, and another search plane shot down an enemy fighter east of Onekotan Island.
On September 11, 11th Army Air Force Mitchells bombed and strafed a number of vessels in the harbor at Shumushu, sinking one medium cargo vessel and four small cargo vessels. Two other small cargo vessels were damaged. Seven enemy fighters intercepted our planes and inflicted minor damage on one Mitchell but all returned safely. On the same day, Venturas of Fleet Air Wing Four bombed and strafed Paramushiru, Araido and Onekotan, setting fires to docks and warehouses.
Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force dropped 26 tons of bombs on airfields at Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands on September 10. Large fires were started. One of four intercepting enemy fighters was destroyed. Antiaircraft fire damaged two Liberators. On September 11, a lone Navy Catalina bombed an ammunition dump at Nauru Island, and Corsairs of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing hit the storage and magazine areas at Jaluit.
Pagan Island in the Marianas was attacked on September 11, by 7th Army Air Force Thunderbolts using bombs and rockets. Gun positions and buildings were hit.
U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Ambassador Winant’s telegram number 7511 sent midnight September 12 reports that the European Advisory Commission on that date approved and signed, for submission to the three governments, the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany (State Department’s note: with British and American zones left in blank) and the administration of greater Berlin.
CH
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
Subject: ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO BRITISH-ARGENTINE MEAT NEGOTIATIONS
I must again refer to the matter of the British meat contract about which I sent you my memorandum of September 12.
Our Embassy in Buenos Aires reports that the British Ministry of Food has informed the Argentine government that the British are disposed to sign a new contract for two years at the same prices as the current contract. The contract would be on the same basis as that recently concluded with New Zealand and Australia so that Britain would buy the entire exportable surplus for four years with prices subject to re-examination at the end of two years. The Embassy adds that this word from London came as a great relief to the Colonels.
I regret to say that it has become increasingly clear that the British continue to treat the Argentine Fascist threat as a matter of minor and relatively unimportant policy. To us it is a matter of major policy. If we fail in the implementation of that policy, the Nazis will have a powerful center to renew their fight in this Hemisphere economically, politically and eventually in a military way. This would mean inevitably the destruction of all that we have been trying to build since 1933.
In view of our enormous aid to the British on supply matters, it is certainly not asking too much to request that they forego the petty commercial advantages of a long-term bargain with a Fascist government. It is hard to believe that they will permit the Argentines to succeed in the “divide and conquer” tactics they are so obviously employing in the matter of the meat contract. As I have said time and again, the political implications of these meat negotiations are really tremendous. If they are concluded, as the Argentines hope they will be, their position will be greatly fortified and our own position correspondingly weakened throughout the Hemisphere.
CH
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/20
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 13, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-FIRST DAY
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
In addition to the matter which I took up in person with you today points of interest which were considered by the Joint Steering Committee at its 10:30 a.m. meeting today were as follows:
(a) Elimination of references to “technical” problems
This is a matter to which the American group attached very great importance and to which they have devoted several days of thorough discussion. At the 9:30 a.m. regular meeting of the American group this morning we agreed that we should accept a compromise provision making it one of the purposes of the organization “to achieve international cooperation in the solution of international, social and other humanitarian problem?”. At the Joint Steering Committee meeting I succeeded in obtaining the assent to this formula of Sir Alexander Cadogan and of Ambassador Gromyko, both of whom had previously rather strongly urged the inclusion of the word “technical.”
(b) Initial membership of the organization
Pursuant to a recommendation made by the American group this morning, I proposed that the provision relating to initial membership (Chapter III, paragraph 2) should read as follows: “The initial members of the organization should be signatories to the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942 and such other states as those nations may invite,” provided the four powers could now agree as to the other states to be so invited. The discussion was inconclusive and it is likely that the Soviet and British representatives do not yet thoroughly understand what we have in mind.
(c) Separate protocol as to Interim Arrangements
I also suggested that section D Interim Arrangements (p. 27) be omitted from the document and be made the subject of a separate protocol. Sir Alexander Cadogan agreed that this is a “transitory” provision and he therefore saw no objection to its being made into a separate document. However, he also apparently saw no objection to inclusion of this matter in the document itself. His assistant, Mr. Jebb, suggested that the reference in the document to this subject might say that it is intended to exclude such a provision from the charter itself in view of the provision’s transitory nature. Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought it would be appropriate to mention the subject in the document itself. We said that we would consider whether some reference to the subject might appropriately be included in the document and would give our answer subsequently.
(d) Provision designed to permit women to serve as members of the organization
The American group at its meeting this morning recommended that some provision be inserted in the document especially authorizing the organization to include women among its personnel. They approved the following provision designed to accomplish that purpose as well as other desirable purposes: “All positions under the organization should be open on the basis of pertinent qualifications without regard to race, nationality, creed, or sex.” I presented this provision at the meeting of the Joint Steering Committee and asked the British and Soviet groups to think about it and to give us their reactions later on. Their initial reaction seemed to be rather negative.
Afternoon Meeting of the American Group
At my request the American group met throughout the afternoon in an attempt to devise possible alternative formulae on the question of voting by the council in the event of disputes involving a permanent member. I explained that this is an important subject, that we had received no indication of any inclination on the part of the Soviet group to recede from the principle of unanimity of the great powers and that in view of the time element this is a matter to which the American group should proceed to give careful thought.