868.01/427
The President’s special assistant to the Secretary of State
Washington, December 20, 1943
Secret
Dear Cordell: Here is a memo which Eden handed me in confidence in Cairo, which apparently was prepared for Eden by some of his associates prior to his talk with the King of Greece.
Mr. Eden told me that he followed this line of argument with the King and I gather he made it pretty strong.
Cordially yours,
HARRY L. HOPKINS
[Attachment]
The British Embassy accredited to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Cairo, November 25, 1943Main talking points with the King of the Hellenes
Refer again to your previous conversation when you told the King that the strategical situation had changed and that it was most [un]likely that any but quite inconsiderable British forces would be sent to Greece when the Germans evacuate.
Point out that at the time when we thought a considerable British army would go to Greece to drive the Germans out, we strongly supported your desire to enter Greece with the British and Greek forces. Under the changed conditions such British forces as might go to Greece would be mainly concerned in ensuring law and order and in assisting in the distribution of relief supplies.
It would be essential for the Greek Government to function at the earliest possible date in close association with the British and in an atmosphere as far removed as possible from political controversy. This Government would have to be mainly composed of leading personalities who have lived in Greece during the period of the occupation.
During the whole period of the German occupation acute controversy has continued and grown increasingly strong on the subject of the King’s return before the will of the people has been expressed. The immediate return of the King in the teeth of this opposition would inevitably raise this controversy to fever point, and it would be impossible for the King himself to remain outside political dissension. He would find himself confronted with a situation even more acute than that which led to the Metaxas Dictatorship, and would therefore start under every disadvantage, which would make it impossible for him to return in the role which he and we desire for him – that of a constitutional monarch.
The immediate confusion that will result from the difficult social and economic conditions caused by the occupation will make it essential for the Government [to] be in the hands of a leading personality, who has made his mark through his bold resistance to the Germans within the country. He will have to form an emergency Committee prepared to act firmly and to put down disorder. The first administration to be formed will be of a temporary character to tide over the period until normal conditions can be established and elections held. It would be an undesirable situation for the King, when he first returned to Greece, to be associated directly with an administration bound to become unpopular and unable to accord all those freedoms associated with a constitutional monarchy.
In these circumstances, the King should consider the choice of the most suitable personality to head a Regency Committee in Athens the moment the Germans evacuate. Archbishop Damaskinos is prepared to undertake this responsibility, but must know in advance that he can announce to the Greek people, as soon as the Germans quit Athens, that he has the legal authority of the King for so doing.
There is therefore every advantage for the King, in his own interests as well as those of his country, to make it clear now to his people that he does not intend to return to Greece until such conditions have been established as will allow him to function as a constitutional monarch. He has no desire to return to Greece unless he can so function, but he also has no desire to return unless he is convinced by a clear expression of the people’s will that the system of constitutional monarchy is desired by them.
An immediate declaration to this effect would rally moderate opinion against any attempt made by a small section, who seek to impose their will by force as soon as the Germans leave Athens. This section have made capital out of the failure of the King so far to make such a declaration.
There is reason to believe that if Zervas knew that such a declaration would be made by the King, he would immediately ask that his irregular forces should be incorporated in the Greek regular Army. If this were immediately granted by the King it would act as a magnet to draw large numbers of the officers and men in the ELAS forces to break away from purely sectional political control and make a similar request for incorporation on the same terms as those accorded to Zervas. This would bring the Greek Government in Cairo into close association with the resistance movements inside Greece, and would thereby enormously enhance the authority and prestige of the King and his Government, which would then be reformed to include personalities from Greece and would consequently provide a Government of which Archbishop Damaskinos could avail himself when he set up his Regency Committee in Athens.
British Embassy to Greece, Cairo
25 November, 1943