Yank reports: ‘We killed all Japs in sight’
Officer wounded on Makin tells of battle
By Ray Coll Jr., Honolulu Advertiser correspondent
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How long will enemy last?
French Indochina lacks enthusiasm for Jap masters
Far East colony to welcome liberation by Allies; native population has passive dislike for invaders
By A. T. Steele
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‘Like a Homing Bird–’
Pilot was only 22 but he knew how to fly a Fortress
By Ira Wolfert, North American Newspaper Alliance
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Maj. de Seversky: Airpower can destroy airpower and also hit other enemy targets
By Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky
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Patton ‘unfit’ for field duty, officer states
Retired National Guard general urges ‘examination’ of commander
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Cunningham: When it is ‘Patton’s order,’ it’s the law in the Army
Strictest discipline is described by war reporter
By C. R. Cunningham, United Press staff writer
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The colonel takes order and aide’s slap on back
Non-commissioned officer calls him ‘Pop,’ wonders if he isn’t ‘a little off’
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Record retail store sales for 1943 seen
Department of Commerce predicts new high in Christmas trade
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Report by Gen. Eisenhower on the Patton incident
November 26, 1943
During the Sicilian campaign, Gen. Patton was the mainspring of the effort during the sustained drive of the Seventh Army from Gela all the way to Messina. He absolutely refused to accept procrastination or any excuse for delay, with a resulting rapid advance of that army which had much to do with the early collapse of resistance in Sicily. He drove himself as hard as he did the members of his army throughout the campaign and consequently became almost ruthless in his demands upon individual men.
While visiting wounded in hospitals in two instances, he encountered unwounded patients who had been evacuated for what is commonly known as “battle anxiety,” specifically nerve difficulty. Also, one man had a temperature. He momentarily lost his temper in these two instances and in an unseemly and indefensible manner upbraided the individuals, and in one of the cases cuffed the individual so that the man’s helmet rolled off his head. These incidents were first reported officially to me by a medical officer, this report being followed by reports from three reputable newspapermen.
Prior to receiving the report from the pressmen, I took the following action:
First, to Gen. Patton I wrote a letter advising him of the allegation, expressing my extreme displeasure, and informing him that any repetition would result in his instant relief. Further, I told him that he would necessarily make, on his own initiative, to the individuals involved, amends, and, if necessary, take the necessary steps to make proper amends before his whole army. I also told him that I would reserve decision affecting his relief from command of the army until I could determine the effect of his own corrective action.
Second, the problem before me was whether the incidents as reported were sufficiently damaging to Patton and to his standing in his army to compel me to relieve him, thus losing to the United Nations his unquestioned value as commander of an assault force, or whether less drastic measures would be appropriate.
I sent Gen. Lucas to make a complete investigation of the affair. I also sent another general officer to Sicily and made a short visit there myself for the purpose of determining whether or not any resentment existed in the Seventh Army against Gen. Patton.
The following action was taken by Patton:
He personally sought out the individuals involved and the persons who were present at the time the incidents took place. To these he made full apologies which it was reported to me were accepted. In addition, he visited each and every division in the Seventh Army and called together all officers, to whom he registered his regret that he should have been guilty of any conduct which could be considered unfair or un-American. The officers of these divisions in turn relayed this message to the enlisted men.
The measures taken by Patton were discussed by me with the three newspapermen who have reported the incident, and apparently, they were convinced that the measures taken were adequate in the circumstances.
On top of all this, I sent the theater Inspector General to make a thorough inspection of the Seventh Army with the particular mission of determining whether or not there existed in that force any general resentment against Patton. The Inspector General reported to me that, while there was more or less general knowledge that incidents of the character described had taken place, the men themselves felt that Gen. Patton had done a splendid overall job and no great harm had been done.
In this connection, it must be remembered that, while the conduct of Patton in these specific cases was indefensible and resented by every officer who knew of it, Patton has in thousands of cases personally supported, encouraged and sustained individuals. The net result was that throughout the Sicilian campaign, the Seventh Army had a high morale.
I personally supervised this investigation throughout and took those steps that seemed applicable in the circumstances because I believe that Gen. Patton has a great field of usefulness in any assault where loyalty, drive and gallantry on the part of the Army commander will be essential.
Gen. Smith had a press conference yesterday with all of the representatives of the press and explained the essentials of the entire story as given above. This was done because of reports of the publication in the United States of exaggerated versions of the story. In this connection, I commend the great body of American newspapermen in this theater, because all of them knew something of the facts involved and some of them knew all, including the corrective action taken and the circumstances that tended to ameliorate the obvious injustice of Patton’s acts. These men chose to regard the matter as one in which the High Command acted for the best interests of the war effort and let the matter rest there. To them I am grateful.
Summing the matter up: It is true that Gen. Patton was guilty of reprehensible conduct with respect to two enlisted men. They were both suffering from a nervous disorder and one man in the case had a temperature. Following an exhaustive investigation, including a personal visit to Sicily, I decided that the corrective action as described above was suitable in the circumstances and adequate. I still believe that this decision was sound. Finally, it has been reported many times to me that in every recent public appearance of Patton before any crowd composed of his own soldiers, he is greeted by thunderous applause.
Völkischer Beobachter (November 27, 1943)
Politische Ränkespiele zwischen London und Washington
Wie Oberbefehlshaber gemacht werden
Von unserer Stockholmer Schriftleitung
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U.S. State Department (November 27, 1943)
The Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of War
Cairo, 27 November 1943
Secret
Priority
10064
To Stimson attention Hilldring and Dunn from McCloy
Had talk yesterday with Eden. Quite evident he feels European Advisory Commission in London important achievement and does not wish to derogate in any way from the authority which he feels was given it by the terms of reference and documents which were referred to it at Moscow. He wants to dignify it and have us send a small but good staff to London immediately to assist Winant whom the President has advised Prime Minister he intends to appoint to Commission. However, Eden has agreed and I believe favors submission by Advisory Commission of their tentative recommendations to Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendation by commission to Governments. Also has tentatively agreed to remove further pressure for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee to London and if we are prepared to take step one above will agree to permit British representatives CCAC to take full part in all discussions relating to U.K.-based operations, perhaps sending to Washington a man with substantial authority to augment or replace existing British representation. Under this arrangement very important we should send good military man to act on Winant’s staff, and that State Department should nominate their men. Eden pleaded that this staff be sent to London immediately. British want a military man who is familiar with CCAC procedures in London to help Winant… Will have to await return of party from the East and further confirmation by British of their agreement as above-outlined. Above entirely satisfactory to me and best arrangement I think we can make under the circumstances but would like to have your views. For information Dunn, Eden seemed much interested in Combined U.K.-U.S. Commission to deal with French political situation suggested in your number 1074. Question was raised by British as to where such a Commission could be located most effectively, whether in London, Washington or Algiers. Eden agrees with Hull on political desirability of avoiding separate spheres of responsibility but both military groups here feel this is impractical. Eden also expressed prompt approval of Hull’s opinion as to declaration by Governments of occupying forces as expressed in 1074.
The Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of War
Cairo, 27 November 1943
Secret
Priority
10065
To Stimson from McCloy
Have had talks with Joint Chiefs and British on civil affairs matters and discussions with others including President, Winant and Eden. Feel that if British confirm agreement outlined in my 10064 we have accomplished all that we have set out to do on civil affairs matter. Though I have only been on fringe of strategical discussions, it is clear that all decisions of important matters are held up pending results Eastern conference to which I did not go though I was requested to stay on here pending their return.
The Director of War Mobilization to the President
Washington, November 27, 1943
For the President from Justice Byrnes
Francis Gibbs advises me that if immediately authorized, forty to fifty additional ships nearly identical with LCIL but having speed of twelve knots probably can be delivered within specified time by converting army cargo vessels under contract in Gulf intended for duty in MacArthur theatre. Could probably start deliveries within sixty days. If these ships are held not suitable for all functions of LCIL they can at least be substituted for non-combat duty of LCIL and LST releasing the latter. If you approve, please wire me authority to proceed.
The Supervising Agent, U.S. Secret Service to the White House
Tehran, 27 November 1943
Mike Reilly to Chief Wilson and Agent Lowery
The President arrived Tehran today. He is well and we feel confident we have done everything possible to insure his protection. Stalin and Churchill are here also and we are working in close cooperation with their security officers. We are at the American Embassy [Legation]. Plans for the return are most indefinite, however we will return to Cairo when this conference is over. I am making every effort to have the party return via Khartoum, Kano and then Dakar where we would meet Capt. McCrea. We will probably arrive in the United States about December 12.
Brown-Maximov meeting, about 3:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| Admiral Brown | Mr. Maximov | |
| Mr. Dreyfus |
Brown was sent to the Soviet Embassy to explain to Maximov why the President had decided to live at the American Legation and why he could not accept the Russian invitation.
Roosevelt had indicated a willingness to stay at the Soviet Embassy if invited to do so by Stalin, and Dreyfus had communicated this fact to Maximov, but no indication of Stalin’s reaction had been received. Brown went to the Soviet Embassy, accompanied by Dreyfus, to see about a reply. Maximov told Brown and Dreyfus that he himself had not yet received a reply from Stalin, but that inasmuch as Stalin had already arrived at Tehran, the matter would be taken up with him there.
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, November 27, 1943
Secret
For the President from Secretary Hull
As you know, the British have named Strang and the Russians Gusev as their principal representatives on the tripartite European Advisory Commission agreed upon at the Moscow Conference. While we of course have no intention of playing up the importance of this body, it would seem advisable to have a representative fully capable of taking care of our interests and feel that it will be a full-time job. I therefore venture to suggest the following names of possible American representative for your consideration: Joseph Grew, Jefferson Caffery, and Herschel Johnson. I have some doubts, however, whether Caffery can be spared from Rio at this time. May I have your instructions?
CH
Roosevelt-Maximov meeting, 4:30 p.m.
The visit of the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires lasted at most 20 minutes and was presumably in the nature of a courtesy call.