Ferguson: Paradox
By Mrs. Walter Ferguson
…
Völkischer Beobachter (December 1, 1943)
Die kostspieligen Gilbeitinseln –
Schwerer Feindkreuzer versenkt
dnb. Tokio, 30. November –
Im Gebiet der Gilbertinseln konnte die japanische Marineluftwaffe einen neuen Erfolg erringen.
Wie das Kaiserliche Hauptquartier am Dienstag bekanntgab, griffen Einheiten der Marineluftwaffe am Sonntagabend einen in der Bucht der Makininsel vor Anker liegenden feindlichen Konvoi an. Ein großer Kreuzer wurde getroffen und sank sofort. Ein zweiter Kreuzer und ein Transporter erhielten ebenfalls schwerste Treffer und gerieten in Brand. Bei diesem Angriff erlitten die japanischen Flieger keine Verluste.
Kämpfe auf Tarawa
Auf der Insel Tarawa (Gilbertgruppe) sind weiterhin heftige Kämpfe im Gange, wie der Sprecher der japanischen Regierung vor der Auslandspresse betonte. Nach Feindmeldungen soll die Insel Makin von den Amerikanern besetzt sein, doch liegt eine Bestätigung noch nicht vor. In dem Gebiet der Insel Bougainville sind die Kämpfe noch lange nicht abgeschlossen. Der Sprecher vertrat die Auffassung, daß die feindlichen Verluste in den dortigen Gewässern so groß seien, daß zweifellos auch Rückwirkungen auf die geplante Offensive des Gegners gegen Burma zu erwarten seien.
Man dürfe annehmen, daß beide Operationen im Zusammenhang stehen. Die Gegenseite habe jedoch kaum mit den erlittenen schweren Niederlagen im Gebiet von Bougainville gerechnet. Außerdem fehle ihr anscheinend das Vertrauen in den Erfolg der Burmaoffensive.
Der Tenno in der Militärakademie
Der Tenno besuchte Dienstag die Militärakademie in Tokio, wobei er Abgangsprüfungen der jungen Generalstabsoffiziere beiwohnte. Sechs jungen Offizieren verlieh er für besondere Leistungen ein Schwert.
Im Gebäude des Generalstabs erstattete ihm Generalstabschef Feldmarschall Sugiyama einen ausführlichen Lagebericht.
Tojo bei den Marinefliegern
Eine Besichtigung der Marineflieger schule in Kasumigaura und Tsuchiura nahm Japans Premierminister am Montag zum Anlaß, um in einer Rede vor den jungen Piloten den japanischen Marinefliegern für ihre stolzen Erfolge im Gebiet von Bougainville und den Gilbertinseln seinen Dank auszusprechen.
Diese Helden, so erklärte Tojo, sollten den jungen Offizieren dieser Lehranstalten stets Vorbild sein. Wenn jetzt die Amerikaner und Engländer zu Gegenoffensiven schritten, so sei dem Offiziersnachwuchs Gelegenheit gegeben, den Feind bei diesen Versuchen vernichtend zu schlagen.
Aus der Konferenz der Atlantic City –
Die UNRRA als Instrument der Hungerblockade
Von unserer Stockholmer Schrittleitung
…
U.S. State Department (December 1, 1943)
The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iran
Tehran, Azar 9, 1322 (December 1, 1943)
Aide-Mémoire
On this occasion when with the help of God Almighty this happiness and honor have come to this ancient land of Iran, our dear homeland, which is the place of conference of the august leaders of the three big allies of Iran, when one of the important events of history in this era happens in Iran for the solution of international difficulties and the establishment of permanent peace and tranquility and insurance of the future life of all of the nations of the world on the foundation of justice and equality which are the ideals of the United Nations, and on which the Atlantic Charter is based, it is a most suitable opportunity to bring to your knowledge the longings of the Iranian people.
The present condition of Iran, which has come to exist as a result of the efforts, pains and sacrifices of all the classes of this country for several years and which has been fully utilized by the allies for the promotion of the designs and speeding up of victory, necessitates that the Iranian Government and people should be certain that the allies will not refrain from lending Iran any kind of assistance at the present and in the future.
In view of the hearty desires and prominent and effective steps that Iran has taken in helping the allies Iran has shown in practice her desire that the war should come to an end as soon as possible with the victory of the allies.
Iran which by showing cordial and sincere cooperation in conformity with the tripartite pact and by full collaboration with the allies shares in this victory and triumph, is positively certain that the allies would take into full consideration all the troubles and damages which have been inflicted on Iran through conditions of war.
In view of the tests of cordial cooperation and sincere collaboration shown during this period by the Iranian people and Government in all fields and stages, and in view of her efforts to insure allied victory and to eradicate cruelty and oppression from the world to an extent which has been above Iran’s ability and power, supporting as she did innumerable economic difficulties, and consequently by declaring war against Germany having won the full confidence of the allies, Iran expects that the allies would make a special effort in turning over the vital threads of the affairs of the country which are at present in their hands and in leaving to the military and security forces of Iran herself the maintenance of security in the country and safeguarding all the means of this work in order that existing trust and confidence may assume a practical shape.
The Iranian Government and people confidently hope that the written promises and oral assurances given by the Allies in regard to the integrity and full independence of Iran will be strengthened through moral and material help in all political and economic realms and that Iran may be able in this way to continue to play in the future the honorable role which she had in the past among the civilized countries of the world.
The Iranian Government and people, in consideration of this demonstration of sincerity and unity, give the assurance that in the same way that in the most difficult times of war they did not refrain from lending cordial cooperation and showing sincere friendship for a speedy Allied Victory, hereafter, too, they will continue this traditional policy in respective international questions and will fully cooperate with their Allies.
Now that the august leaders of the three big powers are staying in Iran, the Iranian Government and people expect that a communiqué will be issued substantiating the foregoing and, in this way, specifying once more the good will that they have repeatedly shown toward Iran orally and in writing.
The Administrator General of Finances of Iran to President Roosevelt
Tehran, December 1, 1943
My Dear Mr. President: In our conversation today, you were good enough to give me permission to write you a personal note about the American effort in Iran.
Iran has on three occasions obtained American administrative assistance:
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The Shuster Financial Mission in 1911, dismissed the same year following a Russian ultimatum.
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The first Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1922-27, with other missions for agriculture, highways and railway construction.
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The second Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1943 – with other missions in the Ministries of War, Interior (Gendarmerie and Police), Agriculture, and Health.
Each of these Missions came at or following a time of political, economic and financial disturbance and danger. Each had, from the Iranian point of view, two main purposes:
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A political purpose – to hold the balance between British and Russian imperialisms and thus safeguard the independence of the country.
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A financial and economic purpose – to help Iran to put its own house in order, to conserve its financial and economic resources, and in this way to prevent Britain and Russia from having an excuse to take over the country.
In general, the Americans in Iran are employees of the Iranian Government, with a period of service that will terminate in about four years. But we feel that we are here and that we can and do appropriately act, not only as administrative employees of the Iranian Government, but also as the practical instruments for implementing your international policies.
Iranians welcome American assistance because they know that Americans are neutral, non-imperialistic, honest, and sincere. But I am convinced that, if Americans are to work effectively over a period of years in this country and really implement your policies, the independence of the country must be safeguarded by an understanding among the three powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.
Because of fifteen years of dictatorship, because of the War, and because of the Allied occupation, Iran and the Iranians are at present in a condition of inconceivable disorganization, demoralization and corruption. If American assistance is withdrawn at the end of four years, our effort will be largely wasted. To do a permanent job, fifteen or twenty years will be required.
As I see it, therefore, the suggested understanding should provide:
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For exclusively American administrative and technical assistance to Iran over a period of fifteen or twenty years;
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For the divorcement of this American effort from American commercial interests;
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For the harmonizing of this effort with the political independence of Iran, with Iranian self-government through constitutional democratic forms and procedures, and with some form of protection against the reestablishment of dictatorship; and,
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For assurances to be given Great Britain and the Soviet Union that Americans in Iran are to be neutral as between these two powers and friendly to both.
The Iranians look to you, Mr. President, to guarantee them freedom from fear. With American administrators to help the Iranians to help themselves, the Iranians can, should and will do the rest. Iran seems to me to be a clinic – a testing ground – for the practical execution of your international policies. Finally, the doing of the job here need not cost the American taxpayers a cent, and need not require any armed intervention.
Permit me to thank you, Mr. President, for seeing me in the midst of your immense responsibilities and let me convey to you on behalf of my Mission our best wishes for your health and continued high accomplishment.
Respectfully yours,
A. C. MILLSPAUGH
President Roosevelt to the Shah of Iran
Tehran, December 1, 1943
Your Majesty, I was very much pleased to see you yesterday when you welcomed me to your country in the name of the Iranian people. Your gesture is one that emphasizes again the more than friendly feeling that has always existed between our two nations. I was delighted to have had this chance to make Your Majesty’s acquaintance.
I have received the magnificent carpet, the gracious gift of Your Majesty. This carpet will serve to remind both myself and the American people of the generous hospitality of the Iranian nation. I am truly grateful.
Your Majesty’s invitation to be a guest at your palace as well as your offer to meet me at the airport upon my arrival and to provide a guard of honor have been conveyed to me and I am most appreciative. Much to my regret, the circumstances of my visit, as you are no doubt aware, have made it impossible for me to avail myself of these kind offers, much as I would have liked to have done so.
I cannot emphasize too strongly how much I have been touched by all of these truly friendly gestures on the part of Your Majesty. I shall leave Iran with regret at not having had an opportunity to extend my acquaintance with you and to have seen more of your country and your people. The American people have for many years been cognizant of the friendly sentiments of the Iranian people, and the hospitality shown by Your Majesty in their name will serve to keep this realization alive for many years to come.
Iran has always occupied a warm spot in American hearts, more than ever now that we are brothers in arms. We know the part Iran is playing in the common struggle and our hope is that when peace at last comes, the spirit of working together that now exists between our two peoples will continue unchecked in peaceful labors.
I take this opportunity to thank Your Majesty again for all the gestures of friendliness and hospitality you have shown me and to wish Your Majesty the greatest happiness both for yourself and for the people of your ancient land.
With my sincere regards, I am,
Faithfully yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
I greatly hope that we shall have the pleasure of a visit from you to Washington.
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Tehran, 1 December 1943
My Dear Franklin, I was indeed touched by your kind present. It is a beautiful bowl, and I shall always treasure it as a reminder of our sunlit days in Tehran and of the most memorable of my Birthdays.
I cannot thank you enough for all your friendship and support in the years in which we have worked together, and I am glad of this occasion to send you a message of sincere affection and gratitude.
Yours always,
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
Tripartite luncheon meeting, 1 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Marshal Stalin |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Pavlov |
| Mr. Harriman | Major Birse | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
Bohlen Minutes
December 1, 1943, 1 p.m.
Secret
During the first part of luncheon the text of a telegram to be dispatched to the British and American Ambassadors in Ankara to deliver orally an invitation to the President of Turkey to meet the President and Mr. Churchill in Cairo on December 3rd, 4th or 5th, was discussed and was agreed to.
Mr. Hopkins then stated that before any meetings with the Turkish President, it was essential that we were agreed as to exactly what form of military assistance could be rendered to Turkey in the event she agreed to enter the war.
The President agreed with Mr. Hopkins, and said that the American Staff had not yet worked out anything in detail on that question.
The Prime Minister said that he only intended to offer the Turks 20 squadrons, mostly of fighter aircraft, and some 3 anti-aircraft regiments, but he had no intention of offering any land forces at this time.
The President remarked that the big problem confronting his Staff was the number of available landing craft in the Mediterranean and how much would be needed for the Italian operations, those in Southern France and in England, as well as for the operations in the Indian Ocean.
Marshal Stalin then said that as he understood it, if Turkey entered the war there would only be made available the air force and anti-aircraft force mentioned by the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister agreed and spoke of the great assistance to the Allied cause that would result from obtaining Turkish air bases, with the possibility of continual bombing of the Ploesti oil fields. He added that he wanted landing craft only for the assault on the Island of Rhodes, which would be a temporary operation in the month of March.
The President stated that he desired to have military advice on the subject, as he did not know whether it would be possible to sandwich in, between the Italian and OVERLORD operations, for any operation in the Aegean, the landing craft which the Prime Minister desired.
The Prime Minister repeated that he had made no promises to Turkey, and would make none beyond the aircraft and anti-aircraft of which he had spoken.
He said if the Turkish President, which is possible, would be unable to come to Cairo, that he proposed himself to go to Ankara subsequently and present to him the ugly case which would result from the failure of Turkey to accept the invitation to join the war, and the unappetizing picture of what help could be afforded her if she did.
Mr. Hopkins again pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had not given consideration to the detailed requirements of the Turkish operation. The whole of the Mediterranean was soon to come under the Combined Chiefs of Staff – hence the resources must be examined in the light of that fact.
It should be clearly understood that the American side believe that there are no landing craft available for an attack on Rhodes – and more important still that even if the landing craft were available, no decision has been reached as to whether or not the landing craft could not be used to better advantage in some other operation.
Under any circumstances it should be clearly understood that no mention can be made to President Inonu, implied or otherwise, that an amphibious landing can be made on Rhodes.
The Prime Minister said he thought we could have the precise information desired by Mr. Hopkins within three days, and in any event before any meeting with the Turkish President. He went on to say that landing craft was the bottleneck, and it might be possible to divert some from the Pacific theater, but that one thing was certain after yesterday’s decision, and that was that OVERLORD not suffer.
The President said, with reference to the Southwest Pacific, that it was absolutely impossible to withdraw any landing craft from that area. The distance alone from the Mediterranean would make it impossible, and besides all landing craft out there were urgently needed for the operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and for the Burma campaign.
Mr. Eden then explained that in his conversations in November with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo he had only asked for bases from Turkey, and had made no mention of any assistance other than the air forces mentioned by the Prime Minister, and no reference whatsoever to any other forces. He said that he had expressed the view that Turkey could make available these bases to the Allies without being attacked by Germany, but the Foreign Minister had not agreed with this opinion.
The Foreign Minister then repeated what he said about the advantages of acquiring bases in Turkey; that it would permit healthy battles with the German Air Force in that region, and in all probability starve out the German garrisons on the Aegean Islands. It might not even be necessary to take Rhodes by assault.
Marshal Stalin expressed agreement with this view, and felt that the German garrisons would be so demoralized following the loss of air superiority that they would be easy prey. He added, however, that he thought some bombers would be necessary for any such operations.
The President then said he was in favor of meeting the Turkish Prime Minister, but he intended to make no offer of any amphibious operations to Turkey whatsoever, and that any commitments should be confined to the air forces referred to by the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister then summed up the advantages to Turkey which would accrue if she accepted the invitation to join the war, and mentioned particularly the possibility of sitting alongside the Soviet Union at the peace table.
In reply to Mr. Eden’s question as to the exact attitude of the Soviet Union towards Bulgaria, which Marshal Stalin had referred to at the formal conference, Marshal Stalin replied that if Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria, or if Bulgaria attacks or goes to war with Turkey, the Soviet Union will break relations or declare war on Bulgaria.
He also inquired what other assistance would be required of the Soviet Union in such an event.
The Prime Minister replied that they were seeking nothing more of the Soviet Union, but that it was obvious that if the Soviet Armies approached Bulgaria, the pro-German Bulgarian circles would be in great fear.
Marshal Stalin inquired what particularly the Turkish Army lacked in the way of armaments.
The Prime Minister replied that the present Turkish Army would have been a good army at the end of the last war, but that when they had seen the modern Bulgarian equipment received from French arsenals, the Turks realized that their army was not a modern one.
He pointed out that they had brave infantry, but lacked anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft, and airplanes. He mentioned that 25 million pounds worth of military equipment, mostly American, had been sent to Turkey.
Marshal Stalin then said it was possible that Turkey would not have to go to war if she granted bases to the Allies; that she need not attack; and that it was possible that neither the Bulgarians nor the Germans would do so.
The President then mentioned the case of Portugal as an example of the granting of bases without the involvement in war.
With reference to Mr. Eden’s remarks that the Turkish Foreign Minister had preferred to go right into war rather than to be dragged in by bases, The Prime Minister said that was Turkey’s usual behaviour. If you suggested a small move they said they preferred the big. And if you suggested the big, they said they were not ready. Mr. Churchill said that he personally preferred that we offer something substantial to the Turks, and that if they refused, then they would wash their hands of Turkey, both now and at the peace table.
In reply to Mr. Eden’s question, Marshal Stalin stated that it was expected that Turkey would declare war only on Germany, and not on Bulgaria. If Bulgaria attacks or declares war on Turkey, the Soviet Union goes to war with Bulgaria.
Marshal Stalin mentioned that there was one other possibility, and that was that if Turkey declared war on Germany, and Bulgaria refused to accede to German demands to go to war, the Germans might occupy Bulgaria. In which case Bulgaria might ask help from the Allies, and what then would be our position?
The Prime Minister replied that in such an event great strain would be put on Germany’s strength, and undoubtedly result in the removal of some German divisions from the Eastern front.
Mr. Molotov said that he had talked the day before yesterday with the Prime Minister, who had referred to the idea that if Turkey would refuse an invitation to enter the war, Great Britain would tell her that her interests in the Straits and in the Bosporus would be adversely affected. He wished to know what this meant.
The Prime Minister replied that he was far from his cabinet, but he personally favored a change in the regime of the Straits if Turkey proved obdurate.
Mr. Molotov said that he had merely meant to indicate that the Black Sea countries were very much interested in the regime of the Straits.
The President said he would like to see the Dardanelles made free to the commerce of the world and the fleets of the world, irrespective of whether Turkey entered the war or not.
After agreeing [after agreement had been reached?] that the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey would come to Cairo and Mr. Bushinsky [Vyshinsky] would come to Cairo from Algiers for the meeting with the Turkish President, if it occurred that the Turkish president was present, the President then said he would like to take up the question of Finland. He said that he wished to help in every way to get Finland out of the war, and he would like to have the views of Marshal Stalin.
Marshal Stalin replied that recently the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Boheman, had inquired of the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm as to what were the Soviet Union’s intentions regarding Finland, saying that the Finns were afraid that the Russians intended to make good the Russian promise and destroy the independence of Finland, and added that the Finns would like an opportunity to talk to the Russians.
The reply from Moscow was to the effect that Russia had no designs on the independence of Finland, if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so. Also that the Soviet Government had no objection to the Finns coming to Moscow for conversations, but would like to have the conditions in [on?] which the Finns would negotiate, in advance.
He added that only today they had had word of a Finnish reply through the Swedish [Swedes], but did not yet have the full text. The gist of the reply was, however, to the effect that the Finns desired to take as a basis the 1939 frontier, and made no mention of disassociation from Germany. Stalin said in his opinion that this inacceptable reply indicated that the Finns were not anxious to conduct serious negotiations, since they knew that such conditions would be inacceptable.
The President said that the Marshal’s statement had been most interesting, but also unsatisfactory.
Marshal Stalin replied that the Finnish ruling groups obviously had hopes still of a German victory.
The President inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought it would be any help if the United States suggested that the Finns send a delegation to Moscow.
Marshal Stalin said he personally had no objections.
The Prime Minister outlined the change in his own and British feeling that had occurred toward Finland from 1939 to the present as a result of the Finnish associations and the German attack on Russia. He said that Great Britain was at war with Finland, and the first consideration was that the city of Leningrad would be secure, and also that the position of the Soviet Union as the leading naval and air power in the Baltic Sea should likewise be secure.
He said, on the other hand, he would greatly regret to see anything done to impair the independence of Finland, and would therefore welcome the Marshal’s statement on that point. He went on to say that an indemnity would not be much good from a country as poor as Finland.
Marshal Stalin expressed disagreement, and said that payments in kind over a period of from 5 to 8 years, such as timber, paper and other materials, would cover some of the damage done by Finland during the war, and that the Soviet Government intended to demand such reparation.
Mr. Churchill developed at some length the reasons why he did not consider reparations, in regard to such a country as Finland, either desirable or feasible. And he said in his ears there was an echo of the slogan “No Annexations and No Indemnities.”
Marshal Stalin laughed, and replied that he had already told Mr. Churchill that he was becoming a Conservative.
The Prime Minister stated that he attached a great importance to Finland’s being out of the war and Sweden’s being in, at the moment of the great attack in May.
To which Stalin expressed assent.
The President then inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought that the Finns could expel the Germans from their country by their own efforts.
Marshal Stalin replied that there were 21 Finnish divisions on the Soviet front, and that while they were expressing their desire to negotiate, they had recently increased their divisions to this number from 16.
Marshal Stalin agreed on the desirability of getting the Finns out of the war, but not at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that for 27 months the Finns and the Germans had had Leningrad under artillery fire.
The President said that according to his information the Finns were willing to remove the frontier a long distance from Leningrad, but hoped to have Vivorg [Viborg] (Marshal Stalin interrupted to say that this was impossible). The President went on to say that Hango should be demilitarized and made into a bathing beach.
The Prime Minister said he did not wish to press his Russian friends, but he would like to know what their conditions were; that the British Government was leaving the initiative entirely in the hands of the Russians.
Marshal Stalin replied that in February the Soviet Government had told the United States Government what the conditions were, and the British Government had been likewise informed, and that since the United States Government did not transmit these terms to the Finns it was obvious that it was not believed that the Finns would accept them.
The President agreed that at that time it was felt that the Finns would not go along with any proposals.
Marshal Stalin said that the Treaty of 1940 was broken and must be restored, but if Hango were belonging to the Finns he was willing to accept Petsamo instead, which would give them a common boundary with Norway. He added that Petsamo had been in the first instance a gift from Russia to Finland.
The Prime Minister said that the British Government desired first of all to see the Soviet Government satisfied with the border in the west, and secondly would like to see Finland remain independent.
Marshal Stalin thought that it was all right to let the Finns live as they wished, but they must pay half of the damages they had caused.
The President asked if it would be helpful if the Finns would go to Moscow without any reservations or conditions.
Marshal Stalin replied that if there was no prospect of success, such a move might play right into the hands of the Germans, since the reactionary group in Finland would exploit such a failure and pretend that it was impossible to talk with the Russians. He added, however, that if the President insisted, let the Finns come to Moscow, but who could they send?
Mr. Churchill interjected that the British Government was not insistent on anything regarding the Finns.
Marshal Stalin said that allies could occasionally use pressure on one another, and repeated that if the President thought it was worthwhile, an attempt might be made.
The President said that in his opinion the present Finnish Government was pro-German, and that nothing could be done with them, but that it might be possible to send other Finns.
Marshal Stalin replied that of course that would be better, that they had no objection to anyone the Finns wanted to send, even Ruti [Ryti], or even, he added, the devil himself. Stalin then outlined the Soviet terms, as follows:
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The restoration of the Treaty of 1940, with the possible exchange of Petsamo for Hango. However, whereas Hango had been leased, Petsamo would be taken as a permanent possession.
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Compensation for 50% of the damage done to the Soviet Union by the Finns, the exact amount to be discussed.
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Break with Germany, and the expulsion of Germans from Finland.
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Reorganization of the army.
The Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin entered into a friendly discussion as to the advisability of reparations from Finland, and Marshal Stalin made clear his determination that Finland should pay.
The meeting adjourned until 6 o’clock.
[Annex]
December 1, 1943
At the beginning of luncheon today after the President had mentioned to Marshal Stalin that his son, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt was in charge of 250 observation and scouting planes, Ambassador Harriman told the Marshal that Colonel Roosevelt was very anxious to obtain permission to land in the Soviet Union, thus flying straight through from Italy, photographing the Danube Basin, and landing in Russia.
Marshal Stalin agreed to give this permission, and said that the exact airfields and other details could be discussed with the United States Military Mission in Moscow.
He also agreed to make available for similar purposes fields in the Northern part of Russia, to permit through flying from England over enemy territory to the Soviet Union.
Hopkins Notes
December 1, 1943, 1 p.m.
Turkey should be asked to come into the war & invite President of Turkey to come to Cairo to meet the President of USA & Prime Minister.
Mr. Eden asked Marshal Stalin whether the Soviet Government wished to send a representative – if so he would of course be welcomed.
M. Stalin answered that he would send such a representative.
Proposed telegram to Pres. Inonu was presented and discussed.
The Minister in Egypt to the President’s special assistant
Cairo, December 1, 1943
Secret
Urgent
For immediate delivery to Harry Hopkins visiting party from Kirk. I have received an urgent but garbled message from Steinhardt at Ankara from which I gather that he wishes me to inform you that neither he nor the British Ambassador at Ankara has received any message from your party and that he believes that communications from Tehran may be temporarily suspended.
740.0011 European War 1939/32357: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State
Ankara, December 1, 1943 – 1 p.m.
1958.
The following telegram has been sent to Cairo, repeated for the Department’s information:
Most Immediate December 1, 1 p.m. Most secret for the President.
In a conversation with the Foreign Minister this morning he referred to your presence in Cairo and again expressed the hope that a meeting could be arranged between Inonu and yourself. He intimated that given sufficient notice Inonu could meet you in Aleppo, just across the Turkish frontier.
For your information Aleppo is about 26 hours by special train from Ankara and would seem satisfactory from a security point of view.
Please instruct the Security Officers to transmit any reply you may send me as quickly as possible.
STEINHARDT
The President to the Ambassador in Turkey
Tehran, December 1, 1943
Secret
Please pass following message immediately to President Inonu from President Roosevelt:
Prime Minister Churchill and I, having had our meeting with Marshal Stalin, will be in Cairo next Saturday and Sunday, accompanied by a representative of the Soviet Government. We should greatly value a meeting with Your Excellency and hope it might be possible for you to join us in Cairo.
You should if possible hand this message in person to the President, and you must of course impress upon him its extreme secrecy.
Your American [British] and Soviet colleagues are being instructed to convey similar messages to President and you should concert with them simultaneous presentation.
You are authorized to tell President Inonu that we have no objection to his consulting his Parliament in secret session regarding his leaving his country if he finds it necessary to do so.
It would be useful if you could accompany the President.
ROOSEVELT
Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, 3:20 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| President Roosevelt | Marshal Stalin | |
| Mr. Harriman | Foreign Commissar Molotov | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov |
Bohlen Minutes
December 1, 1943, 3:20 p.m.
Secret
The President said he had asked Marshal Stalin to come to see him as he wished to discuss a matter briefly and frankly. He said it referred to internal American politics.
He said that we had an election in 1944 and that while personally he did not wish to run again, if the war was still in progress, he might have to.
He added that there were in the United States from six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote. He said personally he agreed with the views of Marshal Stalin as to the necessity of the restoration of a Polish state but would like to see the Eastern border moved further to the west and the Western border moved even to the River Oder. He hoped, however, that the Marshal would understand that for political reasons outlined above, he could not participate in any decision here in Tehran or even next winter on this subject and that he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the present time.
Marshal Stalin replied that now the President explained, he had understood.
The President went on to say that there were a number of persons of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin, in that order, in the United States. He said that he fully realized the three Baltic Republics had in history and again more recently been a part of Russia and added jokingly that when the Soviet armies reoccupied these areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point.
He went on to say that the big issue in the United States, insofar as public opinion went, would be the question of referendum and the right of self-determination. He said he thought that world opinion would want some expression of the will of the people, perhaps not immediately after their reoccupation by Soviet forces, but some day, and that he personally was confident that the people would vote to join the Soviet Union.
Marshal Stalin replied that the three Baltic Republics had no autonomy under the last Czar who had been an ally of Great Britain and the United States, but that no one had raised the question of public opinion, and he did not quite see why it was being raised now.
The President replied that the truth of the matter was that the public neither knew nor understood.
Marshal Stalin answered that they should be informed and some propaganda work should be done.
He added that as to the expression of the will of the people, there would be lots of opportunities for that to be done in accordance with the Soviet constitution but that he could not agree to any form of international control.
The President replied it would be helpful for him personally if some public declaration in regard to the future elections to which the Marshal had referred, could be made.
Marshal Stalin repeated there would be plenty of opportunities for such an expression of the will of the people.
After a brief discussion of the time of the President’s departure and that of Marshal Stalin, the President said there were only two matters which the three of them had not talked over.
He said he had already outlined to the Marshal his ideas on the three world organizations but he felt that it was premature to consider them here with Mr. Churchill. He referred particularly to his idea of the four great nations, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, policing the world in the post-war period. He said it was just an idea, and the exact form would require further study.
Mr. Molotov said that at the Moscow Conference, in accordance with the Four Power Declaration, it had been agreed that the three governments would give further study as to the exact form of world organization and the means of assuring the leading role of the four great powers mentioned.
During the conversation, in reply to the President’s question, Marshal Stalin said that he had received the three papers which the President had handed him the day before yesterday, one in regard to air bases, and the other two in regard to secret contacts involving the Far East, but said he had not had time to study the documents carefully, but would take it up in Moscow with Ambassador Harriman.
At this meeting, Stalin, referring to his conversation with the President on November 28 [29] on the world organization, said that after thinking over the question of the world organization as outlined by the President, he had come to agree with the President that it should be worldwide and not regional.
Tripartite political meeting, 6 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Marshal Stalin |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Pavlov |
| Mr. Bohlen | Major Birse |
Bohlen Minutes
December 1, 1943, 6 p.m.
Secret
The President stated he thought that there were two main questions to be discussed – the question of Poland and the treatment of Germany.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be possible to obtain any answer on the Soviet Union’s request for Italian ships.
The President replied his position on this question was very clear; that the Allies had received a large number of Italian merchant ships and a lesser number of warships and that he felt they should be used by our three nations in the common cause until the end of the war when the division based on title and possession might be made.
Mr. Molotov answered that the Soviet Union would use these ships during the war in the common war effort, and after the war the question of possession could be discussed.
The Prime Minister asked where the Soviet Union would like to have these ships delivered.
Marshal Stalin replied in the Black Sea if Turkey entered the war. If not, to the northern ports.
The Prime Minister said it was a small thing to ask in the face of the tremendous sacrifices of Russia.
Marshal Stalin said that he knew how great the need for war vessels was on the part of England and the United States but that he felt the Soviet request was modest.
Both the President and the Prime Minister said they were in favor of acceptance of the Soviet suggestion.
The Prime Minister said it would require some time to work out the arrangements and that he personally would welcome the sight of these vessels in the Black Sea and hoped some English war vessels could accompany them in action against the enemy in those waters.
He said it would take a couple of months to work out the arrangements with the Italians, since they wish to avoid any possibility of mutiny in the Italian Fleet and the scuttling of the ships.
It was agreed that the ships would pass over to Soviet command sometime around the end of January 1944.
The Prime Minister remarked that it would be one of the advantages to be attained from Turkey even if she did not enter the war; namely to permit the passage of war vessels through the Dardanelles.
The President, turning to the subject of Poland, said it was his hope that negotiations could be started for the reestablishment of relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments. He felt that the reestablishment of relations would facilitate any decisions made in regard to the questions at issue. He said he recognized the difficulties which lay in the way.
Marshal Stalin replied that the Polish Government-in-exile were closely connected with the Germans and their agents in Poland were killing partisans. He said it is impossible to imagine what is going on in Poland.
The Prime Minister said the great question before the English was the fact that they had declared war because of the German invasion of Poland.
He said he personally had been astonished when Chamberlain had given the guarantee in April 1939 to Poland when he had refused to fight for the Czechs. He had been astonished and glad.
He said that England and France had gone to war in pursuance of this guarantee and it was not that he regretted it, but still it would be difficult not to take cognizance of the fact that the British people had gone to war because of Poland.
He said he had used the illustration of the three matches the other evening in order to demonstrate one possible solution of the questions.
He said that the British Government was first of all interested in seeing absolute security for the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union against any surprise assault in the future from Germany.
Marshal Stalin replied that Russia, probably more than any other country was interested in having friendly relations with Poland, since the security of Soviet frontiers was involved.
He said the Russians were in favor of the reconstitution and expansion of Poland at the expense of Germany and that they make distinction between the Polish Government-in-exile and Poland.
He added that they broke relations with Poland not because of a whim but because the Polish [Poles] had joined in slanderous propaganda with the Nazis.
He inquired what guarantee could there be that this would not be repeated. He said they would like to have a guarantee that the Polish Government-in-exile would cease the killing of partisans in Poland and secondly to urge the people to fight against the Germans and not to indulge in intrigues.
The Russians would welcome relations with a Polish Government that led its people in the common struggle but it was not sure that the Polish Government-in-exile could be such a government. However, he added, if the government-in-exile would go along with the partisans and sever all connections with the German agents in Poland, then the Russians would be prepared to negotiate with them.
The Prime Minister said he would like to obtain the views of the Soviet Government in regard to the frontier question, and if some reasonable formula could be devised, he was prepared to take it up with the Polish Government-in-exile, and without telling them that the Soviet Government would accept such a solution, would offer it to them as probably the best they could obtain. If the Polish Government refused this, then Great Britain would be through with them and certainly would not oppose the Soviet Government under any condition at the peace table.
He said the British Government wished to see a Poland strong and friendly to Russia.
Marshal Stalin replied this was desirable, but it was not just for the Poles to try and get back the Ukraine and White Russia; that the frontiers of 1939 had returned the Ukrainian soil to the Ukraine and White Russian soil to White Russia. The Soviet Government adheres to the 1939 line and considers it just and right.
Mr. Eden said that was the line known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line.
Marshal Stalin said call it what you will, we still consider it just and right.
Mr. Molotov interjected to say that the 1939 frontier was the Curzon Line.
Mr. Eden said there were differences.
Mr. Molotov replied in no essential points.
There was then an examination of maps as to the exact location of the Curzon Line, and its location was finally established.
Line “A” = Polish-Soviet boundary, 1921-1939
Lines “B,” “C,” and “D” = Hypothetical Polish-Soviet boundaries
Line “E” = The “Curzon Line”
Line “F” = Portion of the German-Polish boundary, 1939-1941
The marks in red pencil on the attached map were made by Stalin himself to illustrate the fact that if part of eastern Prussia, including the ports of Königsberg and Tilsit, were given to the Soviet Union he would be prepared to accept the Curzon Line (the blue line “E” on the map) as the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland. The red pencil marks to the east of the 1941 Soviet-Polish frontier (the red line “F” on the map) and to the west of the Curzon Line were put on the map by Stalin to show the areas which would go back to Poland. The small area marked in red west of the River Bug northeast of Lublin was put on by Stalin as indicating a place where there would remain in Poland a small area chiefly inhabited by Ukrainians. The Soviet Union, however, would not claim this area but would accept the Curzon Line running along the River Bug. Although it was admitted that the city of Lwów was predominantly Polish, it was situated in the heart of an overwhelmingly Ukrainian region and for that reason (according to Stalin) could not be returned to Poland.
The President inquired whether in the opinion of Marshal Stalin, East Prussia and the area between the old Polish frontier and the Oder was approximately equal to the former Polish territory acquired by the Soviet Union.
Marshal Stalin replied he did not know.
The Prime Minister said that if it was possible to work out some fair solution that it would be up to the Polish [Poles] to accept it.
Marshal Stalin replied that the Soviet Union did not wish to retain any regions primarily occupied by Poles even though they were inside the 1939 Line.
The President inquired whether a voluntary transfer of peoples from the mixed areas was possible.
Marshal Stalin said that such a transfer was entirely possible.
Turning to the question of Germany, the President said that the question was whether or not to split up Germany.
Marshal Stalin replied that they preferred the dismemberment of Germany.
The Prime Minister said he was all for it but that he was primarily more interested in seeing Prussia, the evil core of German militarism, separated from the rest of Germany.
The President said he had a plan that he had thought up some months ago for the division of Germany in five parts. These five parts were:
- All Prussia to be rendered as small and weak as possible.
- Hanover and Northwest section.
- Saxony and Leipzig area.
- Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel and the area South of the Rhine
- Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg
He proposed that these five areas should be self-governed and that there should be two regions under United Nations or some form of International control. These were:
- The area of the Kiel Canal and the City of Hamburg.
- The Ruhr and the Saar, the latter to be used for the benefit of all Europe.
The Prime Minister said, to use an American expression, “The President had said a mouthful.”
He went on to say that in his mind there were two considerations, one destructive and the other constructive.
-
The separation of Prussia from the rest of the Reich.
-
To detach Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and the Palatinate from the rest of Germany and make them part of the Confederation of the Danube.
Marshal Stalin said he felt if Germany was to be dismembered, it should really be dismembered, and it was neither a question of the division of Germany in five or six states and two areas as the President suggested. However, he said he preferred the President’s plan to the suggestion of Mr. Churchill.
He felt that to include German areas within the framework of large confederations would merely offer an opportunity to the German elements to revive a great State.
He went on to say that he did not believe there was a difference among Germans; that all German soldiers fought like devils and the only exception was the Austrians.
He said that the Prussian Officers and Staffs should be eliminated, but as to the inhabitants, he saw little difference between one part of Germany and another.
He said he was against the idea of confederation as artificial and one that would not last in that area, and in addition would provide opportunity for the German elements to control.
Austria, for example, had existed as an independent state and should again. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria likewise.
The President said he agreed with the Marshal, particularly in regard to the absence of differences between Germans. He said fifty years ago there had been a difference but since the last war it was no longer so.
He said the only difference was that in Bavaria and the Southern part of Germany there was no officer caste as there had been in Prussia. He agreed with Marshal Stalin that the Austrians were an exception.
The Prime Minister said he did not wish to be considered as against the dismemberment of Germany – quite the contrary, but he felt to separate the parts above would merely mean that sooner or later they will reunite into one nation and that the main thing was to keep Germany divided if only for fifty years.
Marshal Stalin repeated what he had said as to the danger of the reunification of Germany. He said no matter what measures were adopted there would always be a strong urge on the part of the Germans to unite.
He said it was a great mistake to unite Hungary with Germans since the Germans would merely control the Hungarians and to create large frameworks within which the Germans could operate would be very dangerous.
He felt the whole purpose of any international organization to preserve peace would be to neutralize this tendency on the part of the Germans and apply against them economic and other measures and if necessary, force, to prevent their unification and revival. He said the victorious nations must have the strength to beat the Germans If they ever start on the path of a new war.
The Prime Minister inquired whether Marshal Stalin contemplated a Europe composed of little states, disjoined, separated and weak.
Marshal Stalin replied not Europe but Germany.
He supposed for example that Poland would be a strong country, and France, and Italy likewise; that Rumania and Bulgaria would remain as they always had; small States.
The President remarked Germany had been less dangerous to civilization when in 107 provinces.
The Prime Minister said he hoped for larger units.
The Prime Minister then returned to the question of Poland and said he was not asking for any agreement nor was he set on the matter but he had a statement which he would like to have the Marshal examine.
This statement suggested that Poland should obtain equal compensation in the West, including Eastern Prussia and frontiers on the Oder to compensate for the areas which would be in the Soviet Union.
The President interjected to say that one question in regard to Germany remained to be settled and that was what body should be empowered to study carefully the question of dismemberment of Germany.
It was agreed that the European Advisory Committee [Commission] would undertake this task.
The Prime Minister said in his opinion the Polish question was urgent.
He repeated if it would be possible to work out a formula here, and then [sic] he could go back to the Polish Government in London and urge on them the desirability of at least attempting to reach a settlement along those lines, without however indicating any commitment on the part of the Soviet Government.
Marshal Stalin said that if the Russians would be given the northern part of East Prussia, running along the left bank of the Niemen and include Tilsit and the City of Königsberg, he would be prepared to accept the Curzon Line as the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland.
He said the acquisition of that part of Eastern Prussia would not only afford the Soviet Union an ice-free port but would also give to Russia a small piece of German territory which he felt was deserved.
Although nothing definitely was stated, it was apparent that the British were going to take this suggestion back to London to the Poles.
Roosevelt is selling out the Polish people in particular as victims of the Germans and Soviets (Russia) and the whole of Eastern Europe. He is dividing the world into pieces that the few control for selfish reasons and created the globalist that we suffer today. He assumes most of Eastern Europe want to align with the Soviets….a false assumption that took nearly 50 years to correct. I find this dialogue with Stalin as irresponsible and unacceptable.
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Damn right. And one wonders why I’m not a big fan of old Frankie, despite the efforts of historians who lionize him.
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The President’s special assistant to the President
Tehran, December 1, 1943
Mr. President: It is 8:10.
Do you wish at dinner to introduce the method of our occupation of Germany after her collapse?
HARRY
The President’s special assistant to the President, and the President’s reply
Tehran, December 1, 1943
Mr. President: What do you think of letting the Russians give dinner tonight – your last chance at Russian food
HARRY
OK but I have to leave early as we sleep at the camp.
FDR
Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Marshal Stalin |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Pavlov |
| Mr. Bohlen | Major Birse |
The Declaration on Iran and the Conference communiqué were discussed and put into final form.
Communiqué: First Draft (U.S.)
We – The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of Soviet Russia, Marshal of the Red Army, have met these four days past, in this city of Tehran, and have bent our united efforts toward solutions of our military and political problems.
We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.
As to war – our military staffs have joined in our roundtable discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the final destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South, and arrangements were made to ensure intimate and continuous cooperation.
As to peace – the road is still bloody and hard and long. But the common understanding which he we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.
And as to post-war plans – our mutual understanding [?] gives us courage to hope for an enduring peace. We recognize fully our great responsibilities to help in the writing determination of a peace which will meet approval of the greater part of the peoples of the world, and ensure a lasting surcease from war.
With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future, [(] and we now reiterate our aim to strengthen democratic principles in the world. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose people in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations. [)]
[(] We say to the German people:[)]
[(] “We do not seek to enslave you. We do mean to destroy not only your military forces, but also the false leaders who have led a generation of Germans into bitter excesses against common decencies, culminating with your being plunged, by this same leadership, into a useless war which has cost caused millions of your sons to die, and may sacrifice millions more.” [)]
“ No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their submarines by sea, and their industrial war plants from the air. Our attack will be relentless.”
Emerging from these conferences we look with confidence toward the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in actuality fact, in spirit as well as in purpose.
And we shall meet again as the war – and the peace – progresses!
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON CHURCHILL
JOSEPH STALIN