Cairo, 26 November 1943 CCS 407 (revised) Secret
During the forthcoming conference with the Soviets, it is recommended that the following broad lines of action be adopted:
a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree upon the U.S.-British strategy in Europe and seek the approval of the President and Prime Minister before meeting the Soviets.
b. That the Soviets be urged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations offensive by effective coordination with OVERLORD.
c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to consult together before making reply to proposals upon which there has been no previous agreement.
d. That, specifically, an agreed answer be obtained to any Soviet proposals which involve the undertaking of major operations through the Balkans or the Aegean.
e. That a common policy be adopted concerning Turkey, to include briefly the support of the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war but to stand firm on the principle that no diversion of forces or supplies for Turkey can be accepted to the prejudice of approved operations elsewhere.
Throughout the deliberation with the Soviets, it should be made clear that the United States and Great Britain are involved in military operations not only in the European Theater but also in the Pacific-Asiatic Theater, and that their heavy commitments of resources throughout the world compel them to decide on operations only after careful analysis of the overall situation.
At the Moscow Conference, the United States and British representatives were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In the future, the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests on the Soviets.
A proposed agenda is attached as an enclosure.
Coordination of military effort
The coordination of Soviet operations with Anglo-American operations in Europe.
Discuss current and planned military operations in and from Italy.
Turkish action on entry into the war.
Supplies to Russia
Discussion of Soviet capabilities to initiate strategic bombing of targets in Germany or her satellites in extension of POINTBLANK. (Current intelligence indicates German fighter strength is extremely weak on the Russian front – 130 serviceable fighters.)
On the assumption that the USSR will bring up for discussion its entry into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the following should be considered:
a. Request Soviets to furnish combat intelligence information concerning Japan; if agreed to we will present specific questions through the military mission at Moscow.
b. Request Soviets to indicate whether they consider it desirable at this time to set in hand arrangements to base Soviet submarine force in U.S. territory.
c. Request Soviets to indicate what direct or indirect assistance they will be able to give, if it is found possible to launch an attack on the Northern Kuriles.
d. Soviets to indicate what ports, if any, they could allow the Allies to use. Request Soviets to furnish data on ports through Military Mission in order that we may determine the size and type of Naval Task Forces we can employ.
e. Soviets to indicate what air bases, if any, they could allow our air forces to use for operations against Japan, and what facilities, including gasoline and bombs, could be supplied. What air routes to these bases could be provided?
Cairo, 26 November 1943 CCS 407/1 Secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 131st Meeting, Item 5, agreed that the following items, which are currently under discussion as a result of the Moscow Conference, should be discussed between the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow and the Soviet authorities concerned:
Shuttle bomber bases
(1) When will the USSR be prepared to designate air bases for our use? What are presently available locations, facilities, and capabilities? The United States tentatively desires 10 bases so distributed as to permit shuttle bombing from Italy and United Kingdom.
(2) When may we begin sending the required service personnel into the USSR to the designated bases?
(3) What is Soviet proposal for handling the close operational liaison required?
(4) What signal communications with the United Kingdom and Italy can be provided?
Air transport routes
Request establishment of U.S. Air Transport Service on a minimum frequency basis of one roundtrip weekly on three routes in the following order of priority:
In order that the U.S. may have a direct and independent air line of communications with the USSR
In order that the basic machinery may be set up and be in operation to provide a direct US-USSR aerial route of supply to support any future USSR military air operations.
Primarily to support shuttle bombing operations.
In order to transport munitions and spare parts required in connection with shuttle bombing operations and to connect Moscow with our Mediterranean and SE Asia fronts. This will provide an alternative during the winter months when the northern route (U.S.-U.K.) is not operating regularly.
(1) Request Soviet basic weather ciphers in order to interpret weather broadcasts. The U.S. will furnish weather ciphers desired by the USSR.
(2) Alternatively, if foregoing is not acceptable to the Soviets, U. S. desires weather data on specific areas, using special ciphers as follows:
(a) Shuttle bombing areas.
(b) Tehran transport route; data west of Long. 75°E.
(c) From 60°E. to 160°E (for operations in China).
(d) From 90°E to 180° (for the AlSib route).
(3) Request USSR to indicate the procedure they suggest in the mutual exchange of weather information. We propose exchange of meteorological liaison officers for coordination of technical details and arrangements for distribution of weather codes and ciphers.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire their respective missions to make periodic reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding progress made in the negotiations on the above subjects.
F. B. ROYAL