U.S. State Department (January 20, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
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Present |
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| United States |
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United Kingdom |
| General Marshall |
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General Brooke |
| Admiral King |
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Admiral of the Fleet Pound |
| Lieutenant General Arnold |
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Air Chief Marshal Portal |
| Lieutenant General Somervell |
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Lord Leathers |
| Rear Admiral Cooke |
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Field Marshal Dill |
| Brigadier General Hull |
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Vice Admiral Mountbatten |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer |
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Lieutenant General Ismay |
| Colonel Smart |
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| Commander Libby |
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Secretariat |
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Brigadier Dykes |
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Brigadier General Deane |
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Brigadier Jacob |
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Lieutenant Colonel Grove |
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Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 20, 1943, 10 a.m.
Secret
- U.S. Aid to Russia
(C.C.S. 162)
General Marshall requested Lord Leathers to give his comments on C.C.S. 162.
Lord Leathers stated that the bulk of the munitions sent to Russia under the Protocol are from the United States. He said that C.C.S. 162 does not constitute a paper with which he is in full agreement as is indicated in its heading. He cannot be certain of the basic figures presented because he does not know the backlog of munitions to Russia that are now in the United States. He did, however, concur in General Somervell’s conclusions of the paper.
Lord Leathers stated that an agreement had been arrived at between the United States and British authorities in Washington, including representatives of both Navies, that all calculations for the allocation of shipping in 1943 should be based on a loss rate of 1.9% per month, whereas General Somervell used a rate of 2.6% in his preparation of C.C.S. 162. He said that if the 1.9% figure works out correctly, more shipping will be available than is indicated in this paper.
Admiral King said he had no knowledge of such an agreement and thought that 1.9% was optimistic. This was the figure for December 1942 which was particularly favorable.
General Somervell agreed that if we are able to reduce the losses in shipping from 2.6% to 2% per month, an additional troop lift of 500,000 men to England would be possible in 1943. If it were further reduced to 1.9%, an additional 50,000 could be lifted.
General Marshall said that if we accept General Somervell’s loss rate, the question as to what can be sent to Russia must be reexamined. It must also be determined whether we should undertake such a program considering its effects on troop lift.
General Somervell added that he recognized that there should be an improvement in the loss rate in 1943 over that which was sustained in 1942 because of the more effective anti-submarine measures which are contemplated. He felt it safer, however, to plan on the continuance of the 1942 rate until it could be effectively demonstrated that the losses would decrease. He said that it was reasonably certain that the loss rate would drop as low as 2.4% per month. In this case, all of the commitments under the Russian Protocol could be fulfilled. If the rate improves beyond 2.4%, an additional troop lift for Bolero will become available.
Lord Leathers stated that it is particularly important to establish an agreed estimated loss rate for planning purposes. This will insure that all those concerned with shipping problems will be speaking and thinking in the same terms when planning troop or cargo movements.
Sir Dudley Pound said that the figures in the paper apparently are based on the assumption that the northern route to Russia will be open throughout the year. He stated that this will not be the case, particularly during the period of Operation Husky. He further thought that the paper should include some statement indicating that commitments to Russia will only be fulfilled provided they will not entail prohibitive losses in shipping.
General Somervell said that stopping the northern convoys during the period of Operation Husky would eliminate 64 sailings for which the capacity was available on the Persian route. In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why the shipments to the Persian Gulf dropped off in June, General Somervell said that the commitments to Russia would not require the total capacity of all routes and that, therefore, a reduced rate had been applied to the Persian route which had the longest turnaround. This will provide a safety margin to take care of contingencies such as stopping the northern route during Operation Husky.
Lord Leathers pointed out that C.C.S. 162 applies only to aid from the United States. He said that the British can overtake their backlog of deliveries about the end of June; a relatively small number of British shipments is involved. Assuming a convoy every 27 days, there will be 11 or 12 ships in each, whereas if they were to be run every 40 days, each convoy must include 15 British ships.
General Somervell proposed an amendment to clarify paragraph 14 of C.C.S. 162. He then asked for a careful consideration of the conclusions contained in Paragraph 15 of the paper.
Lord Leathers suggested that in the last sentence the phrase “assigned to United States troop movements” be changed to “assigned to combined troop movements.”
Sir Charles Portal asked if it would be possible to frame our commitment to Russia so as to make it clear that some curtailment in the delivery of munitions might be required because of operational necessities. He felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were taking a big step in making a firm commitment regarding the delivery of munitions to Russia at the expense of all operational requirements.
Lord Leathers stated that we have reserved the right in the past to curtail shipments of munitions to Russia but that Russia did not like to have such reservations made and always objected when an actual curtailment became necessary. A notable exception to this was that they agreed that the northern convoys be discontinued during Operation Torch.
General Somervell pointed out that the current Protocol which expires in June of 1943 does include such a resolution. The new Protocol will be framed by the State Department and the Foreign Office, but actually there will be ample opportunity for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to review it before the negotiations between governments are initiated. It will thus be possible to insure that a safety clause is included in the basic document.
The Committee:
a) Agreed that a loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month could be relied on with sufficient certainty to warrant the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving their approval to the total shipping commitments set forth in Paragraph 6, Table II of C.C.S. 162, subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations’ effort.
b) Took note that the Persian Gulf route could make good the loss of 64 North Russian sailings if these had to be eliminated in the latter part of the year owing to other operations.
c) Agreed to direct the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate of the rate of United Nations’ shipping losses in 1943 which can be used by all United Nations’ Agencies for planning purposes.
d) Agreed to amend paragraph 15 of C.C.S. 162 so as to delete the words “United States” in the last sentence and substitute the word “Combined” therefor.
e) Agreed that, in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia, a clause should be included to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfillment prohibitive.
- British Responsibility for Turkey
(C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 2)
General Marshall suggested the addition of the words “through the Combined Chiefs of Staff” after “Assignment Boards” in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the draft resolution proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff at their previous meeting.
Brigadier Jacob explained the procedure for the submission of Turkish bids to the Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington. Turkish requirements were, in the first instance, scrutinized and coordinated by a Committee in Ankara containing U.S., British and Turkish representatives. This Committee transmitted requirements to London. The London Munitions Assignments Board passed on to the Washington Board bids for all material which could not be supplied from the U.K. The bids were presented by the British representatives of the Washington Munitions Assignments Board. Difficulty was caused, however, by the fact that the Turkish Embassy in Washington was apt to approach the War Department simultaneously with requests for equipment and, as a result, duplication took place. The object of the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff was to canalize all Turkish demands for munitions through London where the majority of these demands were met. Turkey was only one of a large number of claimants for material, and the general principle followed was that all the small European nations dealt with the London Board in the first instance, whereas the South American Republics and China dealt with Washington. For example, any demands made by the Chinese in London were refused, and the Chinese were told to present them direct to Washington. He feared that if all bids had to be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, they would be smothered in a mass of detail.
Admiral King said his only concern was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had an opportunity to exercise control over the actions of the Munitions Assignments Boards in connection with Turkish bids.
The Committee:
a) Agreed that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.
b) Agreed that, in particular, under the general direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward dispatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert such equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignments Board.
- The Bomber Offensive from North Africa
(C.C.S. 159)
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff setting out in order of time the proposed objectives for the bomber offensive from North Africa.
In discussion certain amendments were suggested and agreed.
The Committee:
Approved the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum as amended in the discussion.
- Command in the Mediterranean
(C.C.S. 163)
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff giving their recommendations for the set-up of air command in the Mediterranean.
Sir Alan Brooke said that with the 8th Army approaching Tunisia the time was near when it would be necessary to place it under General Eisenhower’s command. It was, therefore, proposed that General Alexander should come in as Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower with the primary task of commanding the group of armies on the Tunisian front. He would be accompanied by a small nucleus staff with the necessary signals. This proposal, if accepted, would leave General Eisenhower in supreme command over:
a) The group of armies on the Tunisian front.
b) The U.S. 5th Army in Morocco.
c) French forces under General Juin.
He would still have, in addition, his political responsibilities in North Africa.
The position was slightly complicated by the fact that the 8th Army must still be supplied from the East. This could, however, be arranged and the organization in the Middle East was quite adequate for the task.
Sir Alan Brooke then pointed out that responsibility for planning Husky, or whatever operation in the Mediterranean might be decided upon, must soon be fixed. It would probably be thought that General Eisenhower was the appropriate man to assume this responsibility. If that were decided, he would have General Alexander available to take charge of the necessary work.
Sir Charles Portal said that intensive air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were coming to an end, but that many of the bases, such as Malta, in that area as well as the very large maintenance organization which had been established there, would still be available. It was essential that the action of all operational air forces in the Mediterranean area should be coordinated by one Commander.
General Arnold said that certain minor changes in the proposed organization would almost certainly be necessary, but the general setup was acceptable to him.
Sir Charles Portal agreed and said that such changes could most easily be made by the Air Commander-in-Chief once he had been appointed.
Admiral King asked what dividing line was proposed between the Middle East and Northwest African theaters.
Sir Alan Brooke replied that the British Chiefs of Staff when considering this matter had thought that a line from the Tunisia-Tripolitania frontier to Corfu would be most suitable.
Sir Dudley Pound then referred to the question of the naval command which would be necessary for Husky. His proposal was that Admiral Cunningham should become Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and that Admiral Harwood should adopt the title of Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary might be the line Bardia-Zanti [Zante]. Thus Malta would come under Admiral Cunningham who would be responsible for coordinating all movements and matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole. He would also be responsible for the distribution of forces between the Mediterranean and Levant Commands.
The Committee:
a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 163, subject to any minor changes which might be found necessary by the Air Commander-in-Chief after his appointment.
b) Took note with approval that it had been agreed that, at a time to be determined after the British 8th Army had crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander should become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, and that the British 8th Army should at the same time be transferred to the command of General Eisenhower, although it would continue to be based on the Middle East.
c) Agreed that, subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander’s primary task would be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small headquarters of his own, provided from the Middle East, and that after the conclusion of these operations he should take charge of Operation Husky.
d) Took note of the proposals of the First Sea Lord as set out above for Naval command in the Mediterranean during Husky, i.e., Western and Eastern Commands under Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and Commander-in-Chief Levant, respectively, with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean responsible for general coordination.
e) Agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed of the above decisions.
