Casablanca Conference

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4 p.m.

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	France
General Marshall	General Brooke	General Giraud
Admiral King	Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold	Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell	Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke	Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull	Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer	Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart	Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby	Air Vice Marshal Inglis
Major Codman	Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Dykes
	Brigadier General Deane
	Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 19, 1943, 4 p.m.

Secret

1. Axis Oil Position
   (C.C.S. 158)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the Assistant Chief of British Air Staff (Intelligence) summarizing the latest British views on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158).

Sir Charles Portal said that the British had fully realized the great strategical importance of oil targets in Germany, but for tactical reasons these were extremely difficult to attack. The most important targets were the synthetic oil plants and the Rumanian oil refineries. Unfortunately the latter, from bases at present available, were at extreme range of our bombers; and he felt that it would be a mistake to make light and sporadic attacks on Ploesti, which would do little harm and only result in an increase of the German air defenses. It would be better to wait until we had the Turkish air bases before starting our attacks. The synthetic oil plants were in the Ruhr and elsewhere, but they were very small targets which needed precision bombing to put out of action. Recent developments in radio navigation increased the chances of success on these targets, and great hopes were placed on the possibility of daylight precision bombing by the U.S. Air Forces. When a sufficient force had been built up in a few months’ time, it might be possible to resume attacks on these targets more effectively, provided of course that this could be achieved without prejudice to the U-boat warfare.

General Arnold pointed out that the Ploesti fields – which were roughly equidistant from Sicily, Benghazi, Cairo, and Aleppo – were within range of the B-24 with a load of 4,000 pounds of bombs or under.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that one of the chief difficulties was getting the necessary meteorological information, without which long-distance attacks of this nature were unlikely to be successful. It was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain information from secret radio stations in the Balkans owing to the activities of the Gestapo.

Air Vice Marshal Inglis confirmed that in the British view the Rumanian oil supplies were vital to Germany. Her stocks were so low that she depended on Rumanian oil for about thirty-three percent of her total need.

General Somervell said that the latest American estimate was less optimistic about the shortage of oil in Germany than the British. It was believed that Germany would have a surplus of about 40,000,000 barrels at the end of 1943 instead of the 10,000,000 barrels which she had at the end of 1942, owing to the opening up of new sources in Hungary and elsewhere. It was, therefore, calculated that even if the whole of the Rumanian production were knocked out early in the year, she would still have enough for operations in 1944. There were two tetraethyl lead factories however, the destruction of which would hamstring the production of German aviation fuel.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that this latest American information should be immediately given to the British Intelligence Staffs with a view to the production of an agreed estimate.

General Marshall emphasized the importance of making great efforts against German oil if we could be sure that it formed a really critical target. U.S. aircraft in the Southwest Pacific were bombing targets at a greater distance from their base than Rumania from the present bases available. We might have to wait a long time before the Turkish bases could be used.

Sir Charles Portal said that we must be sure our bombing would be really effective. The value of attacks on German oil had to be balanced against the needs of Husky, for which we should try to cause the maximum loss to the German air forces in the Mediterranean during the coming months. Only by this means could we hope to obtain the necessary air superiority on which depended the success of the operation.

After some discussion,

The Committee:
a) Took note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil – namely, the Rumanian oilfields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany – be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow.

b) Directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and U.S. sources.

2. Allied Plans Relating to Turkey
   (C.C.S. 157)

In discussing C.C.S. 157, Sir Alan Brooke said that the plans for inducing Turkey to enter the war on the side of the United Nations were largely political and that the military efforts were designed to further the political negotiations.

He said that Turkey is in need of specialized equipment and that it would be preferable to furnish operating units rather than the equipment alone. The Turkish people are not particularly adept in handling mechanized equipment, but they seem to have a strong desire to attempt it. As a result, we shall probably have to furnish the equipment with certain personnel to train Turkish troops in its use.

Sir Alan Brooke then presented the following draft resolution which he recommended be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.

In particular, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignment Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward despatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert much equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignment Board.

General Somervell stated that just prior to his departure from Washington, an agreement had been reached between the State Department and the British Joint Staff Mission as to methods by which munitions should be supplied to Turkey.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this agreement was not acceptable in London. He pointed out that any agreements previously made were superseded by the agreement arrived at on January 18th between the Prime Minister and the President which provided that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States.

General Marshall stated that he desired more time to study the resolution referred to above and requested that action with regard to it be postponed until the meeting of January 20th. He said that there was some confusion in his mind as to just what was intended with regard to Turkey. The President had said that he had hoped to arrange for Turkey’s permission for the passage of munitions en route to Russia through Turkish territory. C.C.S. 157 indicates that certain arrangements have already been made regarding the supply of munitions to Russia. In addition, the decision has been reached to make certain troop concentrations available to assist Turkey in the event that she enters into the war on the side of the United Nations. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he considered the probabilities with regard to Turkey would be.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British had an agreement to assist Turkey if she were attacked. The agreement includes furnishing Turkey 26 squadrons of pursuit aviation. In order that these squadrons might be able to operate quickly, certain necessary equipment had already been sent there. This had been a defensive agreement, but the intention is now to operate an offensive from Turkey. The present plan is that Turkey should merely hold the Axis forces beyond her frontier and thus secure air bases from which the United Nations could operate against Rumania.

He said it was hoped that we could induce Turkey to come into the war. This might be accomplished by political moves. Certain territorial promises might be made to Turkey at this time. For example, they might be promised the “Duck’s Bill” in Syria, control of the Dodecanese, certain parts of Bulgaria, and assurance that her communications in the Bosphorus will be unhampered. The more apparent a victory by the United Nations becomes, the more will Turkey desire to have a place at the peace table. This might be sufficient inducement for her to join the United Nations. In any event, our efforts with regard to Turkey will not be very costly, but they may provide an opportunity for appreciable gains.

General Marshall said that he had no doubt about the value of bringing Turkey into the war. He thought that if she could be induced to join us at the right moment, the results might play a determining part in the conclusion of the war. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he thought Turkey’s reaction might be if we effected a large concentration in the rear of her borders.

Sir Alan Brooke said it would strengthen the United Nations in the eyes of Turkey and give tangible evidence that we are ready to assist her. He said that the capture of the Dodecanese by the United Nations would give Turkey a feeling of confidence in their power but that these islands could be much more easily captured by an operation from Turkey, once she had joined in with us. He added that there is no possibility of doing operation Husky and capturing the Dodecanese simultaneously.

Sir Charles Portal said that holding the Dodecanese would facilitate operations in Turkey by insuring the use of the port of Smyrna.

The Committee:
a) Agreed to consider the proposed resolution on Turkey, quoted above, at the meeting on January 20th.

b) Took note of the paper under consideration.

3. Meeting With General Giraud

General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were much honored by the presence of General Giraud and were very pleased that it had been possible to arrange the meeting. He hoped that General Giraud would express his views, and in particular that he would indicate the present status of the French forces and the rapidity with which they could be built up.

General Giraud said that he was proud at being able to participate in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The French army had now reentered the war and had not only the will to fight but also the experience and knowledge. As an example, he might mention a message which he had that morning received on the telephone from his Chief of Staff; this was to the effect that the Germans had yesterday attacked the junction of the British and French armies between Medjes el Bab and Pont du Fahs with 80 tanks supported by infantry. On the British front the attack had completely broken down and 10 tanks had been knocked out. On the French front an attack by 50 tanks had been made against a battalion locality. The battalion had held its ground all day, and it was not until the evening that certain advanced posts were evacuated by order of the battalion commander. He had not had any further news but he understood that the situation was in hand. The action showed the quality of the French troops. They had not been able to knock out any tanks as they had no antitank guns. They had, however, prevented the German infantry from supporting their tanks and had held their ground. Similar examples had occurred on the whole front during the last two months. Such troops were worthy of modern arms.

On the existing cadres, the French army could form three armored divisions and ten mobile infantry divisions. It would also be possible to raise the following air forces:

• 50 fighter squadrons with 500 aircraft.
• 30 light bomber squadrons with 300 aircraft.
• 200 transport aircraft.

Such a force was an indispensable accompaniment for a modern army. The French pilots had already given proof of what they could do. One squadron of the Groupe Lafayette, armed with 12 P-40 aircraft, had been fighting for the last six days; they had shot down five enemy aircraft for the loss of one. He was particularly anxious to receive: first, fighter aircraft in the supply of which he hoped the British would participate; and, subsequently, light bombers so that he could equip the pilots of whose quality he had intimate knowledge and who would quickly master the new equipment. He realized that there were considerable difficulties due to the shortage of shipping and the needs of the Allied forces. Some of the aircraft, however, could fly from America, and possibly the fighters might be flown in from aircraft carriers. He felt confident that the French army could make a great contribution to the European campaign if it were properly equipped. He estimated that the campaign in North Africa would be over in two months’ time; and in this campaign he included the capture of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, which he regarded as forming a direct prolongation of Africa and as bases for further action.

General Marshall said that he was very glad to have heard General Giraud’s views. Speaking on behalf of the U.S. Army, air and ground, he explained that he was going into the details of how quickly modern equipment could be provided for the French Army. He knew that the shipping question was under detailed consideration by Admiral King and French Naval officers. General Somervell, the Head of the Services of Supply, had already called on General Giraud to discuss these matters and had reported thereon to him. The question of priority of delivery of items and the method to be adopted in equipping French Units would be taken up with General Giraud. General Arnold had been conferring with French officers to see what could be done to provide air equipment. It was in the interests of the U.S.A. to bring the French forces to a high state of efficiency, and everything possible would be done to obviate the difficulties of distance. It was not a question of whether to equip the French Army, but rather of how to carry it out. Availability of equipment was not the limiting factor, but transport.

Sir Alan Brooke expressed, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, great pleasure at the report which General Giraud had given of the state of the French Army. With the more limited resources at the disposal of the British, they would do what they could to help in providing modern equipment. He fully realized the important part which the French forces would play in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

Admiral King said that arrangements were well in hand for the rehabilitation in rotation of the French warships. Resources would not permit of them being dealt with all at once. He welcomed the officers and men of the French Navy who were now joining in the struggle for victory.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the navies of the Allies were now fighting in every ocean of the world and the U-boats were extending their activities further and further afield. The combined British and American naval forces were less than we should like to have to meet this menace, and the help of the French naval forces would be most welcome. From his experience at the beginning of the war, he knew the value of French naval assistance, and he knew also that this help would be of the same quality now as then.

Sir Charles Portal said that he had the clearest recollection from two wars of the skill and high performance of the French air forces. He, therefore, hoped that they could be equipped as soon as possible to fight once more alongside the Allies. Within the limit of British resources, which were considerably strained, everything would be done to hasten the day of this collaboration.

General Arnold said that he had been trying for some time to find the most effective use for the French pilots, who had proved their ability to take over and operate skillfully American equipment. He hoped that this study would soon be completed.

Sir John Dill said that he felt inspired by the presence of General Giraud, knowing as he did how much General Giraud had suffered for France. It was a matter of great pleasure, therefore, to have the General back to lead France to victory.

General Giraud said that in the early days of the war he had worked in the closest touch with the British Army. The cooperation between all arms at that time, and particularly between the 1st French Army and the Second Corps, of which Sir John Dill was the distinguished Commander, had showed how close such contact could be. Now once more cooperation had been resumed. In September 1940, when he was in a German prison camp, he had told the German generals that they had lost the war. Their attempt to invade Great Britain had failed, and though he could not prophesy how long the war would last, Germany could never win. Sooner or later the U.S. would come to the help of Great Britain. The Germans had asked him to sign a paper to say that he would not escape during the period of two hours each day when the French generals were allowed outside. He had said that he refused to sign any paper in German. They had asked him whether he was planning to escape as he had done in 1915. He had said:

Never mind what I am thinking. You are my jailers, I am your prisoner. It is your duty to guard me; it is my duty to escape. Let us see who can carry out his duty best. It took a year to get away, but now I am here amongst you once more.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed with applause their warm approval of the statement made by General Giraud who then withdrew from the meeting.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, 11:20 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

Churchill advanced the proposal that the French provisional regime might best be left exclusively to de Gaulle, but the President dismissed the subject “almost peremptorily.”

[NormanStewart]

Tuesday, 19 January

As it was necessary for him to get back to his ship by ten o’clock, Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., USNR, departed the President’s villa at 9:20 a.m. after breakfasting with his brother, Elliott, Mr. Hopkins, and Sergeant Robert Hopkins.

During the morning, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Robert Murphy were in conference with the President and Mr. Hopkins, as was Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, who saw the President from 11:25 until 11:45.

The President held a second conference with General Henri Giraud, commencing at noon. Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Captain John L. McCrea, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Captain A. Beaufre, Aide-de-camp to General Giraud, were also present. The conference touched on a number of points, the details of which are set forth in notes taken by Captain McCrea and which have been recorded separately. At 12:40, the President and General Giraud withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made of them. Later the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the group and additional pictures were made. The General and his aide departed at 12:50.

The President, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt, and Sergeant Robert Hopkins lunched together today, following which General Patton called to take Mr. Hopkins and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt downtown to shop and souvenir hunt and make an automobile tour of the waterfront and the business district of Casablanca.

During the afternoon, Lt. General H. H. Arnold called on the President. He was followed by Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, USN, Commander Western Task Force Sea Frontier, who departed at 4:30 p.m.

At 5:30 p.m., the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph Churchill a Captain in a Special Service Brigade (Commandos) paid a cal on the President and chatted until 6:20, when they left to return to “Mirador.”

Mr. Hopkins and his son, Robert, together with Mr. Harriman left the villa about 7:30 to take dinner with the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph. At this time, the President, Captain McCrea, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt also left the villa to have dinner with Major General G. S. Patton Jr. at “Villa Mas,” General Patton’s head quarters. Also dining with the President and General Patton the evening were Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke Jr., “USN”, Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Deputy Commanding General, First Armored Corps Brigadier General A. W. Wedemeyer, Brigadier General W. H. Wilbur, in charge of Special Activities in the area now occupied by the First Armored Corps, Brigadier General John E. Hull, and Colonel H. R. Gay.

The President returned to “Dar es Saada” at 11:15 p.m., and a 11:20 p.m. the Prime Minister came in to chat with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt until 1:00 a.m. the next morning, when the Prime Minister returned to his villa.

The President retired about 1:30.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (January 20, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General Marshall		General Brooke
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell		Lord Leathers
Rear Admiral Cooke		Field Marshal Dill
Brigadier General Hull		Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Lieutenant General Ismay
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Dykes
	Brigadier General Deane
	Brigadier Jacob
	Lieutenant Colonel Grove

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 20, 1943, 10 a.m.

Secret

1. U.S. Aid to Russia
   (C.C.S. 162)

General Marshall requested Lord Leathers to give his comments on C.C.S. 162.

Lord Leathers stated that the bulk of the munitions sent to Russia under the Protocol are from the United States. He said that C.C.S. 162 does not constitute a paper with which he is in full agreement as is indicated in its heading. He cannot be certain of the basic figures presented because he does not know the backlog of munitions to Russia that are now in the United States. He did, however, concur in General Somervell’s conclusions of the paper.

Lord Leathers stated that an agreement had been arrived at between the United States and British authorities in Washington, including representatives of both Navies, that all calculations for the allocation of shipping in 1943 should be based on a loss rate of 1.9% per month, whereas General Somervell used a rate of 2.6% in his preparation of C.C.S. 162. He said that if the 1.9% figure works out correctly, more shipping will be available than is indicated in this paper.

Admiral King said he had no knowledge of such an agreement and thought that 1.9% was optimistic. This was the figure for December 1942 which was particularly favorable.

General Somervell agreed that if we are able to reduce the losses in shipping from 2.6% to 2% per month, an additional troop lift of 500,000 men to England would be possible in 1943. If it were further reduced to 1.9%, an additional 50,000 could be lifted.

General Marshall said that if we accept General Somervell’s loss rate, the question as to what can be sent to Russia must be reexamined. It must also be determined whether we should undertake such a program considering its effects on troop lift.

General Somervell added that he recognized that there should be an improvement in the loss rate in 1943 over that which was sustained in 1942 because of the more effective anti-submarine measures which are contemplated. He felt it safer, however, to plan on the continuance of the 1942 rate until it could be effectively demonstrated that the losses would decrease. He said that it was reasonably certain that the loss rate would drop as low as 2.4% per month. In this case, all of the commitments under the Russian Protocol could be fulfilled. If the rate improves beyond 2.4%, an additional troop lift for Bolero will become available.

Lord Leathers stated that it is particularly important to establish an agreed estimated loss rate for planning purposes. This will insure that all those concerned with shipping problems will be speaking and thinking in the same terms when planning troop or cargo movements.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the figures in the paper apparently are based on the assumption that the northern route to Russia will be open throughout the year. He stated that this will not be the case, particularly during the period of Operation Husky. He further thought that the paper should include some statement indicating that commitments to Russia will only be fulfilled provided they will not entail prohibitive losses in shipping.

General Somervell said that stopping the northern convoys during the period of Operation Husky would eliminate 64 sailings for which the capacity was available on the Persian route. In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why the shipments to the Persian Gulf dropped off in June, General Somervell said that the commitments to Russia would not require the total capacity of all routes and that, therefore, a reduced rate had been applied to the Persian route which had the longest turnaround. This will provide a safety margin to take care of contingencies such as stopping the northern route during Operation Husky.

Lord Leathers pointed out that C.C.S. 162 applies only to aid from the United States. He said that the British can overtake their backlog of deliveries about the end of June; a relatively small number of British shipments is involved. Assuming a convoy every 27 days, there will be 11 or 12 ships in each, whereas if they were to be run every 40 days, each convoy must include 15 British ships.

General Somervell proposed an amendment to clarify paragraph 14 of C.C.S. 162. He then asked for a careful consideration of the conclusions contained in Paragraph 15 of the paper.

Lord Leathers suggested that in the last sentence the phrase “assigned to United States troop movements” be changed to “assigned to combined troop movements.”

Sir Charles Portal asked if it would be possible to frame our commitment to Russia so as to make it clear that some curtailment in the delivery of munitions might be required because of operational necessities. He felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were taking a big step in making a firm commitment regarding the delivery of munitions to Russia at the expense of all operational requirements.

Lord Leathers stated that we have reserved the right in the past to curtail shipments of munitions to Russia but that Russia did not like to have such reservations made and always objected when an actual curtailment became necessary. A notable exception to this was that they agreed that the northern convoys be discontinued during Operation Torch.

General Somervell pointed out that the current Protocol which expires in June of 1943 does include such a resolution. The new Protocol will be framed by the State Department and the Foreign Office, but actually there will be ample opportunity for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to review it before the negotiations between governments are initiated. It will thus be possible to insure that a safety clause is included in the basic document.

The Committee:
a) Agreed that a loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month could be relied on with sufficient certainty to warrant the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving their approval to the total shipping commitments set forth in Paragraph 6, Table II of C.C.S. 162, subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations’ effort.

b) Took note that the Persian Gulf route could make good the loss of 64 North Russian sailings if these had to be eliminated in the latter part of the year owing to other operations.

c) Agreed to direct the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate of the rate of United Nations’ shipping losses in 1943 which can be used by all United Nations’ Agencies for planning purposes.

d) Agreed to amend paragraph 15 of C.C.S. 162 so as to delete the words “United States” in the last sentence and substitute the word “Combined” therefor.

e) Agreed that, in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia, a clause should be included to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfillment prohibitive.

2. British Responsibility for Turkey
   (C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 2)

General Marshall suggested the addition of the words “through the Combined Chiefs of Staff” after “Assignment Boards” in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the draft resolution proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff at their previous meeting.

Brigadier Jacob explained the procedure for the submission of Turkish bids to the Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington. Turkish requirements were, in the first instance, scrutinized and coordinated by a Committee in Ankara containing U.S., British and Turkish representatives. This Committee transmitted requirements to London. The London Munitions Assignments Board passed on to the Washington Board bids for all material which could not be supplied from the U.K. The bids were presented by the British representatives of the Washington Munitions Assignments Board. Difficulty was caused, however, by the fact that the Turkish Embassy in Washington was apt to approach the War Department simultaneously with requests for equipment and, as a result, duplication took place. The object of the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff was to canalize all Turkish demands for munitions through London where the majority of these demands were met. Turkey was only one of a large number of claimants for material, and the general principle followed was that all the small European nations dealt with the London Board in the first instance, whereas the South American Republics and China dealt with Washington. For example, any demands made by the Chinese in London were refused, and the Chinese were told to present them direct to Washington. He feared that if all bids had to be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, they would be smothered in a mass of detail.

Admiral King said his only concern was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had an opportunity to exercise control over the actions of the Munitions Assignments Boards in connection with Turkish bids.

The Committee:
a) Agreed that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.

b) Agreed that, in particular, under the general direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward dispatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert such equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignments Board.

3. The Bomber Offensive from North Africa
   (C.C.S. 159)

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff setting out in order of time the proposed objectives for the bomber offensive from North Africa.

In discussion certain amendments were suggested and agreed.

The Committee:
Approved the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum as amended in the discussion.

4. Command in the Mediterranean
   (C.C.S. 163)

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff giving their recommendations for the set-up of air command in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke said that with the 8th Army approaching Tunisia the time was near when it would be necessary to place it under General Eisenhower’s command. It was, therefore, proposed that General Alexander should come in as Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower with the primary task of commanding the group of armies on the Tunisian front. He would be accompanied by a small nucleus staff with the necessary signals. This proposal, if accepted, would leave General Eisenhower in supreme command over:
a) The group of armies on the Tunisian front.
b) The U.S. 5th Army in Morocco.
c) French forces under General Juin.

He would still have, in addition, his political responsibilities in North Africa.

The position was slightly complicated by the fact that the 8th Army must still be supplied from the East. This could, however, be arranged and the organization in the Middle East was quite adequate for the task.

Sir Alan Brooke then pointed out that responsibility for planning Husky, or whatever operation in the Mediterranean might be decided upon, must soon be fixed. It would probably be thought that General Eisenhower was the appropriate man to assume this responsibility. If that were decided, he would have General Alexander available to take charge of the necessary work.

Sir Charles Portal said that intensive air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were coming to an end, but that many of the bases, such as Malta, in that area as well as the very large maintenance organization which had been established there, would still be available. It was essential that the action of all operational air forces in the Mediterranean area should be coordinated by one Commander.

General Arnold said that certain minor changes in the proposed organization would almost certainly be necessary, but the general setup was acceptable to him.

Sir Charles Portal agreed and said that such changes could most easily be made by the Air Commander-in-Chief once he had been appointed.

Admiral King asked what dividing line was proposed between the Middle East and Northwest African theaters.

Sir Alan Brooke replied that the British Chiefs of Staff when considering this matter had thought that a line from the Tunisia-Tripolitania frontier to Corfu would be most suitable.

Sir Dudley Pound then referred to the question of the naval command which would be necessary for Husky. His proposal was that Admiral Cunningham should become Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and that Admiral Harwood should adopt the title of Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary might be the line Bardia-Zanti [Zante]. Thus Malta would come under Admiral Cunningham who would be responsible for coordinating all movements and matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole. He would also be responsible for the distribution of forces between the Mediterranean and Levant Commands.

The Committee:
a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 163, subject to any minor changes which might be found necessary by the Air Commander-in-Chief after his appointment.

b) Took note with approval that it had been agreed that, at a time to be determined after the British 8th Army had crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander should become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, and that the British 8th Army should at the same time be transferred to the command of General Eisenhower, although it would continue to be based on the Middle East.

c) Agreed that, subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander’s primary task would be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small headquarters of his own, provided from the Middle East, and that after the conclusion of these operations he should take charge of Operation Husky.

d) Took note of the proposals of the First Sea Lord as set out above for Naval command in the Mediterranean during Husky, i.e., Western and Eastern Commands under Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and Commander-in-Chief Levant, respectively, with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean responsible for general coordination.

e) Agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed of the above decisions.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon, 1 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Harriman
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

The conversation was concerned with the de Gaulle-Giraud problem and the question of bringing de Gaulle to the Conference.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General Marshall		General Brooke
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke		Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull		Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart		Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Dykes
	Brigadier General Deane
	Lieutenant Colonel Grove

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 20, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

Secret

1. Husky
   (C.C.S. 161)

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke outlined the British proposals for undertaking this operation. He said that there were two broad alternatives for carrying out the British portion of the assault – either to mount the assaulting force in the U.K. and bring the follow-up from the Middle East, or to mount the major part of the operation from the Middle East. The former would enable us to start at an earlier date but, it involved a grave risk in passing the spearhead of the assault forces through the Sicilian narrows in mineable waters and under air attack. For this reason, the British Chiefs of Staff considered that the second alternative should be adopted.

If the major portion of the assault was to be mounted from North Africa, it seemed that training would be the bottleneck.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that a Brigade required three weeks training before it was fit to take part in the assault. A Brigade which had had previous training could be “brushed up” in about ten days. In either case, a further two weeks’ training was necessary for final rehearsals. Time could only be saved by arranging for two or more Brigades to be trained simultaneously. It was not possible to reduce the training periods below the figures he had given.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that these training times could not be further reduced. He thought, however, that we could not accept the end of September as the earliest date for the operation. Various devices were being examined, such as the setting up of additional training establishments and making use of a wider range of ports in the Middle East; and it was hoped to bring forward this date to about the end of August. It was assumed that Tunisia would have been cleared by the end of April.

Admiral, King asked what divisions were now with the 8th Army and whether any divisions were available in the Middle East which could start training at once.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, although there were some divisions not actively engaged in the present battle, they would all be required for operations after the capture of Tripoli.

Brigadier General Wedemeyer said that no difficulty was foreseen in finding the land forces required for the U.S. portion of the operation. It was assumed that the divisions required would be taken from Morocco and not from Tunisia. The Airborne Division would have to come from the U.S.A. Certain types of aircraft would also have to be brought over, but the majority were already available in North Africa. All could certainly be provided. He felt that some date at the end of July or the beginning of August should be possible.

Rear Admiral Cooke said that a great deal of research into the capacity of Northwest African ports and the provision of landing craft would be necessary. This was already in hand. On the question of timing, his view was about two months before a planning staff could be assembled and detailed plans could be produced. He agreed that it might be possible to start the operation in July.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the operation must depend on when the British could be ready and when the Americans could be ready and the later date set as D-day. He suggested that these should be worked out separately. It might be found that the later date was too late to be acceptable. He thought that if Tunisia were cleared by the end of April, a further two months should be sufficient for the preparation of airfields in the Tunisian tip.

General Marshall referred to the transport by air of 20,000 Chinese to Ramgarh and asked whether time might not be saved by making use of air transport to carry personnel from Northwest Africa to the Middle East. He suggested that, rather than transport troops to the Middle East via the Cape, they might be shipped to North Africa, carry out their training there, and then be taken by air to the Middle East. By that time the passage of the necessary landing craft should have been completed. He said that Sicily was our goal and that we ought not to be diverted from it by the apparent difficulties of the undertaking.

Admiral King agreed that, although for the assault the capacity of the Northwest-African ports might be barely sufficient, it should be possible to find room for training British as well as American formations in this area. He asked whether the Tunisian ports were being used for the assault.

Brigadier General Wedemeyer said that it was intended to make use of Bizerte, Tunis, and Sousse for the U.S. portion of the assault. For training he agreed that it might be possible to squeeze up further west and so leave some of these ports for training British formations if required.

Sir Alan Brooke said that every possible permutation must be examined and that we should aim at arriving at a starting date in July. Two points called for early decision – first, the setup of an organization to plan the whole operation; and, second, the preparation of a cover plan which would need to be integrated between the U.S.A., U.K., Northwest Africa, and the Middle East and put into effect at an early date. He pointed out that the Germans would be forced to divert troops from the Russian front as soon as our preparations made it clear that an offensive was impending somewhere. The effect of the operation would, therefore, be felt long before the actual assault was launched.

The Committee:
Directed the U.S. and British Planning Staffs to:

1. Examine all possible expedients for speeding up the preparations for Husky and to report on the earliest possible date by which the operation could be mounted.

2. Recommend how the organization for planning Husky should be set up.

2. Future Business

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it might be possible to bring forward certain items on the Agenda so as to complete the conference as early as possible. After a short discussion,

The Committee:
Agreed on the following program:

• Thursday
  • U-boat War.
  • Bomber Offensive from Great Britain.
  • Anakim.
  • Bolero (if time permits).
• Friday
  • Husky.
  • Landing Craft.
  • Limited Operations.
  • S. W. Pacific.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill-Giraud conversation, 5 p.m.

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	France
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	General Giraud
Mr. Hopkins		Count Poniatowski
Mr. Murphy

The question under discussion was the establishment of unity between de Gaulle and Giraud.

[NormanStewart]

Churchill-Roosevelt dinner, 7:45 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		General Alexander
Mr. Harriman		Sir Charles Wilson
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt		Mr. Rowan
Sergeant Hopkins		Mr. Martin
		Commander Thompson
		Captain Churchill

[NormanStewart]

Cabled by the Prime Minister to the British Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on January 20, 1943, at 10:03 p.m., along with the following explanatory message:

1. The President has shown me the enclosed draft statement. I invite your comments upon I hear from you tomorrow, 21st.

2. We have been waiting all day for a further reply from de Gaulle or for some explanation by you. If de Gaulle does not come the President will make an arrangement very favourable for General Giraud which I shall not easily be able to resist. Giraud has made an excellent impression on everyone here, military and political alike.

3. The President proposes to raise the rate exchange from 75 francs to the dollar to 50 and he asks whether we will alter our rate in Madagascar and elsewhere in the reverse direction to have one unique rate of 50. On this point, I seek your advice.

Draft Statement to the Press

Casablanca, January 20, 1943.

Suggested Joint Statement by the President and the Prime Minister

The President and the Prime Minister met in northern Africa on January 14th. They were accompanied by or preceded by members of the Combined Staff.

Since then, there have been daily conferences relating to the continuation and strengthening of the war effort.

The plans are progressing in every way, favorably.

They have received visits from Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan, Generals Eisenhower, Clark and Spaatz of the American Expeditionary Force in North Africa, and also from General Alexander and Air Marshal Tedder from the British Eighth Army operating in Tripoli.

The President was accompanied by Mr. Hopkins, and the meeting was joined by Mr. Averell Harriman and Lord Leathers of the British Shipping Administration, who came from London.

General Giraud spent several days with the American and British representatives.

General de Gaulle was invited to come from London, but declined. General Giraud will proceed with the organization of a French army of several hundred thousand men coming from Algeria, Morocco, French West Africa and Tunis; and it is hoped that this Army, formed to assist in the liberation of France itself, will be joined by other French who find themselves in a position to cooperate. The equipping of this French army will come largely from American and British sources. General Giraud will be in command of all French forces and the civil administrations in North and West Africa will be responsible to him in order to forward as greatly as possible the attainment of the single objective – the liberation of France.

This arrangement, pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves, in no sense sets itself up as the government, or the provisional government, or the prospective government of France.

The meetings held during the past week in North Africa make clear the only great purpose which can be considered at this time – the winning of the war against the Axis powers, and, with it, the liberation of France.

The President and the Prime Minister have now completed the work of planning and cooperation necessary at this time. The meetings have been wholly successful.

[NormanStewart]

Churchill-Eaker luncheon meeting

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Major General Eaker		Prime Minister Churchill

[NormanStewart]

Wednesday, 20 January

Lt. General Somervell arrived at Villa Dar es Saada at eight o’clock this morning to breakfast with Mr. Hopkins, and departed one hour later. Major General Spaatz called at ten o’clock to keep an appointment with the President and departed at 11:30. Mr. Robert Murphy also spent an hour at the President’s villa this morning conferring with the President and Mr. Hopkins.

At 11:35, General Marshall, Lt. General Arnold, Lt. General Somervell, and Admiral E. J. King arrived for a conference with the President, and following this conference they were photographed on the terrace with the President, together with Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. After the photographs had been taken, the aforementioned Army and Navy officers departed, about 12:30.

Shortly after 1:00 p.m. the Prime Minister, Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan called to have lunch with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Col. Elliot Roosevelt, and departed just before 3:00 p.m.

At 5:00 p.m., the Prime Minister returned in company with General Giraud, and the General’s Civilian Aide, M. Poniatowski, and went into conference with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Mr. Murphy until 5:55, when they took their departure.

At 7:45, the President left Villa Dar es Saada to dine as the guest of the Prime Minister at “Mirador.” Also dining with the President and the Prime Minister this evening were:

• General H. R. L. G. Alexander
• Sir Charles Wilson
• Mr. T. L. Rowan (Private Secretary to the P.M.)
• Mr. J. M. Martin (Private Secretary to the P.M.)
• Mr. Harry Hopkins
• Mr. Averell Harriman
• Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt
• Commander Thompson (Aide to the Prime Minister)
• Captain Randolph Churchill
• Sergeant Robert Hopkins

The President returned to his villa about 11:15 p.m. and retired shortly thereafter.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (January 21, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral King		General Brooke
General Marshall		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke		Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Lieutenant General Ismay
Colonel Smart		Major General Kennedy
Commander Libby		Air Vice Marshal Slessor
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Dykes
	Brigadier General Deane
	Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 21, 1943, 10 a.m.

Secret

1. The U-Boat War
   (C.C.S. 160)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report by the Combined Staff Planners on minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations (C.C.S. 160).

Sir Dudley Pound said that most of the points in the body of the paper had been touched on in the course of previous discussions, but he drew particular attention to paragraph 14 emphasizing the need for adequate air cover if the number of escorts was to be kept to a minimum Schedule V on the last page of the paper showed the large number of escorts required for this purpose. The table in Enclosure “C” showed the small numbers of escort vessels which would be coining out of production during the first half of 1943.

Sir Charles Portal explained that the categories of aircraft in this Schedule were as follows:

• VLR – Aircraft with a range over 2,000 miles, such as Liberators, and specially prepared Halifaxes with a range of about 2,100 miles which were temporarily assigned to antisubmarine work.
• LR – Aircraft with a range between 1,200 and 2,000 miles.
• MR – Aircraft with a range between 600 and 1,200 miles.

He inquired whether it could be taken that the requirements of Section 2 in Schedule V (North Atlantic, East Coast U.S. and Canada) involved no commitments for the United Kingdom.

Admiral King said that he had not the exact figures, but he had no reason to doubt that this commitment would be fulfilled by the U.S. and Canada entirely. The Caribbean and the East Coast of South America were also, of course, entirely U.S. commitments. The full details of the U.S. figures were not available at the present time, but he suggested that the report should be accepted as a working basis.

Admiral King said that the report of the Combined Staff Planners on the U-boat war, which had been ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a recent meeting in Washington, should be ready very shortly. This would contain the full U.S. figures.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that in their agreed policy for the conduct of the war in 1943 (C.C.S. 155/1), the Combined Chiefs of Staff had said that the defeat of the U-boat must remain the first charge on the resources of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it had been decided that the Rabaul and Husky operations were to be carried out, and these would inevitably detract from the anti-submarine effort. He felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should clearly record their reasons for thus diverging from the anti-submarine effort as a first objective. He passed around draft conclusions on the Combined Staff Planners’ report, which he had discussed with Admiral King, but suggested that since the first two of these were bound up with the directive for the bomber offensive from the U.K., which was to be discussed next, these should be taken up after that item.

After an adjournment,

The Committee:
a) Took note of C.C.S. 160.
b) Agreed that:

1. Intensified bombing of U-boat operating bases should be carried out.

2. Intensified bombing of U-boat constructional yards should be carried out.

3. U.S. and British Naval Staffs should:
   a. Scrutinize the dispositions of all existing destroyers and escort craft;
   b. Allocate as much new construction, or vessels released by new construction, as possible to convoy protection. The above with a view to each nation providing, to the greatest extent possible, half of the present deficiency of sixty-five escorts for the protection of Atlantic convoys.

4. U.S. and British Naval Staffs should provide auxiliary escort carriers for working with Atlantic convoys at the earliest practicable moment.

5. Long distance shore-based air cover should be provided over the following convoy routes as a matter of urgency:
   a. North Atlantic convoys (U.S.-U.K.) – from both sides of the Atlantic.
   b. DWI oil convoys from the West Indies and the U.K.
   c. Torch oil convoys from the West Indies and Gibraltar.
   d. U.K.-Freetown convoys from Northwest and West Africa.

6. Greenland airdromes should be developed for use by LR or VLR aircraft.

7. Non-ocean-going escorts should be used for Husky to the maximum possible extent.

2. The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom
   (C.C.S. 166)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive for the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom submitted by the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 166).

Sir Charles Portal, in answer to a question by General Marshall on the precise implications of paragraph 6, said that political considerations often override military expediency in the case of objectives in the occupied countries. The British Government, on representations from one of the exiled Governments, sometimes placed a political embargo on some excellent military target. In such cases decisions had often to be taken very quickly, and it would not be practicable to deal with the matter through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

General Marshall suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the words “for political reasons” should be inserted in paragraph 6 in order to make this clear.

In discussion it was also agreed that the word “synthetic” should be deleted from paragraph 2 (d).

Sir Charles Portal referred to the difficulty which always arose in such directives over the precise interpretation of placing the German submarine bases and construction yards first in order of priority. This might be held to preclude attacks on any other targets. At the present time the U.S. 8th Bomber Command had U-boat targets at the top of their list and attacked them on every possible occasion with good results. There had been, however, considerable criticism in the U.K. because they never attacked targets in Germany. If too literal an interpretation of the order of priority were taken and the entire weight of our bomber effort were placed on the German submarine bases, to the exclusion of targets in Germany, there would be very serious criticism indeed. His own view was that other targets besides the submarine bases and yards should not be excluded and that paragraph 2 of the paper required some redrafting to make it clear that there was no intention to concentrate on what were strategically defensive operations to the exclusion of the offensive.

General Marshall said that he fully appreciated this difficulty.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that the acceptance of large-scale amphibious operations for 1943 must inevitably detract from the antisubmarine effort and every endeavor should, therefore, be made to offset this by a higher concentration of the air effort against U-boat targets. He believed that if we put the maximum effort onto the Biscay bases now, and destroyed all the facilities and accommodations in the towns, we should vitally affect German capacity to carry on the U–boat campaign. It was no good making sporadic attacks, the pressure had to be continued for a considerable period. If the Germans had gone on bombing Plymouth, Liverpool and Glasgow instead of stopping when they did, we should have been placed in a very difficult position indeed.

He could not see that there was any real difference between so-called offensive and defensive bombing. Both were directed against the power of the enemy to carry on the war.

Admiral King agreed that the bombing of the U-boat bases should be sustained. His impression was that the bombing of anti-submarine targets had so far been sporadic. For example, it appeared that Berlin had had in two raids twice the weight of bombs dropped on Lorient recently.

Sir Charles Portal agreed that it would be a sound move to destroy completely the four Biscay bases if experience showed this was possible. Attacks would be continued on Lorient, but so far we had no information of the result of the recent concentrated bombardments. It had had a greater weight of bombs dropped on it than Plymouth. In comparing this with the weight on Berlin, regard must be paid to the comparative size of these two targets. Weight in relation to area was much greater at Lorient than Berlin.

Sir Alan Brooke did not think that we could win by defeating the U-boat alone. We should be careful, therefore, not to allot more effort than was absolutely necessary for this purpose. The bombing of Germany contributed directly to the destruction of German power, whereas the bombing of U-boat targets was only an indirect contribution.

General Marshall recalled that in the bombing directive for the Mediterranean the emphasis had been laid on preparations for Husky. He asked what would be done from the United Kingdom to support an invasion of Europe.

Sir Charles Portal said that this point was covered by paragraph 5 of the draft directive. Targets would be selected in accordance with the plan of the Commander-in-Chief, so as to give the best possible support to the operations of the Army. Whenever operations were immediately in prospect, attacks on what might be called the long-term targets, such as industry, had to give way to immediate operational needs.

General Arnold said that no one was keener to go for targets in Germany than the U.S. Air Commanders in the United Kingdom. They had been directed on to U-boat targets by General Eisenhower as a direct means of supporting Torch. About half the U.S. bomber force in the U.K. had already been withdrawn from the United Kingdom to North Africa, but large increases in its strength were now in prospect. We should soon be able to think in terms of hundreds of bombers where we were now thinking in tens.

General Marshall said that the control of bomber operations by the U.S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom would be in the hands of the British. It would be a matter of command rather than of agreement with the U.S. Commanders. It would be the responsibility of the U.S. Commanders to decide the technique and method to be employed.

After an adjournment,

The Committee:
Approved, subject to minor amendments, a revised draft directive prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff (circulated subsequently as C.C.S. 166/1/D).

3. Draft Telegram to M. Stalin
   (C.C.S. 165)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 5 of the draft telegram prepared for the President and Prime Minister to send to Premier Stalin be amended by changing the first sentence to read, “We have taken the decision to launch wide scale amphibious operations at the earliest possible moment” and to amend the second sentence to read, “the preparations for these operations are now underway and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in North African ports.”

These changes were acceptable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir John Dill suggested that in paragraph 5 the 5th sentence be terminated with the word “subjected” and that the remainder of the sentence be deleted.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that paragraph 8 should be strengthened in view of the much greater Allied bomber offensive which will be undertaken against Germany as the result of the increased bomber strength which is in view. The British will increase their heavy bomber strength from 600 to 1,000 and the United States’ increase will be from 200 to 900. This will enable the intensity of the bombing attack against Germany to be at least doubled, a fact that M. Stalin should be glad to learn.

Admiral King suggested that the last two sentences of paragraph 5 be deleted from that paragraph and amalgamated with the redraft of paragraph 8, suggested above by Sir Charles Portal.

It was agreed that the last two sentences of paragraph 5, paragraph 7, and a more positive statement of paragraph 8 be amalgamated into one paragraph.

The Committee:
Directed that representatives of the Combined Staffs be directed to revise the draft telegram to M. Stalin in the light of the discussion given above.

4. Anakim
   (C.C.S. 164)

General Marshall suggested that in the remarks [paragraph 3, c concerning the availability of air forces, the last two words, “Middle East,” be deleted, and the words, “Mediterranean area” be substituted therefor.

This change was agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that he believed the target date of November 1943, given as an assumption in paragraph 2, was probably too early for actual accomplishment, but that it should do no harm to let it stand as a target date to be aimed at.

The Committee:
(a) Took note of C.C.S. 164 as amended and agreed:

1. To approve November 15, 1943, as the provisional date for the Anakim assault.
2. To approve the provisional schedule of forces laid out in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 164, recognizing that the actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft, and shipping must depend on the situation in the late summer of 1943.
3. To confirm in July 1943 the decision to undertake or to postpone Operation Anakim.

5. Bolero Buildup

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were informed that a paper on the subject, being prepared by the British Joint Planning Staff, was not ready for consideration.

General Marshall suggested that there be some general discussion regarding Bolero prior to receipt of the British paper. He stated that it had already been decided to keep plans for a cross-channel operation up to date on a month-by-month basis in order to be ready at any time to initiate such operations.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed with this statement.

General Marshall then said he wished to discuss the question of organization. He asked what is to be done in England and also how the plans regarding Bolero are to crystallize.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British can absorb American troops at the rate of 120,000 per month. In this connection, General Somervell said that the number to arrive would be somewhat less than 120,000 per month up to July but considerably more thereafter.

Sir Alan Brooke said that one of the greatest difficulties regarding the reception of American troops in England is the lack of sufficient receiving depots for equipment. It would be necessary to construct additional depots. The British have stopped such construction because of the manpower situation and because they have only been committed to receive five additional American divisions, or a total of 427,000 troops. The construction which must be undertaken and the operating force required for new reception depots will require personnel from the United States. These should be included in the earliest possible troop convoys to the U.K.

An area has been reserved in southwestern England for the United States troops which will be next to the area reserved for British troops in southeastern England. These areas will face France. The area to be occupied by the United States troops is being cleared of British forces. Their accommodations, except for some which cannot be moved, such as schools, will be available to the American forces.

He said that the immediate necessity was the appointment of a Commanding General and staff. The British are now engaged in reorganizing their forces from defensive organizations, supplied from fixed bases, to offensive organizations which include their own mobile service elements. It is expected that 12 divisions will be so organized by July and 15 by October. The new offensive organizations will be divorced entirely from the defensive organizations of the British Isles. Each will be under a separate commander. The British offensive forces, together with those being built up by the United States, including air forces, should come under a supreme commander who should be appointed in the near future.

General Marshall stated that General Andrews is now going to England to replace General Hartle and undertake the same duties that General Eisenhower performed prior to Operation Torch. He will have the responsibility of receiving American divisions in England; and, as soon as these divisions are ready, General Andrews will turn them over to the Supreme Commander for assignment to the cross-channel task force. He assumed that although the British contemplated setting up a separate Home Defense force, the cross-channel task force would also have to be on an alert status and considered as available to participate in the defense of the British Isles.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there were two types of planning involved with regard to the cross-channel operations; one was for a limited offensive operation which might be expected in 1943, and the other was for the larger task of an all-out invasion of the Continent. In the latter case, the decision must be made as to the direction of the attack once the landing was effected. It must be decided whether such an attack would be aimed at Germany or at occupied France. Plans might well be made to meet both contingencies.

He said that plans must envisage making the maximum use of SOE activities and that these activities must be carefully coordinated with the military operations proposed. This has not always been done in the past.

Admiral King said he considered that the appointment of a supreme commander was urgent.

General Somervell said that he had understood Sir Alan Brooke to say that the British could absorb 120,000 troops per month without assistance from the United States. This is contrary to an opinion which General Somervell attributed to Lord Leathers, that assistance would be required from the United States if the flow of troops to England exceeded 70,000 per month. General Somervell said it would be necessary to determine at once which estimate is correct. He also said that he understood it would be necessary for the United States to furnish some locomotives and rolling stock to the British in order to assist in the increased traffic resulting from troop movements.

He pointed out that the speed of sending troops to the U.K. would depend largely upon the success attained in combating the submarine menace. He urged that the United Nations concentrate their efforts in this respect.

General Somervell said that the location of United States troops in England must be made with an eye to training facilities. The troops will need amphibious training for which few facilities are available in southern England. He concluded that, from a supply point of view, an early decision was necessary as to the size of the buildup of United States forces contemplated and the type of operations in which they would be engaged. These decisions are particularly necessary with respect to the allocation of tonnage.

Sir Alan Brooke said that any operation in 1943 will of necessity be limited since an all-out offensive across the Channel can hardly be undertaken until 1944. With regard to the rolling stock for the railroads, he pointed out that when an invasion of the Continent is undertaken, the Germans will make every effort to deny our use of their rolling stock. For this reason, the United Nations must be prepared to follow the initial assault with such equipment.

He stated that the British now send their troops from southern England to Scotland or Northern Ireland by brigade groups for amphibious training. He suggested the possibility of United States troops stopping off in Ireland or Scotland for such training on their way to the final assembling area in southwestern England. The greatest difficulty is in the training of armored units, and that as far as possible it would be better if the United States forces could have this training prior to their departure from the United States.

General Marshall said that this can easily be arranged. It must be remembered that the forces used in the Torch operation were hurriedly gathered together and that the training of the troops, prior to their departure from the United States, had been difficult. The buildup for Bolero can be accomplished more deliberately and will enable the armored units to participate in major maneuvers and complete their target practice prior to departure. Units will be frozen three months prior to leaving the United States, and this will facilitate their training. He pointed out that firing ranges have been made available for use by units in staging areas en route to ports of debarkation.

In reply to a question from Lord Louis Mountbatten, he stated that insofar as possible, all units would have had amphibious training prior to their departure from the United States.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the British had set up an amphibious training establishment at Appledore on the Bristol Channel. The northern part of this training area has been turned over to the Americans for amphibious training. Flat beaches, changes of tides, and all means of possible defense are available to insure the thoroughness of the training. Another amphibious training establishment will be available in the Clyde area in two months and, in addition, one in Northern Ireland which has been started by Admiral Bennett.

General Marshall said that he assumed that the American troops included in the assault waves of a cross-channel attack would have to be rehearsed in amphibious operations, but that the great bulk of American troops would not need such rehearsals.

Lord Louis Mountbatten then pointed out that it would be well to arrange to have American forces use landing craft manned by American crews, with which General Marshall agreed.

General Somervell stated that the movement of American forces to England must be considered in connection with the escort vessels available for convoys.

Admiral King agreed that the Bolero troop movements would constitute an additional requirement for escort vessels.

Sir Charles Portal said that air forces must be reorganized with Bolero in view. At present the RAF operates from static bases. Mobile air units must be organized to support cross-channel operations. He suggested that American fighter aircraft should be under the operational direction of the British in the same manner as had already been decided for heavy bombardment aircraft.

Sir Charles Portal called attention to the fact that a decision must be made as to whether to utilize troop-lift capacity from the United States to Great Britain for ground troops or for the ground echelons of the air force. He also stated that a decision might be forced on the Combined Chiefs of Staff with regard to utilizing some of the shipping engaged in the delivery of munitions to Russia in the buildup of a Bolero force.

General Somervell said that a paper was being prepared, designed to show how many troops can be transported from the United States to the U K. The paper had to be based on a great many assumptions and the figures which it would contain could not be considered as a reliable estimate until certain decisions have been arrived at with reference to other operations, notably Husky. Assuming that Husky is mounted in August and that an attack will be mounted from England on August 15th, it would be possible to bring in approximately 400,000 troops to England by July 1st. This would give them six weeks to settle down in order to be available for an attack August 15th. The 400,000 troops mentioned included those now in England. Of the total number, approximately 172,000 would be air corps troops and there would be five to six ground divisions. He said that, assuming 150 ship voyages could be made available from British imports, the number could be raised from seven to nine divisions.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that these figures bore out his previous estimates that there would be from 18 to 21 divisions available in England in the latter part of the summer.

General Somervell said that if the attack from England were not to be mounted until September 15th, four additional divisions could be transported from the United States, three in American, and one in British shipping. The rate of four divisions per month could be maintained thereafter inasmuch as most of the overhead personnel would be included in the earlier shipments.

Sir Alan Brooke asked what rate of flow could be expected from America monthly, assuming an attack from England in September. Would one division per month be the maximum?

General Somervell replied that the figure would greatly exceed this as far as shipping was concerned. However, if the troops were to be transported to France, the number would be limited by the port facilities available. For this reason, any plans made should envisage the capture of sufficient port facilities.

Admiral King agreed that this should be given careful consideration in planning the operation.

General Marshall suggested that once the operation is initiated, it would probably be necessary to conduct separate operations to gain additional port facilities.

Sir Alan Brooke said he thought it would be easier to establish a bridgehead and widen it out by overland operations in order to capture the ports that would be necessary. He said that at least two or three ports would be required before any attempt could be made to advance further inland. He thought that the ports from Calais to Bordeaux were the most desirable. When the British were in France, they operated from Lorient to Calais and that even with these ports, it required a long period of time to build up nine divisions.

General Marshall said that after the direct crossing had been accomplished, he thought it would be desirable to find some method of making a flank attack in order to shorten the operations. In this connection, he had considered the possibilities of Holland and Denmark.

Sir Alan Brooke said that before a sufficient force could be built up for a direct attack, the Germans, because of their superior communications, could concentrate against our forces in superior numbers. This will be true unless German divisions are forced to withdraw from France because the Russian “steam roller” had started rolling.

Sir Dudley Pound said that Denmark did not offer good opportunities for hostile landings because of the difficulties of air coverage and also because of the lack of ports on her western coast. Holland is undesirable because of her canal system which favors the defense in retarding forward movements.

Sir Alan Brooke said that it would be necessary to determine accurately what flow of reinforcements from the United States could be expected.

General Somervell stated that he would be prepared to present such data within from 8 to 10 hours after a decision concerning Operation Husky had been made.

Admiral King then suggested that limited operations proposed from England in 1943 be discussed.

The British Chiefs of Staff stated that they had a paper on this subject in the process of preparation and would be prepared to discuss it during the meeting of January 22nd.

Sir Alan Brooke brought up the question of what organizational set-up for Bolero would be.

Both the United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed that they had not discussed this matter among themselves and had not come to a definite conclusion.

General Marshall said that there were two methods of organization that might be followed: either a Deputy Commander or a Chief of Staff could be set up with an appropriate staff; or a Commanding General could be selected at once and organize his own staff. In either case, the planning and training for these operations should be undertaken at once and carried out on a month-to-month basis, ready at any time to undertake a cross-channel operation if the opportunity was presented.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that there was a combined staff in London now which might be a nucleus around which the Bolero planning organization could be built.

Lord Louis Mountbatten pointed out that any operations undertaken this year would be very small.

Sir Alan Brooke considered that regardless of how small the operations might be, they should be tied in with the overall plan for the all-out invasion of the Continent and designed to further those operations in some way.

The Committee:
Agreed that representatives of the Combined Staffs should prepare and submit recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be ready not later than the afternoon of January 22 relative to the command, organization, planning and training set-up necessary for entry of Continental Europe from the U.K. in 1943 and 1944.

6. Report to the President and the Prime Minister

Without discussion,

The Committee:
Directed the Secretariat to prepare a draft report of decisions reached subsequent to the submission of C.C.S. 153/1.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, 6:25 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill

Churchill arrived with news that de Gaulle had agreed to come to Casablanca.

[NormanStewart]

Thursday, 21 January

The President arose early this morning, breakfasted, and left Casablanca by automobile at 9:20 for an inspection of the United States Army forces stationed in the vicinity of Rabat, some 85 miles to the northeast. He was accompanied by Major General G. S. Patton, Jr., Commanding General First Armored Corps, Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, and Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire. Captain McCrea had gone on ahead to Rabat by automobile, accompanied by Brigadier General W. H. Wilbur, to deliver in person a letter from the President to the Sultan of Morocco inviting the Sultan and his entourage to take dinner with the President at Casablanca on 22 January. Captain McCrea joined the President’s party upon arrival at a point about five miles north of Rabat, where the President was to begin his inspection.

[Here follows the account of the President’s inspection trip.]

The President reached his villa in Casablanca at 5:20 p.m. He had been gone eight hours on his tour of inspection, traveling approximately 200 miles by automobile.

Following the President’s return to his villa at Casablanca, the Prime Minister called and remained with the President for an hour, departing at 7:25 p.m. Dinner was a comparatively small affair, Admiral McIntire and Captain McCrea dining with the President, Mr. Hopkins, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, and the President’s son, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt. The President said that he had enjoyed himself immensely during this day in the open. He retired shortly after 9:30 for his longest night’s rest since arriving in North Africa.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (January 22, 1943)

Hopkins-Churchill conversation, 9:45 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Mr. Hopkins		Prime Minister Churchill

Hopkins, at Roosevelt’s request, informed Churchill that the press conference planned for noon of January 22 would be postponed. In the course of their discussion, Hopkins expressed dissatisfaction over the results of the Conference, and Churchill held forth the hope that de Gaulle’s arrival at the Conference might permit some progress to be made.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:15 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General Marshall		General Brooke
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke		Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull		Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart		Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby		Air Vice Marshal Inglis
		Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Dykes
	Brigadier General Deane
	Brigadier Jacob
	Lieutenant Colonel Grove

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 22, 1943, 10:15 a.m.

Secret

1. Draft of Telegram to Mr. Stalin
   (C.C.S. 165/1)

After several minor amendments had been agreed upon,

The Committee:
Directed that the draft telegram as amended be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister for their approval.

2. Husky
   (C.C.S. 161/1)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Planners had examined various permutations and combinations with reference to assembling and training the requisite forces for Operation Husky and concluded that it could be mounted by August 30th, with the possibility of putting the date forward to August 15th. The British Chiefs of Staff were in favor of Plan A described in C.C.S. 151/1, Enclosure “A”, paragraph 5. He said that August 22nd would be the best date because of the favorable state of the moon. The date could be set still earlier if the Tunisian ports were made available to the British for loading.

The British will require 5 divisions in all for the operation. These would probably be the 5th, 56th, 78th for the first assault; one division in from U.K. for the Catania assault on D+3; and the New Zealand division for the follow-up. It will be necessary to move the Overseas Assault Force from England to the eastern Mediterranean about March 15th. Once this had been accomplished, the British would be committed to Operation Husky to the exclusion of Brimstone.

General Marshall said that while the U.S. Planning Staff did not have complete data available at this time, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that as far as the United States forces are concerned, Operation Husky could be mounted by August 1st or earlier. He referred to a statement made in paragraph 4 of the outline plan (Enclosure “A” to C.C.S. 165/1 [161/1]) that if the British forces used the Algerian and Tunisian ports in order to be ready by August 1st, the American share of the assault might be delayed beyond August 31st. The United States Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the British could utilize all the ports from Bizerte eastward and the United States forces could still be made ready by August 1st. The only use required by the American forces of Bizerte and ports to the eastward would be for refueling purposes. He stated that as far as landing craft is concerned, little difficulty would be encountered. The limiting factor would be the “degree of finished training” that would be necessary. One division to come from the United States is undergoing thorough amphibious training at this time. The remaining divisions to participate are now in North Africa. They have already participated in landing operations, and their further training presents no problem. The question of relieving these divisions which are now being held ready for any eventuality in Spanish Morocco will require careful planning.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Planners thought that it might be necessary for the British to have ports somewhat further west than Bizerte in order to meet a target date of August 1st.

Admiral Cooke said that the British could train at Bougie and do their loading in the Tunis area. He could see no reason why all the forces could not meet a target date of August 1st. He realized that the Germans might do considerable damage to the ports of Bizerte and Tunis, but he estimated that by blasting processes the ports could be cleared for use by the time the air forces were ready to operate.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the British prognostications for the target date were based on an estimate that the Axis forces would be driven from Tunisia by April 30th. If this is accomplished sooner, the target date could be moved forward accordingly.

Admiral Cooke pointed out that there is still uncertainty regarding the character of the beaches in Sicily. They might not be suitable for the new types of landing craft, and this would involve a change of plans. He also indicated that Admiral Cunningham will be presented with some difficulties when landing craft and combat loaders are moved into the Mediterranean. It will be necessary to do this in time for them to be available for training. The American forces will require some of the new type LCA landing craft. These weigh 8 tons empty, 13 tons loaded, and carry 36 men. The davits on the U.S. combat loaders may have to be replaced or adjusted in order to be capable of handling such weight.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said the British are building 30 LCA type landing craft per month in England. The number needed by the American forces could either be sent to America from England or the blueprints could be sent to America and the craft could be constructed there. The design is comparatively simple, and he thought that they could easily be manufactured in the United States. If the craft were to be manufactured in England, it would be necessary for the United States to furnish the engines required. The shipping of some 60 LCA to the Mediterranean, however, would not be an easy problem.

Sir Alan Brooke said it was apparent that the Whole plan might require some changes; there might be some unforeseen and insurmountable difficulties which would necessitate the postponing of the target date too long. He thought that, in this case, we should be prepared with an alternative.

General Marshall stated that he understood the only possible alternative was Operation Brimstone and indicated that he would like to discuss frankly the desirability of undertaking that operation.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Operation Brimstone would afford a base for the bombing of the whole of Italy; it would be an easier operation to undertake; and it could be accomplished earlier. It does not assist in clearing the Mediterranean for shipping, and it would not be as great a blow to Italy. However, he felt it essential that consideration of Operation Brimstone, as a possibility, be not delayed so long as to leave us with no alternative for 1943 if it were found that Husky could not be accomplished.

General Marshall said it was the opinion of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that while Operation Brimstone would produce an advantage as far as air attack against Italy is concerned, it would postpone Husky. Any operation in the Mediterranean would postpone the Bolero build-up. He considered Brimstone a minor operation which would result in many military restrictions. Either Husky or cross-channel operations will produce great results, whereas Brimstone merely gives an air advantage. At the same time, it jeopardizes the prospects of either Husky or cross-channel operations.

General Marshall pointed out that German resistance to Operation Brimstone could not be discounted. In estimating the capabilities of the United Nations, it must be assumed that the Germans are aware that Sardinia can be undertaken at an earlier date than Husky. They will undoubtedly make their dispositions accordingly. He added that the undertaking of Brimstone would destroy the cover for future operations unless the Germans conclude that we propose to by-pass Sicily entirely and attack southern France. He thought it hardly likely that the Germans would come to such a conclusion.

He said the United States Chiefs of Staff are more concerned with adding to the security of shipping through the Mediterranean and with the immediate effects of our operations on Germany’s strength against the Russians than they are with eliminating Italy from the war. He thought that to undertake Operation Brimstone would be to seek the softest spot before turning to the harder spot and in so doing we might make the harder spot harder.

Admiral King pointed out that the airfields in Sardinia have a relatively small capacity and that they would have to be developed. While the position of Sardinia does bring northern Italy and southern France within range of our fighter aircraft, it is, by the same token, within range of Axis aircraft based in those areas.

General Arnold said that in order to get fighter protection from Sardinia we must capture Corsica.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff are very much opposed to the Operation Brimstone.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he agreed with all of these arguments, and he felt that we must go all out for Sicily. At the same time, he felt that there should be an alternative upon which we could fall back in case of absolute necessity.

Admiral King said that the ideal would be to attack Sicily at the same time the Germans were evacuating Tunis. The longer the attack against Sicily is delayed beyond that date, the stronger will be the defenses of Sicily. He thought it important, therefore, that every effort be made to reduce this lapse of time to the minimum.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that in his opinion the ideal would be to take Sardinia during the time that Tunis was being evacuated by the Axis forces. He felt that the Axis powers would then be giving little attention to the defenses of Sardinia. He thought that the earlier date upon which the Operation Brimstone could be accomplished, the securing of air bases from which to attack northern Italy, and the possibility of conducting Commando raids all along the coast of Italy, combined to make Operation Brimstone very attractive.

General Marshall asked Lord Louis Mountbatten if the training difficulties would be reduced if we were able to attack Sicily at the same time that Tunis was being evacuated by the Axis forces.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said he did not think so inasmuch as the evacuation would have small effect on the fixed defenses of Sicily.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that if the operation were to be mounted before August 22nd, it should be moved forward to July 25th in order to take full advantage of the favorable stage of the moon.

Admiral King suggested that for purposes of surprise it might be well to mount the operation at a time other than when the moon was in its best stage.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that to avoid undue risk of aerial torpedo attack the periods of the full moon should be avoided and that the assault should be made only when there was moonlight during the early morning hours. There was a period of from 5 to 6 days in each month which would be suitable.

Admiral King said he thought that July 25th should be set as the target date for planning purposes and that the attack should only be postponed to August if July proved to be impossible.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that a clear statement should be made by the naval forces as to when their training can be completed. He prophesied that naval training will be the bottleneck.

Sir Charles Portal agreed with Admiral King that July should be set as the target date in order that we might strive for the best. He added that we should also be prepared for the worst. He pointed out that the critical time on the Russian front is in August and September. If the target date for Husky had to be postponed beyond September, it would be of little value. He considered that the collapse of Italy would have the most favorable effect on the Russian front. Since this might be accomplished by Operation Brimstone, he thought that we should be prepared to undertake this operation if Husky had to be delayed too long. Brimstone in June would be better than Husky in September; but a decision to undertake Brimstone must be made by March 1st; otherwise, the landing craft would be at the wrong end of the Mediterranean.

General Marshall said he thought there should be no looseness in our determination to undertake Operation Husky. He recounted the difficulties regarding the changes and delays in Bolero in 1942.

Sir Alan Brooke and Sir Charles Portal agreed with this view.

General Marshall said that we must be determined to do the hard thing and proceed to do it. He did not agree with Sir Charles Portal that the elimination of Italy from the war was the most important thing that could be done. To accept this premise might make it absolutely necessary to turn to Operation Brimstone in order that Italy could be eliminated in time. He felt that this should be avoided because Operation Brimstone would neutralize the efforts of the United Nations for 1943. He said that in Brimstone we should be advancing into a salient with limited air support where we might be shot at from three directions. The supply of Sardinia entails an increase in our line of communications and adds a threat to our limited shipping.

Sir Dudley Pound said that if Operation Brimstone is undertaken, Husky would have to be delayed until the period of bad weather in October or later.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Operation Brimstone would not be an easy operation. Fighter support would be inadequate, and it would be necessary to fight our way northward through the entire island. He believed that we should go bald-headed for Sicily. He felt that the capture of Sicily would have more effect on the war. He added, however, that if by March 1st it develops that Operation Husky cannot be mounted until too late, it was important for us to have an alternative to turn to in order that we do not remain idle for the entire year.

The discussion then turned on the Command and Staff organization which would be required for the operation.

Admiral Cooke said that the Combined Staff Planners felt strongly that one man should be made responsible for the whole of the arrangements; otherwise, it was very unlikely that the necessary preparations could be completed within the short time available. A special staff would be required for the purpose.

In the discussion this need was fully accepted, and it was recognized that the Chief of Staff must be carefully selected.

The Committee:
a) Resolved to attack Sicily in 1943 with the favorable July moor as the target date.

b) Agreed to instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than March 1st: (1) whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon; and, (2) in that event, to confirm that the date will not be later than the favorable August moon.

c) Agreed that the following should be the Command setup for the operation:

1. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for the detailed planning and preparation and for the execution of the actual operation when launched.

2. Admiral Cunningham to be the Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

3. Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

d) Agreed that General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation.

e) Instructed the Secretaries to draft for their approval the necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above decisions.

[NormanStewart]

Hopkins-Harriman-Mountbatten luncheon meeting

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Mr. Hopkins		Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Mr. Harriman

Mountbatten explained his views in favor of an attack on Sardinia rather than Sicily and described current British experiments on special explosives and ships made of ice.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General Marshall		General Brooke
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke		Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull		Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart		Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Dykes
	Brigadier General Deane
	Brigadier Jacob
	Lieutenant Colonel Grove

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 22, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

Secret

1. Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943
   (C.C.S. 168)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff which Admiral King explained with the aid of a map of the Pacific theater.

General Arnold , in reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, said that the theoretical radius of action of the B-29 and B-32 was 1,600 miles. This would be sufficient for the bombardment of Tokyo from the Nanchang area. The best bases for the bombardment of Japan were in the Maritime Province where there were known to be twenty-five airfields. No details, however, were available regarding their condition.

The Committee:
Took note of the proposals of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of the war in the Pacific theater in 1943, as set out in C.C.S. 168.

2. Press Communiqué

(Previous reference C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 4)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that the President and Prime Minister were themselves preparing the communiqué for issue to the press at the conclusion of the Conference, and that it would not, therefore, be necessary for them to submit a draft.

3. Continental Operations in 1943
   (C.C.S. 167)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report by the British Joint Planning Staff on Continental operations in 1943, C.C.S. 167.

Sir Alan Brooke said that paragraph 2 (c) was somewhat misleading in its present form since there could, in fact, be no half-way house between the limited operations described in (a) and (b) of the paragraph and return to the Continent in full. He proposed that subparagraph (c) should, therefore, be amended to read, “Return to the Continent to take advantage of German disintegration.”

The policy which the British Chiefs of Staff recommended was contained in paragraph 19 of the paper.

The provision of additional airborne forces from the U. S. would be essential since Husky would use up all British resources in this respect.

Lord Louis Mountbatten agreed and emphasized the need for airborne forces to turn the beach defenses. Without these and armored forces to follow up, the assault on the northern coast of France was, in his opinion, quite impracticable. He drew attention to the note at the end of paragraph 5 relating to armored landing craft.

The Committee:
Agreed to defer final acceptance of the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff pending further study.

4. Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Cross-Channel Operations
   (C.C.S. 169)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the Combined Staffs, C.C.S. 169.

Sir Alan Brooke thought that it would be premature to designate a Supreme Commander for large-scale operations on the Continent at present in view of the limited operations which could be carried out with available resources in 1943. A special staff was, however, necessary for cross-channel operations and should, he thought, be set up without delay.

General Marshall agreed that a Supreme Commander would make a top-heavy organization at present, but thought that it was desirable to put a special staff under a selected Chief of Staff of sufficient standing; such an officer would perhaps suffice for the command of limited operations during the summer. This special staff could work out their plans on the basis of certain forces being available, even though they were not in actual control of the troops themselves.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the staff which was at present working on cross-channel operations belonged to various Commanders in the United Kingdom. It would be necessary to take them away from their present Commanders and set them up independently.

The Committee:
a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 169, except for the immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander.

b) Agreed that a Supreme Commander will ultimately be necessary for the reentry to the Continent, but that he should not be appointed at the present time.

c) Agreed that a British Chief of Staff, together with an independent U.S.-British staff should be appointed at once for the control, planning and training of cross-channel operations in 1943.

d) Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to prepare for their approval a draft directive to govern the planning and conduct of cross-channel operations in 1943 in accordance with the decisions to be reached on C.C.S. 167.

e) Agreed that the above directive should make provision for a return to the Continent with the forces that will be available for this purpose in the United Kingdom month by month.

5. Landing Craft

Lord Louis Mountbatten gave an account of the British experiences in building up an Assault Fleet. He described how the LCI (L) had been produced and explained the dislocation which had been caused by Torch. For that operation it had been necessary to stop the entry and training of British crews so that U.S. combat teams could have the use of the training center at Inveraray. As a result, a situation had arisen in which the British were temporarily unable to man all the landing craft at their disposal. The position was now in hand, and there would be no difficulty in manning all the landing craft expected by next August.

He drew attention to the shortage of spare parts which had recently forced him to consider the cannibalization of 25% of the landing craft at his disposal. This position, according to Admiral Cooke, also was now improving; but he emphasized the very great importance of providing ample spares parallel with the production of craft.

He described the organization of the British Assault Fleets. Broadly speaking, there were local forces organized for operations in home waters, western and eastern Mediterranean, and India. Besides these local forces, there was an overseas Assault Force with a lift of 30,000 personnel, 3,300 vehicles and 200 tanks. The purpose of this Force was to reinforce the local Assault Fleet in whichever theater might be the center of active operations. This Force would be ready to sail for the Mediterranean by March 15th, to take part in Husky.

He described three important lessons of amphibious operations which had so far emerged:

a) For any amphibious campaign involving assaults on strongly defended coasts held by a determined enemy, it is essential that the landing ships and craft shall be organized well in advance into proper assault fleets. These must have a coherence and degree of permanence comparable to that of any first-line fighting formation. Discipline, training, and tactical flexibility are just as necessary for assault fleets as for naval, military and air combat formations. This was the overriding lesson of Dieppe.

b) No combined operation can be carried out with reasonable hope of success without adequate beach reconnaissance beforehand. He had now organized specially trained beach reconnaissance parties which had already done most valuable work.

c) Adequate fire support for the assault against a strongly defended coast was most essential. A scale of 100 guns (48 self-propelled in LCT and 52 in the new gun craft to be known as LCG) for each assault brigade had been recommended. He handed around drawings of a type of amphibious close support vessel which had been designed for this purpose. These special assault craft were primarily intended for Roundup, and none could be ready in time for Husky.

He then handed around a table showing the estimated availability of British and American built landing ships and craft. Referring to this table, he pointed out that the main British deficiencies by next August would be in LST and LCI (L). He urged most strongly that allocations to the British of both these types should be increased to make up these deficiencies. He confirmed that provisions had already been made for manning the full number of all types of craft which had been asked for by next August together with 50 percent spare crews.

General Somervell confirmed that, so far as could be foreseen, sufficient landing craft could be made available for both the U. S. and British portions of Husky as now planned.

Admiral King drew attention to the great diversity of types of British built ships and craft. He asked whether a greater degree of standardization would not be possible. In reply Lord Louis Mountbatten explained that different types had been developed independently by the two navies; improvements had been made as a result of experience. Some of those shown in the table were now out of date.

Admiral Cooke expressed the view that the production of landing craft would be at least as great as the ability of the U.S. and British Navies to man them. He explained the heavy demand for the Pacific where rate of wastage was high and maintenance facilities extremely limited. He confirmed the shortage of spare engines. Spares had been used to fit up new hulls which had come out of production in large numbers.

He explained that the original split of LST for Roundup, as between U.S. and British, had been in the proportion of 125 to be manned by the U.S. and 75 by the British. Allocations now proposed by the U.S. Navy Department gave a higher proportion to the British, half of the 168 proposed for the European Theater going to the British and half to the U.S.; 117 of these craft would be allocated to the Pacific. He then raised the question of LCA, of which the U.S. had none at all. He understood that 96 of these craft were required for the British portion of Husky, and he thought that a similar number would be required for the U.S. portion as well.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the provision of these craft would need careful examination. It might be found best to send the drawings to America so that they could be built in U.S. yards.

The Committee:
a) Agreed that the question should be reviewed by July 1, 1943, whether the number of LST (2) to be allocated to the British from the total U.S. production of 390 can be raised from the figure of 120 now proposed by the U.S. Navy Department to 150 which was the full British requirement.

b) Took note that the U.S. Navy Department would investigate whether the follow-up order for 44 LCI (L) can be restored and half of this production allocated to the British.

c) Took note that the greatest needs of the British Combined Operations Naval Command were for:

1. LCM (3), of which 646 had been asked for by the British by August 1, 1943, but the detailed allocation of which was not yet available.

2. Scripps-Ford conversion engines for LCA, of which a large additional number would be needed if LCA were built in the United Kingdom for the U.S.

3. Spare parts, as a matter of great urgency, for landing craft in the United Kingdom, to be supplied in the first instance on the requisitions already submitted to the U.S. Navy Department by Comamphoreu.

6. System of Command for Combined U.S. and British Operations
   (C.C.S. 75/3)

(Previous reference: C.C.S. 45th Meeting, Item 1)

General Marshall said that the intention of the paper under consideration was to lay down general principles for the organization of command where U.S. and British forces were engaged in combined operations under a Supreme Commander. The systems of command employed by the two nations for their own forces differed fundamentally. He recalled that when Field Marshal Wavell had been suddenly called upon to form a combined headquarters at short notice in the Southwest Pacific he had had considerable difficulties in arranging satisfactorily the general organization of his command. Similar cases might occur in the future, and it would be of great assistance to have guiding principles agreed beforehand.

Discussion followed on the precise channels for the communication of orders which would be used in the organization shown in the diagram attached to the paper.

Admiral King said that in considering the chain of command shown in the diagram, it must be remembered that all Subordinate Commanders act as the agents of the Supreme Commander. The authority of Task Force Commanders was complete in respect of their own task forces. It would not be necessary, however, for the Naval Commander always to transmit orders affecting naval forces through the Supreme Commander, and the Task Force Commander to the naval component of the task force. He would be an officer of experience and discretion and would avoid issuing orders which would encroach upon the authority of Task Force Commanders. The channels were not rigid. Taking the example of Husky, he explained that the Air Commander with General Eisenhower would have two main functions apart from advising the Supreme Commander. He would arrange for the air bombardment required to soften the defenses of the island, and command the air forces allotted to this task. He would also answer calls for assistance from the task forces. There would be no objection to such calls being passed direct from the Air Commanders in the task forces to the Air Commander at the main headquarters.

The Committee:
Accepted the basic system of unified command in combined U.S. British operations as set out in C.C.S. 75/3.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt dinner party, 7:40 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy
Major General Patton, Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt
Morocco		France
Sultan Mohammed V		General Noguès
Grand Vizier Mohammed el Mokhri
Crown Prince Moulay Hassan
Si Manneri

The conversation ranged over the problems of Morocco’s post-war economic development, the possibilities of American participation in Moroccan development programs, and the colonial question as it applied to Morocco. The President expressed to the Sultan his sympathy with Morocco’s aspirations for independence and spoke of possible American-Moroccan economic cooperation after the war.

[NormanStewart]

Murphy-de Gaulle conversation, about 10 p.m.

	Present
United States		France
Mr. Murphy		General de Gaulle

Murphy and de Gaulle conversed for half an hour prior to the latter’s meeting with Roosevelt. Murphy attempted to explain Roosevelt’s policy toward France and to convince de Gaulle of the necessity of his reaching an understanding with Giraud. After hearing Murphy’s exposition, de Gaulle concluded the meeting by explaining that the French National Committee in London had not empowered him to make any “binding decisions” while attending the Conference.