Says only defeatists call for smaller Army
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Drafting of men with children expected soon
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‘We’re not winning transportation battle,’ Navy says
625 Allied and neutral ships sunk by Axis in the Western Atlantic
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Service needs tripled blood donations in 1943
Washington (UP) –
Four million pints of blood are needed by the Army and Navy during 1943, chairman Norman H. Davis of the American Red Cross announced today.
That is more than three times the amount received from volunteer donors at Red Cross centers last year.
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The Pittsburgh Press (January 19, 1943)
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
A forward airdrome in French North Africa – (Jan. 18)
While bad weather stymies the ground fighting in Tunisia, the air war on both sides has been daily increasing in intensity until it has reached a really violent tempo.
Not a day passes without heavy bombing of Axis ports, vicious strafing of cities and airdromes, losses on both sides and constant watchful patrolling.
Here, at one of our airdromes, all of us can assure you that being bombed is no fun. Yet these tired, hard-worked Americans jokingly decided to send a telegram to Allied headquarters asking them to arrange for the Jerrys to stop there each evening and pick up our mail.
I am living at this airdrome for a while. It can’t be named, although the Germans obviously know where it is, since they call on us frequently. Furthermore, they announced quite a while ago by radio that they would destroy the place within three days.
I hadn’t been here three hours till the Germans came. They arrived just at dusk. And they came arrogantly, flying low. Some of them must have regretted their audacity, for they never got home. The fireworks that met them were beautiful from the ground, but must have been hideous up where they were.
They dropped bombs on several parts of the field, but their aim was marred at the last minute. There were no direct hits on anything. Not a man was scratched, though the stories of near misses multiplied into the hundreds by the next day.
One soldier who had found a bottle of wine was lying in a pup tent drinking. He never got up during the raid just lay there cussing at the Germans:
You can’t touch me, you blankety-blanks! Go to hell, you so-and-so’s!
When the raid was over, he was untouched, but the tent a foot above him was riddled with shrapnel.
Another soldier made a practice of keeping a canteen hanging just above his head. That night when he went to take a drink, the canteen was empty. Investigation revealed a shrapnel hole, through which the water had run out.
Another soldier had the front sight of his rifle shot off by a German machine-gun bullet.
Some of the soldiers were actually picking tiny bits of shrapnel out of their coats all the next day. Yet, as I said, not a drop of American blood was shed.
When this airdrome was first set up the soldiers dug slit trenches just deep enough to lie down in during a raid, but after each new bombing the trenches get deeper.
Everybody makes fun of himself but keeps on digging. Today some of these trenches are more than eight feet deep. I’ll bet there has been more whole-hearted digging here in two weeks than WPA did in two years.
The officers don’t have to hound their men. They dig with a will of their own, and with a vengeance. If we stay here long enough we’ll probably have to install elevators to get to the bottom of the trenches.
After supper you see officers as well as men out digging. Each little group has its own trench design. Some are just square holes. Some form an L. Some are regulation zigzag.
The ground here is dry, and the trenches don’t fill up with water as they do in the coastal and mountain camps. The earth is as hard as concrete. You have to use an ax as well as a pick and shovel.
You’d love our air-raid alarm system. It consists of a dinner bell hanging from a date palm tree outside headquarters. When the radio watchers give the order the dinner bell is rung. Then the warning is carried to the far ends of the vast airdrome by sentries shooting revolvers and rifles into the air. At night it sounds like a small battle.
When the alarm goes, the soldiers get excited and mad too. When the Germans come over, the anti-aircraft guns throw up a fantastic Fourth of July torrent of red tracer bullets. But to the soldiers on the ground that isn’t enough, so they let loose with everything from Colt .45s up to Tommy guns.
If the Germans don’t kill us, we’ll probably shoot ourselves.
U.S. State Department (January 19, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | France |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | General Giraud |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Hull | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Major General Kennedy | |
| Colonel Smart | Air Vice Marshal Slessor | |
| Commander Libby | Air Vice Marshal Inglis | |
| Major Codman | Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 19, 1943, 4 p.m.
Secret
- Axis Oil Position
(C.C.S. 158)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the Assistant Chief of British Air Staff (Intelligence) summarizing the latest British views on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158).
Sir Charles Portal said that the British had fully realized the great strategical importance of oil targets in Germany, but for tactical reasons these were extremely difficult to attack. The most important targets were the synthetic oil plants and the Rumanian oil refineries. Unfortunately the latter, from bases at present available, were at extreme range of our bombers; and he felt that it would be a mistake to make light and sporadic attacks on Ploesti, which would do little harm and only result in an increase of the German air defenses. It would be better to wait until we had the Turkish air bases before starting our attacks. The synthetic oil plants were in the Ruhr and elsewhere, but they were very small targets which needed precision bombing to put out of action. Recent developments in radio navigation increased the chances of success on these targets, and great hopes were placed on the possibility of daylight precision bombing by the U.S. Air Forces. When a sufficient force had been built up in a few months’ time, it might be possible to resume attacks on these targets more effectively, provided of course that this could be achieved without prejudice to the U-boat warfare.
General Arnold pointed out that the Ploesti fields – which were roughly equidistant from Sicily, Benghazi, Cairo, and Aleppo – were within range of the B-24 with a load of 4,000 pounds of bombs or under.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that one of the chief difficulties was getting the necessary meteorological information, without which long-distance attacks of this nature were unlikely to be successful. It was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain information from secret radio stations in the Balkans owing to the activities of the Gestapo.
Air Vice Marshal Inglis confirmed that in the British view the Rumanian oil supplies were vital to Germany. Her stocks were so low that she depended on Rumanian oil for about thirty-three percent of her total need.
General Somervell said that the latest American estimate was less optimistic about the shortage of oil in Germany than the British. It was believed that Germany would have a surplus of about 40,000,000 barrels at the end of 1943 instead of the 10,000,000 barrels which she had at the end of 1942, owing to the opening up of new sources in Hungary and elsewhere. It was, therefore, calculated that even if the whole of the Rumanian production were knocked out early in the year, she would still have enough for operations in 1944. There were two tetraethyl lead factories however, the destruction of which would hamstring the production of German aviation fuel.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that this latest American information should be immediately given to the British Intelligence Staffs with a view to the production of an agreed estimate.
General Marshall emphasized the importance of making great efforts against German oil if we could be sure that it formed a really critical target. U.S. aircraft in the Southwest Pacific were bombing targets at a greater distance from their base than Rumania from the present bases available. We might have to wait a long time before the Turkish bases could be used.
Sir Charles Portal said that we must be sure our bombing would be really effective. The value of attacks on German oil had to be balanced against the needs of Husky, for which we should try to cause the maximum loss to the German air forces in the Mediterranean during the coming months. Only by this means could we hope to obtain the necessary air superiority on which depended the success of the operation.
After some discussion,
The Committee:
a) Took note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil – namely, the Rumanian oilfields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany – be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow.
b) Directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and U.S. sources.
- Allied Plans Relating to Turkey
(C.C.S. 157)
In discussing C.C.S. 157, Sir Alan Brooke said that the plans for inducing Turkey to enter the war on the side of the United Nations were largely political and that the military efforts were designed to further the political negotiations.
He said that Turkey is in need of specialized equipment and that it would be preferable to furnish operating units rather than the equipment alone. The Turkish people are not particularly adept in handling mechanized equipment, but they seem to have a strong desire to attempt it. As a result, we shall probably have to furnish the equipment with certain personnel to train Turkish troops in its use.
Sir Alan Brooke then presented the following draft resolution which he recommended be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.
In particular, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignment Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward despatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert much equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignment Board.
General Somervell stated that just prior to his departure from Washington, an agreement had been reached between the State Department and the British Joint Staff Mission as to methods by which munitions should be supplied to Turkey.
Sir Alan Brooke said that this agreement was not acceptable in London. He pointed out that any agreements previously made were superseded by the agreement arrived at on January 18th between the Prime Minister and the President which provided that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States.
General Marshall stated that he desired more time to study the resolution referred to above and requested that action with regard to it be postponed until the meeting of January 20th. He said that there was some confusion in his mind as to just what was intended with regard to Turkey. The President had said that he had hoped to arrange for Turkey’s permission for the passage of munitions en route to Russia through Turkish territory. C.C.S. 157 indicates that certain arrangements have already been made regarding the supply of munitions to Russia. In addition, the decision has been reached to make certain troop concentrations available to assist Turkey in the event that she enters into the war on the side of the United Nations. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he considered the probabilities with regard to Turkey would be.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British had an agreement to assist Turkey if she were attacked. The agreement includes furnishing Turkey 26 squadrons of pursuit aviation. In order that these squadrons might be able to operate quickly, certain necessary equipment had already been sent there. This had been a defensive agreement, but the intention is now to operate an offensive from Turkey. The present plan is that Turkey should merely hold the Axis forces beyond her frontier and thus secure air bases from which the United Nations could operate against Rumania.
He said it was hoped that we could induce Turkey to come into the war. This might be accomplished by political moves. Certain territorial promises might be made to Turkey at this time. For example, they might be promised the “Duck’s Bill” in Syria, control of the Dodecanese, certain parts of Bulgaria, and assurance that her communications in the Bosphorus will be unhampered. The more apparent a victory by the United Nations becomes, the more will Turkey desire to have a place at the peace table. This might be sufficient inducement for her to join the United Nations. In any event, our efforts with regard to Turkey will not be very costly, but they may provide an opportunity for appreciable gains.
General Marshall said that he had no doubt about the value of bringing Turkey into the war. He thought that if she could be induced to join us at the right moment, the results might play a determining part in the conclusion of the war. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he thought Turkey’s reaction might be if we effected a large concentration in the rear of her borders.
Sir Alan Brooke said it would strengthen the United Nations in the eyes of Turkey and give tangible evidence that we are ready to assist her. He said that the capture of the Dodecanese by the United Nations would give Turkey a feeling of confidence in their power but that these islands could be much more easily captured by an operation from Turkey, once she had joined in with us. He added that there is no possibility of doing operation Husky and capturing the Dodecanese simultaneously.
Sir Charles Portal said that holding the Dodecanese would facilitate operations in Turkey by insuring the use of the port of Smyrna.
The Committee:
a) Agreed to consider the proposed resolution on Turkey, quoted above, at the meeting on January 20th.
b) Took note of the paper under consideration.
- Meeting With General Giraud
General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were much honored by the presence of General Giraud and were very pleased that it had been possible to arrange the meeting. He hoped that General Giraud would express his views, and in particular that he would indicate the present status of the French forces and the rapidity with which they could be built up.
General Giraud said that he was proud at being able to participate in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The French army had now reentered the war and had not only the will to fight but also the experience and knowledge. As an example, he might mention a message which he had that morning received on the telephone from his Chief of Staff; this was to the effect that the Germans had yesterday attacked the junction of the British and French armies between Medjes el Bab and Pont du Fahs with 80 tanks supported by infantry. On the British front the attack had completely broken down and 10 tanks had been knocked out. On the French front an attack by 50 tanks had been made against a battalion locality. The battalion had held its ground all day, and it was not until the evening that certain advanced posts were evacuated by order of the battalion commander. He had not had any further news but he understood that the situation was in hand. The action showed the quality of the French troops. They had not been able to knock out any tanks as they had no antitank guns. They had, however, prevented the German infantry from supporting their tanks and had held their ground. Similar examples had occurred on the whole front during the last two months. Such troops were worthy of modern arms.
On the existing cadres, the French army could form three armored divisions and ten mobile infantry divisions. It would also be possible to raise the following air forces:
- 50 fighter squadrons with 500 aircraft.
- 30 light bomber squadrons with 300 aircraft.
- 200 transport aircraft.
Such a force was an indispensable accompaniment for a modern army. The French pilots had already given proof of what they could do. One squadron of the Groupe Lafayette, armed with 12 P-40 aircraft, had been fighting for the last six days; they had shot down five enemy aircraft for the loss of one. He was particularly anxious to receive: first, fighter aircraft in the supply of which he hoped the British would participate; and, subsequently, light bombers so that he could equip the pilots of whose quality he had intimate knowledge and who would quickly master the new equipment. He realized that there were considerable difficulties due to the shortage of shipping and the needs of the Allied forces. Some of the aircraft, however, could fly from America, and possibly the fighters might be flown in from aircraft carriers. He felt confident that the French army could make a great contribution to the European campaign if it were properly equipped. He estimated that the campaign in North Africa would be over in two months’ time; and in this campaign he included the capture of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, which he regarded as forming a direct prolongation of Africa and as bases for further action.
General Marshall said that he was very glad to have heard General Giraud’s views. Speaking on behalf of the U.S. Army, air and ground, he explained that he was going into the details of how quickly modern equipment could be provided for the French Army. He knew that the shipping question was under detailed consideration by Admiral King and French Naval officers. General Somervell, the Head of the Services of Supply, had already called on General Giraud to discuss these matters and had reported thereon to him. The question of priority of delivery of items and the method to be adopted in equipping French Units would be taken up with General Giraud. General Arnold had been conferring with French officers to see what could be done to provide air equipment. It was in the interests of the U.S.A. to bring the French forces to a high state of efficiency, and everything possible would be done to obviate the difficulties of distance. It was not a question of whether to equip the French Army, but rather of how to carry it out. Availability of equipment was not the limiting factor, but transport.
Sir Alan Brooke expressed, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, great pleasure at the report which General Giraud had given of the state of the French Army. With the more limited resources at the disposal of the British, they would do what they could to help in providing modern equipment. He fully realized the important part which the French forces would play in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.
Admiral King said that arrangements were well in hand for the rehabilitation in rotation of the French warships. Resources would not permit of them being dealt with all at once. He welcomed the officers and men of the French Navy who were now joining in the struggle for victory.
Sir Dudley Pound said that the navies of the Allies were now fighting in every ocean of the world and the U-boats were extending their activities further and further afield. The combined British and American naval forces were less than we should like to have to meet this menace, and the help of the French naval forces would be most welcome. From his experience at the beginning of the war, he knew the value of French naval assistance, and he knew also that this help would be of the same quality now as then.
Sir Charles Portal said that he had the clearest recollection from two wars of the skill and high performance of the French air forces. He, therefore, hoped that they could be equipped as soon as possible to fight once more alongside the Allies. Within the limit of British resources, which were considerably strained, everything would be done to hasten the day of this collaboration.
General Arnold said that he had been trying for some time to find the most effective use for the French pilots, who had proved their ability to take over and operate skillfully American equipment. He hoped that this study would soon be completed.
Sir John Dill said that he felt inspired by the presence of General Giraud, knowing as he did how much General Giraud had suffered for France. It was a matter of great pleasure, therefore, to have the General back to lead France to victory.
General Giraud said that in the early days of the war he had worked in the closest touch with the British Army. The cooperation between all arms at that time, and particularly between the 1st French Army and the Second Corps, of which Sir John Dill was the distinguished Commander, had showed how close such contact could be. Now once more cooperation had been resumed. In September 1940, when he was in a German prison camp, he had told the German generals that they had lost the war. Their attempt to invade Great Britain had failed, and though he could not prophesy how long the war would last, Germany could never win. Sooner or later the U.S. would come to the help of Great Britain. The Germans had asked him to sign a paper to say that he would not escape during the period of two hours each day when the French generals were allowed outside. He had said that he refused to sign any paper in German. They had asked him whether he was planning to escape as he had done in 1915. He had said:
Never mind what I am thinking. You are my jailers, I am your prisoner. It is your duty to guard me; it is my duty to escape. Let us see who can carry out his duty best. It took a year to get away, but now I am here amongst you once more.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed with applause their warm approval of the statement made by General Giraud who then withdrew from the meeting.
Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, 11:20 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt |
Churchill advanced the proposal that the French provisional regime might best be left exclusively to de Gaulle, but the President dismissed the subject “almost peremptorily.”
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Tuesday, 19 January
As it was necessary for him to get back to his ship by ten o’clock, Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., USNR, departed the President’s villa at 9:20 a.m. after breakfasting with his brother, Elliott, Mr. Hopkins, and Sergeant Robert Hopkins.
During the morning, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Robert Murphy were in conference with the President and Mr. Hopkins, as was Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, who saw the President from 11:25 until 11:45.
The President held a second conference with General Henri Giraud, commencing at noon. Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Captain John L. McCrea, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Captain A. Beaufre, Aide-de-camp to General Giraud, were also present. The conference touched on a number of points, the details of which are set forth in notes taken by Captain McCrea and which have been recorded separately. At 12:40, the President and General Giraud withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made of them. Later the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the group and additional pictures were made. The General and his aide departed at 12:50.
The President, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt, and Sergeant Robert Hopkins lunched together today, following which General Patton called to take Mr. Hopkins and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt downtown to shop and souvenir hunt and make an automobile tour of the waterfront and the business district of Casablanca.
During the afternoon, Lt. General H. H. Arnold called on the President. He was followed by Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, USN, Commander Western Task Force Sea Frontier, who departed at 4:30 p.m.
At 5:30 p.m., the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph Churchill a Captain in a Special Service Brigade (Commandos) paid a cal on the President and chatted until 6:20, when they left to return to “Mirador.”
Mr. Hopkins and his son, Robert, together with Mr. Harriman left the villa about 7:30 to take dinner with the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph. At this time, the President, Captain McCrea, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt also left the villa to have dinner with Major General G. S. Patton Jr. at “Villa Mas,” General Patton’s head quarters. Also dining with the President and General Patton the evening were Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke Jr., “USN”, Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Deputy Commanding General, First Armored Corps Brigadier General A. W. Wedemeyer, Brigadier General W. H. Wilbur, in charge of Special Activities in the area now occupied by the First Armored Corps, Brigadier General John E. Hull, and Colonel H. R. Gay.
The President returned to “Dar es Saada” at 11:15 p.m., and a 11:20 p.m. the Prime Minister came in to chat with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt until 1:00 a.m. the next morning, when the Prime Minister returned to his villa.
The President retired about 1:30.
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U.S. State Department (January 20, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lord Leathers | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Brigadier General Hull | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Colonel Smart | ||
| Commander Libby | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Grove |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 20, 1943, 10 a.m.
Secret
- U.S. Aid to Russia
(C.C.S. 162)
General Marshall requested Lord Leathers to give his comments on C.C.S. 162.
Lord Leathers stated that the bulk of the munitions sent to Russia under the Protocol are from the United States. He said that C.C.S. 162 does not constitute a paper with which he is in full agreement as is indicated in its heading. He cannot be certain of the basic figures presented because he does not know the backlog of munitions to Russia that are now in the United States. He did, however, concur in General Somervell’s conclusions of the paper.
Lord Leathers stated that an agreement had been arrived at between the United States and British authorities in Washington, including representatives of both Navies, that all calculations for the allocation of shipping in 1943 should be based on a loss rate of 1.9% per month, whereas General Somervell used a rate of 2.6% in his preparation of C.C.S. 162. He said that if the 1.9% figure works out correctly, more shipping will be available than is indicated in this paper.
Admiral King said he had no knowledge of such an agreement and thought that 1.9% was optimistic. This was the figure for December 1942 which was particularly favorable.
General Somervell agreed that if we are able to reduce the losses in shipping from 2.6% to 2% per month, an additional troop lift of 500,000 men to England would be possible in 1943. If it were further reduced to 1.9%, an additional 50,000 could be lifted.
General Marshall said that if we accept General Somervell’s loss rate, the question as to what can be sent to Russia must be reexamined. It must also be determined whether we should undertake such a program considering its effects on troop lift.
General Somervell added that he recognized that there should be an improvement in the loss rate in 1943 over that which was sustained in 1942 because of the more effective anti-submarine measures which are contemplated. He felt it safer, however, to plan on the continuance of the 1942 rate until it could be effectively demonstrated that the losses would decrease. He said that it was reasonably certain that the loss rate would drop as low as 2.4% per month. In this case, all of the commitments under the Russian Protocol could be fulfilled. If the rate improves beyond 2.4%, an additional troop lift for Bolero will become available.
Lord Leathers stated that it is particularly important to establish an agreed estimated loss rate for planning purposes. This will insure that all those concerned with shipping problems will be speaking and thinking in the same terms when planning troop or cargo movements.
Sir Dudley Pound said that the figures in the paper apparently are based on the assumption that the northern route to Russia will be open throughout the year. He stated that this will not be the case, particularly during the period of Operation Husky. He further thought that the paper should include some statement indicating that commitments to Russia will only be fulfilled provided they will not entail prohibitive losses in shipping.
General Somervell said that stopping the northern convoys during the period of Operation Husky would eliminate 64 sailings for which the capacity was available on the Persian route. In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why the shipments to the Persian Gulf dropped off in June, General Somervell said that the commitments to Russia would not require the total capacity of all routes and that, therefore, a reduced rate had been applied to the Persian route which had the longest turnaround. This will provide a safety margin to take care of contingencies such as stopping the northern route during Operation Husky.
Lord Leathers pointed out that C.C.S. 162 applies only to aid from the United States. He said that the British can overtake their backlog of deliveries about the end of June; a relatively small number of British shipments is involved. Assuming a convoy every 27 days, there will be 11 or 12 ships in each, whereas if they were to be run every 40 days, each convoy must include 15 British ships.
General Somervell proposed an amendment to clarify paragraph 14 of C.C.S. 162. He then asked for a careful consideration of the conclusions contained in Paragraph 15 of the paper.
Lord Leathers suggested that in the last sentence the phrase “assigned to United States troop movements” be changed to “assigned to combined troop movements.”
Sir Charles Portal asked if it would be possible to frame our commitment to Russia so as to make it clear that some curtailment in the delivery of munitions might be required because of operational necessities. He felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were taking a big step in making a firm commitment regarding the delivery of munitions to Russia at the expense of all operational requirements.
Lord Leathers stated that we have reserved the right in the past to curtail shipments of munitions to Russia but that Russia did not like to have such reservations made and always objected when an actual curtailment became necessary. A notable exception to this was that they agreed that the northern convoys be discontinued during Operation Torch.
General Somervell pointed out that the current Protocol which expires in June of 1943 does include such a resolution. The new Protocol will be framed by the State Department and the Foreign Office, but actually there will be ample opportunity for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to review it before the negotiations between governments are initiated. It will thus be possible to insure that a safety clause is included in the basic document.
The Committee:
a) Agreed that a loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month could be relied on with sufficient certainty to warrant the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving their approval to the total shipping commitments set forth in Paragraph 6, Table II of C.C.S. 162, subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations’ effort.
b) Took note that the Persian Gulf route could make good the loss of 64 North Russian sailings if these had to be eliminated in the latter part of the year owing to other operations.
c) Agreed to direct the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate of the rate of United Nations’ shipping losses in 1943 which can be used by all United Nations’ Agencies for planning purposes.
d) Agreed to amend paragraph 15 of C.C.S. 162 so as to delete the words “United States” in the last sentence and substitute the word “Combined” therefor.
e) Agreed that, in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia, a clause should be included to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfillment prohibitive.
- British Responsibility for Turkey
(C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 2)
General Marshall suggested the addition of the words “through the Combined Chiefs of Staff” after “Assignment Boards” in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the draft resolution proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff at their previous meeting.
Brigadier Jacob explained the procedure for the submission of Turkish bids to the Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington. Turkish requirements were, in the first instance, scrutinized and coordinated by a Committee in Ankara containing U.S., British and Turkish representatives. This Committee transmitted requirements to London. The London Munitions Assignments Board passed on to the Washington Board bids for all material which could not be supplied from the U.K. The bids were presented by the British representatives of the Washington Munitions Assignments Board. Difficulty was caused, however, by the fact that the Turkish Embassy in Washington was apt to approach the War Department simultaneously with requests for equipment and, as a result, duplication took place. The object of the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff was to canalize all Turkish demands for munitions through London where the majority of these demands were met. Turkey was only one of a large number of claimants for material, and the general principle followed was that all the small European nations dealt with the London Board in the first instance, whereas the South American Republics and China dealt with Washington. For example, any demands made by the Chinese in London were refused, and the Chinese were told to present them direct to Washington. He feared that if all bids had to be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, they would be smothered in a mass of detail.
Admiral King said his only concern was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had an opportunity to exercise control over the actions of the Munitions Assignments Boards in connection with Turkish bids.
The Committee:
a) Agreed that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.
b) Agreed that, in particular, under the general direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward dispatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert such equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignments Board.
- The Bomber Offensive from North Africa
(C.C.S. 159)
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff setting out in order of time the proposed objectives for the bomber offensive from North Africa.
In discussion certain amendments were suggested and agreed.
The Committee:
Approved the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum as amended in the discussion.
- Command in the Mediterranean
(C.C.S. 163)
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff giving their recommendations for the set-up of air command in the Mediterranean.
Sir Alan Brooke said that with the 8th Army approaching Tunisia the time was near when it would be necessary to place it under General Eisenhower’s command. It was, therefore, proposed that General Alexander should come in as Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower with the primary task of commanding the group of armies on the Tunisian front. He would be accompanied by a small nucleus staff with the necessary signals. This proposal, if accepted, would leave General Eisenhower in supreme command over:
a) The group of armies on the Tunisian front.
b) The U.S. 5th Army in Morocco.
c) French forces under General Juin.
He would still have, in addition, his political responsibilities in North Africa.
The position was slightly complicated by the fact that the 8th Army must still be supplied from the East. This could, however, be arranged and the organization in the Middle East was quite adequate for the task.
Sir Alan Brooke then pointed out that responsibility for planning Husky, or whatever operation in the Mediterranean might be decided upon, must soon be fixed. It would probably be thought that General Eisenhower was the appropriate man to assume this responsibility. If that were decided, he would have General Alexander available to take charge of the necessary work.
Sir Charles Portal said that intensive air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were coming to an end, but that many of the bases, such as Malta, in that area as well as the very large maintenance organization which had been established there, would still be available. It was essential that the action of all operational air forces in the Mediterranean area should be coordinated by one Commander.
General Arnold said that certain minor changes in the proposed organization would almost certainly be necessary, but the general setup was acceptable to him.
Sir Charles Portal agreed and said that such changes could most easily be made by the Air Commander-in-Chief once he had been appointed.
Admiral King asked what dividing line was proposed between the Middle East and Northwest African theaters.
Sir Alan Brooke replied that the British Chiefs of Staff when considering this matter had thought that a line from the Tunisia-Tripolitania frontier to Corfu would be most suitable.
Sir Dudley Pound then referred to the question of the naval command which would be necessary for Husky. His proposal was that Admiral Cunningham should become Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and that Admiral Harwood should adopt the title of Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary might be the line Bardia-Zanti [Zante]. Thus Malta would come under Admiral Cunningham who would be responsible for coordinating all movements and matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole. He would also be responsible for the distribution of forces between the Mediterranean and Levant Commands.
The Committee:
a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 163, subject to any minor changes which might be found necessary by the Air Commander-in-Chief after his appointment.
b) Took note with approval that it had been agreed that, at a time to be determined after the British 8th Army had crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander should become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, and that the British 8th Army should at the same time be transferred to the command of General Eisenhower, although it would continue to be based on the Middle East.
c) Agreed that, subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander’s primary task would be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small headquarters of his own, provided from the Middle East, and that after the conclusion of these operations he should take charge of Operation Husky.
d) Took note of the proposals of the First Sea Lord as set out above for Naval command in the Mediterranean during Husky, i.e., Western and Eastern Commands under Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and Commander-in-Chief Levant, respectively, with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean responsible for general coordination.
e) Agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed of the above decisions.
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon, 1 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Mr. Macmillan | |
| Mr. Murphy | ||
| Mr. Harriman | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt |
The conversation was concerned with the de Gaulle-Giraud problem and the question of bringing de Gaulle to the Conference.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Hull | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Major General Kennedy | |
| Colonel Smart | Air Vice Marshal Slessor | |
| Commander Libby | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Grove |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 20, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
-
Husky
(C.C.S. 161)
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff.
Sir Alan Brooke outlined the British proposals for undertaking this operation. He said that there were two broad alternatives for carrying out the British portion of the assault – either to mount the assaulting force in the U.K. and bring the follow-up from the Middle East, or to mount the major part of the operation from the Middle East. The former would enable us to start at an earlier date but, it involved a grave risk in passing the spearhead of the assault forces through the Sicilian narrows in mineable waters and under air attack. For this reason, the British Chiefs of Staff considered that the second alternative should be adopted.
If the major portion of the assault was to be mounted from North Africa, it seemed that training would be the bottleneck.
Lord Louis Mountbatten said that a Brigade required three weeks training before it was fit to take part in the assault. A Brigade which had had previous training could be “brushed up” in about ten days. In either case, a further two weeks’ training was necessary for final rehearsals. Time could only be saved by arranging for two or more Brigades to be trained simultaneously. It was not possible to reduce the training periods below the figures he had given.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that these training times could not be further reduced. He thought, however, that we could not accept the end of September as the earliest date for the operation. Various devices were being examined, such as the setting up of additional training establishments and making use of a wider range of ports in the Middle East; and it was hoped to bring forward this date to about the end of August. It was assumed that Tunisia would have been cleared by the end of April.
Admiral, King asked what divisions were now with the 8th Army and whether any divisions were available in the Middle East which could start training at once.
Sir Alan Brooke said that, although there were some divisions not actively engaged in the present battle, they would all be required for operations after the capture of Tripoli.
Brigadier General Wedemeyer said that no difficulty was foreseen in finding the land forces required for the U.S. portion of the operation. It was assumed that the divisions required would be taken from Morocco and not from Tunisia. The Airborne Division would have to come from the U.S.A. Certain types of aircraft would also have to be brought over, but the majority were already available in North Africa. All could certainly be provided. He felt that some date at the end of July or the beginning of August should be possible.
Rear Admiral Cooke said that a great deal of research into the capacity of Northwest African ports and the provision of landing craft would be necessary. This was already in hand. On the question of timing, his view was about two months before a planning staff could be assembled and detailed plans could be produced. He agreed that it might be possible to start the operation in July.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the operation must depend on when the British could be ready and when the Americans could be ready and the later date set as D-day. He suggested that these should be worked out separately. It might be found that the later date was too late to be acceptable. He thought that if Tunisia were cleared by the end of April, a further two months should be sufficient for the preparation of airfields in the Tunisian tip.
General Marshall referred to the transport by air of 20,000 Chinese to Ramgarh and asked whether time might not be saved by making use of air transport to carry personnel from Northwest Africa to the Middle East. He suggested that, rather than transport troops to the Middle East via the Cape, they might be shipped to North Africa, carry out their training there, and then be taken by air to the Middle East. By that time the passage of the necessary landing craft should have been completed. He said that Sicily was our goal and that we ought not to be diverted from it by the apparent difficulties of the undertaking.
Admiral King agreed that, although for the assault the capacity of the Northwest-African ports might be barely sufficient, it should be possible to find room for training British as well as American formations in this area. He asked whether the Tunisian ports were being used for the assault.
Brigadier General Wedemeyer said that it was intended to make use of Bizerte, Tunis, and Sousse for the U.S. portion of the assault. For training he agreed that it might be possible to squeeze up further west and so leave some of these ports for training British formations if required.
Sir Alan Brooke said that every possible permutation must be examined and that we should aim at arriving at a starting date in July. Two points called for early decision – first, the setup of an organization to plan the whole operation; and, second, the preparation of a cover plan which would need to be integrated between the U.S.A., U.K., Northwest Africa, and the Middle East and put into effect at an early date. He pointed out that the Germans would be forced to divert troops from the Russian front as soon as our preparations made it clear that an offensive was impending somewhere. The effect of the operation would, therefore, be felt long before the actual assault was launched.
The Committee:
Directed the U.S. and British Planning Staffs to:
-
Examine all possible expedients for speeding up the preparations for Husky and to report on the earliest possible date by which the operation could be mounted.
-
Recommend how the organization for planning Husky should be set up.
- Future Business
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it might be possible to bring forward certain items on the Agenda so as to complete the conference as early as possible. After a short discussion,
The Committee:
Agreed on the following program:
-
Thursday
- U-boat War.
- Bomber Offensive from Great Britain.
- Anakim.
- Bolero (if time permits).
-
Friday
- Husky.
- Landing Craft.
- Limited Operations.
- S. W. Pacific.
Brooklyn Eagle (January 20, 1943)
British close in on Tripoli
Eighth Army 30 miles from city – ‘chutists slash at enemy
…
Madge Bellamy jilted, fires thrice, misses
Just wanted to scare wealthy lumberman who married another
…
Flynn admits Dutch Schultz was his deputy
Denies he acted for Jap, bribed jury foreman or misused city job
…
British paper raps U.S. Africa censorship
London, England (UP) –
The News Chronicle, in a front-page attack on censorship in North Africa, said today the reason Americans have become so upset by British comment on the North African situation is because their own censorship has prevented them from learning the true state of affairs.
Consequently, said the News Chronicle, the truth now trickling through comes as a shock, and the time has come when this question of North Africa censorship musty be cleared up without further delay.
U.S. bombs Burmese cities
New Delhi, India (UP) –
U.S. headquarters announced tonight heavy U.S. bombers attacked docks at Bassein in Burma and installations at Kanaing yesterday.