Lift inquiry of Petrillo
Senate to allow time for union to reach settlement on music
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Sgt. Wilson favored in Garden bout
Negro welterweight seeks to stop youth who went distance against Robinson
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Aliens in Army are naturalized
Citizenship granted men outside U.S.
Washington (UP) –
For the first time in history, aliens outside the United States and serving as members of the U.S. Armed Forces have been naturalized by administrative procedure, Attorney General Francis Biddle announced today.
The proceedings, which took place in the Canal Zone, British and Dutch Guiana, Trinidad, Antigua, Curaçao and Aruba, granted citizenship to 289 aliens – 56 of whom were nationals of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.
The naturalization was conducted by Deputy Commissioner T. B. Shoemaker, of Philadelphia, of the Immigration and Naturalization Division of the Justice Department. He first naturalized 236 soldiers and sailors in the Canal Zone.
Shoemaker reported:
More than one alien soldier told me with tears in his eyes that the day of his naturalization was the happiest of his life.
Granting of citizenship to such aliens outside the jurisdiction of the naturalization courts was made possible by enactment of the Second War Powers Act several months ago.
Shoemaker said in commenting on the act:
It was generally felt by the lawmakers that if these soldiers were willing and good enough to fight for the United States, then they were good enough to be made citizens.
The Pittsburgh Press (January 15, 1943)
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
With U.S. forces in Algeria – (Jan. 14)
Today I’ll try to picture to you the pioneer-like manner in which a field tent hospital operates in wartime.
The Evacuation Hospital is a dark-green sea of tents as you approach it over the mud road leading across a field. It blends so well with the fields and against the low rolling mountains in the distance that you can hardly pick it out half a mile away.
Even the first tent has a “going concern" air about it – there’s a neatly-painted sign on a stake saying “Headquarters," and a little dirt walk lined with whitewashed rocks leads up to it. Inside that tent, men work at crude tables with folding legs. Before them are file cases that fold up into small portable trunks. Field telephones rest in their leather cases. It is the same equipment we saw in all the camps in England and Ireland, and now its quickly movable character is being genuinely put to work.
Back of headquarters the tents spread out and form a city, with streets between the rows. The whole place is laid out just as it was planned on paper in Washington years ago. But the little touches – the street signs, the whitewashed rock borders all over the place – they are additional, and are the volunteer work of the enlisted men.
At the receiving tent, trucks and ambulances arrive with wounded men transferred from other hospitals, with sick men from incoming ships, with ill and injured from our dozens of camps around the countryside, with airmen stricken at high altitudes.
Those able to walk go down a line of desks, where their history is taken for the files. In the next tent they turn in all their belongings. That tent is stacked high with barracks bags. Rifles and mud-covered bayonets stick out of the bags. Attendants gingerly accept hand grenades and give the owner a receipt.
In the next tent the patient turns in his clothes and gets a tag in return. He is given a pair of flannel pajamas and a red corduroy bathrobe. He must keep his own shoes, for the hospital has no house-slippers. Then he goes to whatever ward-tent his type of illness indicates. His belongings are taken by truck to the opposite end of the hospital a quarter mile away, to await his exit.
The surgical and laboratory tents sit in the middle of the big compound. There are three fully-equipped surgeries, and they are astonishingly modern. All equipment is brand-new. It is like the newest hospital in New York, except that the floor is canvas-covered dirt, the walls canvas, and the street outside is a deeply rutted boghole of red clay.
When an operation is going on, a triple flap is pulled over the tent entrance, and a heavy mosquito bar dropped over that. Inside, the air becomes stiflingly hot even now; next summer it will be cruel. Patients are brought up the muddy street on a field stretcher running on bicycle wheels. Surgeons wear white robes, white masks, rubber gloves. All is white, and you are struck with the vast amount of sheeting, swabs, bandages and towels – all white – around a desert operating table.
The light above the surgeons is fiery bright. The hospital taps a nearby high-tension line for its operating-room current. If that fails, there is a whole progression downward for emergency – a generator run by a gas engine, a portable battery set, then powerful flashlights, then lanterns, then candles, and finally just matches if it ever comes to that.
There is an X-ray room, and a fluoroscope. The darkroom was a tent within a tent. All the new equipment shone and sparkled, sitting incongruously on its dirt floor.
One tent is a laboratory, filled with basins and test tubes and burners. Another is a drugstore, where thousands of prescriptions are filled from endless bottles on shelves. And all this, mind you, every bit of it from tents to kitchen stoves to anesthetics, came to Africa on a single boat.
Then there is the dentist’s office, in one end of a surgical tent. The chair is just a hard green metal one, tilted back. There are no arms to hold to when it hurts. The drill is run by the dentist pumping on an old-fashioned treadle. Yet the dentist, Maj. Vaiden Kendrick, says he can do anything he did back home in Charlotte. He offered to make me a plate just to prove it, but I gnashed my original teeth at him and fled.
Then on to the wards. There are more than 40 tents of them. Each tent holds 20 men, on folding cots. The floor is stubble. It sounds makeshift, but the patients are thoroughly comfortable.
U.S. State Department (January 15, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutentant General Eisenhower | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Captain Lambe, RN | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Brigadier Stewart | ||
| Air Commodore Elliot | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 15, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
- Antisubmarine Warfare
Sir Dudley Pound said that the four points at which the U-boats could be attacked were the factories and building yards, the operating bases, the routes to their hunting grounds, and the hunting grounds themselves. He had sent for detailed information concerning the construction bottlenecks. As regards the operating bases, the British Government had agreed to intensify air attacks on French ports which were used as bases. The only question now at issue was that of giving some warning to the French inhabitants.
Attacks on the U-boats on passage to the hunting grounds had been successful for a time and considerable damage and delay had been inflicted on them as long as the U-boats did not know when the aircraft were detecting them with their A.S.V. equipment. This equipment was used in conjunction with the Leigh light at night. Now, however, U-boats were fitted with listening devices which detected the A.S.V. outside the range of the light. Ten-centimeter A.S.V.’s were now being introduced, but no doubt in time the Germans would find a counter to them. Nevertheless, if we were successful even in compelling them to remain submerged in darkness, it would have the effect of making them surface in daylight to recharge batteries.
For dealing with the submarines on the hunting grounds, the two requirements were first: as much air cover as possible, and second: adequate escorts. A rough rule of thumb for the number of escorts was to have three ships with every convoy plus one for every ten ships in the convoy. A convoy of forty ships would thus have seven escorts. In practice, however, we were never able to supply this number of escorts, and as a general rule we never had more than six with any convoy. When escorting vessels had to be withdrawn for operations, there was no pool from which to replace them. We had now new commitments in the Sierra Leone convoys which had had to be restarted, and the convoys bringing oil from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom and to North Africa. As a minimum sixty-five more escort vessels were required in the Atlantic alone. Before any decisions were taken on our strategy for 1943, it seemed essential to weigh carefully the requirements in escort vessels for any operations to be undertaken. Once an operation was launched and escorts were withdrawn from convoys, they could not be returned usually for four or five months, during which an acute shortage was felt. The only relief during such a period would be the intake from new construction.
Sir Charles Portal said that the air had proved the most effective weapon against the U-boat. The estimated German output of U-boats was twenty a month. He gave the following figures for attacks on U-boats during the last two months:
| November | December | |
|---|---|---|
| U-Boats sunk by aircraft | 8 | 2 |
| U-Boats damaged | 24 | 9 |
| U-Boats sunk by other means | 8 | 6 |
| U-Boats damaged | 7 | 6 |
Air patrols over the U-boat routes to the hunting grounds were very costly in aircraft since it was calculated that there was only one sighting for 250 hours flying time. Nevertheless, even if a large number of U-boats were not actually destroyed by this means, aircraft patrols had a good effect in compelling U–boats to remain submerged and thereby reducing their time on the hunting grounds. A further method of attack on U-boats was the laying of mines from the air at the exits of the U-boat bases and construction yards.
General Arnold inquired whether it was not possible to use flying boats for anti-submarine work, both over the hunting grounds and on the routes to them. This would avoid the use of valuable long-range bombers.
Sir Charles Portal said that the long-range bomber was essential for work over the convoys, since flying boats, owing to their slow speed, took too long to reach them after a call for assistance. Moreover, the load of the flying boat in bombs and depth charges was less than that of the Liberator. In addition they were not processed for the 10 centimeter A.S.V. A considerable number of Catalinas were being used in spite of these disadvantages. It was estimated that the minimum requirements for the whole of the Atlantic and British Home Waters was between 120 and 135 long-range bombers. New devices were being developed to combat the German listening apparatus which detected the presence of A.S.V. aircraft.
Admiral King asked whether economy in long-range bombers could not be effected by using Catalinas for patrol work and reserving long-range bombers for emergency calls when convoys were actually attacked. The Catalina had a very long endurance and could be kept in the air for twenty-four hours if the crew was large enough to provide two watches. One advantage of the flying boat was that any sheltered water could be used for a base instead of airfields.
Sir Charles Portal said that Catalinas were being used to the maximum. A survey had been made of the West African coast and it was found that two depot ships for Catalinas would suffice on the northern part, but this did not cover the requirements of the Indian Ocean or the South Atlantic.
Sir Dudley Pound said that anti-submarine aircraft were essential in the area north of Freetown. The requirements in long range bombers which had been stated were an absolute minimum, even allowing for the maximum use of flying boats.
Sir Charles Portal asked whether the aircraft in the Pacific, details of which had been given at a meeting on the previous day, were available for anti-submarine work as well as local defense of the Islands themselves.
Admiral King said that fortunately the Japanese had not yet made any great use of submarines in the Pacific, and it was, therefore, possible to work with only small escorts. If the Japanese submarines became more active, aircraft would have to be used against them. The total resources available, however, were insufficient for security everywhere. When Alaska was threatened, forces had to be sent up from all quarters. The acute shortage of escort vessels was of course fully recognized.
Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that where long range shore based aircraft could not be employed to cover the whole passage, as for example in the direct convoys from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom, auxiliary aircraft carriers had to be used with the convoys themselves. On the northern route it was hoped to establish bases for long range aircraft in Newfoundland to join up with aircraft working from the United Kingdom.
General Arnold said that Greenland would be of little use for this purpose owing to the long hours of darkness and the very bad weather.
Admiral Cooke asked whether full use was being made of direction finding apparatus to pick up the short range inter-communication radio of U-boats working in packs. The Japanese had developed this technique to a high degree.
Sir Dudley Pound said that all destroyers and most corvettes, were fitted with the necessary apparatus for this purpose. This use was being developed to the maximum.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that it would be desirable to have an assessment made of the total resources required in escort vessels and aircraft to combat the submarine menace, in order that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have a picture of what would be left over for offensive operations during the coming year.
The Committee.
Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to examine and report the minimum requirements of escorts (including aircraft carriers) and aircraft which should be devoted to the security of the sea communications of the United Nations during 1943.
(General Eisenhower entered the Meeting at this point.)
- Situation in North Africa
General Eisenhower gave a résumé of the situation in North Africa at the present time. Operations in December had been held up by bad weather and mud which restricted the use of vehicles entirely to the roads. Since this check every effort had been made to build up for an attack in the North by increasing our air power, improving the communications to the front and re-equipping the 6th Armored Division with Sherman Tanks. By the end of December, however, it was clear that the weather conditions would compel postponement of any attack for a considerable time. Attention had then been directed to the possibility of an attack further to the south where ground conditions were better. For this purpose forces composed of the 1st U.S. Armored Division and two U.S. Regimental Combat teams with Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Units were being concentrated. At first operations on the right flank had been looked upon primarily as a diversion, but it now seemed probable that it would be possible to advance on Sfax and hold it with infantry while withdrawing the 1st Armored Division as a mobile reserve further to the rear, where it could be maintained more easily. This mobile reserve would be available to deal with a threat either from the North or from Rommel’s forces retiring from the direction of Tripoli. The plan was to launch the attack on Sfax on January 24. Although the road to Gabes was better, the time factor made it necessary to go direct for Sfax. There seemed, however, every reason to hope that Sfax could be successfully taken.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out the need for careful coordination of the attack on Sfax with General Anderson’s operations in the North and those of the 8th Army in the South. If weather conditions made it impossible for General Anderson to move forward, except on the roads, before March 15 there seemed to be a danger that the Germans would thin out in the North and defeat the Sfax forces in detail. It would take some time before the 8th Army could bring pressure to bear from the southward in support of this force, since even at the best General Montgomery did not expect to reach Tripoli before the middle of February; and before he could advance from there the port would have to be cleared in order to supply his forces with petrol for a further advance.
General Eisenhower agreed that it was improbable that any movement off the roads would be possible in the North before March 15, though General Anderson had seven days’ reserves built up which would be kept intact for an attack whenever conditions permitted. He hoped that General Montgomery would push on through Tripoli as fast as possible. By the end of January the 46th Division would be concentrated forward under General Anderson and the 18th Regimental Combat Team would be withdrawn into reserve. As long as the 1st U.S. Armored Division was kept for counterattack, he felt that he could deal with any threat to the Sfax force. He hoped, however, to be able to discuss the whole problem with General Alexander and to make any necessary adjustments in the plan on the latter’s arrival.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that after two months of “an active defensive,” the 78th Division would not be in very good condition for the attack in the North and suggested that it would be better to let a fresh division form the spearhead.
General Eisenhower said that he was faced with the dilemma of either allowing the troops in the North to deteriorate by remaining inactive in the mud or suffering some losses to them through keeping them more active. In his opinion the latter was the lesser of two evils. Also that active patrolling would reveal any thinning out of the Axis force in the North.
The latest intelligence reports place the Axis strength in North Africa at about 65,000. Every effort had been made to retard their buildup but the appalling conditions of the airfields and the bad weather had largely closed down air operations against them recently. At the present time it was calculated that the Axis were getting in about 750 men a day with the necessary supplies for them, in addition to a certain amount of supplies for Rommel.
The French forces in the middle of the front were playing a most important part since they were holding the line between the British in the North and the American forces in the South. Unless they held firm, a serious situation would develop. Moreover, he was completely dependent on them for the working of his long line of communication and the ports. These considerations necessitated careful handling of the French. The French units themselves were badly equipped and some of them were poorly trained. The French troops from Tunisia were somewhat unreliable since their families were now in the German area. In one battalion there had been 132 desertions. The French Generals Barré and Juin were cooperating excellently with General Anderson and General Fredendall. Unfortunately, General Juin was not being given very much scope by General Giraud. The latter might be a good Division Commander but he had no political sense and no idea of administration. He was dictatorial by nature and seemed to suffer from megalomania. In addition he was very sensitive and always ready to take offense. He did not seem to be a big enough man to carry the burden of civil government in any way. It had been far easier to deal with Admiral Darlan.
Civil affairs, which included economic as well as political matters, had of course, given a great deal of anxiety. There were many agencies involved but the necessary organization to deal with all these problems was being improved.
Rail communications forward were very limited in capacity at present. East of Algiers the daily tonnage which could be carried amounted to about 2,200 tons but with additional rolling stock and locomotives which were being sent from the United States, it was hoped to increase this to 4,400. From Casablanca to Oran the daily tonnage was only about 900. Port clearance was improving. At Oran it averaged 5,000 tons a day. At Algiers the daily clearance was not so great and initially it had been much reduced by the presence of French ships lying at many of the berths. Losses of shipping had been sustained by air attack at Bougie and Bône. Air defense of the ports was being steadily improved. All available French antiaircraft weapons had been brought into action and night fighters had been sent from the United Kingdom. Radar had been installed to cover the stretch from Bône to Algiers and some had also been provided at Oran and Casablanca. Passive air defense measures in the ports were being improved and assistance had been given by an expert sent from the United Kingdom who had done very good work at Algiers. One difficulty was that there was no rigid control over the French civil population.
Sir Charles Portal said that the Radar cover between Bond [Bône?] and Algiers was not yet effective below 10,000 feet. He had made arrangements for additional equipment to be provided to make good this deficiency. He inquired what air defense could be provided for Sfax.
General Eisenhower said that there was good natural cover for the troops in Sfax. One airfield there was practically complete and there was another at Gabes. The improvement of airfields had been one of the greatest problems. Approximately 2,000 tons of steel matting were required for a single runway and this quantity used up the complete capacity of railroads in the forward areas for a whole day. Every possible expedient had been tried to use local material but broken stone merely sank into the mud. Once the weather improved all these difficulties would vanish since there were large areas in the forward zone which could be used as airfields with little or no preparation at all.
(General Eisenhower withdrew at this point.)
- Strategy in the European Theater
Sir Alan Brooke outlined two broad policies which should be followed in the European Theater during 1943. The first was to close down in the Mediterranean as soon as the North African coast had been cleared and the sea route through the Mediterranean had been opened, and to devote every effort to building up in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the North of France at the earliest possible moment. The British Chiefs of Staff had examined the possibilities and calculated that 21 to 23 divisions could be made available for this purpose by September 15th. It had at first been thought that port and railway capacity would be the limiting factor on the build-up of American troops’ expansion but it looked as if these difficulties could be overcome if the expansion of receiving depots for supplies were pushed ahead. As a basis of calculation, a monthly movement of 120 merchant vessels from the U.K. to the U.S.A. had been taken, the corresponding troop lift being 120,000. This would allow 9 to 12 U.S. divisions to be transported to the U.K. by September 1st. The number of troops which could be put into France was severely limited, however, by the availability of landing craft and of administrative facilities in France.
Three possible areas for invasion had been considered:
a) The Calais-Boulogne area which, although heavily defended, was within fighter cover of the United Kingdom;
b) Cherbourg Peninsula, which could be seized by a comparatively small force;
c) Brest Peninsula, which was a more worth while objective, would require a much larger force, say, at least 15 divisions to hold the 150 kilometers of front.
One of the objections to operations against the North of France was the excellent railway connections across Europe which would enable the Germans rapidly to reinforce the invaded area. Moreover, it would not be possible to begin the operation until the early autumn and no support would therefore be given to Russia throughout the summer. This last factor seemed to be the principal objection. A land invasion on a small scale would have little more than a local effect except for the air fighting which would inevitably ensue from it.
The other broad possibility was to maintain activity in the Mediterranean while building up the maximum air offensive against Germany from the U.K. and putting in as many troops as could be spared with a view to undertaking a comparatively small operation such as seizing Cherbourg Peninsula.
The Mediterranean offered many choices: Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, and the Dodecanese. Our amphibious power enabled us to threaten all these points simultaneously and thereby cause the Germans to disperse their forces. Unless they were to risk the loss of these islands, they would be compelled to reinforce them as well as the coasts of Italy, Greece, and France. If Italy could be knocked out, Germany would be involved in large new commitments in an attempt to bolster her up and replacing Italian troops in the Balkans. Other German satellites might also fall out. The British Chiefs of Staff considered that our best policy would be to threaten Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, to try to knock out Italy, and to bring in Turkey on our side. It was not, of course, certain that we could bring Turkey in but by a combination of inducements and pressure we might be successful. With Turkey as a base, we could attack the Rumanian oil fields and open up the Black Sea Route to Russia.
If this policy was adopted, we shall have to make a careful choice of our objective. The main choice seemed to lie between the capture of Sardinia and Corsica and the capture of Sicily. Sicily would be the bigger prize but would be a bigger undertaking and the operation could not be staged until late in the summer. The threat, however, would compel dispersion on Germany long before the operation itself was launched. As for Sardinia and Corsica, these increased the possibilities of air attack against Italy by providing bases for fighter escorted bombers. The operation might be combined with operations from the Middle East against the Dodecanese.
One of the great advantages of adopting the Mediterranean policy was that a larger force of heavy bombers could be built up in the United Kingdom for the attack on Germany than if we concentrated for an invasion of France. For the latter purpose, a much larger proportion of the lighter type of bomber and ground support planes would be needed and the number of heavy bombers would suffer accordingly.
Admiral King pointed out that the more troops that we concentrated in the Mediterranean, the more likely Germany was to move into Spain in order to cut our line of communications through the straits of Gibraltar. An invasion of Northern France such as the seizure of the Brest Peninsula would not nearly so likely precipitate such an event. He doubted whether the Spaniards could be relied upon to offer anything more than guerilla resistance to a German invasion.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff did not consider it was at all probable that Spain would permit free passage to the German forces. It was calculated that some 20 divisions would be necessary to occupy the country if the Spaniards resisted at all. This would be a very large commitment for Germany. In any event, we would be able to secure the south side of the Straits of Gibraltar by occupying Spanish Morocco and this would prevent the complete closure of the sea route. He did not think it would be possible for Germany to seize the Spanish airfields in the South by parachute troops. The problem of supplying them by air would be extremely difficult.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if the Spaniards allowed the Germans free passage we should declare war on Spain which was depending on us for many of the necessities of life. Even if the Germans did go in, we should be better able to afford aircraft for the protection of shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar than could the Germans for its attack. It would be much more advantageous for the Germans if we built up against France and left the Mediterranean alone. They would then be able to withdraw large numbers of air forces from the Mediterranean and reinforce the Russian Front, relying on the strong defenses of Northern France to resist an invasion. On the other hand if we kept the Mediterranean active, they would be compelled to keep large air forces there the whole time. This was of the greatest importance since Germany’s main shortages were air forces and oil.
Considerable discussion followed on the details and timings of operations against Sicily and Sardinia in which the following were the principal points made:
a) If the capture of Sicily was mounted from the United Kingdom and the United States, it could be carried out early in August, but would require some 190 escort vessels. If it was mounted from North Africa some 65 escorts would be saved, but its launching would be delayed about one month. This delay was due to the time required for amphibious training in North Africa where facilities were extremely limited.
b) The capture of Sardinia could be undertaken in about May, i.e., three months earlier than Sicily. Air cover for the Sardinia operation, however, would be more difficult owing to its greater distance from North Africa.
c) The total coastline of Sicily was about 500 miles and it was anticipated that some 7 to 8 enemy divisions would be defending the island. This compared very favorably with the coastline of Northern France which was the same length, more strongly fortified and would be defended, by 15 divisions.
d) Part of the air cover for operations against Sicily could be provided from Malta from which about 300 fighters could be operated. Additional fighter protection could be given if Pantellaria was seized in a preliminary operation. The troops required for the operation amounted to some 9 divisions, 10 to 12 brigade groups being employed as assaulting troops.
e) It was doubtful whether the whole operation against Sicily could be undertaken by troops already in the Mediterranean owing to the difficulties of training them in time in North Africa. Assembly and repair of landing craft was another bottleneck.
Sir Dudley Pound estimated that once the North African Coast had been cleared, even without having Sicily in our possession, it would be possible to run a convoy of thirty ships once every ten days through the Mediterranean, in substitution for the present shipping to the Middle East, Persian Gulf and India, which moved via the Cape. This would effect a saving of some 225 ships. The average losses per month on the Cape route are at present about 15 ships. The estimated losses if the Mediterranean route were used should only be about 9 a month even allowing a higher percentage of loss. He understood, however, that the United States estimate was 18.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| General Marshall | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Admiral King | General Brooke | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Tedder | |
| Lieutenant General Eisenhower | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant Roosevelt, USNR | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 15, 1943, 5:30 p.m.
Secret
The Situation in North Africa
General Eisenhower gave a review of the situation on his front. He explained that the Allied forces which landed in French North Africa were equipped to capture three ports. They were not a mobile army and had little strength for offensive operations. This arrangement had been necessary since the attitude of the French was an unknown quantity. General Anderson had advanced with great boldness and rapidity taking every kind of risk in an attempt to get into Tunis and Bizerte in the first rush. He had finally been stopped by dive bombing when he got into the open country near Tunis, and by wet weather which hampered movement off the roads. Every effort had then been made to reinforce the forward troops, units being moved from Oran and from Casablanca. It was hoped to launch an offensive on December 22 to capture Tunis, making use of superior gun power. The weather had turned against us and it had proved necessary to call off the offensive. A means of carrying out operations in the drier country in the south had then been sought and an operation had now been planned for the capture of Sfax which would begin on January 24th. He had been waiting, however, for a chance of coordinating action with General Alexander, as it was important that the timing should fit in with the movements of the 8th Army.
General Eisenhower then gave details of how it was proposed to conduct the forthcoming operation and of the forces to be employed. It was intended to use the American First Armored Division (less one light battalion), a regimental combat team and additional units of artillery, and also to use the airfields in the Gafsa and Tebessa areas for supporting aircraft. The Germans had disposed their armor northeast of Pont du Fahs, and it would be necessary to guard against a counter stroke towards the rear of the forces attacking Sfax. It was hoped to put supplies into Sfax by sea from the eastward to ease the maintenace problem. It was hoped that this operation would be of real assistance to the 8th Army because the Germans were sending supplies by rail to Sfax whence they were sending small coasting vessels to Rommel. The Sfax force would be separated by 75 miles of rough country from the British 1st Army, in which there were two critical points: Pont du Fahs and Foudouk, which were held by the French. Apart from one regiment in Algiers, and part of a division in Oran, there was virtually nothing between the troops in the front line and Morocco. Troops in the latter place were too far away to move up over the long and difficult line of communications. The 1st Army had 7 to 10 days’ supplies of all kinds, and so if an opening were offered by the Germans they could launch an attack. In the whole theater of war there were now about 320,000 troops. Supplies were ample in the Casablanca area, but again difficulty of transportation prevented much being moved forward.
General Eisenhower then gave a description of the various airfields being used by the Allied Air Forces, and of the difficulties of keeping them serviceable. He then referred to the political situation and pointed out that it was very closely related to the military situation in view of the very vulnerable nature of the line of communications for the guarding of which French troops were responsible. Returning to the air situation he said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had twice visited Algiers and detailed plans had been worked out to insure the coordinated action of the Air Forces from the Middle East, Malta and French North Africa. Medium bombers based on Philippeville were now being used with effect against shipping.
General Alexander then gave an account of the operations of the 8th Army. He said that the El Alamein position was about 40 miles long and was occupied by the German 15th Panzer, 21st Panzer, 90th Light and 164th Infantry Divisions which were at full strength in men and equipment, and by 10 Italian Divisions. The position had no open flank so the problem was one of punching a hole through which the armor could be launched. The attack went in under a very heavy barrage of 500 guns on October 24th. Infantry advanced through deep minefields for 4,000 to 6,000 yards. For the next ten days there was severe fighting designed to eat up the enemy’s reserves and prepare the way for the final breakthrough. On November 4th, the front was broken and the opportunity came for the fine American Sherman tanks to pour through. In two weeks Tobruk was reached and by the end of a month the army was at Agheila. They had the satisfaction of advancing twice as fast as Rommel had been able to move during our retreat. The Germans had not enough transport to go round and so they had made certain that what there was was used for the German units. Our casualties in twelve days were 16,000; the enemy’s must have totalled between 60,000 and 70,000 and Rommel must have lost nearly 5,000 vehicles. None of this would have been possible had it not been for the air superiority gained by the Air Forces who had throughout done magnificent work.
For the further advance beyond Agheila everything depended upon the use of Benghazi. The harbor was left by the Germans in a terrible mess. However by dint of fine work on the part of the Navy, a flow of 3,000 tons per day was reached. A severe gale which again breached the mole and sank several ships interrupted the flow, but it was now back again to 2,000 tons per day. Sirte was useless but there was a small place near Agheila where 400 tons per day had been unloaded.
The plan of the operations which had now begun was an attack by the 7th Armored Division, the New Zealand Division and the 51st Highland Division who were carrying with them 10 days’ supplies and 500 miles of petrol. It was hoped to reach Tripoli by January 26th.
The enemy’s fighting value was hard to assess but he was believed to have at his disposal the following forces:
| 15th Panzer Division with 30 tanks | ) | 50 additional tanks were believed to be ready in Tunisia. |
|---|---|---|
| 21st Panzer Division with about 27 tanks |
| 90th Light Division | } | both weak in strength and short of artillery. |
|---|---|---|
| 164th Division | ||
| About 9 Italian Divisions. |
The total strength might be assessed at 50,000 Germans and 30,000 Italians, though only about 20,000 of the former were strictly fighting troops. The enemy’s organization was much broken up and he was very short of artillery. Furthermore, his army had retreated 1,000 miles, which must have had its effect on morale. Our superiority rested in tanks and guns, of which we had ample. General LeClerc’s advance through Fezzan had been a fine piece of work but would not exercise an influence on the present battle.
If we got to Tripoli according to plan the 8th Army would be quite immobilized until the port was open. This would take probably seven or ten days, though in the worst case it might take three months. It was hoped to work up to 3,000 tons a day and if this was achieved it would be possible to attack the Mareth Line towards the middle of March with 2 Armored and 4 Infantry Divisions. We were getting photographs of the Mareth Line, which was certainly a prepared position, though lacking in depth. It should be realized that the distances involved were very great. From Buerat to Tripoli was 248 miles and from Tripoli to Gabes was 220 miles. It would, of course, be possible, if the enemy’s resistance proved weak, to advance to the Mareth Line with very light forces somewhat earlier.
Discussion then turned upon the coordination of the operations of the 8th Army and of those of General Eisenhower’s command. General Eisenhower inquired what Rommel’s position would be if the 8th Army captured Tripoli and if he captured Sfax. Could the 8th Army keep Rommel engaged so that the forces at Sfax could neglect its right flank and turn all its attention towards the North?
General Alexander said that Rommel was living very much from hand to mouth for supplies and if he lost all his ports he would certainly be trapped; nevertheless, it would be necessary to give very careful study to the Sfax operation. It should be realized that if a force advanced on Sfax, Rommel would react like lightning and his plan would be the best possible. Great care would be necessary to insure that undue risks were not taken.
Sir Alan Brooke said that a great deal depended upon the timing of the Sfax operation. It might be unfortunate if the force arrived at Sfax just at the time that the 8th Army had reached Tripoli and were immobilized for lack of supplies.
It was generally agreed that the coordination of the action of the two armies was a matter of the highest importance and the present opportunity should be utilized to the full.
Discussion then turned on the strength required to hold the North African shore when it had been completely cleared of the enemy. General Alexander said that he had calculated that two divisions with a mobile reserve would be sufficient for Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. General Eisenhower said that he considered four divisions should be held to watch Spanish Morocco and that one infantry and one armored division would certainly be necessary in Algeria and Tunisia. There were at present six U.S. divisions in French North Africa and three more were set up in the original plan to come. If these were shipped there would be three U.S. divisions over and above defensive requirements. He thought it would be unwise to hand over the defense of Tunisia too early to the French. The Prime Minister agreed. He said that it appeared that there would be some thirteen divisions in the whole North African theater available for future operations.
In reply to an inquiry Sir Arthur Tedder said that he was of the opinion that convoys could be passed through the Mediterranean when airfields had been established and when the Tunisian tip had been cleared. Sir Dudley Pound agreed. He reckoned that if thirty ships could be passed through every ten days the whole of the Cape traffic could be done away with and 225 ships would thus be released for other uses. It was hard to estimate the relative losses which might be incurred, but though the percentage of loss might be slightly higher through the Mediterranean the total would be less as fewer ships would be involved. The Mediterranean route would be more expensive in escorts, but there would be a saving in the time of voyages.
The Prime Minister said that the opening of the Mediterranean would have its effect on the attitude of Turkey; moreover, the British 10th Army, consisting of six divisions, which had been established in Persia with the object of meeting the threat through the Caucasus, was now available to encourage and support the Turks.
In discussion it was suggested that it might be worthwhile calculating what specialized units would be required to round out the Turkish Army. Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that up to the present the Turks had been supplied with technical material and arms, but although their Army consisted of first-rate material, as infantry, they tended to misuse technical equipment and allow it to deteriorate. He did not think their army would ever be fit to operate offensively outside Turkey. It might, however, serve to hold Turkey as a base from which our forces could operate.
Sir Arthur Tedder said that the Turks had a small air force to which we gave a limited number of aircraft; it would never be fit to fight. Our plan was to operate initially some twenty-five fighter and bomber squadrons from airfields in Turkey which had been prepared and stocked. Further airfields would be required if we were to operate offensively and plans were all drawn up for their preparation. It was intended to move antiaircraft defenses in with the squadrons.
Sir Arthur Tedder then gave an account of the part played by the Air Force in the recent victories in the Middle East. He emphasized that their task began during the British retreat from Gazala. Since that time the enemy air force had been beaten down and great efforts had been made to stop Rommel’s supplies. The action of an air force in operations of this kind was difficult to explain concisely, extending as it did over great areas and diverse tasks. The Middle East Air Forces had first struck at Rommel’s supplies and then at the supplies to Tunisia; for the latter purpose Malta had been reinforced to the utmost and aircraft had been transferred to Tunisia. The coordination of the Air Forces of the Middle East, Malta and Tunisia was a complicated problem and he was very glad to have the present opportunity of meeting General Eisenhower and discussing it.
General Eisenhower explained the difficulties under which the Air Forces in Tunisia were operating in support of the Army. There were only two airfields available for fighters and even these were 100 miles from the front line. The Germans, on the other hand, had two all weather airfields in Tunis. In the early stages U.S. units from the Western Zone had been moved up and placed under British command; Air Marshal Welch had disposed them in the Tebessa area. For the operation now contemplated the British fighter force would operate from Souk El Arba under Lawson and the U.S. fighters would operate in the South under General Crane. His own conception of the layout on this front was that the British Army Commander should control it all since there was no sound arrangement by which the front could be divided. The French, however, had refused to serve under British command. This had meant that he had had to establish a Command Post from which to direct operations. He hoped to overcome this kind of difficulty in the near future.
The Prime Minister inquired whether there was any danger of the Germans striking through General Anderson’s left flank rather in the manner adopted by the 8th Army at El Alamein. General Eisenhower said that the 1st Army had such superiority over the enemy in artillery that he did not think there was much fear of this. Though the enemy’s specialist and tank units were good, his infantry had not seemed to be up to the same standard.
In conclusion it was emphasized that events had reached a crucial stage in the North African Theater and that the events of the next two or three weeks would be of vital importance. The present was the time at which to consider what action should be taken when the North African shore had finally been cleared.
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Roosevelt-Leathers conversation, 7 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Lord Leathers | |
| Mr. Harriman |
Friday, 15 January
The day started with a long conference in the President’s bedroom. The following persons were present:
- General Geo. C. Marshall
- Admiral E. J. King
- Lt. General H. H. Arnold
- Brig. General J. R. Deane
- Mr. Harry Hopkins
- Mr. Averell Harriman
This conference had lasted from ten o’clock until 12:30. It was followed by a one-thirty luncheon in the President’s villa. Mr. Churchill, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Commander Thompson, and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt lunched with the President.
At 3:00 p.m. the Prime Minister and his personal aide, Commander Thompson, took their departure in company with Mr. Harriman.
At 3:55 p.m., Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA, Commander U.S. Armed Forces in North Africa, called on the President. Shortly after five o’clock, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces visited the President and remained for ten minutes, departing at 5:30 p.m.
Preparatory to a conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, scheduled for 5:30 p.m., the Prime Minister arrived at the President’s villa and introduced to the President the following listed British officers:
- General H.R.L.G. Alexander, Commander Middle East Forces
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
- Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay Office of the Minister of Defense
From 5: 30 until 7:00 p.m. the following listed persons conferred as a group with the President and Prime Minister Churchill in the President’s villa:
| Field Marshal Sir John Dill | General George C. Marshall |
| General H.R.L.G. Alexander | Admiral E. J. King |
| General Sir Alan F. Brooke | Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold |
| Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder | Lt. Gen. D. D. Eisenhower |
| Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound | Brig. Gen. John R. Deane |
| Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal | |
| Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob |
Following the departure of the above-listed conferees, Mr. Harriman and Lord Leathers called on the President and remained for half an hour, departing at 7:35 p.m.
During the afternoon, Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., USNR, had been informed of his father’s arrival at Casablanca and he accordingly took up quarters in “Dar es Saada,” thus making the household four persons – The President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. These four were joined at dinner in the President’s villa this evening by General Marshall, Lt. General Eisenhower, and Mr. Robert Murphy.
The President retired at 11:40.
1 Like
U.S. State Department (January 16, 1943)
Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, 9:55 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Murphy | Mr. Macmillan | |
| Lieutenant General Eisenhower |
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Colonel Smart | Major General Kennedy | |
| Commander Libby | Air Vice Marshal Slessor | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 16, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
- The North African Situation
Sir Alan Brooke gave an account of a conference between General Alexander and General Eisenhower regarding the coming operations in Tunisia and Libya. General Eisenhower had planned an offensive against Sfax to be launched on January 24th. The Plan presented some difficulties. The 1st Army cannot attack prior to March 15th. The British 8th Army expects to take Tripoli by January 24th. At that time they will be out of fuel for their vehicles and a certain amount of reorganizing will be necessary. It is probable that the 8th Army will not be able to attack Rommel’s forces on the Mareth line prior to February 15th. Thus they will be too late to take advantage of the favorable situation created by General Eisenhower’s attack on Sfax and consequently Rommel will be free for a period of time to operate against General Eisenhower’s southern forces and perhaps force him to withdraw from Sfax. This might be coupled with a German attack from the north which would place General Eisenhower’s southern forces in an extremely precarious position.
Sir Alan Brooke stated that it had been decided that the Sfax attack would be canceled. Instead, raids would be conducted against the German line of communications from Sfax but the bulk of General Eisenhower’s forces consisting of the 1st Armored Division, reinforced, would be held in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist General Alexander in his attack on Rommel’s forces or to assist the 1st Army to the north. The Sfax attack might be accomplished later and, if so, it would be timed by agreement between General Alexander and General Eisenhower who will confer frequently.
- The Strategic Concept for 1943 in the European Theater
General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were anxious to learn the British concept as to how Germany is to be defeated. It has been the conception of the United States Chiefs of Staff that Germany must be defeated by a powerful effort on the continent, carrying out the Bolero-Roundup plans. Aid to Russia is regarded as being of paramount importance in order to assist the Russian Army to absorb the strength of the German ground and air forces.
He said we must devise means to enable Russia to continue aggressively through 1943 by providing them with supplies. The amount of such supplies and the methods of delivering them must be determined upon. The German air and ground forces brought to bear against Russia must be reduced. Any method of accomplishing this other than on the Continent is a deviation from the basic plan. The question is then to what extent must the United Nations adhere to the general concept and to what extent do they undertake diversions for the purpose of assisting Russia, improving the tonnage situation, and maintaining momentum.
In commenting on the British presentation of their plans for the Mediterranean, General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to have further information on the following points:
a) Were not the East-West communications in northern Europe, which the British consider capable of moving seven divisions every twelve days, subject to severe interference by heavy air attacks from England?
b) If the Mediterranean operations were undertaken and there were a break in the German strength, might it occur so rapidly that full advantage could not be taken of it? It was, therefore, desired that the British Chiefs of Staff expand on what the tonnage savings from the Mediterranean operations might be in order to determine if they were worth the costs involved?
c) What would be the effects of Mediterranean operations on the timing of the United Nations concentrations in England? In General Eisenhower’s opinion, it was unwise to count on further use of landing craft used in the initial landings for any other operation. A fifty or seventy-five percent loss should be anticipated. General Eisenhower also thought that operations on the Continent to establish a bridgehead would require more divisions than had originally been thought necessary.
d) What were the relative merits of undertaking an operation against Sicily or Sardinia, particularly in regard to the effects on tonnage, and the development of forces in the United Kingdom?
e) Was an operation against Sicily merely a means towards an end or an end in itself? Is it to be a part of an integrated plan to win the war or simply taking advantage of an opportunity?
General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed that every effort must be made to build up forces to support Turkey in order to be able to reinforce her for resistance against the Axis powers and to secure the use of her airfields for bombing operations by the United Nations.
He thought that if operations are to be undertaken in the Mediterranean, they should be financed by the troops now in North Africa. One of the strongest arguments for undertaking such an operation is that there will be an excess of troops in North Africa once Tunisia has been cleared of the Axis forces.
Admiral King stated that he thought it most important to determine how the war is to be conducted. The percentage of the war effort to be applied to Germany and to Japan must be determined as well as over-all plans for the defeat of each. He asked if Russia is to carry the burden as far as the ground forces are concerned; also, if the United Nations were to invade the Continent, and when. He said that since Europe is in the British area of strategic responsibility, he would like to hear their views on these questions. He thought it should be decided whether a planned step-by-step policy was to be pursued or whether we should rely on seizing opportunities.
General Arnold stated that he was interested to know whether an attack on Sicily was to be a means to an end or an end in itself and what relation such an attack would have to the whole strategic conception.
General Marshall said that, when planning for Gymnast, we were attempting to undertake an operation “on a shoestring.” He said we then changed to the Bolero-Roundup concept and had to prepare for Sledgehammer because of the strong possibility of a Russian collapse last autumn. Troop concentrations had been started and production programs rearranged for Bolero. This created difficult complications. The naval program was upset because of the necessity to undertake the construction of landing craft. It was then decided to undertake Operation Torch in which great risks were involved but in which we have been abnormally fortunate.
General Marshall described the difficulties with which the United States Chiefs of Staff were faced over questions of priorities in production. It was essential to fix our strategic policy as carefully as possible in order to avoid production difficulties.
General Marshall thought it important that we now reorient ourselves and decide what the “main plot” is to be. Every diversion or side issue from the main plot acts as a “suction pump.” He stated that the operations against Sicily appeared to be advantageous because of the excess number of troops in North Africa brought about by the splendid efforts of the British 8th Army. However, before deciding to undertake such an operation, he thought it necessary to determine just what part it would play in the over-all strategic plan.
Sir Alan Brooke said that on the Continent Russia is the only ally having large land forces in action. Any effort of the other allies must necessarily be so small as to be unimportant in the over-all picture. He felt that ground operations by the United States and the United Kingdom would not exert any great influence until there were definite signs that Germany was weakening.
General Marshall stated that it was desirable to force the enemy to meet us in air combat. He asked Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the effects of air superiority of the United Nations on the operations of ground troops of the Continent. He felt that if a bridgehead were established and Germany did not attempt to meet our air superiority, the bridgehead could be expanded. On the other hand, if they did meet our air superiority, it would necessitate withdrawing large air forces from the Russian front.
He referred to a suggestion by Mr. Molotov that we send a ground force to the Continent sufficient to divert forty German divisions from the Russian front. He said that this was out of the question and that our aim should be to weaken the German air power in the Russian theater rather than the ground forces.
Sir Alan Brooke stated that with limited ground forces, he did not believe that we could constitute sufficient threat in Northern France to the Germans to force them to withdraw much of their air power from the Russian front. The Germans have forty-four divisions in France, some of which have been moved south as a result of Operation Torch. However, the Germans still have sufficient strength to overwhelm us on the ground and perhaps hem us in with wire or concrete to such an extent that any expansion of the bridgehead would be extremely difficult. Moreover, we cannot undertake any operation in Northern France until very late in the summer of 1943. Since, therefore, we cannot go into the Continent in force until Germany weakens, we should try to make the Germans disperse their forces as much as possible. This can be accomplished by attacking the German allies, Italy in particular. This would result in a considerable shortage of German troops on the Russian front. An effort should be made to put Italy out of the war, largely by bombing attacks on the north from the United Kingdom and in the south from North Africa and Sicily.
Our policy should be to force Italy out of the war and bring Turkey in. If Italy were out of the war, Germany would be forced to occupy that country with a considerable number of divisions and also would be forced to replace Italian divisions in other Axis occupied countries such as Yugoslavia and Greece.
Preparations for an attack against Sicily would be known to the Germans and would necessitate the dispersing of their forces to meet any of the capabilities of our amphibious forces. They would have to be prepared to meet us in Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, Greece and the Dodecanese, and this would give great opportunity for deception plans. He felt that this would cause a much greater withdrawal of strength from the Russian front than any operations which we might undertake across the channel. The protection of the sea route alone would bring on a considerable air battle in the Mediterranean which will give relief to the Russian front. Airplanes which normally leave Russia during the winter months and participate in operations in the Mediterranean would be unable to return to the Russian front in the spring.
Sir Alan Brooke said that at the same time as operations against Sicily were being undertaken, there must be a continued build-up of the United Nations forces in the United Kingdom. These must be prepared to undertake the final action of the war as soon as Germany gives definite signs of weakness.
Sir Alan Brooke did not believe we could undertake any further operations in Italy from Sicily in 1943, unless Italy collapsed completely. We should be very careful of accepting any invitation to support an anti-Fascist insurrection. To do so might only immobilize a considerable force to no useful purpose.
Sir Alan Brooke did not feel that air operations against the German and French railway systems in the north would be particularly effective or do anything more than impose delay. There were so many alternative routes. On the other hand, operations against the north-south railway lines, particularly those in Italy, could be made effective because of the close proximity of the lines to the shore which makes them vulnerable to commando raids as well as to air action.
Sir Dudley Pound discussed the effects that taking Sardinia and Sicily would have on the passage of convoys. He said that securing either of these islands will not have as much effect as securing Tunisia. He anticipated that when Tunisia is gained, we shall be able to convoy thirty cargo ships through the Mediterranean every ten days which will result in the release of two hundred and twenty-five ships for other purposes. The route would not be safe for personnel ships or tankers. The capture of Sardinia would have little effect on the movements of shipping. On the other hand, the capture of Sicily would enable us to move troop convoys as well as cargo convoys through the Mediterranean with relative safety. The troop convoys, however, will, in the future, be limited almost entirely to replacement troops for the Middle East.
He stated that there will also be a saving in tankers because of the possibility of supplying the necessities for oil in the Mediterranean from Haifa rather than bringing oil from the United States.
Sir Alan Brooke recapitulated the comparative merits of an attack on Sardinia and Sicily as follows: The loss of Sicily would be a much heavier blow to Italy than Sardinia and would effectively secure the sea route through the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it was a much more ambitious operation and would have to be mounted later. Sardinia was a smaller undertaking, and could be mounted earlier. It would provide an excellent air base for attack on Industrial Italy, particularly if Corsica were taken as well.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if Sicily had to be taken later in the year and if the Germans in consequence were able to reinforce it more strongly, it would be a much tougher nut to crack. On the other hand, once in possession of the Sicilian airfields we could make it very difficult indeed for the Axis to reinforce the island. The railways along the Italian coasts in the two [toe?] were vulnerable to air attack and raiding; and there were narrow defiles leading from the port of Messina in the island itself.
Sir Charles Portal referred to the suggestion that we might be able to offset inferiority in land forces in Northern France by the greatly superior air forces which could be operated from the United Kingdom. So far as the Brest Peninsula was concerned, no fighter support could be given from the United Kingdom, since it was out of range. The Cherbourg Peninsula was better from this point of view and offered some possibilities as a preliminary operation. Nevertheless, with the limited air facilities in the Peninsula we should probably find ourselves pinned down at the neck of the Peninsula by ground forces whose superiority we should be unable to offset by the use of air. We should certainly be opposed by strong German air forces there. Once we were committed in Northern France the Germans would quickly bring up their air forces from the Mediterranean, realizing that we could not undertake amphibious operations on a considerable scale both across the channel and in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, by threatening in the Mediterranean we should cause a far greater dispersion of German air forces.
Sir Charles Portal said that in his view it was impossible to map out a detailed plan for winning the war, but Germany’s position, if we knocked out Italy, would undoubtedly be most serious. Her ability to continue the fight depended on (a) the possession of the necessary resources and (b) the will to fight on. As regards resources, her main shortages at present were oil and air power. We had no exact knowledge of her oil position, but if she had not succeeded in gaining the Caucasus oil, and if her synthetic oil plants were attacked by precision bombing in daylight, there could be little doubt that her forces would rapidly become immobilized from lack of oil.
As regards her air forces, calculations had been made by the British Air Intelligence Staffs of German deficiencies under the following hypotheses:
- Case A – Italy fighting and Germany continuing the offensive in Caucasia.
- Case B – As for A, but Italy knocked out.
- Case C – Italy fighting and Germany holding a shortened line in Russia by withdrawing to Rostov.
- Case D – As for C, but Italy not fighting.
German deficiencies in June 1943 were calculated as follows:
| Case | Deficiencies in First Line Aircraft | Deficiencies in Divisions |
|---|---|---|
| A | 1700 | 34 |
| B | 2250 | 54 |
| C | 700 | 9 |
| D | 1250 | 30 |
Germany’s will to fight depended largely on her confidence in ultimate success. If we and the Russians began to score continual successes against Germany, which she could not defeat owing to her lack of means, she would begin to realize that the prospects were hopeless. She might be faced with the dilemma of withdrawing all her troops from France and concentrating in the East against Russia. The way to defeat Germany, therefore, seemed to be to take every chance of attacking her oil supplies; to increase the air bombardment of Germany itself with its inevitable results on German morale, and on industrial capacity and its effect in producing heavy casualties in her population and great misery by the destruction of their dwellings. If we could achieve as well a series of successes, even though these might be comparatively small in extent, it seemed fairly certain that a point would be reached at which Germany would suddenly crack. No one, however, could say precisely when or how the collapse would come.
Admiral King said he understood the general concept of the British Chiefs of Staff was to make use of Russia’s geographical position and her reserves of manpower to make the main effort on land against Germany and to support Russia by diverting as many German forces as possible from the Eastern front. This raised the question as to whether we should not give Russia larger supplies of equipment.
Once the North African coast had been cleared it seemed that we should have a surplus of troops in North Africa and the Mediterranean whom we could not readily move elsewhere. It seemed therefore economical to use them in that area if possible. Sicily seemed undoubtedly to offer a greater dividend though its cost would be higher than Sardinia. The question was whether we could afford to delay so long before taking further offensive action against Germany and whether the Russians would be satisfied unless a “second front” was opened in France. The chief bottleneck seemed to be the provision of landing craft. Operations in Norway seemed to be worth examining though they would almost inevitably lead to a demand from Sweden for assistance and equipment.
As regards the Brest Peninsula, it was worth noting that once we were established there, U.S. troops could be moved in direct from America without the need for trans-shipment in the United Kingdom. The effect of capturing Brest on the U-boat war needed careful consideration.
Sir Charles Portal said that Brest was one of the four Biscay ports used by the Germans as U-boat bases, but he doubted whether the possession of the peninsula would greatly assist the proposed heavy bomber attacks on Lorient, La Pallice and Bordeaux. All these were within easy range of the United Kingdom and to operate against them from the Brest Peninsula would involve putting in additional facilities there. The airfields in the peninsula were likely to be fully employed in the air defense of the area and direct support of the army, leaving nothing to spare for fighter escorts for daylight bombing attacks on the Biscay ports.
The next point discussed was the effect of Mediterranean operations on Bolero. Sir Alan Brooke said that the number of divisions which the British Chiefs of Staff calculated could be made available by September 15th for operations from the United Kingdom into Northern France were:
- 21-24 if the Mediterranean were closed down
- 16-18 if Mediterranean operations were undertaken
If the capture of Sicily were undertaken, the number of landing craft left available for operations in Northern France would be less Sir Dudley Pound observed that all Calculations of the number of divisions available for operations in Northern France were based or the date of September 15th. In his view this was too late since the weather was liable to break in the third week in September and it was essential to have a port by then. The first assault should not be later than August 15th.
General Marshall inquired whether considerable numbers of landing craft would not be required for the maintenance of Sicily after it was taken.
Sir Charles Portal said that once Sicily had been occupied the air defense of the ports should present no particular difficulty. We were able to put large ships into Malta which was very exposed to ah attack. The number of enemy airfields in the toe of Italy was small and fighters on the Sicilian airdromes should be able to deal with dive bombers.
Lord Louis Mountbatten then reviewed the British landing craft situation. Available landing craft were being allocated broadly as follows:
a) A group in the United Kingdom of the smaller types of cross-channel craft sufficient to lift 4 brigade groups with their vehicles, of 7 brigade groups loaded for raids when very few motor vehicles would be taken.
b) A group in the Western Mediterranean sufficient to lift 1 brigade group complete.
c) A similar group in the Eastern Mediterranean.
d) A group in India sufficient to train 1 brigade group, but not enough to lift the brigade group if it had to undertake actual operations.
e) An oversea assault force, as a strategic reserve, sufficient to lift 6 brigade groups. The personnel would be carried in combat loaders but they could not all be put ashore in the first flight as the ships could not carry sufficient landing craft for the purpose.
Every attempt was being made to organize landing craft bases in the U.K. so as to give the maximum flexibility and thus allow for a change of plan. The switch over from Roundup to Torch had caused great difficulties owing to the fact that bases prepared for Roundup were in the South of England whereas Scottish bases had to be used for Torch.
Lord Louis Mountbatten observed that he was working on the assumption that any U S. troops would be carried in landing craft manned by the U.S. In the Torch landings the majority of U.S. forces at Oran and Algiers had been landed in British manned craft. He emphasized the need for working out allocations of landing craft well ahead owing to the long time involved in training the necessary crews.
General Somervell said that the introduction of the LST and the LCI necessitated considerable change in our ideas about landing craft; the former carried some 150 infantry as well as tanks, and the latter 250 infantry. He calculated that if all the available landing craft were concentrated in North Africa we should be able to lift a total of some 80,000 men by April. Allowing for the use of 105-foot and 50-foot craft as well, this lift would probably increase to about 90,000 in June. If this force of landing craft were used for a second and third ferrying flight, on a short sea crossing, their lift would probably be about 60,000 in the second flight and 45,000 in the third flight, allowing for inevitable casualties in craft. He considered the use of these landing craft, working to beaches, a sounder proposition than the risking of large ships under air attack. The latter should be reserved for the long ocean hauls.
To transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for a subsequent operation later in the year presented considerable problems. It was certainly essential to have considerable numbers of landing craft in the United Kingdom well in advance for training purposes.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Joint Planners had calculated August as the earliest date for the attack on Sicily. If the whole operation were mounted from North Africa in order to save escorts, the date would be postponed until the end of August. His own view was that, even under the latter condition, the date might be advanced to July. Assuming that the attack be launched about July 20th, he expected that we might gain control of the Island within about six weeks.
General Marshall inquired when, on the above assumptions, there would be sufficient landing craft in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in Germany.
Lord Louis Mountbatten said that three months would have to be allowed from the time when the landing craft could be dispensed with to the time when they would be ready for action again in the United Kingdom. The large types of sea-going landing vessels presented no difficulty but small 50-foot craft were essential for the assault landing. Both the United States and British Planners were agreed that it was not possible to use the large craft for the first flights. These small craft had to be collected from the site of operations, transported to Scotland, distributed for repair, reassembled and then again transported by ship to the South of England for a Continental operation.
There would be in England, however, at all times the assault force to which he had previously referred which could lift 4 Brigade Groups with their transport for an assault against heavy opposition. In addition, for the follow-up troops, a great number of landing barges and small coasting vessels were being prepared. The spearhead would not be affected at all by operations in the Mediterranean and would always be kept intact. Any landing craft recovered from the Mediterranean would therefore be in the nature of a bonus.
Admiral King said that the intended use of combat loaders for an assault on Sicily greatly disturbed him. He had hoped that it would be possible to use the larger types of landing craft instead. He feared that a large number of these valuable combat loaders would be lost in the operation.
Lord Louis Mountbatten said that in the Husky plan all available LST’s and LCI’s would be used, but in addition, 26 combat loaders were required for the assault troops. Of these, the British could provide half.
Admiral King pointed out that the two main factors in winning the war were manpower and munitions. In respect to military manpower, the British Commonwealth had presumably mobilized practically up to the limit. The United States at the present time had reached about 60% of their contemplated strength in military manpower though the position had not yet completely stabilized. His own guess at Russia’s position was that she had mobilized about 80% of available military manpower. China’s resources in manpower were still relatively untouched, and India likewise was scarcely tapped.
As regards munitions, the greatest potential lay in the United States. Next came Great Britain, but she could not supply the full needs of the British Commonwealth farces. Russia was more self-supporting than at first appeared likely but had to receive a considerable amount of assistance from the Allies. From the munitions point of view, China and India were liabilities since their available manpower enormously exceeded their industrial production.
In the European theater Russia was most advantageously placed for dealing with Germany in view of her geographical position and manpower; in the Pacific, China bore a similar relation to the Japanese. It should be our basic policy to provide the manpower resources of Russia and China with the necessary equipment to enable them to fight. With this in mind, the United States Chiefs of Staff set great store by Operation Ravenous. It seemed likely that one of the major British contributions to the defeat of Japan would be to complete the reconquest of Burma and the opening of the Burma Road.
General Marshall observed that, with regard to Operation Ravenous , Chiang Kai-shek had now withdrawn from his undertaking to move in from Yunnan on the grounds that Field Marshal Wavell could only provide very limited British forces and there would be no British naval strength in the Bay of Bengal to cut the Japanese reinforcements route to Rangoon. General Stilwell was certainly placed in a very difficult position at the present time.
Discussion then turned on the need for long-range planning in order that production policy could be coordinated with strategy.
General Arnold pointed out that if operations in the Mediterranean were undertaken, the seizure of Brest, in the British view, would not be possible this year. Further, that even if Cherbourg or Brest were taken, our forces would not be able to break out for a further invasion of the Continent. It looked very much as if no Continental operations on any scale were in prospect before the spring of 1944. We should have to decide not only what we were going to do in 1943 but also in 1944 since otherwise, owing to the time lag, our priorities in production might be wrongly decided.
Sir Alan Brooke expressed the view that we should definitely count on reentering the Continent in 1944 on a large scale.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that production plans could never follow strategy precisely since the situation changed so frequently in war. The best that could be hoped for was to take broad decisions on major questions and these would always be in the nature of compromises. For example, when considering the possibility of reentering the Continent, it had been decided that we must treat it as a fortress and that heavy initial bombardment would be required to break into it. It had therefore been decided to give very high priority to the production of heavy bombers which would be used to soften up Germany before the invasion of the Continent.
Further discussion then followed on the possibility of a German crack in 1943.
Sir John Dill felt that there was quite a possibility of beating Germany this year. We should therefore strain every nerve to effect this since the sooner we beat Germany the sooner we could turn on Japan. We must not let Japan consolidate her position for too long. Japan certainly could not be beaten this year, but Germany might.
Admiral King doubted whether Germany could be defeated before 1944. He felt that her defeat could only be effected by direct military action rather than by a failure in her morale. Was it necessary, however, to accept that we could do nothing in Northern France before April 1944?
Sir Charles Portal said that this depended entirely on Germany’s power of resistance. If we concentrated everything we could on Germany this year, it was possible that we might cause her to crumble and thus be able to move into Germany with comparatively small forces. Until this condition had been produced, however, some 20 divisions would get us nowhere on the Continent. A factor which must not be forgotten was the terrific latent power of the oppressed people which could only come into play when the crumbling process started. At that moment, however, their efforts might contribute greatly to the final collapse. He did not see Germany fighting on and on, completely surrounded by the armed forces of the Allies. A point would come at which the whole structure of Germany and the Nazi Party would collapse, and this moment might well come during the current year. It was essential therefore to have ready a plan and some resources in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack. In order to produce the crack, however, we must keep up the maximum pressure on Germany by land operations; air bombardment alone was not sufficient.
In further discussion the importance of deciding the requirements and availability of escort vessels was emphasized. These appeared to be one of the principal limiting factors.
Admiral King said that there was no reserve of escort vessels but if Operation Husky were decided upon, the United States and British Navies would have to find the escort vessels somehow just as they had in the case of Torch.
After some further discussion,
The Committee:
Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to reexamine the British plan for Husky in the light of the American and British resources of all kinds that can be made available for it, and to calculate the earliest date by which the Operation could be mounted.
- Supplies to Russia
Sir Dudley Pound recapitulated the factors governing PQ convoys to North Russia. With the present resources of the Home Fleet not more than one 30-ship convoy could be run every 40 to 42 days. Each convoy had to contain two oilers, leaving a net total of 28 cargo ships. With more destroyers it would be possible to “double-end” the convoys, reducing cycle to 27 days instead of 40-42. For this purpose about 12 destroyers would be required from the U.S. Navy. He wished to emphasize, however, that if the Germans employed their surface ships boldly and kept up the same amount of air and U-boats as last year, it was within their power to stop the PQ convoys altogether.
General Somervell reviewed the general problem of supplying Russia. The northern route was at present the best since the turn-round was shortest. The turn-round on the Persian Gulf route was about five months. Some fifteen ships a month are now being used on this route but the flow was restricted by port and inland transportation deficiencies. Once the Mediterranean was opened some relief might be given by the use of Haifa and the overland route from there to Bagdad. For this purpose additional heavy trucks for the road haul would be needed. U.S. Technical troops were being dispatched to Persia to improve the trans-Persian transportation facilities, and it was hoped to increase these to about 10,000 tons per day. If this could be achieved, 40 ships a month instead of 15 could be sent into the Persian Gulf.
The sea route from Seattle to Vladivostok was also being used for non-military supplies and raw materials. Twelve ships manned by the Russians were now working this route, and it was hoped to add 10 ships a month in the future. The use of this route naturally depended on non-interference by the Japanese.
All these potential increases in shipping to Russia naturally would have to be found by cutting down elsewhere. If the opening of the Mediterranean saved some million and a half tons of shipping, this would provide a surplus for the purpose; but there appears to be no other sources. It should be possible for Great Britain and the United States to keep the pipeline full even if these potential increases were made. The maximum tonnage might be as high as 10 million tons per annum; the target for the current year was 4 million but it was doubtful if it would be reached. One million deadweight tons of supplies for Russia were awaiting shipment now in U.S. ports.
Sir Alan Brooke observed that one unsatisfactory feature of the whole business of supplying Russia was their refusal to put their cards on the table. It might well be that we were straining ourselves unduly and taking great risks when there was no real necessity to do so.
- Employment of French Forces in North Africa
General Marshall asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the employment of French divisions. The United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they can be effectively used and that their use will effect a considerable economy of force. The French divisions regarded as being the best must be reequipped as soon as practical. This, however, has political complications which must be resolved.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that we should exploit the use of French troops in North Africa to the maximum, particularly for garrison work. We should have to provide them with a considerable quantity of antiaircraft weapons. Their usefulness would depend greatly on whether we could establish a satisfactory French government. Good leadership was required to rekindle in them the desire to fight. Too many of the French were only waiting for the end of the war.
General Marshall asked what the effect would be on Spain if French troops were stationed opposite the border of Spanish Morocco. There seemed no doubt that some very useful French divisions could be formed in North Africa.
Sir Alan Brooke thought that it would be wise to keep U.S. forces on the Spanish border as well as French troops. This would tend to allay Spanish suspicions of the French intentions and at the same time remove any temptation from the Spanish to cross the frontier if they thought the French troops of inferior quality.
U.S. Navy Department (January 16, 1943)
Communiqué No. 252
South Pacific.
During the night of January 13-14, U.S. aircraft bombed Japanese positions at Munda on New Georgia Island. Results were not reported.
On January 14:
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During the morning U.S. planes bombed Sorum village, 3 miles east of the Japanese airfield on the southern end of Buka Island.
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At 8:35 a.m. and 11:35 a.m. enemy planes bombed U.S. positions on Guadalcanal Island. No damage to installations resulted. U.S. forces suffered some casualties.
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U.S. troops on Guadalcanal continued to advance and gains of 3,000-4,000 yards were made against stiff enemy resistance.
On January 15:
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During the early morning a “Catalina” reconnaissance plane (Consolidated PBY) attacked a group of five Japanese destroyer 16 miles northeast of the Russell Islands. One direct and two near hits damaged one of the destroyers, which was left burning.
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During the morning a force of “Dauntless” dive bombers (Douglas A-24) escorted by “Wildcat” (Grumman F4F) and “Airacobra” (Bell P-39) fighters attacked 9 Japanese destroyers 140 miles northwest of Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. Twelve enemy “Zeros” intercepted the attack and 8 were shot down. One of our dive bombers was forced down and 5 of our fighters failed to return. The dive bombers pressed home the attack and seriously damaged 2 of the enemy destroyers.
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During the morning a U.S. plane patrolling the vicinity of Guadalcanal shot down three Japanese “Zeros.”
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During the afternoon “Flying Fortress” heavy bombers (Boeing B-17) with “Lightning” Lockheed P-38), “Airacobra” and “Warhawk” (Curtiss P-40) escort attacked 5 enemy destroyers 37 miles southeast of Faisi in the Shortland Island area. No hits on the enemy vessels were scored but 12 of the enemy float-type biplanes which intercepted the attack were shot down. No U.S. planes were lost.
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During the evening a force of dive bombers with “Wildcat” and “Airacobra” escort attacked an enemy cargo ship 37 miles north Munda. Two direct hits and 4 near hits were scored and the ship was left burning. Our “Wildcats” and “Airacobras” drove off 12 “Zeros” which attempted to intercept and shot down 7 of them. One U.S. fighter failed to return.
Brooklyn Eagle (January 16, 1943)
U.S. fliers fight air fleet – down 7 Nazi troop planes
Bombers in attacks – battle seen on to erase Rommel
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Find women in crews of two Axis planes
Seattle, Washington (UP) –
U.S. troops found a woman gunner in a German plane shot down in North Africa, Lt. Joe Klaas of the Army Air Force reported in a letter to his mother.
Klaas said:
We shot down a German plane the other day with a female tail gunner. She was quite dead.
Asbury Park, New Jersey (UP) –
Cox. James A. Prince, on furlough, revealed that one of the Japanese pilots who crashed their planes against the aircraft carrier Hornet was a woman.
He said:
The plane piloted by the woman crashed into the Hornet’s elevator. There wasn’t much left of it or the pilot, but reports confirmed by doctors that the pilot was a woman was subject of much conversation among us survivors.
Big oil firms pirate trade, dealers say
Independents claim they’re denied fuel, customers stolen
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New plan saves rubber, gas for U.S. in Britain
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Frances Farmer held for sanity hearing
Hollywood, California (UP) –
Frances Farmer underwent observation in General Hospital today awaiting a hearing on an insanity petition filed at the request of her sister-in-law.
Dr. Thomas Leonard, psychiatrist, described the tempestuous blonde actress as:
…mentally ill, hyperemotional and dangerous to others and probably to herself.