Rickenbacker praises former Scouts in war
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‘United Nations Week’ on, with monster noon rallies
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Paul Muni tops self in Commandos film
By Jane Corby
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The Los Angeles Times (January 14, 1943)
Frances Farmer resists arrest
Officers get actress to jail after being forced to clothe her
Frances Farmer, 29-year-old stage and screen actress, was arrested in a Hollywood Knickerbocker Hotel apartment yesterday by Santa Monica police on a warrant charging violation of parole from a drunk-driving sentence imposed last November.
The actress, located by Detective Earl Reinbold and Policewoman Martha Maus at the apartment, refused to clothe herself for the trip to jail, and had to be forcibly attired, the officers reported.
Violated dimout
Miss Farmer, held in the San ta Monica Jail without bail, was arrested two months ago and charged with drunk driving when found operating her car with bright lights in a dimout zone on Pico Blvd.
She pleaded guilty and was given 180 days in jail and fined $230. The jail term was relaxed to probation for two years, and she was given time to pay a $130 balance of the fine.
Two-week hunt
A condition of probation was that she refrain from drinking. When police were informed, according to their statement, that she was not observing this prohibition, a two-week hunt was launched for her.
More trouble loomed for Miss Farmer as a result of her asserted unprovoked attack on a studio hairdresser last Tuesday on a film set.
The victim, Edna Marie Burge of 11161 Dickens Ave., North Hollywood, complained to Deputy City Attorney John H. Carter yesterday that while she was dressing the actress hair the latter suddenly jumped up, struck her in the face and knocked her down According to the victim, Miss Farmer then flew into a tantrum and work on the picture was canceled for the day.
As a result of this flare of temper, producer Frank King of B-K Productions, who is producing No Escape on the Monogram lot, said he ejected Miss Farmer from the picture and replaced her with Mary Brian.
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The Pittsburgh Press (January 14, 1943)
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
With U.S. forces in Algeria – (Jan. 13)
When the Evacuation Hospital – the bunch of doctors and nurses recruited in Charlotte, North Carolina – arrived in Africa, they were neophytes at living in the field, for that part of their training had been overlooked.
Lt. Col. Rollin Bauchspies had taken over command while they were on the boat coming from England, and he’d had no time to give them the neglected field training.
So, they arrived in the middle of an African oatfield with 300 tents to set up, and not a soul knew how to put up a shelter-half or drive a tent peg properly. But they soon learned. Col. Bauchspies, who did know how, being a Regular Army man, got out and drove tent pegs himself. Everybody worked like a slave. Doctors helped dig ditches. Nurses helped unload trucks.
One amateur electrician among the enlisted men started wiring the office tents for lights. A couple of carpenters-by-trade made themselves known, and went to work. A professional sign painter turned up among the first patients, and painted the street signs around the hospital that help give it a civilized touch.
In a few days, the veterans had taught the tenderfeet how to make themselves comfortable living in the rough. Now the tents of officers and nurses are touchingly homelike. There is canvas on the floor. There are mosquito nets over the cots and framed pictures of wives and children standing on the wooden tables. The Charlotte doctors and nurses were wise enough to bring air mattresses and sleeping bags, and they’ve never slept more comfortably.
Of course, getting up in the cold before daylight and washing in cold water behind your tent out of a canvas washpan takes some getting used to. And yet it grows on you. Everything out here is so open, so free, so exempt from city turmoil.
Maj. Paul Sanger is chief surgeon of the hospital. He was chief surgeon back in Charlotte. He is a highly skilled, well-to-do professional man. He told me:
I never go into town. I feel better out here than I’ve ever felt in my life. We were all prima donnas back home. We had every comfort that money could buy. We would have been shocked at the idea of living like this. But we love it. We all do. I suppose we’ll be making our families live in tents when we get home.
Lt. Col. Preston White, chief medical officer, is from Lexington, Virginia. He’s an older man than the others, but he’s as enthusiastic as a child over the whole hospital setup. And he too has become an addict of outdoor living.
He says:
We have only a quart of water a day to wash, shave and wash clothes in, so we don’t take many baths. Maybe we don’t smell so good, but when you’re all in the same boat you don’t notice it. And you sure feel good living out like this.
The hospital is already spreading a fame for its food. Anybody in the army knows that a field hospital is the best place to eat. The other night, we had big juicy steaks for dinner. I asked Col. Bauchspies:
Where did these come from?
He said:
Hell, I wouldn’t dare ask. I suppose Stan stole them.
Stan is Capt. Stanton Pickens, the Coca-Cola king of Charlotte. He came along as mess officer. His brother, Lt. Col. Bob Pickens, is a friend of mine in London. Stan set such a good table that the trucks bringing patients from outlying camps always manage to arrive just at lunchtime. And another indication – Stan made arrangements with a local Arab to collect their garbage, for which he was to give the hospital a crate of oranges every three days. But it seems everybody cleaned his plate, and the Arab is getting so little garbage he wants to give oranges only every four days now.
The hospital’s supply officer is Capt. William F. Medearis. He’s a Charlotte bigwig. They say he owns all of Main Street, plus half the real estate and all the laundries. He is national secretary-treasurer of the Laundry Association. He turned down a lieutenant-colonelcy in Washington in order to come to Africa with his friends.
Capt. George C. Snyder, who commands the non-medical detachment of enlisted men at the hospital, shares the Coca-Cola honors with Capt. Pickens. Between them they have that special goldmine sewed up in Charlotte. But they’ve got nary a bottle of it here.
There are two Capt. Otis Jones’ in the outfit. They’re no relation and never heard of each other until they joined the Army. One is the chaplain, and he’s from Bude, Mississippi, near Natchez. The other is a Charlotte obstetrician. Since none of the soldiers is given to having babies, Dr. Jones is registrar for the hospital. So, they wisecrack that he “delivers papers’’ over here.
U.S. State Department (January 14, 1943)
Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, about 7 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill |
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, about 8 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | General Brooke | |
| Mr. Harriman | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt |
Log of the President’s trip
Thursday 14 January
The President’s plane landed at Medouina Airport, Casablanca, at 6:20 local time, where the President and the passengers in his plane were met by Mr. Michael Reilly of the White House Secret Service. The President proceeded by automobile to his villa adjoining the Anfa Hotel on the outskirts of the city. Here the American Army authorities had taken over a medium-sized modern hotel and 14 nearby villas. The entire area had been surrounded with barbed wire together with a heavy guard of troops, planes, and artillery. The hotel and the adjoining villas had been organized to provide temporary headquarters for the President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and their respective staffs.
The President was installed in Villa No. 2, “Dar es Saada,” by 7:00 p.m., and a few minutes later Mr. Hopkins left for Villa No. 3, “Mirador,” to escort Prime Minister Churchill across to the President’s villa. The President and Mr. Churchill conferred for an hour and then went in to dinner. In addition to Mr. Churchill, the following persons dined with the President:
| General Sir Alan F. Brooke | Gen. George C. Marshall |
| Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound | Admiral E. J. King |
| Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal | Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold |
| Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten | Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt |
| Mr. Harry L. Hopkins | |
| Mr. Averell Harriman |
After dinner, the President’s guests stayed late, renewing old acquaintances and “talking shop.” It was not until almost three hours after midnight that the President retired.
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U.S. State Department (January 15, 1943)
Meeting of Roosevelt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Mr. Harriman | ||
| General Marshall | ||
| Admiral King | ||
| Lieutenant General Arnold | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 15, 1943, 10 a.m.
Secret
- Visit of General Noguès and the Sultan of Morocco with the President
The President asked as to the advisability of his seeing General Noguès and possibly the Sultan of Morocco. General Marshall and Admiral King both stated they felt that General Eisenhower was in a better position to advise the President on this subject and he would no doubt do so when he arrived at Anfa Camp. Admiral King, however, questioned whether or not General Noguès merited the honor of visiting the President of the United States.
- The President’s Program
General Marshall explained that it had at first been thought the President would stay here for about four or five days; then leave by motor for Rabat and Lyauty [Port Lyautey] where he would visit three divisions and interview certain selected officers and men; then proceed by air to Oran, observe the troops there and also visit a hopital. From Oran, it was planned that he should go to Marrakech, change planes at the airfield there and then return to the United States. He stated that in view of the fact that the conference would probably last about ten days, these plans would of necessity have to undergo some change. He said that it is not desirable for the President to visit Marrakech and he should refuse any invitation of the Prime Minister to do so.
General Marshall explained that Marrakech is inland, that its airfield is entirely open. No one knows how many Axis agents may be included in the civilian populations. He also said that it would be unwise to have the President of the United States in a city that contained about one and one-half French divisions which have recently been hostile to us and only one regiment of American troops.
General Marshall suggested that if the Prime Minister desired to visit Marrakech, he might do so with Mr. Hopkins and this would furnish good cover for the real location of the President.
It was decided that the President would remain here and that if there was any indication that his presence here had become known, he would immediately start on the inspection tour which had been previously planned to start at the conclusion of his stay in Africa, except that when he returned to the Marrakech airport, he would change planes and leave the Marrakech airport as though returning to the United States. Actually he would return to the Anfa Camp in time to be here to finish up such business as might be necessary in connection with the conference.
In discussing the protection available at Anfa Camp, General Arnold brought out the fact that there was a French squadron equipped with our P-40 airplanes and at the request of the President, he explained something of our program for equipping French air units.
- The British Strategic Concept
General Marshall gave the President a brief summary of the British Chiefs of Staff concept regarding the prospects in the European theatre. They believed that we should first expand the bombing effort against the Axis and that operations in the Mediterranean offer the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her air resources. He explained that the British are now in favor of an attack against Sicily rather than Sardinia and that this change of attitude was probably inspired by the Prime Minister.
At the same time, the United Nations should try to bring Turkey in on our side. Continued aid should be given to the Russians. A balance will have to be struck between these various commitments because they are mutually conflicting.
They also feel that we must be in a position to take advantage of any weakness developing in Germany by being prepared for operations across the English Channel.
General Marshall said that both Lord Mountbatten and General Clark agreed that there must be a long period of training before any attempt is made to land against determined resistance. General Clark had pointed out many of the mishaps that occurred in the landing in North Africa which would have been fatal had the resistance been more determined. General Clark was also apprehensive about our ability to maintain a surprise because of the necessity of locating landing craft along the northern coast of Africa prior to initiating operations. General Marshall stated that General Clark felt that while this presented some difficulties, they could be overcome.
General Marshall stated that the British are extremely fearful of any direct action against the continent until a decided crack in the German efficiency and morale has become apparent. The British point out that the rail net in Europe would permit the movement of seven divisions a day from east to west which would enable them to reinforce their defenses of the northern coast of France rapidly. On the other hand, they can only move one division from north to south each day in order to reinforce their defense of southern Europe.
General Marshall said that General Clark had expressed the opinion that operations in the Mediterranean could be mounted more efficiently from North Africa. His reasons are that the lines of communication would be shorter there, that the troops in North Africa have had experience in landing operations, and that there will be an excess number of troops available for the operation once the Axis has been forced out of Tunisia, and finally that training will be more effective if undertaken in close contact with the enemy.
General Marshall stated that while the British wish to build up a strong force in the United Kingdom for possible operations against Germany in case a weakness develops, it must be understood that any operation in the Mediterranean will definitely retard Bolero.
Admiral King pointed out that the line of communication is the bottle neck in any operations in the Mediterranean.
Mr. Hopkins asked if the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the lines of communication are sufficient. General Marshall said that the two critical factors in the decision as to whether the operation is to be in the north or the south were: (1) the safety of the line of communications and (2) the fact that there will be an excess of veteran soldiers available in North Africa to mount an operation.
In discussing Turkey, General Marshall said that the British Eighth Army would be prepared to send a considerable force there or near there. The aim of the United Nations should be to have Turkey resist Axis aggression and at the same time permit and protect our use of their airfields.
The President said that the question of bringing Turkey into the war is one for the diplomats to settle. In conducting negotiations, he stated that he and the Prime Minister should be given information as to how much military support the United Nations should be prepared to offer Turkey in order to accomplish what is desired. He stated that he did not want to be in the position of over-promising anything to the Turkish government. (The Joint Staff Planners have been directed to investigate how much aid it would be necessary for us to furnish Turkey in order to enable them to provide effective resistance to an Axis invasion.)
It was agreed that regardless of whether Turkey came into the war on the side of the United Nations, we should assemble sufficient force to the east of the Turkish boundary to enable the United Nations to reinforce Turkey as soon as she did become involved in the war. This can probably be accomplished by using part of the British Eighth Army.
- Anti-Submarine Warfare
General Marshall then pointed out that both the American and the British Chiefs of Staff agreed that effective measures must be taken against the Axis submarines. He said that Admiral King had pointed out that the most effective targets would be at the places where the submarines are assembled. He agreed with the statement, which he attributed to Sir Charles Portal, that we must keep hammering on one link in the chain, whether it be the factories which manufacture component parts, the submarine assembly yards, submarine bases, or submarines along the sea lanes.
- Operation Ravenous
General Marshall informed the President of the British attitude concerning the operation Ravenous.
Admiral King stated that he had the impression that the British were coming around to the idea that it would be [a] profitable gamble.
General Marshall explained that there were hazards, particularly from Japanese action against the southern flank, but that if the operation was successful it would secure favorable results far out of proportion to the risks involved. The most important benefit to be hoped for would be a decrease in the Japanese pressure in the southern Pacific by forcing the Japanese to divert their attention to the Burma theatre and even in the event of failure it would almost certainly result in a junction of the Chinese forces now in Burma with those from Yunnan and if a retirement became necessary, a trained Chinese army would withdraw into China.
General Marshall then spoke of the Generalissimo’s refusal to mount the operation. One reason given by the Generalissimo is the failure to secure British cooperation in assembling naval forces in the Bay of Bengal which he felt was a definite British commitment.
It was agreed that an effort should be made to obtain firm British support for the operation before requesting the President to discuss the matter further with the Generalissimo.
The President added that for psychological reasons he thought it would be advisable to double General Chennault’s force in China and also to bomb Japan proper. General Arnold replied that he agreed that it would be wise to increase General Chennault’s force and expressed great confidence in his ability to effectively operate against the Japanese. He stated, however, that the difficulty of supplying gasoline, spare parts, and other maintenance necessities prevented doing this at this time. He indicated that this was one of the most urgent reasons for opening the Burma road.
Mr. Hopkins asked General Marshall what he thought the prospects of success in Operation Ravenous were.
General Marshall replied that he thought they were better than fifty-fifty. He said the British presented all sorts of difficulties which must be overcome but that he personally did not feel any of them were insurmountable. The tactical operations involved would not be of long duration but it would be necessary to build an improved road rapidly before the rainy season set in. He felt that our engineers could do this but the British were inclined to doubt it. The British also feared the effects of Malaria but General Marshall pointed out that their malaria preventative methods did not approach the effectiveness of ours.
Admiral King stated that he thought it was most essential to undertake Operation Ravenous, particularly for its effect on the Japanese in the South Pacific. He stated that they are operating on interior lines and it was difficult to understand why they did not make some serious thrusts at Midway or other points on our line of communications.
- Command Situation in Europe
General Marshall stated that he had learned that the Prime Minister was concerned over the effectiveness of our bombing operations in Europe. The utilization of our bombing force is tied up with the question of command. At the present time General Eisenhower controls the Air Force, both in North Africa and in England. We are cooperating with the British in selecting the bombing objectives but we are not subject to their orders. General Marshall said that he felt the time had come when we should establish a separate United Kingdom theatre. He stated that he had sent General Andrews to Cairo to give him some experience in an active theatre of operations and that he now proposed to put him in command of the American troops in the United Kingdom.
General Marshall stated that so far as operational direction of bombing, i.e. time and mission, our bombers in England should be subject to British command. So far as technique, etc. they should not be permitted to dictate our procedure.
- Operations in Tunisia
General Marshall indicated that there may be a change in the British command in the operations in Tunisia. He said that Admiral Cunningham agreed that the command had not been well handled. Instances occurred in which trained United States combat teams loaned to the British were broken up, thus reducing their effectiveness. There had also been instances of the misuse of British parachute troops. This situation is now being corrected.
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Commander Thompson | |
| Mr. Harriman | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt |
I showed this to the P.M., Casablanca, Jan. 15, 1943.
F.D.R.
851R.20/49: TelegramThe Chargé in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State
London, January 8, 1943 — 6 p.m. [Received 10:05 p.m.] 192.As instructed in your telegram No. 146, January 7, 2 p.m., I left with Mr. Eden this morning paraphrases of that telegram and of your telegram No. 104, January 5, 10 [11] p.m., and went over the North African situation with him. I gained the impression that he had not previously been fully impressed with the seriousness with which you view the situation or that he considered the attitude of the British press as particularly harmful. He took some exception to the statement that “British leaders” were approving de Gaulle’s broadcast or the present Fighting French propaganda campaign. He referred to his attempt to dissuade General de Gaulle from issuing his January 2 statement and of de Gaulle’s refusal to grant his request. He added “de Gaulle has caused me more trouble than all the other Allies put together”. He said that he had been faced with the alternative of issuing a dead censorship stop which six hundred correspondents would have known about, or of letting him go ahead. I said that since the British had largely built up de Gaulle and he was obtaining all his financial support from the British Government, and since the British have turned over to him control over Madagascar and Djibouti that it seemed to us in the United States that there must be means of bringing about a more reasonable attitude on de Gaulle’s part. His reply was that due in large part, he thought, to the Darlan arrangements, de Gaulle had become a sort of public hero in Britain; that he, Eden, had had great difficulties with the House of Commons on the question, and that any attempt to exercise financial or other pressure would inevitably bring a serious backfire in the House of Commons. He added:
I can’t censor him any more than you can censor the statements of the Willkies and Luces.
He asked me to tell you: First, that the British had a lot of troops fighting in Tunisia and they are just as anxious for a military success as we are. Secondly, that de Gaulle is not like “a quantity of gin that can be put in a bottle”, but is very difficult to handle and that we must remember he has a large following in metropolitan France. Thirdly, he feels that it is important that all French be brought together and that they would work better under a single organization than under separate ones. I said that it did not seem to me that de Gaulle’s present tactics were calculated to bring them together, and he agreed. He said specifically that he did not care whether Giraud or de Gaulle headed such unified group. I said that de Gaulle’s allegations of “increasing confusion” in North Africa did not seem likely either to help our military operations or to bring about unity, and that I wondered whether the British had suggested to de Gaulle that he might simply offer his military support to General Giraud. Eden replied that he did not think that the Fighting French would agree to it. He added that he understood that de Gaulle was planning to send military emissaries as suggested by Giraud and that this seemed to be a step in the right direction. I said that my reading of de Gaulle’s reply (my telegram 174, January 7, 8 p.m.) did not seem to indicate any clear acceptance of the suggestion, and we found out later that he had based his statement on an earlier indication to Charles Peake by de Gaulle that he would send military representatives to Algiers, a tentative decision apparently reversed by the General later. Your statement that de Gaulle’s political aspirations were forcing General Eisenhower to take time out from essential military duties elicited Mr. Eden’s comment that he understood that:
Eisenhower had returned from the front because of Darlan’s assassination and not because of General de Gaulle’s activities.
Although our conversation was friendly throughout, I left with the impression that Mr. Eden had not fully realized the seriousness with which you view the situation, that he did not accept the view that the British are in any way responsible for the propaganda and intrigues of de Gaulle and his advisers, and that he does wish a single de facto political organization set up in Algiers which will provide for the elimination of what he considers unreliable elements. Incidentally he is inclined to feel that a visit by de Gaulle to Washington at this time would not be wise, a view with which I concur. (Most secret. I understand that the Prime Minister in private conversation with an American has expressed bluntly the view that the “Americans should not have one Frenchman, Giraud, while the British have another, de Gaulle”. When it was suggested to him that one solution might be that de Gaulle assume a secondary role, he replied: “No, you can’t do that. De Gaulle is more than a man. He is a movement and a symbol”.)
To sum up, I feel that, quite aside from de Gaulle propaganda and the question of British responsibility for not restraining it, there are certain divergencies of viewpoint between us: (1) the British place more emphasis on setting up some political entity which will have most of the attributes of a transitional government though not calling itself so by name, whereas we consider the military aspect of French support be more important; (2) the British Government lays great store on the strength of de Gaulle’s followers and his public support in France with a corollary emphasis on the need to get rid of all taint of Vichy and Pétain supporters in North Africa, while we, not having based our policy for the last 2 years on support of de Gaulle and vilification of Vichy, see the problem in truer perspective; (3) our policy is that of letting the French people freely choose their own government after the war, whereas the British would prefer, the transitional period which they envisage, to see a regime which owes its existence to them; (4) they are perhaps jealous of our leading role in North Africa.
I believe that a public statement of our policy is the best way to clarify the present confusion. Your telegrams Nos. 104 and 146 have been most helpful. If in addition you could give me (if a public statement seems inadvisable) a full statement of your policy – such as that mentioned in your telegram No. 6662, December 30, 9 p.m. – it would be, I think, useful.
MATTHEWS
Brooklyn Eagle (January 15, 1943)
U.S. rips Nazi supply ports as subs blast 7 Axis ships
Berlin reports Tunis battle; Italian coast bombarded
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‘When are you going to start the torture?’ asks Frances in jail
Hollywood, California (UP) –
Frances Farmer, tempestuous screen actress, awoke after a quiet night in jail, her first of a 180-day sentence, drank a cup of jail coffee which she eyed with disdain and asked:
Well, where are the instruments? When are you going to start the torture? I thought you would brand me with a hot iron.
Matron Vada Sullivan said the actress slept as though she were completely exhausted after going to bed at 11 p.m.
Mrs. Sullivan said Miss Farmer would not be put to work in the jail because she is in a high-strung condition and requires rest.
It was disclosed today that Dr. Thomas H. Leonard, psychiatrist, had visited Miss Farmer late yesterday and had questioned her. Friends and relatives were attempting to work out a rehabilitation program for Miss Farmer, who was led in a straitjacket to a solitary confinement cell to begin her sentence for violation of probation on a drunken driving charge.
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Aussie raiders wipe out enemy force in Papua
Commandos slay 116 near Salamaua in two-day operation
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