Petrillo asks for protection by Congress
Says union wouldn’t resort to ban if law safeguarded his men
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Army discharge makes citizen of veteran
Naturalization to substitute for birth certificate
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Navy hero held for homicide
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O’Connor flays Flynn as friend as Republicans
New Deal foe says he helped to ‘destroy’ the Democratic Party
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The Pittsburgh Press (January 13, 1943)
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
With U.S. forces in Algeria – (Jan. 12)
When a soldier is in a perilous predicament or especially aggravated with the rough-and-tumble life of the battlefront, he usually pacifies himself by thinking, “If the folks at home could only see me now!”
And if the folks of Charlotte, North Carolina, could only peep down out of the African sky and see their family doctors and nurses in their new kind of life – what a surprise they’d have! For a bunch of men and women from Charlotte are operating the only American tent hospital so far set up in North Africa, and they’re doing a dramatically beautiful job. They’re really like something out of Hollywood, and I’ve visited them time after time just out of fascination.
They are far from any town, set in the middle of a big oatfield, out on the rolling plains. They began setting up the day after troops had battled their way over that very ground. They took in their first patients the next morning. Now the hospital has more than 700 patients, it takes 400 people to run it, and there are more than 300 tents covering 80 acres of oat stubble. The stubble field was picked so the mud and dust wouldn’t be so bad – but they are anyway.
Everything is in tents, from operating room to toilets. Everything was set up in three days. They can knock down and be on the move in another three days, and they expect it to happen at any moment. They are like a giant medical Ringling Brothers.
They are known as the evacuation hospital. They were taken into active service last April, practically denuding the Charlotte Memorial Hospital of doctors and nurses.
They arrived in England in mid-August. They stood off the North African coast with the great overwhelming convoy that brought our occupying troops, and they came ashore in assault boats the morning after the occupation. They jumped immediately to work.
There are 50 Charlotte men in the unit – mostly doctors and surgeons, but a few businessmen who do the non-medical part of running a hospital. There are 50 nurses too. None had ever lived any closer to nature than an occasional hunting trip. Today they have become nomads of the desert, living on the ground and under the sky, and they loved it.
Their commanding officer is a Regular Army man – Lt. Col. Rollin Bauchspies, who only recently joined them. He’s a tough, hoarse, friendly guy who cusses continuously and drinks hard liquor and drives his own jeep and says to hell with regulations, dying people can’t wait. He’s a Pennsylvanian and says he could lick the whole damn Dixie tribe if he had to, but you see he doesn’t have to because the whole outfit vibrates with accomplishment and they’re all proud together.
The officers and nurses live two in a tent on two sides of a company street – nurses on one side, officers on the other. The street has a neat sign at the end on which is painted “Carolina Avenue." Some Yankee has painted under this: “Rebel Street."
The 300 enlisted men who do the non-medical work live in their little shelter tents just on beyond. They’re mostly from New England. They’ve built a little wall of whitewashed rocks between the two areas, and put up a sign saying “Mason-Dixon Line.’’
The chief nurse is 1st Lt. Bessie Fullbright. In true Southern style, everybody calls her “Miss Bessie.” They’ve even got a small detachment of Negro engineer troops, just to make everybody feel at home. The nurses wear khaki overalls because of the mud and dust. Doctors go around tieless and with knit brown caps on their heads. Pink feminine panties fly from a long line among the brown warlike tents. On the flagpole is a Red Cross flag, made from a bed sheet and a French soldier’s red sash.
You wash outdoors in cold water, and go to a Chic Sale with a canvas wall around it. You eat and read by lanternlight. You almost never take a bath. You seldom drive the 20 miles into town because you get to like it out there, and you feel so healthy.
Planes bound for destruction of the Axis roar tent-high over your weird city of canvas. At night a trillion stars shower down out of the clear African night. You sleep on a folding cot under a mosquito bar, with your tent flap open.
You’re up in the darkness of 6:30 a.m., and boy, was it cold! You sort of put off washing your faces till later in the day. Your whole crude existence is built around the call of those 700 men whose lives depend on you – and you realize you’re happier than you have been in a long time.
Yes, if the folks back in Charlotte could only see them now!
U.S. State Department (January 13, 1943)
Algiers Consulate Files: 800.1 Giraud: Telegram
The President’s personal representative to the Secretary of State
Algiers, January 13, 1943.
SECRET PRIORITY
No. 5385. Naf 102.
General Smith, Macmillan and I called on General Giraud last evening and during the conversation informed him for his personal and secret information of Symbol indicating that we had been unable to advise him sooner due to his recent absence in French West Africa. He was delighted. Smith then brought out very clearly the Allied desire to cooperate with and assist Giraud in every way in his avowed purpose of prosecuting the war against the Axis describing the efforts made by the Allies to overcome the many obstacles in the way of supplying matériel to the French Forces which is the subject closest to Giraud’s heart. Smith emphasized the important part which public opinion plays in such matters both in Great Britain and in the United States and explained that it is primarily for that reason that we take occasion from time to time to discuss in a spirit of frankness certain political factors which unavoidably enter into the military situation. One of these he said is the arrest of a number of persons on December 30th which has aroused considerable interest in the Press abroad and that he had been conscious of a number of criticisms levelled against the local administration because of the mystery and secrecy which surrounded the proceedings. Smith urged that the present occasion be seized to demonstrate the liberal tendency and the evident desire of Giraud’s administration to revert to the time honored French traditions of Freedom of the Press etc. Giraud insisted that no one would expect him to countenance assassination nor could they justly criticize the honest attempt which is being made to ascertain the guilt of persons involved in the assassination. We made it quite clear that there was no argument on the moral issue involved but that the point on which we insisted was simply a question of procedure and the avoidance of [Page 519]unnecessary political complications. We felt that the French administration here would be well advised to release immediately all persons whose guilt is not established. Giraud said he agreed with this point of view and that he hoped action would be taken to release some of the persons involved. He could not say how many within two or three days. He also agreed that the trial of these persons would be postponed until after Symbol and agreed as did General Bergeret in a preceding conversation that the name of Henri D’Astier De La Vigerie will not be published.
We also referred to the question of certain administrative changes including that of the Governor General of Algeria who we understand is to be replaced by Marcel Peyrouton. Giraud habitually shies when a foreigner discusses French internal politics and he refused to commit himself on this point saying that he would see. Notwithstanding the fact that Bergeret informed Murphy definitely on the preceding day that Peyrouton would be appointed Governor General immediately on his arrival here.
We also referred to the presence of the Comte De Paris in Algiers. Giraud said that he was sending word to the Comte De Paris last evening suggesting that his presence in Algiers is undesirable. We learned this morning that the Comte De Paris is exceedingly embarrassed over the way in which the situation has developed and that he plans to depart from Algiers at once and has announced his intention of joining the French armed forces. Probably the French Foreign Legion, as he did in 1939.
Macmillan brought up the matter of a civilian representative proceeding to London in behalf of the Giraud administration. Giraud was pleased that this would be acceptable and said that he nominated there and then Monsieur Pose, his Director of Finance and Economic Affairs. Macmillan promised to make the necessary arrangements with his Government and also proposed that Monsieur Pose contact some of the entourage of General de Gaulle.
Giraud went on to say that he felt fully confident of amicable and fruitful negotiations with de Gaulle who he said “after all served as a Colonel under my orders”. Giraud, however, took great exception to some of de Gaulle’s associates with whom he felt it would be impossible to get along. Macmillan interjected that this feeling was possibly reciprocated but that part of the discussion ended on the note that every effort be made to arrive at a reconciliation.
As in almost any recent discussion with Giraud, the question of the dollar-pound-franc rate of exchange came up. Giraud reproached Murphy with the statement that he always received from Murphy encouraging words but rarely obtained practical satisfaction stating that the injustice of the discriminatory rate of exchange applied to this area as compared to the other French territories is so glaring as to be unbearable.
There were a number of references during the conversation to the question of military equipment for the French Forces. Smith repeatedly described the situation demonstrating the extraordinary effort which is being made by the Allies to render maximum assistance to the French. Giraud referred especially to the troops in French West Africa and the French merchant shipping which is being turned over to the Allied Shipping Pool insisting that some of that shipping be employed in the transport of equipment to North Africa for the French Forces. Smith assured him that everything possible was being done in that connection emphasizing the limitation of port facilities, railroad equipment and generally the unfavorable logistics which Giraud is prone to brush aside.
U.S. State Department (January 14, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 14, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
General Marshall outlined the broad problem facing the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the allocation of resources between the two major theaters of war – the Atlantic (which included for this purpose the Mediterranean) and the Pacific. He suggested as a concept on which to work that this broad allocation should consist of 70 percent in the Atlantic theater and 30 percent in the Pacific theater.
Admiral King said that according to his estimates we were at present engaging only 15 percent of our total resources against the Japanese in the Pacific theater, which for this purpose included the Indian Ocean and Burma. In his view this was not sufficient to prevent Japan consolidating herself and thereby presenting ultimately too difficult a problem. The Japanese were fighting a delaying action in the Solomon Islands and digging in along the whole line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. They were shipping back raw material into Japan as fast as they could. He felt that before the Combined Chiefs of Staff turned to the discussion of particular operations, they should first fix the general proportion of effort to be applied in the two main theaters.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that in fixing this balance of effort between the two theaters, it would be wise first to try and weigh up the enemy situation as both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff saw it. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff would naturally know more of the situation in Japan than the British. He expressed the admiration of the British Chiefs of Staff on the magnificent work of the U.S. Forces during the last twelve months after the early disasters of the war against Japan. At one time it seemed as if nothing would stem the tide of the Japanese, but the position was now very different. The Japanese were definitely on a defensive basis and from intelligence received it appeared as if they were taking quite a different outlook on the war now from what they had been some months ago. They were worried about the situation of their European allies.
The security of the United States and the United Kingdom had always been basic factors in our strategy. The threat to the United Kingdom had been at one time serious, but as a result of our latest review of this danger it was felt that the forces in the United Kingdom could be reorientated from a defensive to an offensive basis. The greatest danger at the present time was to our communications. The shortage of shipping was a stranglehold on all offensive operations and unless we could effectively combat the U-boat menace, we might not be able to win the war.
Germany’s situation was undoubtedly developing favorably from our point of view. She was staggering under the failure of her second offensive against Russia, and feeling must be growing in that country that it was impossible for her to defeat Russia. Her successes in 1942 against Russia had been very much smaller in scale than in 1941. She had failed in her main object of the 1942 campaign, the capture of the Caucasus oil. By failing to capture even the port of Tuapse, she had failed in securing the facilities to export such oil as she had captured at Grozny. Her northern flank was in danger as also were the troops in the Caucasus salient.
The Russian offensive had been well carried out and had now reached within fifty miles of Rostov. Germany had only two courses open to her, either to push back the Russians into Stalingrad, which would be almost impossible during the winter, or to shorten her line. The latter, therefore, was the more probable course; and that would involve reverting to the 1941 line. The psychological effect of this withdrawal would be very serious in Germany.
Germany was thus on the defensive both in Russia and in North Africa. In the operations which had led to the defeat of the Germans in North Africa after the British defeat at Tobruk, very great assistance had been given by the timely arrival of American Sherman tanks and SP guns.
Germany was already having trouble among her allies. The Rumanians had suffered severely in the Crimea but had been forced to carry on, although greatly weakened in strength. The Italian troops on the Russian front had also suffered heavy losses and the Hungarian forces, which had never had much stomach for the fight, were also in bad shape. Italy was becoming more and more shaky; and if she collapsed, Germany would not only have to bolster up Italy by sending troops into the country but would also have to replace the numerous German [Italian?] divisions in Yugoslavia and in Greece. Alternatively, she would have to withdraw altogether from the Balkans and Italy, and leave it open to the Allies.
All indications showed that Germany’s manpower was failing and that some cannibalization of her divisions would have to be carried out. The latest estimate was that she would lose ten divisions in this way during the first quarter of 1943. Lack of oil was another of Germany’s major difficulties which would hit her particularly hard during the next six months.
Taking all these factors into account, it seemed at least possible that the precarious internal situation of Germany might make it possible to achieve a final victory in the European theater before the end of 1943. The immediate problem was how best to apply our available resources in order to take advantage of Germany’s present situation.
The means we had at our disposal were broadly three in number. First there was Russia, which constituted the largest land power; her efficiency was rising and the work of moving Russian manufacturing plants to the eastward away from the German invasion had been very well carried out. Russia’s oil situation was now more satisfactory than had seemed likely earlier in the year, but she was short of grain. In order to get the best value out of Russia, we must support her in every way we could. Our second main weapon was air bombardment, by U.S. and British forces. This we must exploit to the maximum. Our third means of striking at Germany was by amphibious operations which included invasion of the Continent. The possession of sea power enabled us to threaten the enemy at several points and thereby compel him to disperse his forces. Once committed to a point of entry, however, the enemy would be able to concentrate his forces against us, and it was therefore necessary to choose this point of entry with the greatest care at the place where the enemy was least able to concentrate large forces.
As a point of reentry to the Continent, France had great advantages. In the first place the sea-crossing was short, and we had better facilities for giving air support to our invasion. On the other hand, the German defenses in this area were most strong and Germany’s power of concentrating against us was greatest. A recent study had shown that the East-West communications across the Continent enabled Germany to move seven divisions simultaneously from the Russian front to the West in about twelve to fourteen days. The North-South communications on the Continent were not nearly so good. Not more than one division at a time could be moved from the North to the Mediterranean front. The Italian railways were close to the coast and vulnerable to interruption from the sea, and in the Balkans, there was only a single line of railway passing through Nish. From this point of view, therefore, the Southern front seemed to offer better prospects for amphibious operations.
Torch operations in North Africa had been an outstanding example of successful cooperation between U. S. and British forces, and the British Chiefs of Staff wished to express their admiration of the very able manner in which General Eisenhower had overcome the extremely difficult problems with which he had been faced. North Africa would provide a valuable base from which either to threaten Southern Europe or to undertake offensive operations. By this use we could compel the Germans to disperse their forces in order to reinforce threatened points. In this way we could probably give greater assistance to Russia than if we committed ourselves definitely to Northern France. Once we had captured Bizerte, we could pass merchant ship convoys through the Mediterranean. Their very passage would compel the Germans to fight in the air, since if they let them pass through unmolested the effect of their U-boat operations against our shipping would be largely nullified. These air battles against the German Air Force would be of the greatest importance. Already more than half the German Air Force was deployed on fronts other than the Russian.
In all Mediterranean operations Spain, of course, was a most important factor. There must be always some anxiety that Spain would close the door behind us, but all recent opinion tended to show that Spain was turning away from Germany and that it was at least highly improbable that she would ever grant free access to German forces. The more successes we had in the Mediterranean the more likely it was that this favorable tendency in Spain would continue. Spain knew that from the economic point of view she must depend primarily on the Allies. Against this there was, of course, the fear of Communism in Spain if the Allies were victorious and Russia overran Germany. Generally speaking, however, the feeling of the British Chiefs of Staff was that we had no cause for anxiety about Spain at the present time.
Another important factor in the Mediterranean was Turkey. That country no doubt would either try and keep out of the war altogether or at least join in on the side of the Allies only at the eleventh hour. There were, however, reasons to hope that if well handled, Turkey might be brought in earlier. As an inducement we should have to give her equipment, technical personnel and instructors. It did not seem wise to press Turkey to undertake an advance into the Balkans but rather to hold her position and afford us bases from which to attack Germany, in particular the Rumanian oil. We might also obtain a free passage to the Black Sea as another means of striking at Germany.
Summing up prospects in the European Theater, Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that we should first expand the bomber offensive against the Axis to the maximum and that operations in the Mediterranean offered the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her resources. With this end in view we should take as our immediate objective the knocking out of Italy. At the same time, we should try and bring in Turkey on our side. By this means we should give Germany no respite at all in 1943 and we should give the best aid to Russia, whom we must continue to supply with all the equipment which we could send. The difficulty, of course, was that many of these operations were mutually exclusive. For example, to send large supplies to Russia used up great quantities of available escort vessels. This naturally cut down our capacity to undertake amphibious operations. A balance would have to be struck between these various commitments, and we should have to face the necessity for accepting considerable losses in shipping, providing these paid a good dividend.
We must be in a position to take advantage of a crack in Germany in the late summer. There were already indications of considerable German withdrawals from France to the eastward. If Germany were compelled to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from France, the possibilities of an invasion across the Channel would be much greater. The estimate of the British Chiefs of Staff was that by August 1943 there would be available for cross-channel operations some 13 British and 9 U.S. divisions whether or not we undertook limited operations in the Mediterranean. Mediterranean operations, however, would produce other shortages, notably in Assault Shipping; and it might be difficult, if not impossible, to transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom or to the Burma front in time.
In all amphibious operations the provision of landing craft was the critical factor. Not only had the crews to be provided but the naval crews to man them had to be trained and the land forces had to be trained to work from them. This training was a slow process.
The British landing craft resources were being formed into two main forces, one earmarked for operations on the Continent and one for operations further afield, such as Burma. As regards operations in Burma, a limited offensive was now being undertaken with the object of capturing Akyab, on which the 14th Indian Division was now closing. Operations in the North of Burma presented very difficult logistical problems owing to the absence of roads.
The complete conquest of Burma was a much bigger problem, and naval supremacy in the Bay of Bengal would be required for it. It would be necessary to undertake simultaneous offensives against Rangoon and Moulmein since Rangoon could not be taken if the Moulmein airfields were in the hands of the Japs. Rail communications between Thailand and Burma were being improved and it might be necessary to extend the occupation of Burma by going some distance into Thailand as well. For this major operation seven divisions were being prepared in India; and two African divisions, one from the East and one from the West, could be found, both composed of seasoned native troops well adapted to jungle fighting. If the Germans were compelled to abandon their Caucasus offensive, troops could also be found from Iraq and Persia. There appeared, therefore, no particular difficulty in finding the land divisions; the difficulty lay rather in the provision of the necessary naval forces. It must be realized, however, that once started operations for the recapture of Burma would develop into a full-scale campaign.
Sir Dudley Pound stated that in the Atlantic the greatest concerns to the Home Fleet were: first, to prevent a break-out of the German naval forces; and, second, to provide protection for convoys to North Russia.
At first, the Russian convoys did not present any great difficulty. Their early success gave everyone a false sense of security. German interference, however, has been increasing constantly, culminating with the concentration of their surface vessels on the coast of Norway; namely, the Tirpitz, Lutzow, Hipper, Scharnhorst, and Prinz Eugen, all of which have now been completely repaired. A force of 20 U-boats was maintained in northern waters, as well as considerable air force. The security of Russian convoys is affected chiefly by the hours of darkness and the ice limit. For the next three months, the ice limit will only permit utilizing a channel about 220 miles in width which can be kept under close air reconnaissance by the Germans. The passage occupies about twelve days, and vessels are under attack all but two of them.
For the last convoy of 16 ships there were 12 escort vessels of the corvette type and 4 destroyers. Two six-inch cruisers were employed to give cover against surface attack; the Commander of the convoy had placed the cruisers between the vessels being escorted and the operational base of the German surface vessels. However, the Hipper and Lutzow attacked from the other side and came into contact with the 4 British destroyers. Until joined by the two cruisers, the destroyers prevented an attack on the convoy for some forty minutes and drove the enemy ships out of gun range of the convoy, although one of our destroyers and a minesweeper were sunk. As soon as the cruisers appeared, the Hipper and Lutzow withdrew. The Germans thus sacrificed a splendid opportunity to effect some serious damage on an inferior force.
It was first thought that the German Admiral commanding had made an error in judgment, but it was later learned that he had received orders from the German authorities ashore to expedite his withdrawal. This would seem to indicate that the Germans are following a policy of preventing their ships from receiving any damage. It can possibly be explained by their desire to keep them intact preliminary to a break-out into the Atlantic.
Sir Dudley Pound stated that before such a break-out into the Atlantic could be effected, the Germans must send out oilers which will enable them to refuel at sea, since he doubted if the Germans would again attempt to retire to Brest in view of their previous experience there.
During the months of long daylight, the danger of air attack precluded the use of cruisers with the Russian convoys; and their escorts consisted only of a powerful destroyer force. Convoys can then only be run every thirty-six to forty-two days. Twelve days are required for the journey, three days for refueling, twelve days for the return journey, and the remainder for boiler cleaning, etc. The Royal Navy does not have sufficient destroyers to operate two convoys simultaneously. If, therefore, it is necessary to send more than thirty ships to Russia every forty days, it will be necessary for the United States to furnish some assistance in escort vessels.
Sir Dudley Pound then stated that there was considerable traffic between Japan and Germany, Japan sending to Germany rubber and other raw materials obtained in the Far East in return for machinery and machine parts. It was important to stop this traffic at once. There are two places from which this can be best accomplished: first, in the Bay of Biscay by air and submarine action, and second, in the Atlantic narrows. For the latter a British task force was being built up on the east side and a U.S. task force was operating from the United States on the west side.
Sir Dudley Pound then discussed the situation in the Indian Ocean. It had at first been hoped to create a considerable Eastern Fleet, but this has been seriously reduced in size by Torch and other operations; and it now appears that its remaining carrier, the Illustrious, may be needed for future operations in the Mediterranean. If this is so, now would be an opportune time to withdraw it from the Indian Ocean for repairs and the installation of the most modern fighter direction devices. Without the protection of carrier aircraft, the Eastern Fleet is unable to operate in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean against Japanese naval forces accompanied by aircraft carriers.
In the Mediterranean area, Admiral Cunningham has a force of three battleships and two aircraft carriers. One of the duties of this Task Force consists in containing three modern Italian battleships which are at present unlocated. In the Eastern Mediterranean, British naval forces had been heavily engaged in the supply of the 8th Army in the Eastern North African ports. What the future redistribution of the Mediterranean naval forces will be must be based on the future strategy to be adopted.
Sir Dudley Pound then discussed the German U-boat situation. At the present time the Germans have one hundred and ten submarines in the Atlantic in addition to those in the Mediterranean and off the coast of Norway. It is anticipated that new production will go to the Atlantic.
The Germans are apparently concentrating their submarines into large groups, each of which is responsible for a certain area. One of these has been located off the coast of Newfoundland, one in the Central Atlantic, and one off Southwest Ireland. It is possible that a convoy may at any time blunder into a pack of German submarines if our intelligence is at fault.
Recently there were two convoys from the United States, each attacked by a considerable number of German submarines, one convoy losing two vessels and the other losing none. This was accomplished by providing air coverage for the convoys with Liberator airplanes which resulted in keeping the U-boats down during the day. While they were down, the convoys were able to alter their course and, by nightfall, leave the submarines behind.
Sir Dudley Pound then described an experiment which had been made owing to shortage of escorts due to Torch, in sending cargo vessels bound for Freetown out with a trans-Atlantic convoy, the vessels bound for Freetown breaking off from the convoy at a suitable moment and proceeding to their destination independently. The experiment was unsuccessful and the loss amounted to ten percent. Seventeen out of forty-four ships were lost in one convoy. The British have, therefore, found it necessary to résumé the Freetown convoys.
Sir Dudley Pound stated that escorts to convoys must be sufficiently large to deal with a heavy attack. He said our aim must be to get a long-range air protection and additional escort vessels. He added that it would be desirable to obtain more long-range aircraft protection to escorts from the United States.
Sir Dudley Pound indicated that we must make special efforts to provide adequate protection in the early part of 1943 in order that we may be able to meet the great demands in the build-up of Bolero in the latter part of the year.
Sir Charles Portal then discussed the air situation. He stated that our experience so far has been that the German operations are definitely tied up with the adequacy of their air power. He felt that this will be as true with regard to the German defensive operations as it has been in their offensive operations.
The present state of the German air force is critical. The stamina of the airplane crews is decreasing; the crews lack interest and are less determined, and their training is deteriorating. One explanation for this is that training units and personnel are being used for combat purposes because of a shortage of aircraft. He felt that there is no depth behind the German front line of aircraft. The British Intelligence Service is of the opinion that if the United Nations can keep Germany fighting with aircraft, they will suffer losses from which they cannot recover.
He felt certain that they are incapable of conducting large scale operations on two fronts and that if they are kept fighting through the winter and spring they will have in the summer a shortage of from seven hundred to two thousand first-line aircraft below what will be necessary for all fronts.
He stated that German production for next year will be about twenty-three thousand aircraft; Italy will produce three or four thousand; and Japan will produce about seven thousand. On the other hand, the lowest estimates for the United Nations’ aircraft production will be one hundred thousand combat airplanes or about four times that of the Axis powers.
Sir Charles Portal said that our greatest need is to force the Germans to extend the use of their aircraft to as many areas as possible and thus destroy and bleed them. The best ways to accomplish this are: (1) to engage them while they are in support of land operations (However this is only possible at present on the Russian front.); (2) to meet them while they are attempting to stop our amphibian operations; and (3) by directing operations directly at Germany.
He stated that one of the most pressing questions was how we should accomplish our air attack against Germany. The United Kingdom is the most advantageous base for such operations and one of the most important questions before the present conference is to decide on where the United States bombers are to be used.
He indicated that daylight attacks by United States bombers should be continued, as this has a serious effect on the German Air Force, on their industries, and on their morale. The question of whether to strike Italy from the United Kingdom or from North Africa is still an open question; but before deciding to build up a strong bomber force in North Africa, it is desirable to be certain that this action is more advantageous than concentrating them in the United Kingdom.
General Marshall stated that insofar as the estimates presented by the British Chiefs of Staff concerning Germany, Russia, and the occupied countries are concerned, the United States Chiefs of Staff are in full accord.
He also expressed concurrence in the idea that the U-boat menace is the paramount issue and that everything must be done to combat it by directing our attacks against it from the place of manufacture of submarines to the places where they are used.
He stated that the Japs are digging in, in an effort to build up a defensive front from the Solomons, through New Guinea and Timor, particularly with their air forces.
He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff are anxious to find some method whereby they can strike in the rear and against the flank of the Japanese defenses. In this connection, they feel that operations in Burma will serve to weaken the Japs’ defensive front and that therefore, they are most anxious to undertake Operation Ravenous.
They feel that a reverse in this operation would not be a calamity but that a success would bring advantages all out of proportion to the risks involved. It would have an effect not only in the South Pacific area but would enable us to furnish strong support to China. A successful Operation Ravenous would result in an eventual economy of tonnage by relieving the Japanese pressure in the Southwest Pacific.
General Marshall then stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff are concerned as to whether operations in the Mediterranean area would bring advantages commensurate with the risks involved. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are inclined to look favorably on an operation from the United Kingdom because of the strong air support that can be furnished from that base as well as the relative ease with which it can be supplied from the United States.
He repeated that our first concern must be the defeat of Germany’s submarine warfare.
Sir Charles Portal then said that the British Chiefs of Staff also felt that the defeat of the submarine menace must be given first priority in the use of air power, particularly in the protection of our line of communications.
For long range antisubmarine operations not only the provision of suitable aircraft had to be considered but also the bases from which they are to be used. The British are considering the advisability of establishing an air base in Greenland for this purpose. They were most grateful for the 21 Liberators provided by the U.S.A. for the Bay of Biscay. There are three possible methods of attack on submarines: (1) along the sea lanes; (2) against bases in the Bay of Biscay; and (3) against factories in which submarines are built. The British now propose making air attacks in sufficient force to destroy the entire port in which the submarines are based rather than confining their attacks to the submarine pens and surrounding installations. He pointed out that no one can be certain as to how much damage can be done in the port towns themselves and that the method proposed will be in the nature of an experiment, the results of which will not be known for five or six months.
Admiral King then asked whether the possibility of concentrating all air attacks on the building yards had been considered.
Sir Charles Portal replied that the building yards are not sufficiently large to be certain of hitting them at night.
Admiral King said that he felt the most favorable targets against the submarine menace were the yards at which they are assembled and at their bases. He said that he had the personal impression that there has not been a program undertaken there that has been consistently followed. He felt that the attacks had been sporadic. He thought that attacks should be aimed: first, against factories where component parts are made; secondly, at yards where the submarines are assembled; thirdly, at bases; and fourthly, at sea.
General Arnold said he felt we should attempt to find what component part or parts of submarines constitute a bottleneck and then strike at factories where they are made.
Sir Charles Portal stated that the greatest bottleneck was the ball bearings, but pointed out that it would be tactically impossible to destroy the factories.
General Arnold drew attention to the necessity for a decision as to where airplanes are to be utilized before they left the factory. This is so because different theaters require different equipment on aircraft.
General Marshall stated that the United States is now in the process of recasting its troop deployments. As an example, he indicated that it had become possible to reduce the size of the Caribbean garrison considerably. He stated that the United States is also considering reducing the size of the Iceland garrison and in that connection, he thought it would be desirable to have opinions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the hazards that now face Iceland. The purpose of this scaling down of forces wherever it can be accomplished is for saving shipping.
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Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Commander Libby | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 14, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Combined Strategy
Sir Allen Brooke said that he would like to hear the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the situation in the Pacific.
Admiral King stated that of the nine fronts on which the United Nations are now engaged, four are in the Pacific. These include the Alaska-Aleutian area, the Hawaiian-Midway area, the South and Southwest Pacific areas, and the Burma-China area.
He said that when he took office as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet on December 30, 1941, he immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was, first, to hold the Hawaiian-Midway line and the communications with the Pacific coast; and, secondly, to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.
The Navy had already established a refueling point at Bora Bora which was sufficiently far to the rear to insure its being held. Marines had been sent to Samoa and there were also troops in the Fiji Islands. Steps had been taken to establish three strong points on the line of communications: Samoa, the Fiji Islands, and New Caledonia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had then established a base for the Navy in Auckland with an advanced base at Tongatabu. As time went on, the United States forces went into the New Hebrides to Efate and Esperitu Santos.
Meanwhile, there had been engagements with the Japanese near the Marshall Islands, the Island of Wake, and in the Coral Sea.
The Japanese had advanced as far south as Tulagi with the apparent intent of using it as a base from which to operate against our line of communications.
Admiral King said that had we been set at the time of Midway, we could have made great progress in an attack on the Solomon Islands. The operation was in preparation in July and took place on August 7th but we did not have sufficient force even at that time to exploit our success beyond the occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The Japanese reaction there was more violent and sustained than had been anticipated. Another reason why we could not proceed further with the Solomon operations was that Operation Torch had been decided upon and much of our available means had to be diverted to it.
Admiral King stated, however, that we have attempted to go on with the Solomon operations. The Japanese reaction was, at first, probably designed to “save face” but eventually that became a minor consideration. The Japanese have a long line of communications, and it soon became apparent that they were fighting a delaying action to cover the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines where the “treasures” are to be found.
He pointed out that we have had some success in the attrition of the Japanese forces but not as much as has been claimed. At present, the Tulagi area is pretty well stabilized and General Mac Arthur has driven the Japanese out of the Papuan Peninsula on New Guinea. The enemy is reinforcing Lae and Salamaua.
The main object of the operations has been the safety of the approaches to northeastern Australia, and the key to the situation is Rabaul.
The campaign in the Solomons was to be divided into three parts: (1) the capture of Tulagi, (2) securing the northeast coast of New Guinea, and (3) the capture of Rabaul. The process has been slow but the United States forces are going on with it. The immediate question is where to go when this campaign has been completed.
Admiral King stated that he felt the Philippines should be our objective rather than the Netherlands East Indies. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The most likely intermediate objective, once Rabaul is captured, is Truk and thence to the Marianas.
Prior to the war, every class at the Naval War College was required to play the game of the Pacific Islands involving the recapture of the Philippines. There are three ways in which the Philippines may be taken: first, the direct route which would constitute a frontal attack; second, the southern route which is outflanked by the enemy along much of its course; and third, the northern route through the Aleutians to the northern tip of the Island of Luzon. The northern route would include establishing a base in the northwestern Marshall Islands and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas are the key of the situation because of their location on the Japanese line of communications. Any line of action decided upon requires considerable force, especially air strength. All of the necessary operations are amphibious.
Admiral King said that Mr. Stalin had been good enough to say that the Solomons operations have been of considerable assistance to Russia.
He pointed out the importance to the Japanese of occupying the Maritime Provinces in order to secure the Japanese Islands. He felt that such action would be necessary and that the Japanese should attach more importance to them than holding the Netherlands East Indies.
Admiral King stated that the Japanese are now replenishing Japan with raw materials and also fortifying an inner defense ring along the line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. For these reasons, he believed that it was necessary for the United Nations to prevent the Japanese having time to consolidate their gains. He compared this situation with the present desire of the United Nations to avoid giving Germany a respite during the winter months.
Admiral King then said that the idea of utilizing 30 percent of the United Nations war effort against Japan was a concept rather than an arithmetical computation. He had caused studies to be made of how much of the total war effort is now being applied to Japan and found it to be approximately 15 percent. He said that this is not sufficient to do more than hold; it is not enough to permit maintaining pressure on the Japanese.
Admiral King stated that we are continuously exploring possibilities of an attack against Japan by the northern route and called attention to the fact that the United States forces had just captured Amchitka. All operations in the Pacific are limited by the amount of available shipping.
Admiral King pointed out that the Japanese route for a naval effort against Siberia is secure. He said that he had recently had a survey made of Paramushir Island, the northernmost of the Kurile Islands. This revealed that it would be unsatisfactory as a base for operating against Japan.
It would be desirable to have the cooperation of the Russians in this respect but there has been difficulty in obtaining any information from them. The best means of obtaining information so far has been by direct correspondence between the President and Mr. Stalin.
General Marshall then reviewed the deployment of the United States troops in all of the islands of the Pacific, giving the strength of each in ground and air troops and in aircraft. He pointed out the logistical difficulties of supplying these forces.
Admiral King then gave the disposition of the Marine forces which amount to approximately 60,000 men in the area from Midway to the South Pacific Islands.
General Marshall said that in the light of the logistical requirements in the Pacific, the United States’ interest in undertaking an operation to open the Burma Road could be well understood. General Stilwell and Field Marshal Wavell would have to determine the logistical requirements of such an operation but, in any event, they would be minor in comparison to the requirements in the Operation Torch. Any success in the Operation Ravenous would have a tremendous effect in the Pacific chiefly by making it necessary for the Japanese to divert forces to the Burma operations, thus lessening the pressure in the South Pacific and the consequent demands on our available shipping.
General Marshall stated that the peace of mind of the United States Chiefs of Staff was greater now than it had been a year ago. The Japanese are now on the defensive and must be careful of a surprise move from us. However, he pointed out that we must still worry about the locations of the Japanese aircraft carriers because they constitute a constant threat against our line of communications and for raiding purposes against our west coast.
We must not allow the Japanese any pause. They fight with no idea of surrendering and they will continue to be aggressive until attrition has defeated them. To accomplish this, we must maintain the initiative and force them to meet us.
General Arnold then discussed the United States efforts to obtain information concerning Russia. He stated that when the Germans threatened to capture the Caucasus, the Russians began to be fearful that the supply of airplanes from the United States via the southern route would be eliminated. They, therefore, requested the United States to start delivery of airplanes from Alaska at once. The United States agreed to this, providing the Russians would demonstrate that there were sufficient facilities available to make possible the delivery of one hundred and fifty planes a month. The Russians did not have these facilities at the time but built them rapidly. At the present time, both the southern route and the Alaskan route are in use. In the coming year, the delivery to Russia amounts to four hundred airplanes a month. These will be divided over the two routes. Bombers are flown to Basra but the flight is so long that the Russians refuse to accept the engines and this necessitates replacing them. The northern route will be used for this purpose as much as possible inasmuch as it eliminates fifty hours of flying time on the journey.
General Arnold then stated that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were desirous of knowing what facilities were available in southern Siberia and Vladivostok in order to see if they could be of assistance to Russia in case Russia was attacked by the Japanese.
General Marshall stated that Mr. Stalin had finally given General Bradley permission to make a survey. General Bradley, however, considered that it would be better to present the Russians with a specific proposal. He returned to the United States, and it was decided to offer Russia one hundred heavy bombers seventy-two days after the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. Mr. Stalin had rejected this offer and said he would like 100 aircraft at once for use against Germany.
General Marshall also stated that the Russians object to the presence of “gossipy” people from the United Nations and that they were afraid that the United Nations personnel could not put up with the conditions which are imposed on Russian troops.
Sir Charles Portal stated that the British had operated successfully with the Russian navy in the Murmansk area but that they had the same experiences with the Russian army as the U.S. had.
General Marshall then described the difficulties which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had concerning sending air units to the Caucasus. The Russians had stated definitely that they did not desire units but airplanes only. There had been some sentiment among the United States authorities to furnish sufficient airplanes for the purpose of placating Mr. Stalin. However, to do so, especially in the case of heavy bombers, would necessitate immobilizing these airplanes for as much as six months while the Russians were learning to operate them and establishing ground crews for their maintenance. General Marshall stated that in his opinion it was unwise to withhold this striking power against the enemy for so long a period.
Admiral King then asked the British Chiefs of Staff if they had the impression that the Russians were unwilling to help themselves. The Germans were successfully operating air forces out of the northern part of Norway and the Russians had apparently made no effort to stop them although they were well within range.
Sir Dudley Pound stated that the Russians do send destroyers out to meet convoys. They invariably state, however, that they have run out of fuel before completing their task and then leave the convoy for home at a rate of 28 knots, which is hardly consistent with a shortage of fuel. Their Air Force has not furnished much protection.
Sir Charles Portal stated that he felt the reason for this was that their air personnel is not properly trained. The Russians had made some attempts to strike at the German forces but had been unsuccessful.
General Marshall asked why the Russians were willing to risk whole divisions but not their naval forces.
Sir Dudley Pound replied that they are continental people who do not understand naval action. Their submarines have been the only effective units of their navy.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed with this statement and added that while they do not know what dangers are involved in escorting convoys, they are very free to offer silly advice as to how security should be attained.
General Marshall then described the development of troops of the United States, which was proceeding very well. He added that United States troops, both in this and the last war, appeared to “veteranize” quickly in the field. The young officers and non-commissioned officers had exhibited a remarkable facility for eliminating errors rapidly. We may expect their effectiveness to increase enormously in a short time.
He thought we were particularly fortunate in the deadly character of the Pacific fight, since our forces which have been engaged in the Pacific have become imbued with the idea that it is “kill or be killed”; and this attitude gives promise of tremendous power for future operations. The staffs are sound and the engineers are particularly effective. He recalled a remark that had been made in the War Department, when Field Marshal Wavell questioned the possibility of building a road which could support the Burma operations, to the effect that “Wavell does not know General Wheeler,” the United States engineer in this theater.
Sir Alan Brooke inquired how far forward the U.S. Chiefs of Staff envisaged it would be necessary to go in order to prevent the Japanese from digging themselves in. He feared that if operations were too extended it would inevitably lead to an all-out war against Japan and it was certain that we had not sufficient resources to undertake this at the same time as a major effort against Germany. Would it be possible for the forces at present in the Pacific to hold the Japanese without incurring the additional drain on our resources which would result from pushing forward our present defensive positions?
General Marshall explained that it had been essential to act offensively in order to stop the Japanese advancing. For example, in New Guinea it had been necessary to push the Japanese back to prevent them capturing Port Moresby. In order to do this, every device for reinforcing the troops on the island had had to be employed. The same considerations applied in Guadalcanal. It had been essential to take offensive action to seize the island. Short of offensive action of this nature, the only way of stopping the Japanese was by complete exhaustion through attrition. It was very difficult to pause: the process of whittling away Japan had to be continuous.
Sir Charles Portal asked whether it was not possible to stand on a line and inflict heavy losses on the Japanese when they tried to break through it. From the very fact that the Japanese continued to attack, it was clear that they had already been pushed back further than they cared to go. We [He?] also inquired whether the U.S. Chiefs of Staff thought it would be possible to gain a decision by air bombardment of Japan alone.
General Arnold pointed out that the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific were now operating from the tips of two narrow salients. The Japanese had greater width in their line and could therefore operate on a larger scale than the forces which we could bring to bear.
General Marshall said that in Papua it would be possible to gain additional airfields alongside our present position, but this was not the case in Guadalcanal where only a small strip of suitable territory was available. To broaden our base there, we should have to have New Britain and New Ireland. As regards air bombardment of Japan, the U.S. view was that Japanese industries were so vulnerable to the air that heavy attack would ultimately destroy her capacity to maintain her war effort.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that it should be possible to determine what it was that we had to prevent the Japanese from doing, and what forces we should require for the purpose. We should then see what forces remained for use elsewhere in the world.
Admiral King observed that unless some effort was made to assist Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese might pull out of the war. The 30 percent effort to which he had referred would, of course, include operations in Burma.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that operation Ravenous might be successful but when we had reached the objective we should still have to defend our line of communication against Japanese attack from the flank. It was calculated that the route would only suffice to maintain two Divisions, and this would leave little if any capacity for the supply air forces operating in China.
Admiral King pointed out that in addition to opening the supply route to China, Ravenous would gain the territory necessary to secure the air supply route from India to China.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that it would be well worth while taking a risk on Ravenous since it would not cut across the main effort against Germany, whereas Anakim would.
General Marshall pointed out that the Chinese only required about half the maintenance tonnage required by white troops. In any event, even a small residual tonnage for supplies to China would probably be far greater than could be transported by air. Twelve bombers in China under General Chennault had done wonderful work; and if he had even 50, the results they might achieve would be very great. For this reason, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff thought that Ravenous was a gamble well worthwhile. It should also be remembered that any help given to China which would threaten Japan might have a most favorable effect on Stalin.
General Arnold said that General Chennault claimed he could drive the Japanese Air Force out of China if he had 175 aircraft. This might be an exaggerated claim, but there was no doubt additional air forces in China would have a very great effect. By December it was hoped to have 150 transports working from India to China, with a maximum delivery estimated at 10,000 tons per month.
Admiral King asked on whom would fall the principal burden of beating Japan once Germany had been knocked out.
Sir Alan Brooke said that once Germany was defeated, practically all the British naval forces would be released for the war against Japan. Forces destined for the recapture of Burma and Malaya were already forming in India. He did not think it wise, however, to embark on Operation Anakim unless we were quite prepared for a full-scale campaign.
Sir Charles Portal said that India had already been asked to provide airfields for double the number of air forces we were ever likely to have available before the defeat of Germany. These were intended for the campaign against Japan. He had no doubt that as soon as Germany was defeated the British Government would turn the whole of their resources against Japan.
General Marshall pointed out that to depend on sea operations alone against Japan was hazardous, owing to the rapidity with which the balance of sea power could change in the event of a reverse. For example, in the Midway battle the U.S. Forces had been able to get all their aircraft into the air before the Japanese attack developed. In consequence, the Japanese had lost four carriers as against one American. With a little ill-fortune the reverse might have taken place; and in that case, the whole of the west coast of America would have been open to Japanese carrier-borne attack. The Japanese territories were not nearly so vulnerable in this respect.
Admiral King said that the Japanese might well strike again at Midway. They were on interior lines, and it was easier for them to take the initiative against us. At the present time it looked as if their carriers were being prepared for another attack somewhere, perhaps on Midway or Samoa. It was essential, therefore, to maintain the initiative against the Japanese and not wait for them to come against us.
General Marshall explained the difficulties with which he had been faced in finding even the small forces required by General Stil-well to support Ravenous. Shipping could not be spared for them in the absence of some definite assurance from Chiang Kai-shek and agreement with Field Marshal Wavell on the operations to be undertaken. By the time these had been obtained much time had been lost and shipping had to be found by drawing it away from other commitments in the Pacific such as Alaska and Hawaii. General MacArthur was some 20,000 men short of his requirements, and provision of these reinforcements had had to be deferred. By the most rigid economy sufficient shipping had at last been found to move 6,000 men to General Stilwell. In order to cut down numbers to the minimum, units had been stripped to the bone of all personnel which were not absolutely essential. It was certainly fortunate that losses sustained in the Pacific from submarines had been so small.
Admiral King said he was puzzled to know why these losses had been so small and what the Japanese were keeping their submarines for.
Sir Dudley Pound said that, in British experience, Japanese submarines were much less of a menace than the German. They were less efficiently operated, and quite small escorts were sufficient to drive them away. He pointed out that it was in a way to our advantage to allow the Japanese to dig in well in places which we did not mean to attack as this dispersed their forces. To recapture the Philippines before the defeat of Germany was impossible; and it was, therefore, all to the good if the Japanese locked up troops in these Islands. The quickest way of recapturing the Philippines would be to defeat Germany. It seemed to him that the correct strategy was to establish a line where we had better air facilities than the Japanese and then to allow them to wear out their air forces by attacking us on that line. Would it be of any advantage to go as far forward as Truk in the immediate future rather than just before the main attack on the Philippines? Even if we had Truk he questioned whether we could operate surface forces against the Japanese lines of communication at the present time.
Admiral King agreed that the recapture of the Philippines must probably await the defeat of Germany. On the other hand, he would be in favor of seizing Truk and going forward to the Marianas in order to dominate the Japanese sea routes to the eastward thus freeing our submarines for the more covered Japanese supply route to the westward. He felt it was necessary to soften up the Japanese before making our main effort and not simply to allow them to do what they wanted, while we held a static position. The 30 percent allocation of resources which he had suggested would certainly suffice for the recapture of Rabaul.
After some further discussion,
The Committee:
Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to report, on the basis that Germany is the primary enemy, what situation do we wish to establish in the Eastern Theater (i.e., the Pacific and Burma) in 1943, and what forces will be necessary to establish that situation.
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U.S. Navy Department (January 14, 1943)
Communiqué No. 251
South Pacific.
During the night of January 10-11, U.S. motor torpedo boats attacked a number of Japanese destroyers near Guadalcanal. Two torpedo hits were scored on one of the enemy destroyers and one hit on a second destroyer. Two possible hits were reported on a third destroyer. The enemy force retired to the northwest.
On January 13, a force of “Marauder” medium bombers (Martin B-26), with “Airacobra” (Bell P-39) and “Lightning” (Lockheed P-38) escort, bombed enemy installations at Rekata Bay. Results were not reported.
U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal Island supported by air forces continued their advance.
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