U.S. State Department (September 8, 1943)
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 10:55 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| General Marshall | Field Marshal Dill |
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Washington, 8 September 1943
Secret
CCS 339
Directive for the Control Commission and AMG in Italy
It is necessary that General Eisenhower be furnished immediately with a Directive for his use in the event that the Conditions of Surrender are accomplished. The Directive should inform him:
a. Whom he shall designate as Military Governor for occupied Italy.
b. The Basic Organization of the Control Commission and its relationship with Allied Military Government and the Italian National Government, as General Eisenhower requested in his Naf 340.
Facts bearing on the problem
a. General Eisenhower, pursuant to the Directive furnished him for HUSKY, established Allied Military Government. He designated General Alexander as Military Governor and empowered him to exercise the functions of Allied Military Government in Sicily. Recently General Eisenhower requested authority to extend the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government under General Alexander to areas of continental Italy captured in the near future. General Eisenhower was given such authority. General Eisenhower cabled that he did not intend that the authority given the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, would include supervision of the Italian National Government.
b. General Eisenhower, in his Naf 340, outlined his preliminary plans for handling the Control Commission, Allied Military Government in Italy, and the Italian Government. This planning has been done in the absence of any such Directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A reply to Naf 340 has been sent to General Eisenhower, which confirms his present planning program, but which does not constitute an adequate Directive. The reply states that he will receive such a Directive in the near future.
Discussion
a. Control Commission
The Control Commission referred to in this Paper is created by the authority contained in Paragraph 37 of the comprehensive surrender terms Document in General Eisenhower’s possession and is quoted herewith:
There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations, charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
With reference to the term “United Nations” mentioned above, the Document states in the preamble that the United States and United Kingdom governments are acting on behalf of the United Nations. This explains the reason for establishing a Control Commission consisting of personnel furnished generally by the U.S. and U.K.
b. Jurisdictional Authority of AMG and the Control Commission. The jurisdictional authority of the Control Commission, the Allied Military Government in Italy (AMG), and the Italian Government can be explained as follows:
(1) The Control Commission is charged in the Instrument of Surrender with regulating and executing its provisions. Therefore, the Commission enforces the Surrender Conditions; it does not govern. The Commission operates under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. In the performance of its duties, the Commission functions through existing governmental agencies, whether it is territory being governed by the Italian Government, or by AMG.
(2) AMG is a governing body, and constitutes the sovereign authority in occupied Italy.
(3) The Italian Government constitutes the sovereign authority in unoccupied Italy.
(4) The Control Commission operates throughout Italy and makes use of both governments as its operators in order to assure compliance with the provisions of the Surrender Terms. The Control Commission is not an administrative governmental agency, and does not infringe upon the functions of the Italian Government or AMG.
(5) The division of Italy into occupied and unoccupied areas is based on military considerations and not on economic self-sufficiency. Hence it is of the utmost importance that there be close coordination between the policies and operations of AMG, the Italian Government, and the Control Commission.
Conclusion
a. Conflicts in the operation of AMG and the Control Commission may well ensue in actual practice unless one individual is the head of both agencies. To insure complete cooperation and coordination between AMG and the Control Commission, and to insure that the same policies prevail in both occupied and unoccupied territories, it is proposed that General Eisenhower designate an American officer of high rank to serve both as Military Governor of Italy and Deputy President of the Control Commission.
b. The Enclosure is a proposed Directive to General Eisenhower.
c. We are informed that the British members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee concur in the proposed Directive subject to comment from London.
Recommendation
That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the enclosed Directive and submit it to the President and the Prime Minister for their approval.
Enclosure
Draft Directive on Military Government in Italy
Secret
Directive to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff
In the event that the terms of surrender are concluded, it is of the utmost importance that the Control Commission for Italy and AMG follow uniform policies and procedure in their dealings with the Italian Government and people. Their functions must be completely coordinated under one supreme authority. To accomplish this, you will announce yourself as President of the Control Commission, and appoint a Deputy President who will also be the Military Governor of occupied Italy.
Allied Military Government. The Directives for AMG for HUSKY will serve as a basis for AMG in Italy. As circumstances require, you will acquaint the Italians and Italian Government with the areas over which AMG has extended or will extend its jurisdiction.
Control Commission.
a. Functions. To enforce and execute the Instrument of Surrender under your orders and general directives.
b. Organization. The Control Commission will be divided into three sections: (1) Military, (2) Political, (3) Economic and Administrative. Each Section will be in charge of a Vice-President, and will be divided into sub-commissions to conform as nearly as practicable with the Organization of Italian Ministries.
c. The Military Section will be divided into the following sub-commissions: (1) Naval Forces, (2) Land Forces, (3) Air Forces, (4) Prisoners of War, (5) War Material Factories, and (6) Material Disposal.
d. The Economic and Administrative Section will be divided into the following sub-commissions: (1) Interior, (2) Justice (Law, Order, Police, Prisons), (3) Finance, (4) Foreign Trade, (5) Industry and Commerce, (6) Public Works and Utilities, (7) Fuel, (8) Food, (9) Agriculture, (10) Public Health, (11) Labor, (12) Transportation, (13) Communications (Postal Telegraph, and Telephone, Radio).
e. The Political Section will be divided into the following sub-commissions: (1) Foreign and Internal Affairs, (2) Civilian Internees and Displaced Persons, (3) Information, Press, Censorship, and (4) Fine Arts and Archives.
f. Where the functions of the various Sections overlap, liaison and, if necessary, exchange of personnel, will be arranged between the sub-commissions concerned.
g. A suitable Secretariat should be established.
h. You may assume that each Government will assume expenses of the personnel it furnishes, and that other expenses will be shared equally.
Personnel.
a. Allocation of posts between U.S. and U.K. The Commission will be organized generally on an Anglo-American basis, according to the most convenient alternation of posts and preserving the ratio in numbers of 50/50; at any rate, in the higher posts.
b. The allocation of the principal posts between U.S. and U.K. is as follows:
| Deputy President of the Commission | U.S. |
| Vice President in charge of the Military Section | U.S. |
| Deputy Vice President in charge of the Military Section | U.K. |
| Vice President in charge of the Political Section | U.K. |
| Deputy Vice President in charge of the Political Section | U.S. |
| Vice President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section | U.K. |
| Deputy Vice President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section | U.S. |
In the event a vacancy should occur in the posts of the Deputy President, Vice Presidents, or Deputy Vice Presidents, such a vacancy will be filled by a person of the same nationality.
The posts of heads of the sub-commissions will, insofar as possible, be distributed equally between the U.S. and U.K., and the assistant heads will similarly be of opposite nationality.
Except in special cases, the personnel of the Military and Economic and Administrative Sections should have a military status, and the personnel of the Political Section should have a civilian status. The Deputy President of the Commission should be military.
The Vice President of the Economic and Administrative Section will be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Military Government.
It is contemplated that provision will be made for representation of the interested United Nations at the Headquarters of the Control Commission. Further instructions will be sent to you on this point.
The channel of communication for instructions and directives and all matters of policy will be to and from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
AFHQ North Africa, 8 September 1943
Secret
Urgent
W–9423/1907. Following cipher message has just been received (to AGWar from[for] Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff from Smith signed Eisenhower. This is Naf 365. Delivery times to both addresses immediately required.)
Owing to changes in the situation which has broken down and the existence of German forces in the Rome area it is no longer possible to accept immediate armistice since this proves [would mean?] that the capital would be occupied and the government taken over forcibly by the Germans. Operation GIANT 2 no longer possible because of lack of forces to guarantee airfields. General Taylor ready to return to Sicily to present views of the government and awaits orders. Communicate means and location you prefer for this return. Signed Badoglio.
CinC is now in conference with Commanders at Advanced Command Post and has this information. Decisions taken will be communicated to you at the earliest possible moment. They probably will be to call off GIANT 2 (this is inevitable) and to go ahead with all other plans. Question of whether announcement of armistice should be made as originally scheduled is most important. It might have great effect on Italian resistance and after all we have the signed document which was completed in good faith by an authorized representative of the man who now retracts. It is possible but not probable that Ambrosio will leave Rome and go ahead with the original plan from some other location. In any case we would like to have at the earliest possible moment your thought on whether or not we should proceed with the armistice announcement for the tactical and deception value it might have. Certainly the Italian government itself deserves no consideration. This is Eyes Only.
The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ
Washington, September 8, 1943
Secret
7196.
It is the view of the President and the Prime Minister that the agreement having been signed you should make such public announcement regarding it as would facilitate your military operations. (To Eisenhower or Smith personal attention from Marshall) No consideration need be given to the embarrassment it might cause the Italian Government.
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ
Washington, September 8, 1943
Secret
Urgent
From President and Prime Minister to General Eisenhower, Algiers.
We agree with line you are taking as indicated in your 387 and are withholding all announcements here and in London until we know what you have said and done.
ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL
The Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Algiers, 8 September 1943
Secret
Urgent
W–9443/1972. Supplementing Naf 365, I have just completed a conference with the principal commanders and have determined not to accept the Italian change of attitude. To AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for the British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is Naf 387. We intend to proceed in accordance with plan for the announcement of the armistice and with subsequent propaganda and other measures. Marshal Badoglio is being informed through our direct link that this instrument entered into by his accredited representative with presumed good faith on both sides is considered valid and binding and that we will not recognize any deviation from our original agreement. Acknowledge time of delivery to both addresses is desired immediately.
Proclamation by Gen. Eisenhower of the Italian surrender
September 8, 1943, 12:30 p.m. EWT
Broadcast audio (CAN):
This is Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces. The Italian government has surrendered its armed forces unconditionally. As Allied Commander-in-Chief, I have granted a military armistice, the terms of which have been approved by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acting in the interests of the United Nations. The Italian government has bound itself to abide by these terms without reservation. The armistice was signed by my representative and the representative of Marshal Badoglio and becomes effective this instant. Hostilities between the armed forces of the United Nations and those of Italy terminate at once. All Italians who now act to help eject the German aggressor from Italian soil will have the assistance and support of the United Nations.
U.S. State Department (September 8, 1943)
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of War Stimson | Colonel Llewellin | |
| Mr. Baruch | ||
| Mr. Hopkins |
From Stimson’s Diary:
At one o’clock I went over to the White House to lunch where there was a very cheerful party – the President, Churchill, Barney Baruch, Harry Hopkins, Colonel Llewellin, British Resident Minister for Supply, and myself, with the naval aide of the Prime Minister and another younger Englishman who I think was in his party. Of course the surrender [of Italy] was talked over every which way, and the probable effects.
Then we got on to post-war talk and there was a great deal of back and forth talk by the Prime Minister and myself on that subject. He had just made a speech up at Cambridge when he received a degree which took very much the position that I have been taking in regard to carrying on the association of Great Britain and the United States in the war into the immediate post-war period and doing it as informally as possible and without an attempt to build up by treaty a big organization like the League of Nations. I also broached to them the suggestion I had made at the meeting [with Hull and Secretary of the Navy Knox] in Hull’s office on Monday, namely that when we come to creating an association of all the allied powers it should start with an economic association to repair the ravages of war and to keep them from starvation and to do this by establishing stable money systems and preventing the rise of tariffs between the needy nations. The Prime Minister at first started to criticize the idea that we should become almoners of the other nations, but I made it clear to him that that was not my idea, but on the contrary that we should as far as possible confine ourselves to doing what was left undone among the several small successor states after the Great War in Central Europe and what was successfully accomplished by our thirteen post-Revolutionary states in 1787.
The President’s Personal Representative in North Africa to the President
AFHQ North Africa, September 8, 1943
Personal and secret
My Dear Mr. President: In accordance with the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief I departed from Algiers on August 31 with General Walter B. Smith, the Chief of Staff, Mr. Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, and General Zanussi, the second emissary sent to Lisbon by General Ambrosio, arriving at Cassibile airport, near Syracusa (this is a landing field which our forces carved out of an almond grove and is a splendid piece of work), and stopped at Fairfield Camp nearby. We arrived simultaneously with Brigadier General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, who had gone to Palermo in advance to meet Giuseppe Castellano, who, accompanied by Signor Montanari (of the Italian Foreign Office acting as interpreter – his mother is an American), arrived from Rome that morning. Castellano, you will recall, was the first emissary sent by Marshal Pietro Badoglio to Lisbon. Castellano and Montanari were the emissaries at Lisbon with whom General Smith and Brigadier Strong conferred two weeks ago. In the party at Fairfield were also Brigadier Sugden (G-3 at Allied Force Headquarters), Commodore Dick, Chief of Staff of Admiral Cunningham, General Joseph Cannon and General Lemnitzer, both of whom are now with the 15th Army Group.
General Zanussi and General Castellano got together for a few minutes and then entered into a military conference with General Smith and the others above-mentioned, Macmillan and I staying in another tent with General Alexander who had come over from the headquarters of the 15th Army Group.
This meeting lasted until about 2 p.m. According to General Smith, General Castellano’s attitude had stiffened considerably since his meeting in Lisbon. Both General Smith and Brigadier Strong attributed this to the arrival in Italy of increased German forces which now amount to nineteen divisions. It was apparent that in the minds of the Italians the great question was not the character nor the harshness of our armistice terms (you will recall that the British Ambassador in Lisbon had communicated to General Zanussi informally the complete armistice terms), or even the question of unconditional surrender. The outstanding factor is that the Italians are not free agents at liberty to do as they please. It is a nice balance in their minds whether we or their German allies will work the most damage and destruction in Italy. They are literally between the hammer and the anvil.
The Italian representatives in this first conversation at Fairfield insisted that they could do but little and were not prepared to sign anything, long or short terms, unless we could guarantee an Allied landing north of Rome – even a little bit north of Rome. They asserted that if we only land south of Rome the Germans will take the city and everything north of it. In their minds the slaughter, pillage and destruction would be too awful to contemplate.
General Smith made no commitments but said there was a possibility of our landing – for example, a force of airborne troops north of the Eternal City. The Italians said that in such a case their forces would guarantee no opposition to the landings on the Rome airfields and would aid our forces in holding them.
There was lengthy discussion of the military situation, eventual German plans, the possibility of a German deal with Russia and also the question of the Italian fleet. Commodore Dick appeared confident that the Italians are prepared to yield on the fleet and come over. There was considerable question of an operation in Taranto which was subsequently developed and now contemplates the landing of the First British Airborne Division in cooperation with the fleet and with the promised cooperation of the Italian forces.
After the military meeting, Macmillan and I had a brief conversation with Generals Castellano and Zanussi. We impressed on them the urgency of stimulating their government to take immediate steps, reminding them that this is their last chance. The Allies, we pointed out, had not bombed the city of Rome as yet, but there was no reason to defer such action. We suggested that if the Italians declined now to accept and sign, three things were indicated:
(1) The King and the present Italian Government would be all through as far as the Allies are concerned.
(2) We would be obliged to incite disorder and anarchy throughout Italy, even though it might not appear that it would be in our interest to do so and from the military point of view such a state of affairs might present certain disadvantages.
(3) We would obviously be obliged to bomb relentlessly and on a large scale until all the major Italian cities, including Rome, would be reduced to ashes and piles of rubble.
The reaction of the Italians remained the same and, in a sense, it was like preaching to the converted. The fact remained that the Rome Government still appears more afraid of the immediate German peril than of the Allies. Generals Castellano and Zanussi both said that it is a question of inducing the cautious and frightened men at Rome who, as much as they yearned to be rid of the Germans, lack the bold initiative to act against them, especially as they are not entirely convinced that the Allies are strong enough to take immediately a major part of Italy, even with Italian help, and protect the country against the large German forces. The latter, in their fury against the Italians, they believe, would unquestionably destroy ruthlessly.
Generals Castellano and Zanussi were permitted to depart from Sicily about 5 p.m. August 31, returning to Rome by Italian plane via Palermo. It was understood between them and General Smith that if Allied Force Headquarters had no reply indicating Italian acceptance by midnight September 1, the Allies would find it necessary to bomb Rome heavily.
That evening we dined with General Alexander and after dinner General Smith, Brigadier [Major General] Richardson, Macmillan and I went with General Alexander to his trailer for a discussion. General Alexander, as he had done in our earlier conversation that day, emphasized the weakness of the Allied position and the danger that unless the Allies are actively aided by the Italians in landing in AVALANCHE and elsewhere, the operations might fail or at least gain a limited success at a very heavy cost of lives. It was obvious that in his mind, as well as that of Macmillan, a disaster at the present time would have a catastrophic effect in England even to the extent, they say, of causing the fall of the British Government and seriously compromising Britain’s determination to remain in the war. They talked much of the fatigue, both of the British people as well as of the soldiers, many of whom have been away from home over three years. General Alexander pointed out that the Germans now have at least nineteen divisions in Italy which, added to the sixteen Italian divisions, makes a total of thirty-five divisions. AVALANCHE contemplates an initial landing of three to five divisions and a buildup over two weeks of a maximum of eight divisions. He also emphasized that a landing on a hostile shore is the most dangerous of military operations. General Alexander, therefore, is positive that literally everything must be done to persuade the Italians to help our forces, both during the landing as well as afterwards. Without that aid he would have no assurance of success. There would be, in his opinion, a grave risk of disaster. He urged that nothing be neglected to persuade the Italians to cooperate and said that he would be quite willing to risk his reputation and, if necessary, to retire from the army should his Government disapprove his insistence on immediate signature by the Italians of the short armistice terms, and Allied acceptance of Italian military cooperation.
On September 1, a radio message was sent from Allied Force Headquarters to Rome, in accordance with the recommendation of Generals Smith and Alexander, that Allied airborne forces should land in the Rome area incident to AVALANCHE. This was done after Brigadier Strong, Commodore Dick and Brigadier Sugden returned to Algiers and reported to General Eisenhower, who considered their recommendations, as well as that of Admiral Cunningham, who has always vigorously supported the idea of an operation in the Rome area.
We therefore waited at the Fairfield Camp, which is pleasantly situated in an olive grove, making a side trip to Palermo (one hour by air) to inspect the Allied Military Government organization there. Incidentally, we found that the Allied Military Government has performed remarkably well and we greatly admired both the efficiency as well as the fine spirit of both the American and British officers who are engaged in that task.
After dinner September 1, we received a radio message from Rome saying that the emissaries would return on the morning of September 2. This was most encouraging and General Smith decided to go to the Termini airfield to meet their plane. On August 31, the Italian plane had landed at the Palermo airport by mistake and caused somewhat of a sensation. It had been expected at Termini, a more isolated airport which is a bit east of Palermo.
Early on September 2, General Smith met the Italians at Termini and accompanied them to Fairfield – General Castellano, Signor Montanari, Major Marchesi and the Italian pilot who, incidentally, knows the Rome airports well.
General Smith ascertained from the Italians that they were not yet authorized to sign either the short or the long armistice terms, but that they were instructed to discuss the matter of military cooperation with the Allies. They suggested that the signature be postponed until after the Allied landing on the mainland. This sounded bad and General Smith indicated great dissatisfaction. The Italians had brought with them considerable military data – maps showing the disposition of the German forces, etc.
It was decided at this point that General Alexander should make an impressive entrance in full dress uniform, approach the Italians, who were in a tent which had been assigned to them at Fairfield, and indicate that he was coldly furious that they had returned unprepared to sign, thus wasting our time. He went through with this performance very well, making thereafter a stern exit, and the Italians seemed impressed. General Alexander insisted also afterwards, in discussing the matter with us, that under no circumstances were the Italians to leave Fairfield unless and until they signed. General Smith missed no opportunity to impress on the Italians the terrible destruction and chaos which their country would suffer if they failed.
Shortly thereafter the Italians requested the transmission of a radio message to Rome in which they urgently recommended that immediate authorization be given them to sign and discuss afterwards the details of military cooperation with the Allies. This was done about noon.
It was decided also that, in the interval, it would be best to let the Italian representatives “stew in their own juice” and all conversation with them was avoided.
General Alexander, in a conversation with us, reviewed again the disproportionate situation of fighting thirty-five Axis divisions with an initial five or six divisions available in the first days of AVALANCHE, and those not even landed but faced with the perilous test of getting ashore under the fire of several first-class German divisions. He again and again said that our forces needed every possible aid we could induce by hook or crook the Italians to extend. He said he was ready to stake his military career in the effort to prevail upon the Italians to come over to our camp, employing any ruse or subterfuge to gain this end. Everyone agreed that the odds against the Allies without Italian aid are unreasonably great and were determined to prevail on the Italians to sign the short terms and then work out the details of military cooperation.
In the afternoon of September 2, we were greatly relieved to receive from the Commander-in-Chief a message saying that you and the Prime Minister were agreed that our dealings with the Italians should be governed by military considerations alone. We had all been disturbed over the thought that it might be believed that the stage was all set for a public Allied-Italian armistice ceremony, forgetting that the Italians are living in the cage with the tiger and are not free agents. Military necessity required that the negotiations be conducted with the Italians in the greatest secrecy.
During the afternoon, I participated in a conference attended by Generals Cannon, Timberlake, Lemnitzer and Taylor, who are engaged in the preliminary planning for the landing of the 82nd Airborne Division on the Rome airports. They all agreed that it is a hazardous undertaking which could only succeed if the four Italian divisions in the Rome area, or part of them, actively cooperate in resisting the German Panzer forces said to be six hours distant. They all thought the risk was worth taking, even if the divisions were lost.
No news was received from Rome late September 2 because the last message from Allied Force Headquarters despatched from Castellano to General Ambrosio was only transmitted at 9 p.m. due to atmospheric difficulties. In that message General Castellano informed General Ambrosio that it was urgently necessary that he be authorized to sign immediately and that Marshal Badoglio transmit to the British Minister in the Vatican a document confirming the authorization to accept the terms unconditionally and to sign the short armistice terms.
We received on the morning of September 3 an encouraging message from Rome saying that the matter was under consideration. At 4:30 p.m., a radio message was received from the Badoglio Government granting General Castellano the necessary authority and stating that the deposit of the document confirming the authorization had been made. The British later received advice that the document had been deposited with the British Minister in the Vatican.
In the meantime, General Eisenhower had arrived on a visit to Sicily in connection with the BAYTOWN operation and conferred with General Smith, several officers, Macmillan and myself. He approved General Smith’s signing the armistice terms as his representative as a strictly military arrangement which must be regarded as highly secret until announcement can be made a few hours before the AVALANCHE operation.
At 5:30 p.m. on September 3, at Fairfield Camp, the short armistice terms with Italy were signed in behalf of Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, by Brigadier General Giuseppe Castellano, and in behalf of Lieutenant General [General] Dwight Eisenhower, Allied Commander-in-Chief, by Major General Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff.
After congratulations and amenities, General Eisenhower informed General Castellano that the latter had acted in the best interests of his country. General Eisenhower stated that in the case of the Italian people, as had been the case of all other peoples determined to combat Nazi Germany, the Italians could count on the Allies for full cooperation to this end. General Eisenhower thereupon bade General Castellano goodbye and departed for North Africa.
Thus, precisely four years after Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, the duly constituted Italian authorities acknowledged Italy’s defeat, surrendered unconditionally to an American General acting as Chief of Staff to another American General, the Allied Commander-in-Chief. But the Italians went further and agreed to place the resources of their country in the fight on the side of the Allies against Germany. It is truly an historic milestone.
Incidentally, the signature occurred under an olive tree and I enclose a branch of the olive tree as a souvenir.
General Alexander arrived immediately thereafter and a discussion of Italian military cooperation with the Allies ensued between the Italians and Allied staff officers through the night.
Before the military conversations, several questions were asked by General Castellano and Montanari regarding the possibilities which would face the Italian Government in the event of a German spearhead movement to seize Rome. General Castellano talked of the Italian Government and King proceeding to Corsica or Sardinia or Sicily, but expressed a preference for Albania. Macmillan and I took no position but mentioned that possibly in such an event the Palermo region of Sicily might be considered should circumstances require, in which case the Allied forces might delimit a region where Italian sovereignty would be maintained. It was pointed out, however, that the Italian mainland would be available after the future Allied military operations, the details of which, of course, had not been disclosed to the Italians, had been successfully completed.
Immediately after the military surrender terms had been signed, General Smith, in accordance with your instructions, handed General Castellano the text of the full armistice terms with a covering letter which made it clear that these terms must be accepted. It is our thought that as soon as direct contact with the Italian Government can be established after landing, the complete armistice can be signed with appropriate ceremony on behalf of the United Nations and in the presence of their representatives.
At this point I want to speak a word of sincere praise for the superb manner in which General W. B. Smith has handled these negotiations under the intelligent supervision of General Eisenhower. It is an excellent example of what our military men are capable when put to the test.
General Castellano seemed perturbed over some of the conditions, but a detailed discussion of them was avoided.
Macmillan and I also discussed with General Smith the matter of setting up a program for the radio announcement by the King and Badoglio of the signing of an armistice. This would be made immediately prior to AVALANCHE. Macmillan made the point that the announcement should be prepared and registered on phonographic discs so that they could be given immediate and widespread publicity by radio stimulating the maximum aid for our military operations from the Italian people and armed forces. It was agreed to order General McClure to Fairfield immediately to work out the details of this program.
Among the miscellaneous items of information we gathered from the Italians was that Farinacci left Rome wearing a German uniform by the German Embassy plane, which took him to Germany. They also informed us that von Rahn, a German diplomat with the rank of Minister, arrived in Rome four days ago. We recalled his odorous reputation in French affairs. He was the agent who proceeded to Syria in 1941 and was one of the most effective German elements in France after the armistice. We believe that his arrival in Rome may portend the imminence of a German political spearhead involving an effort to capture the King and the Badoglio Government, looking to the establishment of a Farinacci Quisling régime. The Italians stated that Farinacci has absolutely no popular support.
The Italians told us also that over 600,000 additional persons, refugees from the northern bombed cities in Italy, especially Turin and Milan, are now in Rome, because they believe that Rome will be protected from Allied bombing. This is one of the weak points of the Italian position and explains the Italian reaction to our suggestion that it would probably be necessary to bomb the city if prompt and favorable action were not immediately undertaken. It would appear that not much would be necessary to create complete demoralization of a surplus population of hundreds of thousands who have literally no other place to go.
General Castellano informed me in strictest secrecy that Mussolini is now in Maddalena (a small island off the northeast corner of Sardinia). Ciano has departed from Rome but Castellano does not know his whereabouts. Castellano also indicated that during the course of Mussolini’s last meeting with Hitler at Verona, Hitler promised numerous German divisions from the Russian front but said they could not arrive in Italy before October when the mud in Russia would reduce operations in that area.
All of the Italians said that food conditions in Italy are unsatisfactory, largely due to the prevailing lack of transportation. There are important supplies of food in the country, resulting particularly from the excellent cereal crop, but inadequate distribution reduces the supply in urban centers. There is a flourishing black market.
You may have heard the story of General Patton at Licata. The Podestà at that place pointed out to General Patton the ruins of a former Greek temple, saying that it had been destroyed in the last war. General Patton expressed surprise and said that he had not realized that Licata had been shelled in the 1914-18 war. The Podestà explained that he was not referring to the 1914-18 war, but that by the last war he meant the second Punic War.
Faithfully yours,
ROBERT MURPHY
AFHQ announcement
September 8, 1943, 1:00 p.m. ET
Some weeks ago, the Italian government made an approach to the British and American governments with a view to concluding an armistice. A meeting was arranged and took place in neutral territory.
It was at once explained to the representatives of the Italian government that they must surrender unconditionally. On this understanding representatives of the Allied Commander-in-Chief were empowered to communicate to them the military conditions which they would have to fulfill.
One clause in these military terms binds the Italian government to comply with the political, economic and financial conditions of the Allies which will be imposed later.
Further meetings were arranged and took place in Sicily. The armistice was signed at Allied advanced headquarters there on September 3, but it was agreed with the representatives of the Italian government that the armistice should come into force at a moment most favorable to the Allies and be simultaneously announced by both sides. That moment has now arrived.
The possibility of a German move to forestall publication of the armistice by the Italian government was discussed during the negotiations. To meet this eventuality, it was agreed that one of the senior Italian military representatives should not return to Rome.
He is now in Sicily.
Further, Marshal Badoglio arranged to send the text of his proclamation to Allied headquarters.
Proclamation by Marshal Badoglio of the Italian surrender
September 8, 1943, 7:45 p.m. CET
Il Governo italiano, riconosciuta la impossibilità di continuare l’impari lotta contro la soverchiante potenza avversaria, nell’intento di risparmiare ulteriori e più gravi sciagure alla Nazione, ha chiesto un armistizio al Generale Eisenhower, Comandante in Capo delle Forze Alleate e Angloamericane. La richiesta è stata accolta. Conseguentemente ogni atto di ostilità contro le forze Angloamericane deve cessare da parte delle forze italiane in ogni luogo. Esse però reagiranno ad eventuali attacchi da qualsiasi altra provenienza.
The Italian Government, recognizing the impossibility of continuing the unequal struggle against the overwhelming power of the enemy, and with the object of avoiding further and more grievous harm to the nation, has requested an armistice from Gen. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American Allied Forces. This request has been granted. The Italian forces will, therefore, cease all acts of hostility against the Anglo-American forces wherever they may be met. They will, however, oppose attacks from any other quarter.
PR 10 “Foreign Relations of U.S.”/9–1069
The British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, September 8, 1943.
Interchange of Information on Weapons with the USSR
In September, 1942, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed by which each Government undertook to furnish the other, spontaneously or on request, with all information on weapons or processes employed by them against the common enemy unless it was not in the common interest when reasons would be given.
The proper implementation of our part of this agreement has been, and is, most difficult because much of the information we should disclose is partly American and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are reluctant to agree to its disclosure.
We have therefore to choose between breaking our agreement, disclosing information without U.S. approval on weapons and processes we employ, and giving the Russians (who are pressing us hard for certain information) the reasons for non-disclosure which would embarrass the U.S.
None of these choices is attractive. A tripartite agreement (U.K., U.S. and USSR) to replace our existing agreement would solve our difficulties.
If this solution is agreeable to you and the President, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be instructed that for political reasons it is essential to have a Tripartite agreement and be asked to consider the form it should take and to recommend how it should be implemented, i.e. outline the factors which should govern disclosure or non-disclosure of information.
It is recognised that we will not obtain much useful information from the Russians but nonetheless such an agreement should have military as well as political value to the extent that the information we give enables the Russians to kill more Germans.
Prime Minister Churchill’s Principal Private Secretary to the President’s Naval Aide
Washington, September 8, 1943
Admiral Wilson Brown. In confirmation of our telephone conversation, the Prime Minister has been informed by Mr. Mackenzie King that he has no objection to the terms of the proposed statement on U-Boat warfare in August.
I should be grateful if you will let me know whether the draft is approved on your side, so that simultaneous publication on September 10 can be arranged.
JOHN MILLER MARTIN
8.9.43
Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt
Moscow, September 8, 1943
Secret
[TRANSLATION]
Personal and secret message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Your message in which you touched upon several important questions I received on September 6.
- I still consider, as I did before, that the question of the creation of the Military-Political Commission of the representatives of the three countries with its residence at the beginning in Sicily or in Algiers is the most urgent one. Sending of a Soviet officer to the Staff of General Eisenhower can by no means substitute [for] the Military-Political Commission, which is necessary for directing on the spot the negotiations with Italy (as well as with other countries dissociating themselves from Germany). Much time has passed, but nothing is done.
As to the participation of the French representative in this Commission, I have already expressed my opinion on this subject. However, if you have any doubt, in this case this question can be discussed after the Commission is created.
-
I consider that the beginning of October as the Prime Minister suggested, would be convenient time for the meeting of the three our representatives [sic], and I propose as the place of the meeting – Moscow. By that time the three Governments could have reached an agreement regarding the questions which have to be discussed as well as the proposals on those questions, without which (agreement) the meeting will not give the necessary results in which our Governments are interested.
-
As to our personal meeting with participation of Mr. Churchill I am also interested to have it arranged as soon as possible. Your proposal regarding the time of the meeting seems to me acceptable. I consider that it would be expedient to choose as the place of the meeting the country where there are the representations of all three countries, for instance, Iran. However, I have to say that the exact date of the meeting has to be defined later taking into consideration the situation on the Soviet-German front where more than 500 divisions are engaged in the fighting in all, and where the control on the part of the High Command of the USSR is needed almost daily.
-
I thank you for congratulations on the occasion of the successes of the Soviet Armies. I take this opportunity to congratulate you and Anglo-American troops on the occasion of the new brilliant successes in Italy.
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, early afternoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of War Stimson |
From Stimson’s Diary:
Just before I started to come over to the White House, we had received from the President the S-1 agreement signed by him and Churchill. It was in the form in which we had drafted it in company with Sir John Anderson some time ago. But it inserted me as chairman of the Policy Committee. As worded, that would have imposed upon me a great deal of routine work which I could not possibly do in addition to my present labors. So immediately after luncheon I got the President and Churchill aside and talked it over with them. Both of them wanted me to remain as chairman but consented that I should have General Styer, who is now doing all the routine work, as my deputy to take care of the routine work.
U.S. Navy Department (September 8, 1943)
Press Release
For Immediate Release
September 8, 1943
Navy carrier‑based aircraft and escort surface ship each destroys U‑boat in single day’s actions
Coordinated participation of both air and surface Naval units in protecting vital convoys to the Mediterranean theatre was exemplified a few weeks ago when two U‑boats were blasted to the bottom of the Atlantic and another severely damaged in one day’s action.
Screening against suspected enemy submarines, miles ahead of a large convoy carrying tanks, ammunition, food and other supplies, was famed Escort Carrier “B,” the “baby flattop” which had scored two certain kills, four very probables and four probables out of 11 attacks on a previous mission, as announced by the Navy Department on July 16, 1943, and Carrier “B’s” own small group of escort vessels. One of these escort ships was the USS GEORGE B. BADGER (DD-196), an old four‑stacker destroyer, since modernized, which was completed at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company 25 years ago. Carrier “B” and the BADGER each scored a kill this day; Carrier “B” was credited with “severely damaging” another.
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 11
A task force commanded by RAdm. Charles A. Pownall, USN, attacked Marcus Island at dawn on September 1, 1943, East Longitude Time. The first wave of the attack apparently caught the enemy completely by surprise. It is estimated that the attack, made in several waves throughout the day, destroyed 80% of military installations on the island. Our losses totaled two fighters and one torpedo plane.
Some anti-aircraft fire was encountered by the initial wave, but was eliminated by succeeding attacks. Fires started throughout the island were still burning the day following the attack.
No enemy planes left the ground. Seven twin‑motored bombers which were parked on the runway were destroyed by our fighters. Installations destroyed included hangars, fuel and ammunition storage, shops, and living quarters. The two landing strips were severely damaged by heavy bombs. A small tanker caught near the island was sunk by our bombers.
The Pittsburgh Press (September 8, 1943)
ITALY QUITS WAR!
Unconditional surrender
Badoglio agrees to fight Hitler; Allies get fleet
By Richard D. McMillan, United Press staff writer
Bulletin
Allied HQ, North Africa –
Axis radio reports insisted today that the U.S. 7th Army was sailing northward across the Mediterranean against the continent. The Axis radio reports have persisted since Monday.
Allied HQ, North Africa –
Italy has surrendered unconditionally and ordered its armed forces to resist the Nazis if they should try to interfere with the surrender.
The Italian collapse was announced today by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, who said that he had granted Italy a military armistice on Sept. 3 and that it was effective “this instant” (12:30 p.m. today ET).
At that hour, Gen. Eisenhower went to a microphone of the United Nations radio station here and read his statement to the world.
Gen. Eisenhower said:
This is Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces. The Italian government has surrendered its armed forces unconditionally. As Allied Commander-in-Chief, I have granted a military armistice, the terms of which have been approved by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acting in the interests of the United Nations. The Italian government has bound itself to abide by these terms without reservation. The armistice was signed by my representative and the representative of Marshal Badoglio and becomes effective this instant. Hostilities between the armed forces of the United Nations and those of Italy terminate at once. All Italians who now act to help eject the German aggressor from Italian soil will have the assistance and support of the United Nations.
Thus, five days after the Allies invaded Italy proper, the nation was officially out of the war.
A special announcement issued from Allied headquarters explained the developments leading up to the capitulation of Italy as follows:
Some weeks ago, the Italian government made an approach to the British and American governments with a view to concluding an armistice. A meeting was arranged and took place in neutral territory.
It was at once explained to the representatives of the Italian government that they must surrender unconditionally. On this understanding representatives of the Allied Commander-in-Chief were empowered to communicate to them the military conditions which they would have to fulfill.
One clause in these military terms binds the Italian government to comply with the political, economic and financial conditions of the Allies which will be imposed later.
Further meetings were arranged and took place in Sicily. The armistice was signed at Allied advanced headquarters there on Sept. 3, but it was agreed with the representatives of the Italian government that the armistice should come into force at a moment most favorable to the Allies and be simultaneously announced by both sides. That moment has now arrived.
The possibility of a German move to forestall publication of the armistice by the Italian government was discussed during the negotiations. To meet this eventuality, it was agreed that one of the senior Italian military representatives should not return to Rome.
He is now in Sicily.
Further, Marshal Badoglio arranged to send the text of his proclamation to Allied headquarters.
Badoglio’s proclamation as the head of the Italian government recognized the impossibility of continuing “the unequal struggle against overwhelming power,” and said the armistice was requested to avoid “further and more grievous harm” to the country.
Under terms of the armistice, Badoglio pledged Italy to “oppose attacks from any other quarter,” which meant she would war against Germany if the Nazis attacked Italian soil.
Negotiated secretly without Hitler’s knowledge, according to official reports, the armistice represented the most severe blow the Germans had suffered and meant that the original Axis was no more.
The armistice was signed on the fourth anniversary of the declaration by Britain and France that a state of war with Germany existed.
The Italian government bound itself to comply with the political, economic and financial conditions which the Allies will impose later.
Italy fell out of the war just under three ways and three months after she entered it on June 10, 1940.
The armistice was signed on the day the British 8th Army launched the invasion of southern Italy, apparently explaining why slight resistance was encountered. The Allies, however, continued bombing the key centers of Italy, presumably directing their continuing offensive against the German elements in control of them.
The announcement of the Italian surrender was prepared in greatest secrecy, unlike any previous formal statement at Allied headquarters.
At noon, correspondents were told that a special press conference would be held at 5:15 p.m. local time (11:15 a.m. ET). At 5:30 p.m., the doors were closed. The censors and correspondents were alert and tense when Lt. Col. Joseph B. Philips said the tiny press work room would be sealed for 70 minutes, during which officers would collect the copy and take it to the censors, eliminating the usual mad scramble to file the first flash.
Thereafter, 25 correspondents typed madly at tiny tables while their colleagues, who had no immediate deadlines, clustered on the balcony overlooking the busy street.
An hour after Gen. Eisenhower made the announcement by radio, a special release was issued, saying that the Italian people were being informed by radio and leaflet of the armistice.
The leaflets said:
Italians! Backed by the might of the Allies, Italy now has the opportunity of taking vengeance on the German oppressor and of aiding in the expulsion of the enemy from Italian soil.
The Italians were exhorted to see that no single train carrying German material be permitted to pass and that dock workers allow no German ships to unload.
Sailors of the Italian Navy and mercantile marine were being notified that “the Germans have become your enemies.” But they were asked not to scuttle their ships, instead sailing them, if possible, to safe ports in North Africa, Malta, Black Sea ports or wherever they could be put into Allied hands.
The sailors were told to fly a black or blue pennant and identify themselves to Allied ships and planes, to burn dim navigation lights at night, and to follow all directions of the United Nations forces.
The Italian Navy consists of seven battleships, three aircraft carriers building, two heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers, 25 destroyers, and 60 submarines.
Besides completing the Allied control of the Mediterranean, the new acquisition of the Allies curtails German U-boat operations there.
With the use of Spezia, Pola, Taranto and Genoa naval bases, the Allies will be able to command and blockade the French coast, as well as the Adriatic including the Yugoslavian, Albanian and Greek coasts.
Italian shipping resources remaining in the Mediterranean are estimated at 300 vessels (totaling 1,500,000 tons). Italy had 2,000,000 tons of shipping in the Mediterranean when she entered the war.
An official announcement credited the Italians with still having possession of the Rex and Conte di Savoia, two luxury liners, despite a Washington announcement that one of the class was sunk off Bagnara last August.
‘It’s Eisenhower’s story,’ White House comments
Washington (UP) –
President Roosevelt kept silent today on the capitulation of Italy, feeling, the White House said, that “it is Gen. Eisenhower’s story – let him tell it.”
The President’s deference to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was made known by White House Secretary Stephen T. Early, who also revealed that Mr. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill were not in conference when the official news came from North Africa. The President was in his office at the time and Mr. Churchill in the White House proper.
The President may however refer to the capitulation in his radio address tonight opening the third war loan drive.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull declined immediate comment at his regular noonday press conference.
Planned at Casablanca
The surrender represented the culmination of brilliant operations conceived, in consultation with their staffs, by Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill in conferences begun here in December 1941 and climaxed, so far as the Mediterranean theater was concerned, in the historic meeting at Casablanca early this year.
That Italian unconditional surrender was imminent was surmised here because of Mr. Churchill’s prolonged stay in this country after the conclusion of the Québec Conference last month.
It appeared probable that the President and the Prime Minister had laid down the general terms of Italian capitulation – terms consonant with the “unconditional surrender” formula announced at Casablanca – but had left Gen. Eisenhower with a relatively free hand to deal with Italian offers.
Almost the first speculation after the news arrived here was that other of Germany’s satellite states will follow Italy’s suit, possibly in the near future. The example of Italy’s defeat, for example, might encourage Finland to make a separate peace with Soviet Russia, some sources believed.
In any event, the Italian disaster is bound to be received with great joy in the various conquered countries of Europe.
At the War Department, the news, packed with portents as the most tremendous single break in the Axis war front to date, was received with official silence for the time being.
Military observers, however, were quick to recognize the thus-far-unparalleled opportunities now opened up for the Allied forces under Gen. Eisenhower.
Known to be inevitable
It appeared likely that Italian capitulation had long been known to be inevitable and that the British 8th Army’s assault upon the toe of Italy was designed to spur Italian leaders to “surrender with honor.” It had been pointed out that the Italians could hardly be expected to give up until the homeland had been invaded.
War Department observers believed that the Italian surrender will lead to rapid occupation of at least a substantial portion of the Italian peninsula.
The Germans, however, may be expected to oppose complete Anglo-American domination of Italy. There have been indications that they will undertake to hold a line somewhere in northern Italy, despite the collapse of their erstwhile allies.
Po Valley stand likely
The Germans may try to hold the Po River Valley and may attempt to establish a line in the Apennine Mountains across Italy in the region of Florence. European sources have recently reported the withdrawal of German forces into northern Italy.
In addition to giving the Allies a tremendous advantage in land and air fighting, the Italian surrender will remove the last potential threat – inherent in continued existence of the Italian fleet as a fighting force – to Allied domination of the Mediterranean. The fleet comprises about 190 vessels, of which, however, by no means are all fit for sea duty.
The surrender also appeared to advance the day of all-out continental operations against Germany itself. Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, were in the White House when the news from North Africa arrived.
Hopkins hurries in
At about the same time, Harry Hopkins, the President’s right-hand man, hurried into the building. High-ranking British staff officers were also present, as was Elmer Davis, director of the Office of War Information.
Some sources believed the impending announcement of Italian collapse may have been the progress to which President Roosevelt alluded yesterday in referring to the prospects of a meeting between him, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and Mr. Churchill. With Italy out of the way, it was pointed out, the hour when forces of all three nations will be pressing against Germany would appear to be closer.
The Italian collapse brought to the fore again the question of Benito Mussolini’s whereabouts and the question of his surrender, as a war criminal, to the United Nations. The United States, Great Britain, and Russia have warned neutral nations not to give sanctuary to Mussolini or other Axis leaders. Whether the terms of Italian surrender dealt with the fate of the erstwhile Fascist dictator was not known.
Has army in Balkans
Another question yet to be resolved, it would appear, is the destiny of Italian troops in the Balkans, where thousands of them had been on Axis policy duty, and of such Italian forces as may have been engaged against Russia. The Germans, it seemed likely, will attempt to disarm any Italian soldiers now willing to go on fighting now that their mother country has cried quits.
In Greece and Yugoslavia, guerilla patriots may be expected to rally against their enemies with renewed fury. Yugoslav Ambassador Konstantin Fotić said Italy’s surrender means that “the day of Yugoslavia’s liberation approaches.” The news, he said, will electrify into action 300,000 Yugoslav patriots who have been waiting for this moment.
To get bases
Possession of southern and central Italy will give the Allies bases for invasion of the Balkans and for intensification of the air war against Germany. The Allied bomber line, observers pointed out, will be much closer to German home industries and resources.
Recent authoritative estimates place the number of Italian divisions in the Balkans at from 22 to 30. Axis forces in Europe all told were estimated at around 300 German divisions, 70 Italian divisions and 80 divisions of various satellite countries. Thus, the defection of Italy will represent a loss of about 15% of Axis manpower.
Nazis hurled back
The collapse of Italian resistance comes at a time when German forces are being hurled back over a long front from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov, and Allied offensive action throughout the Pacific and Far East is mounting. The psychological effect on the Nazi will to resist may well be profound.
Meanwhile, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill were believed to be awaiting word from Stalin as to whether, in the light of new events, he will be able to meet with them.
Buenos Aires, Argentina –
Blaring sirens of the newspaper La Prensa and La Nación, which hadn’t been blown since Pearl Harbor, announced the fall of Italy today.
Times Square bond rally cheers armistice news
Ticker tape cascades from New York skyscrapers as office workers swarm into streets
New York (UP) –
Ticker tape, torn telephone books and newspapers rained from the skyscrapers of Manhattan today as word of the Italian armistice brought a spontaneous demonstration of joy and hope from thousands who swarmed into the streets.
Several thousands attending a noonday bond sales rally in Times Square broke into a roar of cheering when the news was announced from the platform by Newbold Morris, president of the City Council. Their numbers were augmented by many more thousands who tumbled out of offices and stores.
On historic spot
Morris held up his hand and said over the loudspeaker system:
Here in Times Square, this historic spot, I have an announcement to make and if you want to cheer, let it go. It has just been announced that Italy has unconditionally surrendered–
His words were drowned in a roar of cheers that lasted three or four minutes.
Movie star Carole Landis, who was one of those on the platform, shouted at the top of her lungs.
Foul forces dead
When comparative quiet was restored, Morris shouted:
The foul forces of Fascism are dead and the people of Italy will live again. This means the soldiers of America will not have to shoot again at the soldiers of Italy.
In “Little Italy,” the city’s chief Italian section, there were wild shouts and spontaneous dancing. Some snatched corn and tomatoes from pushcarts and tossed them in the air.
One Italian mother, Mrs. Margaret Baroni, who was buying from a pushcart, let a bunch of grapes fall from her fingers and cried:
God bless us all.
Son may come home
She shouted to all who could hear that her son Dominick, 23, who is with the Americans in the South Pacific, would “maybe be home soon now.”
At City Hall, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia called in reporters and said:
I just can’t help feeling now that the jig is up soon in Europe.
La Guardia expressed confidence that the American people would help in the reconstruction of Europe, and added the hope that no one would stop work today or slacken the war effort on the strength of the good news.
Cheering broke out on the floor of the stock exchange and torn newspapers snowed down from the galleries.
Soldier’s lament
A soldier in Times Square with his girl was overheard to say:
I’ll miss the big show if they don’t hurry me over.
A civilian shouted:
Out of the trenches by Christmas!
A taxicab driver observed:
This will break the German morale.
Bets were being made that the war would be over by the end of the year.
‘Glorious,’ Hoover says of surrender
New York (UP) –
The Italian surrender “is a glorious turning point in the war,” former President Herbert Hoover said today.
In a statement, Mr. Hoover said:
The Italian victory is a glorious turning point in the war. We can take pride in the share of our splendid forces with the British in bringing it about. We have now quickly to show the Italian people that this is their redemption from oppression; that it is the resurrection, not the destruction, of their national life. Great statesmanship will now hasten the surrender of others.
Providence, Rhode Island –
Wendell Willkie said today that the unconditional surrender of Italy was “not unexpected but a magnificent result.”