Editorial: The Québec question
Inclusion of Secretary of State Hull and Foreign Minister Eden in the Anglo-American war conference is welcome proof that delayed problems of foreign political policy will be faced jointly. That most of them will be solved – or indeed can be solved without the presence of other Allies – is too much to expect. But at least more political unity between London and Washington can be achieved on French, Italian and Russian questions, to mention only a few; and that is the necessary beginning for larger Allied agreement.
The Nazi propaganda radio now blatantly extends the feelers for a fake peace which Berlin and Rome have been making less publicly for months, particularly since the fall of Mussolini. The danger that the Axis in losing the war will win the peace, by a convenient change of color and other hocus-pocus to wangle soft terms instead of unconditional surrender is one with which the Québec conferees must deal.
This is the basic issue in Allied policy toward Italy today, and will soon be in our policy relating to such satellite countries as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Fascist Spain.
Also, the same issue is involved in Allied disagreement concerning Eastern European frontiers in particular and the post-war political settlement in general. Russia wants the Baltic states, and parts of Finland, Poland and Romania.
In addition to those territories which Stalin considers essential to Russian security, he is also said to want to dominate or protect Eastern Europe and northern Iran in exchange for sanctioning British spheres of influence in Western Europe and southern Iran.
Will Russia, or Britain, or the United States, or all three, or the United Nations as a whole, have the determining voice in Germany’s status? Stalin’s own statements and the manifesto of his Moscow “Free Germany Committee” indicate that Russia might be willing to make a soft peace with the German Army after the fall of Hitlerism, while the Churchill-Roosevelt terms are unconditional surrender.
These differences cannot be solved by ignoring them. Recent experience proves they grow worse unless faced. Somehow an agreement on basic European policy must be reached with Stalin. Presumably that will be possible only after a prior tentative agreement by Britain and the United States, plus a willingness to meet Russia partway in a mutual adjustment to which all can give vigorous support.
Meanwhile, the sweep of military events is determining political events to our disadvantage. The fall of Mussolini caught the Allies political unprepared, which enabled Hitler and Badoglio to strengthen the Nazi hold on northern Italian bases which we had hoped to get. Of more importance, Russian advances on the Eastern Front are giving Stalin dominant influence in a future German settlement because there is neither an Allied political agreement or a Western land front. Where and when the Western Allies invade the continent are questions of vast political consequence.
Thus, military and political problems have been fused by the heat of battle, and no longer can be separated. This is nobody’s fault. It is inevitable that military victories precipitate political questions. This is embarrassing, but it is a great opportunity for statesmanship.
The hope is that Allied statesmen – including Stalin – are realistic enough to know that they must stick together, that if Germany can divide them, she certainly will win the peace and may even win the war.