Allied parley reaches point of big decision
Results of confidence by Roosevelt, Churchill to stay secret
By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press staff writer
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Italian cities unprepared for Allied bomb attacks
Relentless air assault, if carried on long enough, may cause people to overthrow fascists
By Reynolds Packard, United Press staff writer
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Mission to Moscow: Hollywood movie viewed as peril to Allied unity
Film on Davies’ book advances phony defense of Russo-German Pact, Lyons says
By Eugene Lyons
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Attu Japs fire on U.S. medical men carrying wounded from battlefields
By Russell, Annabel, United Press staff writer
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Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
In Tunisia – (by wireless)
While with the infantry in the north Tunisian campaign, I had to live of course just as they did. Our home was on the ground. We sat, ate, and slept on the ground.
We were in a different place almost every night, for we were constantly moving forward from hill to hill. Establishing a new bivouac consisted of nothing more than digging new foxholes. We never took off our clothes, not even our shoes. Nobody had more than one blanket, and many had none at all. For three nights I slept on the ground with nothing under or over me. Finally, I got one blanket and my shelter-halves sent up.
We had no warm food for days. Each man kept his own rations and ate whenever he pleased. Oddly enough I was never conscious of the lack of warm food. Water was brought to us in cans, but very little washing was done.
Artillery is worst to stand
Sometimes we were up all night on the march and then would sleep in the daytime till the hot sun made sleep impossible. Some of the men slept right in their foxholes, others on the ground alongside. Since rocks were so abundant, most of us buttressed our foxholes with little rock walls around them.
During that week, we were shot at by 88s, 47s, machine guns, tanks. Despite our own air superiority, we were dive-bombed numerous times, but they were always in such a hurry to get it over and get home that usually their aim was bad and the bombs fell harmlessly in open spaces. You could always count on being awakened at dawn by a dive-bombing.
Having now been both shelled and bombed, I believe an artillery barrage is the worse of the two. A prolonged artillery barrage comes very close to being unbearable, and we saw many pitiful cases of “anxiety neurosis.”
The nights were sometimes fantastic. The skies would flash all night from the muzzle blasts of big guns. Flares shot from the ground and dropped from planes would hang in the sky. Armored vehicles would rumble across country all night. German planes would thrum through the skies seeking some flash of light on the ground.
Awake, 30 hours at a time
At dusk groups of litter-bearers would set out to carry the wounded from forward companies. Just after dawn each morning the stretchers and the walking wounded would come slowly downhill from the night’s fighting. Ammunition carriers in long lines toiled up to us, carrying those triple clusters of heavy mortar shells on their shoulders.
A couple of miles behind us the engineers worked day and night without cease, digging and blasting and bulldozing passes through the hills so that our wheeled vehicles could follow the advance.
Sometimes we didn’t sleep at all for 30 hours or more. At first the activity and excitement and everything kept me awake. I didn’t want to go to sleep for fear of missing something. Also, at first the terrific noise of the artillery kept us awake. But on my last two nights in the lines, I slept eight hours solid and never heard a thing.
Letdown comes after victory
During all the time we were under fire I felt fine. The catch-as-catch-can sleep didn’t seem to bother me. I never felt physically tired even after the marches. The days were so diverse and so unregimented that a week sped by before I knew it. I never felt that I was excited or tense except during certain fast-moving periods of shelling or bombing, and these were quickly over. When I finally left the line just after daylight one morning I never felt better in my life.
And yet, once I was safe back in camp, an intense weariness came over me. I slept almost every minute of two days and nights. I just didn’t have the will to get up, except to eat. My mind was as blank as my body was lifeless. I felt as though every cell in my makeup had been consumed. It was utter exhaustion such as I had never known before. Apparently, it was the letdown from a week of being uncommonly tense without realizing I was tense. It was not until the fourth day that I began to feel really normal again, and even now, I’m afraid I think too much about the wounded men.
MORAL: German 88mm shells are evil companions and their company should be avoided.
Critical state in manpower situation near
Armed Forces account for 4 million increase in employment
…
[]
Lt. Cdr. Dempsey watches with former tennis champion, Helen Jacobs, now a WAVE officer, Brooklyn’s physical fitness day exhibition. Meanwhile, Jack’s lawyers were engaged in a counter divorce suit brought by the former Hannah Williams after Jack had asked for a divorce.
U.S. State Department (May 25, 1943)
Roosevelt-Soong meeting, 2:45 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | China | |
| President Roosevelt | Foreign Minister Soong |
At this meeting, Roosevelt presumably transmitted to Soong the report to the Chinese authorities on the results of the Conference.
Memorandum Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington, May 25, 1943.
Secret
Proposals To Be Made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
The following are the proposals which will be made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to operations in the ANAKIM Theater:
First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air Route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:
a. Intensifying Air operations against Japanese in Burma;
b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and
c. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.
Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air Route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.
Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.
Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.
For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China.
Marshall-Chu conversation, [3 p.m.?]
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | China | |
| General Marshall | Major General Chu |
The scheduling of the meeting, the purpose of which was the transmission to the Chinese authorities of a report on the Conference, is referred to in Marshall’s remarks during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as well as in the conclusion to item 3 of the record of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Hopkins-Bush-Cherwell meeting, 3:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Lord Cherwell | |
| Mr. Bush |
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development
Washington, May 25, 1943.
Secret
Mr. Hopkins called me on the telephone and told me that the Prime Minister had formally raised the question of interchange on S-1, and asked me to confer with Lord Cherwell in his office to see if there could be a meeting of minds.
I met Mr. Hopkins and Lord Cherwell at 3:30. Lord Cherwell asked that I state why we had altered our policy in regard to interchange on this subject. In reply, I traced the entire subject from the standpoint of its organization, beginning with the Briggs Committee and going through the NDRC handling, the taking over by the military, the existence of the Military Committee, and the Policy Group consisting of the Vice President and others. I then outlined the way in which the present policy had been adopted by these groups, making it clear that a new policy was needed at the time that the matter went into production in the hands of the Army, inasmuch as OSRD previously had had to do only with the scientific angles. I then outlined the principle which was adopted and outlined its application. I then asked Lord Cherwell whether they disagreed with the principle itself or with the way in which it was being applied. He stated that he disagreed with the principle itself.
We then had a considerable discussion in which I outlined that this was a principle that was applied generally. I also made it clear that the reason for the restriction of information to those who could use it in this war was for security purposes. I made it clear that this was being applied impartially and that there were groups such as the Naval Research Laboratory which wished much more information but were not being given it because they could not utilize it in this war.
Incidentally, in discussing the reasons for a restricted policy, namely security, I told Lord Cherwell that, if we were to furnish the manufacturing information freely at all points to the British, we could not then very well refuse to pass similar information from one American company to another, that we had at the present time each company confined to its proper field, that no information was being passed beyond that necessary for each company to operate properly therein, and that we would feel that it was undesirable from a security standpoint to pass the information around more freely than this in American companies. He stated that of course if we furnished the manufacturing information it would be to the British Government, and I stated that of course I would assume that the British Government would immediately have to work with some company such as ICI in order to utilize the information effectively, which he did not contest.
On my insistence that, under the present plans, the British could not use for the purposes of this war the information on the manufacturing process, Lord Cherwell agreed that this was true as far as the present plans go. He also stated, however, that, unless this manufacturing information was furnished to the British, they might feel impelled to alter the plans and go into manufacturing themselves, to the disadvantage of the balance of the war effort. I pressed him on the question as to whether they would expect in this way to attain results useful in this war, and he did not insist that they could. The matter finally came down to the point where he admitted rather freely that the real reason they wished this information at this time was so that after the war they could then at that time go into manufacture and produce the weapon for themselves, so that they would depend upon us during this war for the weapon but would be prepared after this war to put themselves in a position to do the job promptly themselves. He disclaimed the commercial aspects. He felt that it would be five or ten years before the matter came into use commercially, and that if commercial usage was indicated after study the British could readily go into that aspect of the subject. It was quite clear, and Mr. Hopkins reiterated it and emphasized it, that the reason the British wish the information was so that in the period immediately after this war they would be able to develop the weapon for themselves very promptly and not after a considerable interval.
The matter having gotten very definitely boiled down to this one point, I took the point of view, in which Mr. Hopkins joined me, that delivery of information to the British for after-the-war military reasons was a subject which needed to be approached quite on its own merits, and that this question is tied up with the large problem of international relations on this whole subject from a long-term viewpoint, Lord Cherwell stated that there was a connection, because unless the British could now be assured that they would have this information for the above purpose they might have to divert some of their war effort in order to get it. He stated that he did not wish to say that they would do this, that it was up to the Prime Minister, but that they might feel that they were constrained to do so in order that their position immediately after the war might be properly secure. He made it clear, of course, that he did not mean secure as against the United States, but rather as against some other country which might have it far developed at that time. Mr. Hopkins said some things about one administration not being able to commit a succeeding one, except where the matter was incorporated in a treaty.
In conclusion, Mr. Hopkins stated that he now had the point very definitely in mind for the first time, and that he understood now exactly what was the point at issue. He evidently intends to talk to the President about it, although he did not say so. I asked him whether he wished me at this time, in view of the new angle of the matter, to discuss it in any way with Mr. Wallace or Mr. Stimson. He stated that there was nothing further that he wished me to do, that he did not think that I should take the matter up with either of those men at the present time, and I said to him that I would sit tight and do nothing unless and until I heard from him further on the matter.
V. BUSH
Roosevelt-Churchill joint press conference, 4:03 p.m.
Washington, May 25, 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: (to the Prime Minister) If you don’t mind, I will make these three little announcements first.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Yes.
A long wait here as newspapermen continue to file in.
MR. DONALDSON: All in.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, if our old-time friend will pardon me for about five minutes or less, I will give you one or two things that really ought to be said.
Here follow statements by the President regarding certain domestic matters.
And at this point I think I had better go off the record, and turn the meeting over to my distinguished colleague.
We are awfully glad to have Mr. Churchill back here. I don’t have– I don’t have to tell him that. All he has to do is to read the papers, and look into the faces of any American. He is very welcome.
I don’t think we have very much to tell you, except that we are making exceedingly good progress, and taking up a– a matter which I spoke of the other day, the total war – the global war, which considering the– the size of our problems, these discussions have been done in practically record time.
And so I am going to turn the meeting over to Mr. Churchill, and I– I think that he will be willing to answer almost – with stress on the almost – any question, (laughter)
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in Australia there is a very great fear as to the Japanese threat in that area. What is your feeling about the matter?
THE PRIME MINISTER: The threat is certainly, in our opinion, less serious than it was when I saw you last in this room [December 23, 1941].
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what can you tell us generally about the plans for the future, probably beginning with Europe?
THE PRIME MINISTER: A very expansive topic– (laughter)
Q. (interjecting) Yes, sir.
Q. (aside) Expansive?
THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –and one which leads very early to difficult country; but our plans for the future are to wage this war until unconditional surrender is procured from all those who have molested us, and– and this applies equally to Asia and to Europe. It used to apply to – quite recently – to Africa.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that word “molestation,” or “molesting” is one of the best examples of your habitual understatement that I know, (laughter)
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, could you say anything about how well satisfied you are with the way things are going on the fighting fronts?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much more satisfied than I was when I was here last [June 18, 1942]. (laughter) It was within this– this– not in this room – that the President handed me the telegram of the surrender of Tobruk. And as I have mentioned to him, I don’t think there was anybody – any Englishman in the United States so unhappy, as I was that day, since Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga, (loud laughter)
But the situation is very different now. The– the plans which were made then in June, and before June, and the movements of troops which were set in motion before June last, enabled us to alter the balance of the affairs in Africa entirely. And we opened our offensive in Alamein on the 23rd of October. The United States and British descent upon North Africa began on the eighth of November, and since then we have already had a very great measure of– of success, culminating in decisive victory of proportions equal to any of the great victories that have been– that have been won: complete obliteration of the enemy.
And too, while this has been going on, our Russian Ally who this time last year was subject to very– well, who in June last year was subject to the beginning of a very heavy and possibly deadly offensive by the Germans, and it seemed that they might well lose the Caucasus, has gained another series of successes, culminating in Stalingrad.
And Hitler has been struck with two– two immense blows, tremendous shattering blows: in Tunisia, and at Stalingrad. And from every point of view, we must regard the last ten or eleven months as examples of highly successful war – a perfectly indisputable turning of the tide.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, on this question of Russia. After you spoke to Congress, Senator (Albert B.) Chandler (Democrat of Kentucky), who is from my State, issued a statement saying that while you had promised Great Britain would stay to fight Japan to the end, you could not promise Russia would. Of course, there are reasons for this, but do you care to say anything? In your opinion of Russia’s self-interest, would it lead her to fight Japan after the European war?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Oh well, it’s one of those oversights that I haven’t been placed in the position to give directions to Russia, as he mentions, (laughter)
And I have this feeling, that those people have been doing such a tremendous job facing this enormous mass – they have done what nobody else was in a position to do: torn a large part of the guts out of the German Army. And they have suffered very grievous losses. They are battling with, as I said to the Congress, 190 German divisions – not up to strength, of course – and 28 satellite divisions from the different countries that Hitler gathered around him in his attack on Russia. They are bearing all that weight, and I certainly have not felt that I ought to suggest to my government asking more of them.
But their strength may grow as time goes on. They must know that Japan has watched them with a purely opportunist eye. But it isn’t for me at all to make any suggestions to them at all.
They have been grand Allies; and of course, they have shown it in heroic fashion. They have struck blows that no one else could strike, and they have endured losses that no one power has ever been capable of enduring, and continuing an effective and even a growing factor in the field.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what do you think of the dissolution of the Comintern?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I like it– (laughter) –I like it.
Q. To get back to Russia, sir, are you confident that the Russians will be able to hold out this year, as they have in past years?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I certainly think that they have a much better prospect of holding out this year than they had the previous time. Indeed, I must express my full confidence that they will hurl back any attack which is made upon them.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in the light of developments since your speech to Congress, would you care to make any general statement concerning the experiment of bombing Germany into submission?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I haven’t had very much time to go on with the experiment since I spoke to Congress, (laughter)
We have had the heaviest raid we have ever had, the– the raid on Dortmund (Germany), where 2 thousand tons were cast down upon them with, I believe, highly satisfactory results.
And also, it has been an extremely good week for the United States Air Forces in Great Britain– in the United Kingdom. They– they made, I think, four heavy daylight attacks, which are judged to be extremely successful. Precision bombing in the daylight, of course, in proportion to the weight of bombs dropped, produces a more decisive effect – more than the night bombing, because it goes to more specific targets precise and accurate.
THE PRESIDENT: You know, I think that’s something that hasn’t been brought out, and that is that the night bombing over Europe carries more weight of explosives; but of course, being nighttime, the precision of the actual bombing can’t be so great as the day bombing, which carries less explosives but with more precision because it’s daylight. On the whole, the combination of the two, day and night, is achieving a more and more satisfactory result.
THE PRIME MINISTER: It’s like running a twenty-four-hour service, (laughter)
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you any comment to make upon relations between General (Henri Honoré) Giraud and General (Charles) de Gaulle?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I have– I am very glad to see that apparently it’s improved, and that there is to be a meeting, judging only from what I read in the– in the organs which you gentlemen sustain– (laughter) –and serve.
But certainly it is – it will be very satisfactory if all this backchat comes to an end, and Frenchmen who are fighting to relieve and liberate their country get together and look forward to the future instead of backward on the past, and think of the great duty they owe to France rather than to any factional interest.
MR. GODWIN: Mr. Prime Minister, the last time you spoke to us you used a term that I have remembered, because you said that you were not going to rely on an internal collapse of Germany, rather would you rely on an external knockout, at that time. Well, since then you have worked on Germany and the Occupied countries a good deal, and there are constantly recurring evidences that the German people may be getting close to “had enough.” We still are working for this knockout, but have you any further light on that for us – on the internal collapse?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I stand pat on the knockout, (laughter) But, of course, any windfall will be gratefully accepted, (more laughter)
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, some quarters interpret your remarks to Congress on bombing to mean that other methods, which you said should not be excluded, should be postponed until the termination of the experiment.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Oh, no. That would be a most– a most distorted deduction to draw. I said– I said there is no reason why the experiment should not be continued, provided other methods are not excluded– I mean other simultaneous methods, or current methods, are not excluded.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, whenever you and the President confer, the rumor always goes around that you are about to pick an Allied commander in the European theatre. Could you tell us whether you have done that?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Done what?
Q. Picked an Allied commander for the European theatre?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, we have– we have an Allied commander in the theatre that is at present in force in Northwest Africa.
Q. I was thinking of the next one, sir? (laughter)
THE PRIME MINISTER: No step of that kind has been taken at the present moment, because the great preparations that are going forward–
Q. (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, back to Australia–
THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –haven’t got to the point where the executive commander has to be chosen.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister–
MISS MAY CRAIG: (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, this may be an oversight, or you might not have been informed of this either, but I am curious to know what you think is going on in Hitler’s mind now? (much laughter)
THE PRIME MINISTER: I have very little doubt that if he could have the past back he would probably play his hand a little differently. I think he would have hesitated long, before he rejected all the repeated peace efforts that were made by Great Britain, which even brought the name of our government into disrepute, so far did we go on the path of trying to placate and appease.
But he then got out of the period where he was restoring his country to its place among the countries of Europe. He had achieved that, but that wasn’t what he was after at all. Appetite unbridled, ambition unmeasured – all the world! There was no end to the appetite of this– of this wicked man. I should say he repents now that he did not curb his passion before he brought such a great portion of the world against him and his country.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you think it’s a sound assumption that he still has a mind? (laughter)
THE PRIME MINISTER: Do I think what?
Q. Do you think it’s a sound assumption that he still has a mind?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I have no reason to suppose that he isn’t in control of his faculties, and of the resources of his country. But, of course, I haven’t the same facilities of acquainting myself with what is going on there, as I fortunately have on what is going on in the United States, (laughter)
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you care to say anything about Mussolini, and Italy? Is there any hint or news that you can bring us on that?
THE PRIME MINISTER: You know as much as I do about that. I think they are a softer proposition than Germany–
Q. (interposing) What kind of proposition?
THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) softer.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Softer – but I wouldn’t count on anything but the force of anus. It may be aided at any time by a change of heart on the part of the enemy’s country– countries, a weakening of morale.
Italy– nobody proposes to take the native soil of Italy away from the Italian people. They will have their life. They will have their life in the new Europe. They have sinned – erred – by allowing themselves to be led by the nose by a very elaborate tyranny which was imposed upon them so that it gripped every part of their life. The one-party totalitarian system, plus the secret police applied over a number of years is capable of completely obliterating the sense of personal liberty.
And thus they were led by intriguing leaders – who thought they had got the chance of five thousand years in aggrandizing themselves by the misfortunes of their neighbors who had not offended them in any way – into this terrible plight in which they find themselves.
I think they would be very well advised to dismiss those leaders, and– and throw themselves upon the– upon the justice of those they have so grievously offended. We– we should not stain our names before posterity by cruel and inhuman acts. We have our own reputation to consider. But after all it really is a matter for them to settle among themselves, and settle with their leaders.
All we can do is to apply those physical stimuli– (laughter) –which in default of moral sanctions are– are sometimes capable of inducing a better state of mind in recalcitrant individuals and recalcitrant nations, (more laughter)
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there has been a lot of interest in the experts from India you brought with you. Would you care to comment about the situation in India, or China?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I am very anxious to increase the intensity of the war effort against Japan, and therefore brought these commanders-in-chief in order that they could meet with the United States officers, and particularly with those who have been serving with such effect in China, like General (Claire) Chennault and General (Joseph W.) Stilwell, and the high officers here, because it is evident that the war in that theatre must be prosecuted with the very greatest vigor, and on the best lines. And we have been talking a great deal about that, and thinking a great deal, and have arrived at conclusions which I believe are sound – are good.
When I was here – when I saw you last in– in December 1941, or January 1942 – I forget which it was– when I did, of course, this question of priority – which was first and which was second of the two great theatres and antagonists – assumed a much more sharp form than at the present time. Our resources have greatly expanded. If the war continues on both fronts the war will be waged with equal force as our resources grow. Instead of being consecutive our efforts will be concurrent, and that great degree of effort will be capable of being applied at the same time in both directions. They have been already applied.
The forces that we have are becoming very respectable in munitions, and in men trained to war of all kinds; but as I pointed out to Congress, the problem is one of application, and that problem of application is limited by distance, and the U-boat war, the amount of shipping, the character of the communications, the vast distances of the ocean. Our forces are growing and gathering their ambition, but to apply it is a matter of time, and it is exceedingly difficult to apply.
But we follow out this principle, that all soldiers must be engaged, and ships and airplanes must be engaged on the widest possible fronts, the broadest possible superficies, and maintain the fighting with the utmost intensity, because we are the stronger animal; we are the stronger combination; we are shaking the life out of the enemy; and as we are able to continue, we will not give him a moment’s surcease.
This is particularly true of the air, where they are already beginning to fail to keep up at all to the necessary strength on the various fronts. Neither Japan nor Germany is able to maintain equality with Britain, the United States and Russia on all the fronts.
Still less are they able to do so in the field of production. Immense plurality – the superiority of production – is on our side. And although it takes a certain number of months after planes are made before they come into action – perhaps a good many months, having regard to all the distances to be covered, and to the large ground staffs that have to be transported – but in spite of that, at the end of certain periods, the great superiority in numbers of our manufacture and of our trading is bound to have effect, which so far as the air war is concerned will be decisive.
Whether the ending of the air war – the deciding of the air war will entail a similar ending of the other forms of warfare has yet to be seen. But the air was the weapon these people chose to subjugate the world.
Q. (interjecting) That’s right.
THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) This was the weapon they struck at Pearl Harbor with. This was the weapon with which they boasted– the Germans boasted they would terrorize all the countries of the world. And it is an example of poetic justice that this should be the weapon in which they should find themselves most out-matched and first outmatched in the ensuing struggle.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you anything to say about the submarine side of the situation?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much encouraged by all that has happened there since the turn of the year. Really, it has been– it has been very encouraging. The– the output from the United States’ shipyards is prodigious and has fulfilled all hopes, hopes which, when the– the plans were first made and published, seemed to be excessive. But they have been made good. The movement of supplies across the ocean has been on an increasing scale. The surplus of– of new building over sinkings over the last six months has been substantial, especially in the later months; and the killings of U-boats have improved and reached a very high pitch – never better than in the last month.
MR. GODWIN: What was that word, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) Killings.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Killings–
MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.
THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –of U-boats. I mean the killings of U-boats by our forces.
MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.
THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) That is due, of course, to the increasing numbers of U-boats,–
MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.
THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –but it is also due to the improved methods, and some wonderful things– wonderful things that have been thought of on both sides of the Atlantic. And, of course, we interchange everything immediately. Anything we have we share and bring into action. A lot of clever people are thinking a lot about these things.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there is– there is a great deal more confidence in the Allied commanders in the field than there was a year ago. Would you care to comment on that?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, they have had a chance to come into action on reasonable terms. Indeed, on advantageous terms, because we– we struck with superior forces at the right spot. We– as your Conferedate general (Nathan Bedford Forrest, a Cavalry commander in the Civil War) used to say:
We got there firstest with the mostest.
(laughter)
MR. GODWIN: (aside) That’s right.
THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) And also, because our troops have – since I was here last – been equipped with all the best weapons. You have only got to turn the industry of the United States and Britain over from peace to war. It undoubtedly takes a couple of years or more to get it running, but when it does run it gives you a flow of weapons which certainly neither Germany nor Japan possibly can beat us.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, would you undertake to make a prediction on the progress of the war for the rest of this year? I have in mind your– this statement you and the President made at Casablanca, on new and heavier blows against all of the Axis members in 1943?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think– I think that seems to be a very sound prediction, and couched in terms which are unexceptionable from the point of view of military security, (laughter)
Q. Thank you very much, sir.
Q. Thank you.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Thank you very much.
The newspapermen started to leave rather slowly, and the Prime Minister climbed onto his chair and gave the “V” for Victory sign with his fingers, which was accompanied by much applause.
THE PRESIDENT: May I say one word, please? Don’t get the idea that the conferences are concluded. They are not. They are continuing. (laughter)
THE PRIME MINISTER: We have a lot of ground to cover.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
Q. Thank you.
Q. Thank you.
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill |
The meeting was given over to a prolonged consideration of several drafts of a message to Stalin on the results of the conference. Finally, at 2 a.m., it was agreed that Churchill would take the draft message with him and work on it during his flight to Newfoundland en route to Africa. Marshall appeared at the meeting and was persuaded to accompany Churchill on his flight and help prepare the draft message to Stalin.
Draft Message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin
Washington, May 25, 1943. SecretUpon the conclusion of the conferences which we have been holding in Washington with our combined military staffs, we think it proper that the following comprehensive report concerning our decisions should be sent to you.
Throughout our conferences full recognition was given to the most important part which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is playing in the defeat of the European Axis Powers. Nearly all of the decisions enumerated below were made only after they had been measured against the yardstick of their aid to your country’s war effort. Briefly, our decisions may be summarized as follows:
Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.
Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
a. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.
b. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
c. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.
d. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.
e. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.
Specific operations for 1943-44 in execution of overall strategic concept
a. Certain detailed operations were decided upon to combat the U-boat menace. These operations, we feel certain, will enable us to increase our capacity to transport troops and supplies to active theaters and to our allies.
b. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE.
We have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.
c. CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS.
We have resolved: That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting a large-scale operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. French forces from North Africa may be represented in the initial assault or in the immediate build-up.The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the buildup forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the fastest possible rate.
Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date to take advantage of a collapse in France or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in case of a German withdrawal.
d. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
We have resolved to conduct such operations in exploitation of the forthcoming operation, of which you are aware, as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Alternative plans are to be prepared at once. Specific operations will be determined upon in the light of the situation developing from the coming operations. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for these operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom.e. OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN.
Our plans also provide for extensive operations against Japan in the Far Eastern and Pacific Theaters. While these operations will, of necessity, have repercussions on our efforts in the European Theater, they are within the scope of the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war as set forth above.Availability of resources to meet the requirements of our specific undertakings
After full and careful examination, we have found that the above operations utilize our resources to the full. It has been our earnest desire to make the utmost use of our resources wherever they can be brought to bear upon the enemy and we believe that our object has been fulfilled in the statement of operations as set out above.
It appears likely that it was also at this meeting that Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the resumption of the exchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom on the atomic bomb project. Churchill received messages from London during the Conference regarding the increased urgency of restored American-British collaboration in this field.
At this meeting Roosevelt and Churchill also apparently sought to perfect a draft joint statement or final conference communiqué.
Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, May 25, 1943.There has been a complete meeting of minds on:
A. The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
B. The war in China – southern Asia
C. War in the Near East
D. War in all parts of the Mediterranean
E. War in the Atlantic N.-SouthAll related to each other in regard to transportation.
After successful completion of N. African campaign one phase of the Casablanca plans was completed and the next phase was initiated.
The need of a further staff conference was therefore clear in order to take up further steps. And the C. C. of S. has agreed on further steps in the overall planning.
It is important to state that these further steps included every theatre of the war.
This phase of the conduct of war affairs [is?] in a more satisfactory condition than when the C. C. of S. met in Casablanca.
This integrated with anti-submarine campaign which is showing greater success last month.
The Pres, the Prime Minister and the staffs also discussed in greater detail the temporary civil–military organization to be put into effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Jap occupied territories are freed.
Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, May 25, 1943.The complete destruction of the Nazi Afrika Korps and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, are proceeding satisfactorily. Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore, the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.
They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. It is important to state that the operations which have been agreed to include every theater of war all over the world.
There has been a complete meeting of minds on:
a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
b) The war in China and Southern Asia
c) The war in the Near East
d) The war in all parts of the Mediterranean
e) The war in the North and South Atlantic
f) The war in EuropeAll of these plans are related to each other in regard to shipping, air support and the command of the seas by our navies.
The state of the war at this time is in a far more satisfactory condition than when the Chiefs of Staff met with the President and the Prime Minister in Casablanca. The unrelenting anti U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated.
The vast production of war materials assures the United Nations of weapons with which to destroy the enemy.
The President and the Prime Minister also discussed with the Chiefs of Staff the temporary civil and military organizations to be put in effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.
A complete report of the conference has been sent to Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.
Statement by President Roosevelt
Washington, May 25, 1943.
The recent conference of the Combined Staffs in Washington has ended in complete agreement on future operations in all theatres of the war.
To be given out in Washington on arrival of Prime Minister in TORCH.
TRIDENT: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington, 25 May 1943.
Enclosure to CCS 242/6
Secret
In a previous memorandum (CCS 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.
Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.
Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
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In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
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Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
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Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
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Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
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Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.
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Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.
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Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
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Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.
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Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.
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Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
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To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)
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To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI 2.)
Specific operations for 1943-44 in execution of overall strategic concept
The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
THE U-BOAT WAR
a. Operation to Seize the Azores Islands
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.
The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be settled by the two Governments.
b. Other Anti-U-boat Measures
All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken.
c. Flexibility of Forces
The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.
DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
a. Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.
The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.
b. Cross-Channel Operations
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.
| Assault: | 5 | Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft). |
| 2 | Infantry Divisions – Follow-up. | |
| 2 | Airborne Divisions. | |
| Total | 9 | Divisions in the Assault. |
| Buildup: | 20 | Divisions available for movement into lodgment area. |
| Total | 29 | Divisions. |
The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.
The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.
The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.
c. Operations in the Mediterranean to Eliminate Italy from the War
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean area subsequent to HUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.
d. Bombing of Ploești
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U.S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.
OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.
a. Operations in the Burma-China Theater
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:
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The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam–Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:
a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and
c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China. -
Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.
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The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.
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The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.
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The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.
b. Operations in the Pacific
Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:
- Conduct of air operations in and from China.
- Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
- Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
- Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese-held New Guinea.
- Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.
Availability of resources to meet the requirements of basic undertakings and specific operations in execution of overall strategic concept 1943-44
We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:
Ground Forces
- All the ground forces required can be made available.
Naval Forces
- If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.
Air Forces
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Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.
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For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.
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For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.
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Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.
Assault Shipping and Landing Craft
- Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.
Supply of Critical Items
- In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.
Shipping
- The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.
The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943-1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.
Oil
- We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.
Conclusions on miscellaneous subjects
Equipment for Turkey
The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.
Re-Arming of the French in North Africa
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U.S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.
Other conferences
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Decisions of the Casablanca Conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.
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The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.
Annex
Advantages To Be Gained by the Use of the Azores
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Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for the U.S.-U.K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage. There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the U.S. Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the Azores as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.
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The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:
a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira for operating VLR aircraft;
b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal. -
The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:
a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:
(1) USA or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
(2) West Indies and the U.K.;
(3) South America and the U.K.;
(4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
(5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.
b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U–boats were concentrated in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route.
c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U–boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters.
d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.
e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting, refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.
f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.
g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.
h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.
i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from USA to Europe, Africa, and the Far East.
U.S. Navy Department (May 26, 1943)
Communiqué No. 390
South Pacific.
On May 23, the small U.S. auxiliary vessel NIAGARA was attacked by Japanese planes east of Cape Surville, San Cristobal Island. Considerable damage was inflicted on the vessel, which was subsequently sunk by U.S. forces after members of the crew were taken aboard accompanying naval units.
On May 24, Avenger (Grumman TBF) torpedo bombers and Wildcat (Grumman F4F) fighters bombed and strafed Japanese installations at Ringi Cove, west of Vila on Kolombangara Island.
On May 25, Dauntless (Douglas SBD) dive bombers, Avenger torpedo bombers and Wildcat fighters bombed and strafed Japanese installations at Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island. Ammunition dumps were exploded and large fires were started.
North Pacific.
On May 24, U.S. Army ground troops cleared out both sides of Chichagof Valley. An assault was made by combined northern and southern forces along the ridge north of the Valley and was reported as continuing. Assisting in the assault were U.S. Army air forces consisting of Liberator (Consolidated B‑24) heavy bombers, Mitchell (North American B-25) medium bombers and Lightning (Lockheed P‑38) fighters. These planes bombed and strafed Japanese positions in the Chichagof area and started fires.
Press Release
For Immediate Release
May 26, 1943
Navy patrol plane sinks enemy submarine
Diving his big PBY patrol plane on a surfaced enemy submarine in the face of steady antiaircraft fire, Ens. Thurmond Edgar Robertson, USN, 136 East Columbia Ave., Spartanburg, South Carolina, so crippled the enemy craft with his depth bombs that a second patrol plane, piloted by Lt. Gerard Bradford Jr., USNR., 61 Williams Court, Mobile, Alabama, was able to finish the job and sink the sub. The sinking took place several weeks ago.
Leaving 30 or 40 survivors on the surface, the submarine continued firing until the conning tower disappeared.
The Pittsburgh Press (May 26, 1943)
RAF rocks Nazi steel city; 400 planes hit Italian isles
Bombs pound Düsseldorf, Sicily, Pantelleria and Sardinia
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