America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

The meeting was given over to a prolonged consideration of several drafts of a message to Stalin on the results of the conference. Finally, at 2 a.m., it was agreed that Churchill would take the draft message with him and work on it during his flight to Newfoundland en route to Africa. Marshall appeared at the meeting and was persuaded to accompany Churchill on his flight and help prepare the draft message to Stalin.

Draft Message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin

Washington, May 25, 1943.

Secret

Upon the conclusion of the conferences which we have been holding in Washington with our combined military staffs, we think it proper that the following comprehensive report concerning our decisions should be sent to you.

Throughout our conferences full recognition was given to the most important part which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is playing in the defeat of the European Axis Powers. Nearly all of the decisions enumerated below were made only after they had been measured against the yardstick of their aid to your country’s war effort. Briefly, our decisions may be summarized as follows:

Overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

a. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.

b. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

c. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

d. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

e. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

Specific operations for 1943-44 in execution of overall strategic concept

a. Certain detailed operations were decided upon to combat the U-boat menace. These operations, we feel certain, will enable us to increase our capacity to transport troops and supplies to active theaters and to our allies.

b. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE.
We have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

c. CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS.
We have resolved: That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting a large-scale operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. French forces from North Africa may be represented in the initial assault or in the immediate build-up.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the buildup forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the fastest possible rate.

Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date to take advantage of a collapse in France or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in case of a German withdrawal.

d. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
We have resolved to conduct such operations in exploitation of the forthcoming operation, of which you are aware, as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Alternative plans are to be prepared at once. Specific operations will be determined upon in the light of the situation developing from the coming operations. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for these operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom.

e. OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN.
Our plans also provide for extensive operations against Japan in the Far Eastern and Pacific Theaters. While these operations will, of necessity, have repercussions on our efforts in the European Theater, they are within the scope of the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war as set forth above.

Availability of resources to meet the requirements of our specific undertakings

After full and careful examination, we have found that the above operations utilize our resources to the full. It has been our earnest desire to make the utmost use of our resources wherever they can be brought to bear upon the enemy and we believe that our object has been fulfilled in the statement of operations as set out above.

It appears likely that it was also at this meeting that Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the resumption of the exchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom on the atomic bomb project. Churchill received messages from London during the Conference regarding the increased urgency of restored American-British collaboration in this field.

At this meeting Roosevelt and Churchill also apparently sought to perfect a draft joint statement or final conference communiqué.

Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, May 25, 1943.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on:
A. The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
B. The war in China – southern Asia
C. War in the Near East
D. War in all parts of the Mediterranean
E. War in the Atlantic N.-South

All related to each other in regard to transportation.

After successful completion of N. African campaign one phase of the Casablanca plans was completed and the next phase was initiated.

The need of a further staff conference was therefore clear in order to take up further steps. And the C. C. of S. has agreed on further steps in the overall planning.

It is important to state that these further steps included every theatre of the war.

This phase of the conduct of war affairs [is?] in a more satisfactory condition than when the C. C. of S. met in Casablanca.

This integrated with anti-submarine campaign which is showing greater success last month.

The Pres, the Prime Minister and the staffs also discussed in greater detail the temporary civil–military organization to be put into effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Jap occupied territories are freed.

Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, May 25, 1943.

The complete destruction of the Nazi Afrika Korps and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, are proceeding satisfactorily. Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore, the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.

They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. It is important to state that the operations which have been agreed to include every theater of war all over the world.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on:
a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
b) The war in China and Southern Asia
c) The war in the Near East
d) The war in all parts of the Mediterranean
e) The war in the North and South Atlantic
f) The war in Europe

All of these plans are related to each other in regard to shipping, air support and the command of the seas by our navies.

The state of the war at this time is in a far more satisfactory condition than when the Chiefs of Staff met with the President and the Prime Minister in Casablanca. The unrelenting anti U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated.

The vast production of war materials assures the United Nations of weapons with which to destroy the enemy.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed with the Chiefs of Staff the temporary civil and military organizations to be put in effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.

A complete report of the conference has been sent to Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

Statement by President Roosevelt

Washington, May 25, 1943.

The recent conference of the Combined Staffs in Washington has ended in complete agreement on future operations in all theatres of the war.

To be given out in Washington on arrival of Prime Minister in TORCH.

TRIDENT: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Washington, 25 May 1943.

Enclosure to CCS 242/6
Secret

In a previous memorandum (CCS 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

Overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

  1. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

  2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

  3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

  1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

  2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

  3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.

  4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

  5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

  6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

  7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

  8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

  9. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

Specific operations for 1943-44 in execution of overall strategic concept

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE U-BOAT WAR

a. Operation to Seize the Azores Islands
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be settled by the two Governments.

b. Other Anti-U-boat Measures
All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken.

c. Flexibility of Forces
The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

a. Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
2 Infantry Divisions – Follow-up.
2 Airborne Divisions.
Total 9 Divisions in the Assault.
Buildup: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.
Total 29 Divisions.

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.

c. Operations in the Mediterranean to Eliminate Italy from the War
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean area subsequent to HUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

d. Bombing of Ploești
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U.S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

a. Operations in the Burma-China Theater
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

  1. The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam–Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:
    a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
    b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and
    c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

  2. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

  3. The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

  4. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

  5. The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

b. Operations in the Pacific
Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

  1. Conduct of air operations in and from China.
  2. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
  3. Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
  4. Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese-held New Guinea.
  5. Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

Availability of resources to meet the requirements of basic undertakings and specific operations in execution of overall strategic concept 1943-44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

Ground Forces

  1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

Naval Forces

  1. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces

  1. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

  2. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

  3. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

  4. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft

  1. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

Supply of Critical Items

  1. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

Shipping

  1. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943-1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil

  1. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.

Conclusions on miscellaneous subjects

Equipment for Turkey

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

Re-Arming of the French in North Africa

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U.S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

Other conferences

  1. Decisions of the Casablanca Conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

  2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

Annex

Advantages To Be Gained by the Use of the Azores

  1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for the U.S.-U.K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage. There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the U.S. Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the Azores as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.

  2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:
    a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira for operating VLR aircraft;
    b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal.

  3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:
    a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:
    (1) USA or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
    (2) West Indies and the U.K.;
    (3) South America and the U.K.;
    (4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
    (5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U–boats were concentrated in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route.

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U–boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting, refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from USA to Europe, Africa, and the Far East.

U.S. Navy Department (May 26, 1943)

Communiqué No. 390

South Pacific.
On May 23, the small U.S. auxiliary vessel NIAGARA was attacked by Japanese planes east of Cape Surville, San Cristobal Island. Considerable damage was inflicted on the vessel, which was subsequently sunk by U.S. forces after members of the crew were taken aboard accompanying naval units.

On May 24, Avenger (Grumman TBF) torpedo bombers and Wildcat (Grumman F4F) fighters bombed and strafed Japanese installations at Ringi Cove, west of Vila on Kolombangara Island.

On May 25, Dauntless (Douglas SBD) dive bombers, Avenger torpedo bombers and Wildcat fighters bombed and strafed Japanese installations at Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island. Ammunition dumps were exploded and large fires were started.

North Pacific.
On May 24, U.S. Army ground troops cleared out both sides of Chichagof Valley. An assault was made by combined northern and southern forces along the ridge north of the Valley and was reported as continuing. Assisting in the assault were U.S. Army air forces consisting of Liberator (Consolidated B‑24) heavy bombers, Mitchell (North American B-25) medium bombers and Lightning (Lockheed P‑38) fighters. These planes bombed and strafed Japanese positions in the Chichagof area and started fires.


Press Release

For Immediate Release
May 26, 1943

Navy patrol plane sinks enemy submarine

Diving his big PBY patrol plane on a surfaced enemy submarine in the face of steady antiaircraft fire, Ens. Thurmond Edgar Robertson, USN, 136 East Columbia Ave., Spartanburg, South Carolina, so crippled the enemy craft with his depth bombs that a second patrol plane, piloted by Lt. Gerard Bradford Jr., USNR., 61 Williams Court, Mobile, Alabama, was able to finish the job and sink the sub. The sinking took place several weeks ago.

Leaving 30 or 40 survivors on the surface, the submarine continued firing until the conning tower disappeared.

The Pittsburgh Press (May 26, 1943)

RAF rocks Nazi steel city; 400 planes hit Italian isles

Bombs pound Düsseldorf, Sicily, Pantelleria and Sardinia

Pocket of Jap resistance wiped out on Attu Island

U.S. troops pound second batch of encircled soldiers; U.S. ship lost in Solomons

WLB decision spurs Lewis to $2 goal

Negotiations resumed today with token victory already won

House to act on tax accord next Tuesday

Congressional approval of modified Ruml Plan believed certain

Edsel B. Ford is dead at 49

Head of vast motor empire victim of fever

Back pay in bonds –
Raise granted to railroaders

8¢-an-hour increase recommended by panel

I DARE SAY —
Are children people?

By Florence Fisher Parry

Strikes grow on union plea of WLB delays

52,000 out now in Akron; jeep plant closed in Toledo
By the United Press

Ring photographer testifies –
Mrs. Dempsey’s relations with fight manager told

Ex-champion’s wife and Jenkins’ pilot were “always kissing,” witness charges

Heavy bombers pound Messina

175 tons of bombs fall on Sicilian base
By Dana Adams Schmidt, United Press staff writer

Japs in Aleutians doomed within 60 days, Father Hubbard, ‘Glacier Priest,’ thinks

American fighters there ‘itching’ to get job done

Mission to Moscow: Handling of blood purges in films called chicanery

Lyons asserts Americans should seek explanation for movie on Davies’ book
By Eugene Lyons

Poll tax bill attacks mount

Filibuster is threatened in the Senate

U.S. proposes world control at food parley

Temporary commission to hold office in interim period wins support

Medals given 2 Americans for high-altitude heroism

Fliers remove oxygen masks to aid wounded pals; third Yank honored for nipping bomb fuse

Italy warned by Churchill to surrender

People told to toss out leaders, yield to Allied justice
By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press staff writer