Groups to get first chance to buy cookers
Women urged to join in use of pressure devices
By Ned Brooks, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
Brass hats give in; WAACs are all right
…
Millett: Youth needs some fun at end of school year
War or no war, teenage boys and girls deserve to have their last big social fling before class separates
By Ruth Millett
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$6.5 billion asked to aid foreign lands
Army must feed subjugated people in liberated lands, group says
…
U.S. State Department (May 21, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Dill | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
May 21, 1943, 5 p.m.
Secret
Interim Report on the Work of the Conference
The Meeting had before them a draft of agreed decisions prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the President and the Prime Minister (CCS 242). The draft was considered paragraph by paragraph.
Azores Islands
The Prime Minister reiterated the view which he had expressed at the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately by force. In his opinion, the Portuguese should be presented with the fact of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to send a message to order that there should be no resistance. He therefore suggested that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement, it would be better to omit from this paragraph of the agreed decisions the following words: “(b) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these Islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese” and also in the last sentence of the paragraph the words “in case diplomatic efforts should fail.”
Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would certainly agree to the omission of these words which had only been inserted because it was understood that it was the wish of the Governments to proceed in this manner.
The Prime Minister thought that the question of the diplomatic approach should be left to the President and himself and he hoped shortly to have the views of the British Government on the subject. At the same time, it would be necessary to have on record a statement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff showing the reasons why it was of such importance to occupy the Islands without delay. This could be achieved by expanding paragraph 1 (a).
It was agreed that in their final report the Combined Chiefs of Staff should expand their recommendation in the manner suggested by the Prime Minister and should omit the words quoted above.
The combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom
General McNarney gave the meeting a short account of the process which had been gone through in building up the plan for the combined bomber offensive. In view of the expansion of the German fighter forces, it had been found necessary to include in the plan attacks on the manufacturing plants. According to a conservative estimate based on experience, it was hoped to reduce the German fighter strength down to 500 as against the 3,000 to which it would otherwise rise in the middle of 1944. 25% of the bomber effort would go on submarine targets. About 425,000 ground personnel would be required to implement the plan.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that this figure included the ground personnel for ROUNDHAMMER.
The Prime Minister asked whether the figure could not be reduced. He recalled that when he had asked Monsieur Maisky why the Russians had refused the 20 squadrons for the Caucasus, the latter had pointed to the large number of ground personnel who would have to accompany the aircraft and the complication this would cause to the Russian communications. Every man brought to the U. K. on the ground staff of the Air Force would exclude a soldier. He earnestly hoped there could be a reduction.
General Marshall said that he had appointed a special group under an experienced and capable officer whose duty it was to survey the establishments of the Army and of the Air Corps. General Arnold had already made an arbitrary cut in the numbers of ground personnel for the United Kingdom and it was hoped that a further reduction might be secured, though the figure was already lower than that set by General Arnold.
The Prime Minister said that he attached the greatest importance to this combined plan. There had not yet been an opportunity for the American scheme of daylight bombing to be applied in full, and he had been from time to time critical of the account of the few occasions when the bombers could go out and the comparatively small loads thus delivered on Germany; but he could see in the future, when several raids could be made in one day, most deadly results would be produced. He therefore welcomed the plan and hoped that it could be developed to the full.
General Marshall observed that in the latest raid which the U.S. B-17s had carried out from England three separate forces had been employed on three different objectives. One had had 6% casualties, and the other[s] had had nil. The overall loss had been 3½%. This was as [an] indication of what might be achieved in the future. He assured the Prime Minister that he was just as anxious as he was to reduce the number of ground personnel to be transported to the United Kingdom.
The Prime Minister thanked General Marshall for this assurance.
The President drew attention to the value of occasional raids, say 5% of the effort, on the smaller towns where factories were known to exist. It would greatly depress the Germans if they felt that even the smaller towns could not escape.
General agreement was expressed with this view.
Defeat of Axis powers in Europe
The President inquired whether the forces listed in paragraph 3 (a) would be sufficient to hold the Brest Peninsula.
Sir Alan Brooke said that they should be sufficient to enable this area to be held and extended. The latter would be most necessary in order to secure more ports for the buildup.
The Prime Minister inquired what would be the buildup after that shown in this paragraph. Could not something be added to indicate the subsequent rate?
General Marshall said that he would very much like to include something to show the subsequent buildup. It would be purely a matter of shipping and this was being examined. The probable rate would be three to four divisions per month.
In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, it was pointed out that the “Air Forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY consisted of certain British and American air reinforcements which had been specially lent to the Mediterranean Theater from the United Kingdom for a short period immediately around the HUSKY date.
The Prime Minister suggested that it would be desirable to include a statement to show what Army forces would be available in the Mediterranean Theater for use after HUSKY. He did not think it would be right to leave North Africa entirely in the hands of the French, some of whom should certainly move forward in the general advance.
The President said that no French Division was shown as taking part in the first attack on the Continent: he thought that politically it might be very desirable that one should be included. He agreed that a statement of forces which would be available in the Mediterranean Area should be drawn up. For example, it would be well to know what would be available to send into, say Salonika, if the Germans withdrew from the Balkans. One would also want to know what could be done supposing Italy collapsed immediately after HUSKY.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that this matter had been considered, and a survey of the troops in the Mediterranean Area, and of the various garrisons required, had been drawn up.
After further discussion it was agreed that the final report should include a statement of the troops which would be available in the Mediterranean Area after HUSKY, excluding the American and British Divisions earmarked for the United Kingdom.
It was also agreed that the words “Italy and” should be inserted before the word “Russia” at the end of paragraph 3 (c).
The Prime Minister drew attention to the need for a new code word to cover post-HUSKY operations in general.
Admiral Leahy said that the security staffs had already been instructed to propose code words for a number of different operations and final suggestions would be put forward by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Burma–China Theater
The President read the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s decision concerning the Burma–China Theater. At the conclusion, he questioned the statement given in paragraph 4 d with regard to interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma. He wished to know if it implied an operation against Rangoon.
Admiral King replied that it did not, that actually it envisaged submarine operations against Japanese communications in the Bay of Bengal and the approaches to all the ports of Burma.
The Prime Minister then stated that he was in agreement with paragraph 4 of the Chiefs of Staff’s report on the proposed Burma operations, but was unhappy that it did not include any mention of offensive action against Kra, Sumatra, or Penang.
Sir Alan Brooke informed the Prime Minister that the whole conception for the defeat of Japan was now the subject of study by the Combined Staff Planners and all of the operations which the Prime Minister had referred to would be considered in this study; the present report included only the operations proposed for Burma.
The President was concerned about the failure to mention Rangoon in the decision. He thought the Chinese would be much happier if some mention of Rangoon was included and thought it would be wise to do so if only for political reasons.
The Prime Minister suggested that paragraph 4 c might be amended to read: “The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations with possible exploitation toward Rangoon.” After some discussion it was agreed that the words “toward Rangoon” should be deleted from the amendment suggested by the Prime Minister in order that it would not be interpreted as a promise by the Chinese.
The Prime Minister informed Admiral King that as soon as the Italian Fleet had been neutralized the First Sea Lord intended to send six or seven battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, from the Indian Ocean to operate in coordination with the United States Fleet in the Pacific.
Admiral King felt that mounting operations against Sumatra, Kra, or Penang, would depend upon the availability of shipping. He doubted if they could be mounted in conjunction with the operations planned in the report under consideration. He pointed out that the shortage of shipping also limited the use of troops from India in the Burma Theater. He said, however, that he felt some such operation as an attack on Sumatra or the Kra Peninsula was eventually indispensable to induce the Japanese to split their naval forces. If this could be accomplished, an augmented Indian Ocean Fleet, operating in coordination with the U. S. Pacific Fleet, might inflict severe damage on the enemy.
The Prime Minister said that the Chiefs of Staff had shown in their report that they had considered all of the operations that are essential. He felt that subsidiary plans should also be worked out in order to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities that might present themselves.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound said that the program under discussion would probably take all of the resources available. As a matter of fact, the Planners were now investigating to see whether or not the operations envisaged could actually be carried out with the resources available.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the relating of resources to the operations would occur on Saturday and Sunday and the results would be included in the final report to be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister on Monday.
Operations in the Pacific 1943-44
The President , after reading paragraph 5, concerning operations in the Pacific, commented that it included no sub-paragraph concerning air coverage for U.S. convoys, or regarding patrolling for enemy submarines.
Admiral King said that aircraft were being sent to the Pacific for this purpose as rapidly as possible but there are not sufficient numbers available to give the complete cover everywhere. He pointed out that other operations, particularly HUSKY, absorb many aircraft of the types necessary for this work.
The President said that while everything possible was being done in this regard nothing was said concerning it in the report.
Admiral King pointed out that the submarine situation in the Pacific was difficult to explain. He could not understand why the Japanese had not attacked our West Coast. He felt that they had great potentialities which they were not using, and indicated that he was concerned constantly over the possibility of a Japanese submarine effort carried out in accordance with a well-conceived plan.
Admiral Leahy said he thought the President had made a good point and suggested adding paragraph 5 b (7) which would make provision for the protection of the U.S. lines of communications.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the question of security to lines of communications would be covered in a paper that was being prepared on global strategy.
The Prime Minister thought perhaps it would be better to leave the question of protection of the lines of communications out of the report under consideration as most of the decisions recorded were conceptions of the offensive. Defensive measures, therefore, might more properly be included in the global strategy paper. He asked Sir Dudley Pound how many submarines had been sunk in the last four days, to which the Admiral of the Fleet replied that the United Nations had been maintaining an average of about one per day.
Rearming of the French in North Africa
After the President had read a paragraph on this subject, the Prime Minister asked for further information. He pointed out that large quantities of captured material had been taken from the Germans and suggested that investigation be made to determine whether it would be worthwhile to start manufacturing a limited amount of ammunition of German calibers.
General Marshall informed the Prime Minister that General Smith, the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters, had informed him that a rapid survey was being made to determine what captured material could be used for equipping the French forces.
The Prime Minister then asked Admiral King if ammunition was being manufactured for use on the Richelieu. When Admiral King replied in the affirmative, the Prime Minister suggested that something of similar nature might be accomplished with regard to manufacturing ammunition for captured German weapons.
General Marshall said he would have General Somervell make an immediate investigation of the possibilities in this connection.
The Prime Minister then asked how many French Divisions were to be armed.
General Marshall replied that it was proposed to rearm a maximum of eleven. At the present time three and a half divisions have been reequipped, including two and a half infantry divisions and one armored division.
The President asked if use was being made of French pilots.
General Marshall replied that the British have provided airplanes for one French squadron, and the United States has equipped another.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the British were also supplying the French with airplanes for patrolling purposes off the coast of West Africa. However, apart from the one squadron which they had already given the French toward the buildup of a French Air Force, the entire project was in the hands of the United States.
Bombing of Ploești
After reading a paragraph on this subject, the President asked how far the Ploești oil fields were from North Africa.
General McNarney replied that Ploești was 895 miles from Tobruk and 875 miles from Aleppo.
The Prime Minister asked when it was envisaged conducting the proposed operation.
General McNarney said that it should be accomplished either in June or early July because of the excellent weather conditions which obtain in those months, and also because a blow struck then would coincide with the summer campaign in Russia. He said it would require two B-24 groups to be taken from the United Kingdom for a period of about four weeks, that is, two weeks prior to mounting the operation and two weeks after it had been completed. Additionally, one B-24 group on its way to the United Kingdom would be diverted to this operation and thus be about two weeks late in its arrival in Great Britain. He said that officers with special sights for low level bombing which would be required for the attack on Ploești were now on their way to England and North Africa to give instructions in the use of these sights. Those going to North Africa were to present the plan to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, who was then to submit his comments to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Charles Portal said that there were two considerations which were of paramount importance in deciding whether the proposed bombing of Ploești should be undertaken. The first was whether or not aircraft should be diverted from pre-HUSKY preparation. The British Chiefs of Staff were doubtful if this should be done. The second consideration was that unless the operation was fully successful, it would make subsequent operations from more suitable bases, which might later become available, more difficult. This could be attributed to the additional defenses that the enemy would install. He added, however, that since the prize was so great and because of weather conditions, the subject should be thoroughly explored before a decision was made.
General Marshall said that if there was a fair degree of success, an attack against Ploești would be a staggering blow to the enemy, probably the greatest single blow that could be struck.
The President pointed out that even if the operation were not successful, it would result in diverting considerable German anti-aircraft equipment from the Russian Front.
The Prime Minister then asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the subject report in the light of the discussion that had taken place, with a view to making appropriate amendments.
Sir Alan Brooke informed the Prime Minister that the report submitted included only those decisions which had been agreed upon thus far. They were still to be related with the resources that are available. When this was done, the items which had been considered would be incorporated in a final report, which would be submitted on Monday.
The President called attention to a news report concerning the German evacuation of Norway and suggested that the staffs might consider what action should be taken in the event such report proved true.
The President and The Prime Minister both expressed their gratification regarding the work accomplished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and regarding the decisions which had been reached.
The Prime Minister said that what appealed to him most was the spirit of the offensive that permeated the paper, and the provisions which it made for the full utilization of our troops and resources.
Völkischer Beobachter (May 22, 1943)
Der Oberbefehlshaber der japanischen Flotte –
Admiral Yamamoto im Luftkampf gefallen
Aufn: Wien-Bild
dnb. Tokio, 21. Mai –
Wie das Kaiserliche Hauptquartier am Freitagnachmittag um 15 Uhr bekanntgibt, fand der Oberbefehlshaber der vereinigten japanischen Flotte, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, bei der Leitung militärischer Operationen im April dieses Jahres an Bord eines Flugzeuges während eines Luftkampfes den Heldentod. Zu seinem Nachfolger wurde Admiral Mineichi Koga ernannt, der bereits seinen Posten übernommen hat. Admiral Koga war früher der Befehlshaber der japanischen Flotte in den chinesischen Gewässern.
Mit Admiral Yamamoto hat Japan einen seiner größten und fähigsten Flottenchefs verloren. Sein Name ist untrennbar verbunden mit den großen Erfolgen der Kaiserlichen Marine im gegenwärtigen Kriege, mit der Vernichtung der amerikanischen Flotte in Pearl Harbour, der Versenkung des Prince of Wales und der Repulse und mit den zahlreichen Seeschlachten, die in allen Teilen des Pazifiks erfolgreich für Japan ausgefochten wurden und unlösbaren Ruhm an die Fahnen der japanischen Marine hefteten. Der „Schweigende Admiral,“ wie er mit größter Ehrfurcht auch genannt wurde, hat selbst diese Pläne ausgearbeitet, die unter seiner Führung verwirklicht wurden.
Im August 1940, also knapp ein Jahr vor Ausbruch des Krieges gegen England und Amerika, übernahm Yamamoto den Posten des Oberbefehlshabers der vereinigten Flotte, nachdem er bereits bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt eine glänzende Karriere als Offizier hinter sich hatte.
Er trat 1904 in die Marineakademie ein und erhielt noch im gleichen Jahr im japanisch-russischen Krieg als junger Offizier an Bord des Kriegsschiffes „Nisschin“ die Feuertaufe, wurde schwer verwundet und verlor zwei Finger seiner linken Hand. Nach dem Weltkrieg weilte Yamamoto von 1921 bis 1925 als Marineattaché in Amerika, war 1929 Vertreter Japans auf der Flottenkonferenz in London, wo er als der große „Radikalist“ Japans galt, bekleidete von 1936 bis 1939 den Posten des Vizemarineministers und leitete gleichzeitig die Luftwaffenabteilung der Marine.
Nicht nur die japanische Marine, sondern auch das gesamte japanische Volk brachte seinem obersten Flottenchef unbegrenztes Vertrauen entgegen, das er, als es zum Kampfe kam, bis zu seinem Tode vorbildlich rechtfertigte. Seinen Mannschaften und seinen Offizieren war er das unerreichte Vorbild eines Führers. So ereilte ihn auch der Heldentod, als er im April dieses Jahres an Bord eines Flugzeuges selbst wichtige militärische Operationen befehligte.
Staatsbegräbnis angeordnet
Das Informationsamt in Tokio gibt bekannt, daß der Tenno für den in einem Luftkampf gefallenen Admiral Yamamoto ein Staatsbegräbnis angeordnet hat. Der Tenno bestimmte ferner, daß Yamamoto zum Großadmiral ernannt und ihm der höchste staatliche Verdienstrang zuerkannt wird.
Der neue Flottenchef
Admiral Mineichi Koga, der neue Oberkommandierende der Gesamtflotte, der anerkanntermaßen der fähigste Offizier der Kaiserlichen Marine und der beste Nachfolger des gefallenen Admirals Yamamoto ist, ist 58 Jahre alt und stammt aus der Sage-Präfektur. Im Jahre 1906 hatte er die Marineakademie absolviert-, er war dann unter anderem 1926 Marineattaché bei der japanischen Botschaft in Paris und wurde im Dezember 1941 zum Oberkommandierenden der japanischen Flotte in den chinesischen Gewässern ernannt. Im Krieg um ein größeres Ostasien erwarb er sich glänzende Erfolge bei den Flottenoperationen. Im Mai 1942 wurde er zum Volladmiral ernannt und im Dezember des gleichen Jahres zum Kommandeur der Yokosuka-Marinestation, welches Amt er bis vor kurzem versah.
Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen der USA.-Invasion –
Schieber und Banknotenfilseber im Nordafrikakrieg
Sonderdienst des „Völkischen Beobachters“
…
U.S. Navy Department (May 22, 1943)
Communiqué No. 386
North Pacific.
The battle for Attu has entered the final phase with the defending Japanese forces split into three groups occupying positions in the following areas:
- Chichagof Harbor.
- Chichagof Valley.
- North side of Lake Nicholas.
On May 20, during the night, a strong enemy position on a ridge in the Sarana‑Massacre Bay area was neutralized. An enemy unit which succeeded in penetrating our lines was subsequently wiped out.
On May 21:
-
U.S. forces attacked the enemy position to the eastward of Chichagof Valley.
-
Lightning fighters supported ground operations by strafing and bombing enemy positions from low altitudes. A fuel depot was set on fire and other fires were started. Attu Village was completely destroyed with the exception of a church and one other building.
On May 21, Army Liberator heavy bombers (Consolidated B-24) attacked the Japanese main camp area on Kiska. Due to weather conditions, results were not observed.
South Pacific.
On May 20‑21, during the night, Liberator heavy bombers (Consolidated) attacked Japanese installations at Kahili and Ballale in the Shortland Island area. Hits were scored on the runway and enemy searchlight positions at Kahili.
U.S. State Department (May 22, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Embick | Admiral Noble | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Vice Admiral Horne | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Major General Streett | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Brigadier Porter | |
| Colonel Cabell | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Freseman | Brigadier Macleod | |
| Commander Long | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
May 22, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the Minutes of the 92nd Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 92nd Meeting held on Friday, 21 May.
Anti-U-Boat Warfare (CCS 241 and 241/1)
Admiral Leahy said that the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, after examining the British paper (CCS 241), were contained in CCS 241/1.
Admiral Pound , in discussing the British proposals, emphasized the importance of the support groups and of their flexibility. He believed that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, since they were continually examining the situation, were in the best position to advise on the transfer of the support groups north or south of 40° North. They could, of course, only make recommendations and the final decisions for such transfers would rest with Admiral King and himself.
Admiral King said that he accepted the importance of the principle of flexibility, but he did not believe the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be charged with the responsibility for recommending transfer of support groups, nor that the Admiralty and Navy Department should await such recommendations before taking action.
Admiral Leahy said that he believed that the Admiralty and Navy Department, rather than the Survey Board, were in the best position to review the situation and decide on the necessary allocation of means. He considered the duties of the Survey Board were to study and make recommendations with regard to facilities and methods of attack.
Admiral Pound said that it had been suggested that unified control over the whole of the North Atlantic should be instituted by the appointment of a supreme commander. This was, however, in his view, impracticable since no one commander could have sufficiently detailed knowledge of all the areas concerned. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, on the other hand, since it could continually travel and thus cover the whole area, should have an intimate knowledge of conditions throughout, and would be in a better position to assess the requirements of all areas and recommend the transfer of forces. He believed this to be an important part of their functions, but of course their recommendations would not tie either Admiral King or himself, with whom the final decision would rest. While the Admiralty and Admiral King’s headquarters each had an intimate knowledge of the requirements and conditions on their own side of the Atlantic, neither was in a position to assess completely the situation on the other’s side. The whole picture, however, was available to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.
Admiral King said that he could not agree with Admiral Pound’s views. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board had done, and would continue to do, most useful work but they were in no better position than the First Sea Lord and himself to assess the transfer of forces. He was apprehensive that, if the responsibility for recommending transfers was placed on the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, the Admiralty and Navy Department would feel tied down by their recommendations, and no action to transfer would be taken without such recommendations. The function of the Board was to survey conditions and not to exercise the function of command as regards the allocation of forces. The Survey Board was not an executive agency. As he saw it, the British proposal tended to delegate executive responsibility to the Board.
Admiral Pound said that this was not the intention. It would not be necessary for the executive authorities to await recommendations from the Board before taking action to transfer forces.
Admiral King pointed out with regard to VLR aircraft that the arguments put forward in the British paper were misleading since the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February were largely done by short-range aircraft and those of the civilian air patrols. Only 4,500 hours had been flown by LR and VLR aircraft. Further, he was in general opposed to a mixed command which was envisaged in the British paper.
Sir Charles Portal said that he appreciated that only 4,500 of the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February had been flown by VLR or LR aircraft. Even on the figure of 4,500 there was, however, still a case for the transfer of aircraft from this area to the Bay. He would be interested to know in which areas it was proposed to relieve British aircraft in order that these could then operate in the Bay. He appreciated the advantages derived from the maintenance of homogeneous forces, but a firm decision to insist on this would be disappointing since it would cut across the principle of flexibility. A committee was now drawing up a simple standard procedure for the operation of A/S aircraft which should increase the efficiency of mixed forces and thus improve flexibility. There were disadvantages in mixed commands but he did not feel that too much importance should be attached to these.
Admiral King said that he agreed that homogeneous forces were not essential, but mixed forces, in his opinion, should be avoided as much as possible.
Admiral Pound explained that after a review of the advantages of an increased air effort over the Bay of Biscay, all possible British aircraft had been transferred to this duty. Squadrons had been removed from the East Coast and the North of Scotland. No further aircraft could be provided except at the expense of Bomber Command, a diversion from which, he believed, was not justifiable.
Admiral King said that it was essential to maintain a certain irreducible minimum of A/S air forces on the East Coast of America, even though their proportion of sightings was lower than that in other areas. The locality of submarine activity could be more rapidly transferred than could aircraft. Certain U.S. PBMs were not yet operational but drastic measures were being taken to render them effective. When this had been done, they could be used to release aircraft for the Bay. He was fully in agreement with the principle that the Bay provided an excellent hunting ground for anti-submarine operations.
Admiral Leahy then suggested certain amendments to paragraph 4 of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper (CCS 241/1).
Admiral Pound explained that the British proposals with regard to the Bay offensive should not be taken to mean that action would only be effective if the full number of 72 aircraft were provided. Every aircraft would be of great value.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on these papers until the next meeting.
Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities (CCS 185/3)
Sir Alan Brooke explained that this was largely a political matter. The views of the Prime Minister had not yet been received.
Admiral Leahy said that the President had expressed the following views. We certainly could not tell the Italians that if they ceased hostilities they would have peace with honor: we could not get away from unconditional surrender: all we could tell them was that they would be treated by the United States and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people should be reconstituted into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination: this latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship.
General Marshall explained that on receipt of this message from the President, he had prepared a draft telegram to General Eisenhower based on the President’s views and instructing General Eisenhower to adhere to his original directive with regard to propaganda. He would like to send this message to the President for his approval.
General Ismay explained that this matter had also been put in very-similar terms to the Prime Minister whose decision was awaited.
Sir Charles Portal explained that the Foreign Office considered that, if too soft a line were taken now, its effects would wear off before Operation HUSKY and even further promises would then be required.
General Marshall suggested that he should send the President the draft reply to General Eisenhower with a notation that it had not as yet received the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff nor of the Prime Minister.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper pending reference to the Prime Minister and the President by General Ismay and General Marshall respectively.
Sonic Warfare (CCS 240)
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it was important that this form of warfare should be designated by a code name.
Admiral King said he believed that it might be found necessary that sonic warfare should be used for the first time in Operation HUSKY.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the recommendations contained in this paper.
b. Directed the secretaries to request the security authorities to recommend a code name to cover this type of warfare.
Movement of the Queens
Admiral Pound said that from his experience on the trip over, he was convinced that the Queens should not be allowed to pass through the submarine area except in dark periods. This would entail the cycle for the Queens being opened out to 28 days. The loss in troop lift which this would entail had been estimated at 15,000 for the third quarter of the year and 31,000 for the fourth quarter, making a total of 46,000 for the remainder of the year. If one of these ships were torpedoed, the resulting loss to our troop lift would far exceed 46,000.
In reply to a question by General Marshall as to the extra degree of safety which could be expected from his proposal, Admiral Pound said that, when considering the possibilities of the Prime Minister travelling in one of these ships, he had taken the view that, while it was a fair risk during a dark period of the moon, he would have strongly advised against it being undertaken during a light period. Similar considerations applied to the movement of 15,000 troops. In an emergency, he believed that one of these ships could be used in a light period, but only as a very special case. Boats were available for only 3,000 of the 15,000 passengers carried. Owing to the congestion on board and the fact that there might be no vessels capable of rescuing the personnel within several hundred miles, the loss of life, if a Queen were sunk, would be appalling.
The United States Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to examine the implications of the British proposal.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would present a paper recommending a change in the cycle of military transport vessels of the Queen type with a view to lessening the risk of passage.
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Stilwell-Churchill meeting, forenoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Lieutenant General Stilwell | Prime Minister Churchill |
Regarding this meeting, which probably took place at the British Embassy, the Stimson Diary records the following observations:
Stilwell was going to see him [Churchill] this morning for a short talk and I coached Stilwell on how to act with him so as to get some punch into his remarks and not be afraid of him and, as it happens, it worked like a charm because when I met the Prime Minister he told me he liked Stilwell very much in what he had said to him in the morning.
The Commanding General, U.S. Forces (China, Burma, India) to the Secretary of War
Washington, May 23, 1943.
Secret
Memorandum for the Secretary of War
The Prime Minister listened sympathetically Saturday, while I presented the case.
He asked if I thought the British had been dilatory and lacked energy. I said “yes.” He thought so too.
He asked if the decisions reached were satisfactory, barring the allotment of tonnage by air, which would starve the Yunnan force. I said “no,” because there was no definite objective assigned, because the offensive was not all-out against all of Burma, and because the advance was conditional on being kept “in step.” I said that a really aggressive commander could operate under the plan, but that as written there were too many loopholes for one who did not mean business.
He said he meant business and wanted to put into action every man he possibly could. In this case, he said the only way to give China any help within two or three months was by air. He realized the necessity of keeping China in the war and the value of the China base.
He asked if I accepted the estimate that the Burma Road could not be built before the middle of 1945. I told him, “No,” and that it should be operating by the middle of 1944.
In connection with Chinese policy, I told him that I thought CKS was trying to substitute American air power for Chinese ground troops. Last summer during the operations in Chekiang, I heard from a fairly reliable source that Ho Ying Chin, who would not have done it without the Generalissimo’s acquiescence, had told the Chekiang Commander to take it easy and withdraw as the Japs advanced, adding that the allies could now see to defeating Japan, and that the Chinese could coast. I could never definitely trace these remarks, but that was what the Chinese did, and Ku Chu Tung, the commander, is still there, although I tried to get him relieved and the Generalissimo indicated that he was going to remove him. In my opinion, the Generalissimo will continue on this line, asking for more and more U.S. aviation, and letting the ground forces, except for certain units under his direct control, deteriorate beyond redemption by neglect, and that if it went any further, our progress in Yunnan would be lost, and that it would be practically impossible to reestablish it later.
He reiterated that he wanted to help in every way possible, and would try and see me again on this subject.
JOSEPH W. STILWELL
Lieut. General, U.S. Army
American-British luncheon meeting, 1:15 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Vice President Wallace | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of War Stimson | Ambassador Halifax | |
| Secretary of the Interior Ickes | ||
| Senator Connally | ||
| Under Secretary of State Welles |
Memorandum Prepared by the British Embassy
May 22, 1943, 1:15 p.m.
The Prime Minister met the following at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22, 1943: The Vice President (Mr. Wallace), the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson), the Secretary of the Interior (Mr. Ickes), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (Senator Connally) and the Under Secretary of State (Mr. Sumner Welles).
World and Regional Councils
In the course of a general talk about the structure of a post-war settlement, Mr. Churchill said that the first preoccupation must be to prevent further aggression in the future by Germany or Japan. To this end he contemplated an association of the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If, as he understood, the United States wished to include China in an association with the other three, he was perfectly willing that this should be done; but however great the importance of China, she was not comparable to the others. On these Powers would rest the real responsibility for peace. They together with certain other Powers should form a Supreme World Council.
Subordinate to this World Council there should be three Regional Councils, one for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific.
Europe
Mr. Churchill thought that after the war Europe might consist of some twelve states or confederations who would form the Regional European Council. It was important to recreate a strong France, whatever we might think about French deserts or the probable difficulty of achieving our purpose. For the prospect of having no strong country on the map between England and Russia was not attractive. Moreover, the Prime Minister could not easily foresee the United States being able to keep large numbers of men indefinitely on guard in Europe. If such an experiment were tried, he could not believe it would last for more than one Presidential election. Great Britain could not do so either. No doubt it would be necessary, and he thought it would be possible, that the United States should be associated in the same way in the policing of Europe, in which Great Britain would obviously also have to take part; but France also must assist.
Then there would be Spain and Italy. He also hoped that in South Eastern Europe there might be several confederations; a Danubian federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria might join this group. Then there should be a Balkan federation.
He would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty million Prussians being a manageable European unit. Many people wished to carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into component parts, but on this question the Prime Minister reserved judgment. Poland and Czechoslovakia he hoped would stand together in friendly relations with Russia. This left the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, which last might or might not be willing with Greece to play some part in the Balkan system.
Mr. Wallace asked about Belgium and Holland suggesting that they might join France. Mr. Churchill said that was a possibility, or alternatively they might form a group of the Low Countries with Denmark. Mr. Wallace asked whether the Prime Minister contemplated the possibility of Switzerland joining with France, but the Prime Minister was disposed to regard Switzerland as a special case.
In his view each of the dozen or so of the European countries should appoint a representative to the European Regional Council thus creating a form of United States of Europe. He thought Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas on this subject had much to recommend them.
The American Hemisphere
Similarly, there might be a Regional Council for the Americas of which the Prime Minister thought Canada would naturally be a member and would represent the British Commonwealth.
The Pacific
There should be a Regional Council for the Pacific in which he supposed that Russia would participate. He thought it was quite possible that when the pressure on her western frontiers had been relieved Russia would turn her attention to the Far East.
Relation of the Regional Councils to the Supreme World Council
The Regional Councils should be subordinate in the Prime Minister’s view to the World Council. The members of the World Council should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly interested and he hoped that in addition to being represented on the American Regional Council and the Pacific Regional Council, the United States would also be represented on the European Regional Council. However this might be, the last word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of interest to the World Council and bring the World Council in.
Mr. Wallace thought that the other countries would not agree that the World Council should consist of the four major Powers alone. Mr. Churchill agreed and expressed the view that to the four Powers should be added others by election in rotation from the Regional Councils. The central idea of the structure was that of a three-legged stool – the World Council resting on three Regional Councils. But he attached great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion.
Mr. Wallace asked what in practice would be the procedure if, for example, there were a dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Churchill said that such a dispute would fall to be dealt with in the first place by the American Regional Council but always under the general overriding authority of the World Council. In the instance chosen the interests of countries outside the American Hemisphere would hardly be affected; but plainly a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in.
Neutrality
Mr. Churchill was asked whether the association of nations which he contemplated would be confined to the United Nations, or include the neutrals. He said that in his view there was advantage in trying to induce those nations at present neutral to join the United Nations before the end of the war. He thought we ought to use all possible persuasion and pressure to secure this when it could be done with safety to the nation concerned. An example was Turkey. His policy was to help Turkey to build up her own forces to the point where, at the right moment she could and would effectively intervene. When the United Nations brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice, he could see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for Mr. de Valera and others who might remain neutral to the end.
The Lessons of the League of Nations
Mr. Churchill maintained that we had much to learn from the experience of the League of Nations. It was wrong to say that the League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed the League. Senator Connally agreed and pointed to the achievements of the League in the years immediately after 1919. Mr. Stimson also agreed and thought that if the original guarantee to France had not fallen through subsequent French policy and also the history of the League would have been very different.
National and International Forces
Mr. Churchill said that force would clearly be required to see that peace was preserved. He suggested that there should be an agreement between the United Nations as to the minimum and maximum armed forces which each would maintain. The forces of each country might be divided into two contingents, the one to form the national forces of that country, and the other to form its contingent to an international police force at the disposal of the Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World Council. Thus, if one country out of twelve in Europe threatened the peace, eleven contingents would be ready to deal with that country if necessary. The personnel of the international contingent provided by each country would be bound, if it were so decided by the World Council, to undertake operations against any country other than their own. Mr. Wallace said that bases would be required for these contingents. Mr. Churchill agreed. In this connection he said that he would place a total prohibition for an indefinite time upon the practice in the enemy countries, and certainly in Germany, of the art of flying. There should be international air lines, for example, operating in and through Prussia which would give the Prussians as good a service at as cheap rates as obtained elsewhere, but they should neither be allowed to fly themselves nor to build aircraft.
Fraternal Association Between Great Britain and the United States
Mr. Churchill said that there was something else in his mind which was complementary to the ideas he had just expressed. The proposals for a world security organization did not exclude special friendships devoid of sinister purpose against others. He could see small hope for the world unless the United States and the British Commonwealth worked together in what he would call fraternal association. He believed that this could take a form which would confer on each advantages without sacrifice. He would like the citizens of each without losing their present nationality to be able to come and settle and trade with freedom and equal rights in the territories of the other. There might be a common passport or a special form of passport or visa. There might even be some common form of citizenship, under which citizens of the United States and of the British Commonwealth might enjoy voting privileges after residential qualification and be eligible for public office in the territories of the other, subject of course to the laws and institutions there prevailing.
Then there were bases. He had himself welcomed the Destroyer-Bases deal not for the sake of the destroyers, useful as these were, but because he felt it was to the advantage of both countries that the United States should have the use of such bases in British territory as she might find necessary to her own defence, for a strong United States was a vital interest of the British Commonwealth and vice versa. He looked forward therefore to an extension of the practice of common user [use] of bases for the common defence of common interests. Take the Pacific where there were countless islands possessed by enemy powers. There were also British islands and harbours. If he had anything to do with the direction of public affairs after the war, he would certainly advocate that the United States had the use of those that they might require for bases.
American Opinion. Importance of Concluding an Agreement During the War
All the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines propounded by the Prime Minister, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them. The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles whether he thought that the establishment of a Regional Council for Europe would have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs. Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils. Mr. Stimson said most emphatically that in his opinion there would be a tendency to relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experience. He believed that it would be much easier to secure American agreement during the war; indeed that it was a case of during the war or never. The others were disposed to agree, and all felt that the best approach to future cooperation was to present such plans for the future as a continuation of the cooperation now in force, and to do so while the war was still proceeding.
The Prime Minister made two other suggestions both of which carried the warm assent of those present. First, that after the war we should continue the practice of Combined Staff conversations, and second, that we should by constant contact, take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that the main lines of our foreign policy ran closely together.
Mr. Wallace said to the Ambassador as he left that it was the most encouraging conversation in which he had taken part for the last two years.
Mr. Churchill on all occasions stated that he was expressing only personal views.
Stimson-Churchill meeting, 3 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of War Stimson | Prime Minister Churchill |
Stimson’s preparations for his meeting with Churchill are described in the Stimson Diary as follows:
I at last got a chance to put in my oar and do my stick of work for the cause covered by these conferences today and I have an idea that I accomplished something. My reading of the minutes has shown pretty well what the situation is. The European situation is covered fairly well, but the Burma situation, as shown by the resolution adopted yesterday, is in very poor shape and that of course is vitally important on account of China. So this morning I spent time on that. I talked with Jack McCloy who had dined with the Prime Minister and had heard him say that he wanted to talk with me. I had in General Stilwell and went over the situation in Burma, getting his ideas as clearly as I could of what was necessary to make the resolutions which had been adopted have a little life in them. The thing had been pretty well gummed up. A step backward has even been taken in giving all of the capacity of the Burma air route to Chennault as against Stilwell. Therefore the only help that we can see in sight is to increase the capacity of the road and that depends upon getting more steam into the British commanders out there. So Stilwell and McCloy and I went over our maps in my room and we called in Colonel Timberman who had just been out there for the Operations Division of the General Staff and I got myself pretty well primed up by the time of the approach for my going to lunch at the Embassy where I was for the first time to get a whack at the Prime Minister.
The Stimson Diary records the course of the meeting in the following manner:
Then after the round table conference was over about three o’clock I had a half hour more alone with the Prime Minister and I took up with him the Burma problem. I gave him my views on that, talking very frankly, and he answered me frankly. He told me he was thoroughly dissatisfied with the way his commanders there had acted; he was going to change them all and put in some new punch to it. I said that was the only way in which the thing could be made to work. I brought out the resolutions which he hadn’t seen yet and he asked me to prepare a map showing the place where the new airfields were to be built to strengthen the Burma air route and what work the difficulties required. I told him I would do so.
The Secretary of War to Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, May 22, 1943.
Secret
My Dear Prime Minister: I send you herewith the map which you requested, showing the four airfields to be completed in the neighborhood of Ledo in Assam.
The names of the sites are shown in large type as follows: Chabua, Mohanbari, Sookerating and Jorhat. These four fields have been selected by men of our General Staff and Air Corps who have recently personally visited the spot, and the sites have been checked up with and approved by General Stilwell. These fields have been chosen after a careful examination of all those in that locality and these officers estimate that, if first priorities are given on the shipment of cement, gravel, asphalt and equipment for the completion of these airfields, and an intense effort is concentrated upon these four fields, they may be ready by July first.
They also estimate that, if this is accomplished, our people will be able by intense effort to increase materially the capacity of the air route to Kunming during July possibly up to a capacity of seven thousand tons per month. They also think that it is possible but not probable that, if three additional fields are made available, they will be able to raise this capacity up to ten thousand tons in September. Success will depend upon the keenest concentrated effort in bringing in the fields and in the subsequent management of the route.
The Brahmaputra River is reported to me as now high, thus making difficult the obtaining of gravel from its bed. I am told that during the course of the monsoon it will tend to rise higher. If so, this means that the gravel will have to be obtained from quarries and this would necessitate its being hauled to the fields by overtaxed railway and highway routes.
But the possibility of General Stilwell’s receiving enough equipment under his allotment to arm and equip the divisions which are to defend Kunming, as well as those which are to be in readiness to enter the Burma campaign from Yunnan, depends upon this enlargement of the capacity of the route at the times estimated. This indicates the importance of speed in the project.
Faithfully yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON
Hull-Halifax conversation
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Hull | Ambassador Halifax |
740.0011 EW/29737
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
Washington, May 22, 1943.
Confidential
The British Ambassador called at his request. He inquired if I had seen Mr. Churchill and I proceeded to give him the substance of what was said between Churchill and myself:
I said that I had brought up our trade agreements program and our entire commercial and related policies, such as monetary exchange and others. It is not necessary here to repeat any of these statements in detail.
I then took up Russia and said that Great Britain and the United States must by persistent effort talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell, so to speak, that is, out of his aloofness, secretiveness and suspicion. I elaborated on what I had said on previous occasions with respect to each of these points, including the vital step of calling off all communistic activities in other countries under the direction of the Third Internationale at Moscow.
Mr. Churchill had expressed the view that Russia would aid us in defeating Japan after Germany is defeated. I stated that I hoped she would, but added that this illustrates her secretive attitude compared with that of Great Britain and the United States; that Russia has not, so far as I knew, intimated even in a confidential way what she may have in mind in this connection.
The Ambassador said that the President requested him to talk to me about de Gaulle. I thereupon related substantially what I had said during my recent conversation with the Prime Minister, which need not be repeated here.
CORDELL HULL
840.48 Refugees/4034½
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, May 22, 1943.
My Dear Mr. President: I recently had occasion to direct your attention to the refugee situation in connection with the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference which proposed a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee to carry on the work.
As my mind approaches the subject matter to be discussed and the questions to be decided by the Committee which it is now proposed to start in London and to continue in Washington, certain doubts assert themselves.
A meeting of that character would attract worldwide attention. It could not be allowed to fail. Unless the American and British Governments were determined in advance as to the purposes which they would pursue and as to the extent to which they would commit themselves on financial accounts, the Conference could not come to any satisfactory conclusions.
Attached is a telegram directed to London which was prepared after the receipt of your recent memorandum on this matter. The Department has been in telegraphic correspondence with the British Foreign Office and has discussed the matter on several occasions with Mr. Law, Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, now in the United States. Before proceeding further with it the thought occurs to me that its extreme importance from the psychological point of view would probably justify consultation by you with Mr. Churchill.
- Expressed concretely, refugees who may need attention and protection are found in the following places in the following approximate number:
| Iran | 19,000 |
| Cyprus | 4,650 |
| Spain | 20,000 |
| Bulgaria | 4,500 |
| France | 10,000 |
| Switzerland | 13,500 |
| Portugal | 1,400 |
| — | — |
| Total | 73,050 |
-
It is impractical to estimate accurately the cost of transfer by vessel and maintenance of the individual on a yearly basis, but considering the short haul to some part of Africa, a figure of $2,000 per capita per annum is considered not unreasonable. The moving of all these 73,000 on that basis would cost $150,000,000. The estimate should include repatriation at the end of the war.
-
The determination is to be made whether it would be possible to limit the Intergovernmental Committee’s participation in the plan for the succor and transit of the refugees to a place of temporary refuge where Governor Lehman’s relief organization could take up the relief activities during their temporary residence, provided there is legal authority under existing legislation to permit it and provided further that the British join on equal terms.
If you could present this matter to the consideration of Mr. Churchill and arrive at some common decision with him as to what extent our respective Governments could be committed at the suggested Intergovernmental Committee meeting it would seem to be justifiable to proceed with that meeting, with the assurance of achieving some success. Lacking an understanding of the attitudes of our respective Governments it would seem that the Conference could not accomplish a very useful purpose.
Those persons who have escaped from German control or who may escape in the future can be forwarded to places of temporary refuge till the successful ending of the war will assure them the right to return to their homes.
I am attaching a telegram which I would propose to send to London in case it is justified by the conclusions you will reach with the Prime Minister.
Respectfully,
CORDELL HULL
The Pittsburgh Press (May 22, 1943)
96 MORE AXIS PLANES SMASHED
Allies wreck 282 aircraft in three days
Only 12 of United Nations raiders lost in blows against Italy
By C. R. Cunningham, United Press staff writer
…
Yanks slice Japs on Attu into three isolated groups
Final phase of battle underway, Navy announces; bombs obliterate Aleutian village
…
Mosquitos lash at Berlin again
Yanks hit Wilhelmshaven, Emden sub bases
By Walter Cronkite, United Press staff writer
…