Food charity turned down by delegates
System of steady livelihood preferred by United Nations
Marjorie Main to take on glamor for first time in 7 years
By Erskine Johnson
By Ernie Pyle
Southern Tunisia – (by wireless)
This column has three heroes, if you want to call them that. They are the three men who commanded, one after the other, the same infantry company – all within five hours of battle. For lack of a better name, we’ll simply call it Company K.
It was daytime. The whole company was pinned down on a green wheatfield that led up onto the slope of a hill. We were trying to take the Germans on the back slope of the hill, but from the ridge they could butcher our men below with their machine guns if they stirred.
Lt. Richard Cole, of Worcester, Massachusetts, was commander of Company K. In midafternoon, a German shell found him as he lay in hiding with his men in the wheat. One leg got only a slight wound, but the other was shattered.
His head saves his life
Lt. Cole saved his life by using his head. He made a tourniquet of his handkerchief, and using a fountain pen for a lever he twisted the tourniquet and held it, and at the same time began slowly crawling to the rear. For he knew the medics didn’t dare to venture onto the shell-raked field looking for possible wounded.
After about an hour he loosened the tourniquet, to prevent gangrene. Darkness came on and he continued to crawl slowly, attending to the tourniquet at intervals.
Sometime during the night, he felt a telephone wire under him. That was what he had been hunting for. He got out his knife and cut the wire. He knew that eventually linemen would come looking for the break. Then he lay down on the wire and waited. And finally they did come, just as he had anticipated. It was long after daylight, and Lt. Cole had by then been wounded 20 hours.
He is now in a hospital. Not only will he live, but he won’t even lose a leg. One opf these days he will probably be going homer to recuperate.
Antonelli has job four hours
As soon as Lt. Cole was wounded. Lt. Theodore Antonelli, of New Britain, Connecticut, automatically took command of Company K. They waited in the wheatfield till dusk, then began slowly working around the left end of the hill that was facing them. They took the Germans from the rear, completely by surprise. They rushed up the hill and attacked with bayonets.
Lt. Antonelli, instead of staying behind his company, pulled out his .45 and led the company up the hill. Usually, a company commander doesn’t do that, but this time it was the thing to do.
Lt. Antonelli paid for his bravery. A hand-thrown German grenade scattered fragments over his chest, and he fell. His wounds were not serious, but they put him out of action. He had had command of Company K just four hours.
Sergeant leads bayonet charge
Company K has three commissioned officers. One of them was already on a hospital from a previous wound. The two remaining ones, as you have seen, fell in succession. Next in line of command was Sgt. Arthur Godwin. He instantly assumed the command expected of him, and he carried it so well that today his praises are being sung throughout the whole division.
Sgt. Godwin led his men in one of the few bayonet charges Americans made in the Tunisian war. They didn’t kill or capture the enemy. He just fled in terror, yelling, “Madmen! Madmen!” The hill was taken.
Sgt. Godwin is from Enterprise, Alabama, the cotton town that is famous for its statue to the boll weevil. Back home he used to drive a truck, and in season he roved the Florida orchards as a fruit picker. He has been in the Army more than three years.
Godwin is a tall, nice-looking fellow of 26. He swears in good soldier fashion, but his manner is quiet and considerate. There is something calmly forceful about him. He is the kind of man you like to have faith in.
Story has a happy ending
Everybody in the regiment, including its commanding officer, wished Godwin could keep Company K, he had served it so well. But it was impossible. Other officers in the battalion deserved a company command, so Sgt. Godwin was replaced the next day.
But wait – the story doesn’t have a bitter end nor a sad one. Godwin has had a commission in the offing ever since he landed in Africa six months ago. It was one of those Army things. Months passed and nothing happened. Like a good soldier, he kept on plugging as a sergeant. But the division commander has put a stop to that nonsense. He exercised his right to promote a man on the battlefield, and within a few hours after the last German was marched off the hill, Sgt. Godwin was Lt. Godwin. A company command will not be far behind.
Everybody is glad. That’s the way good men rise to their rightful niche in battle, where true character shows and red tape is a hated phrase.
By Blair Moody, North American Newspaper Alliance
Women urged to join in use of pressure devices
By Ned Brooks, Scripps-Howard staff writer
War or no war, teenage boys and girls deserve to have their last big social fling before class separates
By Ruth Millett
Army must feed subjugated people in liberated lands, group says
U.S. State Department (May 21, 1943)
|United States||United Kingdom|
|President Roosevelt||Prime Minister Churchill|
|Admiral Leahy||Field Marshal Dill|
|General Marshall||General Brooke|
|Admiral King||Admiral of the Fleet Pound|
|Lieutenant General McNarney||Air Chief Marshal Portal|
|Lieutenant General Ismay|
|Brigadier General Deane|
May 21, 1943, 5 p.m. Secret
The Meeting had before them a draft of agreed decisions prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the President and the Prime Minister (CCS 242). The draft was considered paragraph by paragraph.
The Prime Minister reiterated the view which he had expressed at the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately by force. In his opinion, the Portuguese should be presented with the fact of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to send a message to order that there should be no resistance. He therefore suggested that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement, it would be better to omit from this paragraph of the agreed decisions the following words: “(b) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these Islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese” and also in the last sentence of the paragraph the words “in case diplomatic efforts should fail.”
Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would certainly agree to the omission of these words which had only been inserted because it was understood that it was the wish of the Governments to proceed in this manner.
The Prime Minister thought that the question of the diplomatic approach should be left to the President and himself and he hoped shortly to have the views of the British Government on the subject. At the same time, it would be necessary to have on record a statement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff showing the reasons why it was of such importance to occupy the Islands without delay. This could be achieved by expanding paragraph 1 (a).
It was agreed that in their final report the Combined Chiefs of Staff should expand their recommendation in the manner suggested by the Prime Minister and should omit the words quoted above.
General McNarney gave the meeting a short account of the process which had been gone through in building up the plan for the combined bomber offensive. In view of the expansion of the German fighter forces, it had been found necessary to include in the plan attacks on the manufacturing plants. According to a conservative estimate based on experience, it was hoped to reduce the German fighter strength down to 500 as against the 3,000 to which it would otherwise rise in the middle of 1944. 25% of the bomber effort would go on submarine targets. About 425,000 ground personnel would be required to implement the plan.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that this figure included the ground personnel for ROUNDHAMMER.
The Prime Minister asked whether the figure could not be reduced. He recalled that when he had asked Monsieur Maisky why the Russians had refused the 20 squadrons for the Caucasus, the latter had pointed to the large number of ground personnel who would have to accompany the aircraft and the complication this would cause to the Russian communications. Every man brought to the U. K. on the ground staff of the Air Force would exclude a soldier. He earnestly hoped there could be a reduction.
General Marshall said that he had appointed a special group under an experienced and capable officer whose duty it was to survey the establishments of the Army and of the Air Corps. General Arnold had already made an arbitrary cut in the numbers of ground personnel for the United Kingdom and it was hoped that a further reduction might be secured, though the figure was already lower than that set by General Arnold.
The Prime Minister said that he attached the greatest importance to this combined plan. There had not yet been an opportunity for the American scheme of daylight bombing to be applied in full, and he had been from time to time critical of the account of the few occasions when the bombers could go out and the comparatively small loads thus delivered on Germany; but he could see in the future, when several raids could be made in one day, most deadly results would be produced. He therefore welcomed the plan and hoped that it could be developed to the full.
General Marshall observed that in the latest raid which the U.S. B-17s had carried out from England three separate forces had been employed on three different objectives. One had had 6% casualties, and the other[s] had had nil. The overall loss had been 3½%. This was as [an] indication of what might be achieved in the future. He assured the Prime Minister that he was just as anxious as he was to reduce the number of ground personnel to be transported to the United Kingdom.
The Prime Minister thanked General Marshall for this assurance.
The President drew attention to the value of occasional raids, say 5% of the effort, on the smaller towns where factories were known to exist. It would greatly depress the Germans if they felt that even the smaller towns could not escape.
General agreement was expressed with this view.
The President inquired whether the forces listed in paragraph 3 (a) would be sufficient to hold the Brest Peninsula.
Sir Alan Brooke said that they should be sufficient to enable this area to be held and extended. The latter would be most necessary in order to secure more ports for the buildup.
The Prime Minister inquired what would be the buildup after that shown in this paragraph. Could not something be added to indicate the subsequent rate?
General Marshall said that he would very much like to include something to show the subsequent buildup. It would be purely a matter of shipping and this was being examined. The probable rate would be three to four divisions per month.
In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, it was pointed out that the “Air Forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY consisted of certain British and American air reinforcements which had been specially lent to the Mediterranean Theater from the United Kingdom for a short period immediately around the HUSKY date.
The Prime Minister suggested that it would be desirable to include a statement to show what Army forces would be available in the Mediterranean Theater for use after HUSKY. He did not think it would be right to leave North Africa entirely in the hands of the French, some of whom should certainly move forward in the general advance.
The President said that no French Division was shown as taking part in the first attack on the Continent: he thought that politically it might be very desirable that one should be included. He agreed that a statement of forces which would be available in the Mediterranean Area should be drawn up. For example, it would be well to know what would be available to send into, say Salonika, if the Germans withdrew from the Balkans. One would also want to know what could be done supposing Italy collapsed immediately after HUSKY.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that this matter had been considered, and a survey of the troops in the Mediterranean Area, and of the various garrisons required, had been drawn up.
After further discussion it was agreed that the final report should include a statement of the troops which would be available in the Mediterranean Area after HUSKY, excluding the American and British Divisions earmarked for the United Kingdom.
It was also agreed that the words “Italy and” should be inserted before the word “Russia” at the end of paragraph 3 (c).
The Prime Minister drew attention to the need for a new code word to cover post-HUSKY operations in general.
Admiral Leahy said that the security staffs had already been instructed to propose code words for a number of different operations and final suggestions would be put forward by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The President read the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s decision concerning the Burma–China Theater. At the conclusion, he questioned the statement given in paragraph 4 d with regard to interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma. He wished to know if it implied an operation against Rangoon.
Admiral King replied that it did not, that actually it envisaged submarine operations against Japanese communications in the Bay of Bengal and the approaches to all the ports of Burma.
The Prime Minister then stated that he was in agreement with paragraph 4 of the Chiefs of Staff’s report on the proposed Burma operations, but was unhappy that it did not include any mention of offensive action against Kra, Sumatra, or Penang.
Sir Alan Brooke informed the Prime Minister that the whole conception for the defeat of Japan was now the subject of study by the Combined Staff Planners and all of the operations which the Prime Minister had referred to would be considered in this study; the present report included only the operations proposed for Burma.
The President was concerned about the failure to mention Rangoon in the decision. He thought the Chinese would be much happier if some mention of Rangoon was included and thought it would be wise to do so if only for political reasons.
The Prime Minister suggested that paragraph 4 c might be amended to read: “The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations with possible exploitation toward Rangoon.” After some discussion it was agreed that the words “toward Rangoon” should be deleted from the amendment suggested by the Prime Minister in order that it would not be interpreted as a promise by the Chinese.
The Prime Minister informed Admiral King that as soon as the Italian Fleet had been neutralized the First Sea Lord intended to send six or seven battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, from the Indian Ocean to operate in coordination with the United States Fleet in the Pacific.
Admiral King felt that mounting operations against Sumatra, Kra, or Penang, would depend upon the availability of shipping. He doubted if they could be mounted in conjunction with the operations planned in the report under consideration. He pointed out that the shortage of shipping also limited the use of troops from India in the Burma Theater. He said, however, that he felt some such operation as an attack on Sumatra or the Kra Peninsula was eventually indispensable to induce the Japanese to split their naval forces. If this could be accomplished, an augmented Indian Ocean Fleet, operating in coordination with the U. S. Pacific Fleet, might inflict severe damage on the enemy.
The Prime Minister said that the Chiefs of Staff had shown in their report that they had considered all of the operations that are essential. He felt that subsidiary plans should also be worked out in order to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities that might present themselves.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound said that the program under discussion would probably take all of the resources available. As a matter of fact, the Planners were now investigating to see whether or not the operations envisaged could actually be carried out with the resources available.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the relating of resources to the operations would occur on Saturday and Sunday and the results would be included in the final report to be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister on Monday.
The President , after reading paragraph 5, concerning operations in the Pacific, commented that it included no sub-paragraph concerning air coverage for U.S. convoys, or regarding patrolling for enemy submarines.
Admiral King said that aircraft were being sent to the Pacific for this purpose as rapidly as possible but there are not sufficient numbers available to give the complete cover everywhere. He pointed out that other operations, particularly HUSKY, absorb many aircraft of the types necessary for this work.
The President said that while everything possible was being done in this regard nothing was said concerning it in the report.
Admiral King pointed out that the submarine situation in the Pacific was difficult to explain. He could not understand why the Japanese had not attacked our West Coast. He felt that they had great potentialities which they were not using, and indicated that he was concerned constantly over the possibility of a Japanese submarine effort carried out in accordance with a well-conceived plan.
Admiral Leahy said he thought the President had made a good point and suggested adding paragraph 5 b (7) which would make provision for the protection of the U.S. lines of communications.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the question of security to lines of communications would be covered in a paper that was being prepared on global strategy.
The Prime Minister thought perhaps it would be better to leave the question of protection of the lines of communications out of the report under consideration as most of the decisions recorded were conceptions of the offensive. Defensive measures, therefore, might more properly be included in the global strategy paper. He asked Sir Dudley Pound how many submarines had been sunk in the last four days, to which the Admiral of the Fleet replied that the United Nations had been maintaining an average of about one per day.
After the President had read a paragraph on this subject, the Prime Minister asked for further information. He pointed out that large quantities of captured material had been taken from the Germans and suggested that investigation be made to determine whether it would be worthwhile to start manufacturing a limited amount of ammunition of German calibers.
General Marshall informed the Prime Minister that General Smith, the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters, had informed him that a rapid survey was being made to determine what captured material could be used for equipping the French forces.
The Prime Minister then asked Admiral King if ammunition was being manufactured for use on the Richelieu. When Admiral King replied in the affirmative, the Prime Minister suggested that something of similar nature might be accomplished with regard to manufacturing ammunition for captured German weapons.
General Marshall said he would have General Somervell make an immediate investigation of the possibilities in this connection.
The Prime Minister then asked how many French Divisions were to be armed.
General Marshall replied that it was proposed to rearm a maximum of eleven. At the present time three and a half divisions have been reequipped, including two and a half infantry divisions and one armored division.
The President asked if use was being made of French pilots.
General Marshall replied that the British have provided airplanes for one French squadron, and the United States has equipped another.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the British were also supplying the French with airplanes for patrolling purposes off the coast of West Africa. However, apart from the one squadron which they had already given the French toward the buildup of a French Air Force, the entire project was in the hands of the United States.
After reading a paragraph on this subject, the President asked how far the Ploești oil fields were from North Africa.
General McNarney replied that Ploești was 895 miles from Tobruk and 875 miles from Aleppo.
The Prime Minister asked when it was envisaged conducting the proposed operation.
General McNarney said that it should be accomplished either in June or early July because of the excellent weather conditions which obtain in those months, and also because a blow struck then would coincide with the summer campaign in Russia. He said it would require two B-24 groups to be taken from the United Kingdom for a period of about four weeks, that is, two weeks prior to mounting the operation and two weeks after it had been completed. Additionally, one B-24 group on its way to the United Kingdom would be diverted to this operation and thus be about two weeks late in its arrival in Great Britain. He said that officers with special sights for low level bombing which would be required for the attack on Ploești were now on their way to England and North Africa to give instructions in the use of these sights. Those going to North Africa were to present the plan to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, who was then to submit his comments to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Charles Portal said that there were two considerations which were of paramount importance in deciding whether the proposed bombing of Ploești should be undertaken. The first was whether or not aircraft should be diverted from pre-HUSKY preparation. The British Chiefs of Staff were doubtful if this should be done. The second consideration was that unless the operation was fully successful, it would make subsequent operations from more suitable bases, which might later become available, more difficult. This could be attributed to the additional defenses that the enemy would install. He added, however, that since the prize was so great and because of weather conditions, the subject should be thoroughly explored before a decision was made.
General Marshall said that if there was a fair degree of success, an attack against Ploești would be a staggering blow to the enemy, probably the greatest single blow that could be struck.
The President pointed out that even if the operation were not successful, it would result in diverting considerable German anti-aircraft equipment from the Russian Front.
The Prime Minister then asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the subject report in the light of the discussion that had taken place, with a view to making appropriate amendments.
Sir Alan Brooke informed the Prime Minister that the report submitted included only those decisions which had been agreed upon thus far. They were still to be related with the resources that are available. When this was done, the items which had been considered would be incorporated in a final report, which would be submitted on Monday.
The President called attention to a news report concerning the German evacuation of Norway and suggested that the staffs might consider what action should be taken in the event such report proved true.
The President and The Prime Minister both expressed their gratification regarding the work accomplished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and regarding the decisions which had been reached.
The Prime Minister said that what appealed to him most was the spirit of the offensive that permeated the paper, and the provisions which it made for the full utilization of our troops and resources.
Völkischer Beobachter (May 22, 1943)
dnb. Tokio, 21. Mai –
Wie das Kaiserliche Hauptquartier am Freitagnachmittag um 15 Uhr bekanntgibt, fand der Oberbefehlshaber der vereinigten japanischen Flotte, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, bei der Leitung militärischer Operationen im April dieses Jahres an Bord eines Flugzeuges während eines Luftkampfes den Heldentod. Zu seinem Nachfolger wurde Admiral Mineichi Koga ernannt, der bereits seinen Posten übernommen hat. Admiral Koga war früher der Befehlshaber der japanischen Flotte in den chinesischen Gewässern.
Mit Admiral Yamamoto hat Japan einen seiner größten und fähigsten Flottenchefs verloren. Sein Name ist untrennbar verbunden mit den großen Erfolgen der Kaiserlichen Marine im gegenwärtigen Kriege, mit der Vernichtung der amerikanischen Flotte in Pearl Harbour, der Versenkung des Prince of Wales und der Repulse und mit den zahlreichen Seeschlachten, die in allen Teilen des Pazifiks erfolgreich für Japan ausgefochten wurden und unlösbaren Ruhm an die Fahnen der japanischen Marine hefteten. Der „Schweigende Admiral,“ wie er mit größter Ehrfurcht auch genannt wurde, hat selbst diese Pläne ausgearbeitet, die unter seiner Führung verwirklicht wurden.
Im August 1940, also knapp ein Jahr vor Ausbruch des Krieges gegen England und Amerika, übernahm Yamamoto den Posten des Oberbefehlshabers der vereinigten Flotte, nachdem er bereits bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt eine glänzende Karriere als Offizier hinter sich hatte.
Er trat 1904 in die Marineakademie ein und erhielt noch im gleichen Jahr im japanisch-russischen Krieg als junger Offizier an Bord des Kriegsschiffes „Nisschin“ die Feuertaufe, wurde schwer verwundet und verlor zwei Finger seiner linken Hand. Nach dem Weltkrieg weilte Yamamoto von 1921 bis 1925 als Marineattaché in Amerika, war 1929 Vertreter Japans auf der Flottenkonferenz in London, wo er als der große „Radikalist“ Japans galt, bekleidete von 1936 bis 1939 den Posten des Vizemarineministers und leitete gleichzeitig die Luftwaffenabteilung der Marine.
Nicht nur die japanische Marine, sondern auch das gesamte japanische Volk brachte seinem obersten Flottenchef unbegrenztes Vertrauen entgegen, das er, als es zum Kampfe kam, bis zu seinem Tode vorbildlich rechtfertigte. Seinen Mannschaften und seinen Offizieren war er das unerreichte Vorbild eines Führers. So ereilte ihn auch der Heldentod, als er im April dieses Jahres an Bord eines Flugzeuges selbst wichtige militärische Operationen befehligte.
Das Informationsamt in Tokio gibt bekannt, daß der Tenno für den in einem Luftkampf gefallenen Admiral Yamamoto ein Staatsbegräbnis angeordnet hat. Der Tenno bestimmte ferner, daß Yamamoto zum Großadmiral ernannt und ihm der höchste staatliche Verdienstrang zuerkannt wird.
Der neue Flottenchef
Admiral Mineichi Koga, der neue Oberkommandierende der Gesamtflotte, der anerkanntermaßen der fähigste Offizier der Kaiserlichen Marine und der beste Nachfolger des gefallenen Admirals Yamamoto ist, ist 58 Jahre alt und stammt aus der Sage-Präfektur. Im Jahre 1906 hatte er die Marineakademie absolviert-, er war dann unter anderem 1926 Marineattaché bei der japanischen Botschaft in Paris und wurde im Dezember 1941 zum Oberkommandierenden der japanischen Flotte in den chinesischen Gewässern ernannt. Im Krieg um ein größeres Ostasien erwarb er sich glänzende Erfolge bei den Flottenoperationen. Im Mai 1942 wurde er zum Volladmiral ernannt und im Dezember des gleichen Jahres zum Kommandeur der Yokosuka-Marinestation, welches Amt er bis vor kurzem versah.
Sonderdienst des „Völkischen Beobachters“