Salzburger Nachrichten (August 29, 1945)
Alliierte landen bei Tokio
Kapitulationsverhandlungen an allen australischen Fronten bis auf weiteres eingestellt
…
De Gaulle déclare à Chicago :
« J’emporte de ma visite la plus solide confiance »
Le Canada accueille à son tour le chef du gouvernement français
…
Rudolf Hess sera transféré à Nuremberg
Une dépêche de Londres annonce que Rudolf Hess, ancien vice-chancelier et dauphin du Reich, interné en Ecosse, sera prochainement transféré à Nuremberg pour y être jugé avec les autres criminels de guerre.
U.S. State Department (August 29, 1945)
740.00116 PW/7-3045
The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé
Washington, August 29, 1945
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Switzerland in charge of Japanese interests in the United States with the exception of the Territory of Hawaii and acknowledges the receipt of the Legation’s note dated July 30, 1945 (Reference: I-10) transmitting the text of a communication from the Japanese Government concerning alleged attacks by United States aircraft upon various Japanese cities. It is noted that certain non-military objectives are said to have been damaged during these attacks.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9605
Revoking Paragraph 4 of Executive Order No. 9279 of December 5, 1942, so as to Permit Voluntary Enlistments in the Armed Forces
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the selective Training and Service Act of 1940 as amended, as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to permit voluntary enlistments in the armed forces of the United States, it is ordered that paragraph 4 of Executive Order No. 9279 of December 5, 1942, be, and it is hereby, revoked.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 29, 1945
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9606
Adopting and Ratifying the Capture of the German Motor Vessel ‘Caribia’
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 4613 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended, and by the act of August 18, 1942, 56 Stat. 746, as amended by the act of July 1, 1944, 58 Stat. 678, and for the purposes of such statutes, I hereby adopt and ratify the capture made as prize by Captain J.F. Devlin of the War Shipping Administration in July 1945 of the German Motor Vessel “CARIBIA”, her engines, boilers, furniture, tackle, apparel, spare parts, equipment, and contents, and of property on board.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 29, 1945
Presidential News Conference
August 29, 1945, 11:03 a.m. EWT
THE PRESIDENT: I have a release for you this morning which is being handed to you in the form of three documents. The release date is 1 o’clock today.
[Reading] I have here reports on the Pearl Harbor disaster. One is from the Army and one is from the Navy. The Navy report gives a “Finding of Facts” by a Navy Court of Inquiry. Attached to this Finding of Facts are indorsements by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Rear Admiral T. L. Gatch; Admiral E. J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of the Navy. You will find a summation of the findings in the final indorsement by the Secretary of the Navy at the end of the document.
From the Army we have the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and, bound separately, a statement by the Secretary of War. Certain criticisms of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, appear in the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. You will notice in the Secretary’s statement, beginning on page nineteen, that he takes sharp issue with this criticism of General Marshall, stating that the criticism “is entirely unjustified.” The conclusion of the Secretary of War is that General Marshall acted throughout this matter with his usual “great skill, energy and efficiency.” I associate myself wholeheartedly with this expression by the Secretary of War.
Indeed I have the fullest confidence in the skill, energy and efficiency of all our war leaders, both Army and Navy. [Ends reading]
Now, these documents will be given to you. There is a lot of reading matter in them, and you have 2 hours to look them over before the release date comes. Any questions?
Q. Yes; can you give us a 30-word lead? [Laughter]
THE PRESIDENT: I could give you a 300-word lead. [Laughter]
Q. Are your remarks quotable – on the record?
THE PRESIDENT: My remarks are on the record. We can have a copy of my statement prepared for you. It is on the record.
Q. We have until 1 o’clock to–
THE PRESIDENT: You have until 1 o’clock to study these documents, and you can consult Mr. Ross and anybody else you wish to consult.
Q. Is what you are trying to clear up, sir, also for 1 o’clock release?
THE PRESIDENT: They are all for 1 o’clock release; everything in connection with it is for 1 o’clock release. That is to give you time to look these things over so you won’t have to go off half-cocked.
Q. I suppose the documents are pretty well self-explanatory?
THE PRESIDENT: They are.
Q. Do they present any action?
THE PRESIDENT: They state the facts so that there won’t be any more argument about what the facts are.
Q. What is the status on the court-martial matter?
THE PRESIDENT: I have nothing to say on the court-martial, except that if a court-martial is necessary, the gentlemen will have a prompt and fair trial.
Q. Mr. President, can you tell us something about the circumstances surrounding the decision to make this public at this time?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, there has been a great deal of conversation in regard to Pearl Harbor and various boards have looked into the facts, and I just decided that the country is entitled to the facts. There is nothing there that needs to be covered up now that hostilities have ceased, and I think the sooner the press and the public know the facts the better off everybody will be.
Any other questions?
Q. We still have a press conference tomorrow?
THE PRESIDENT: We still have a press conference tomorrow, so you can cross-question me then on these documents if you care to. [Laughter]
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER
By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed “to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper.”
On December 1, 1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter as follows:
This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.
I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions were as follows:
The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board’s conclusions.
So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.
Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.
In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.
Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based.
Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to be taken was correct.
Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the FBI, and others. From these same sources there came to the Government additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan.
The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress the full reports and the record of the testimony.
My conclusions are as follows:
I
The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation. Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local situation and conditions. Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese attack.
I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until he latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that le was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared or the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.
I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would have modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan.
I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiaircraft defenses sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded.
This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz.: the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.
The underlying cause of this error of Judgment was General Short’s confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then-prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.
Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27, 1941, to the effect that he was “alerted against sabotage.” He urges that this should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department’s caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with this failure to comment on Short’s report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others.
But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of “no threat from without.” Protection against the possibility of such an attack was his own definite responsibility.
To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.
To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack on that outpost to the opinion of another service.
Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater commander.
I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my statement of December 1, 1944 and in my judgment the additional investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been taken.
II
Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had specially assigned duties.
The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders.
I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation, that he was warned that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures – the all-important measure to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated. I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty.
There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short’s attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate.
The information available to the War Department on or before December 7, 1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following: information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by November 25, 1941, later extended to November 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no further, and information available the morning of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1:00 P.M., December 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however was that the War Department had information through secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that officers on General Short’s staff also had this information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that General Short had been fully advised by the War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any time.
The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy’s general plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible.
Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9:00 A.M. on the morning of December 7.
When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Government at 1:00 P.M. And the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message, which in the ease of General Short, did not arrive until after the attack.
Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about November 30, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed.
With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event.
Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short’s reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short’s message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.
It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division
Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
III
The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for and supervise the organization. Equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hopelessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts.
It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such situation in this ease. The scattered and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.
IV
The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.
V
In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have prolonged the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board’s comment in this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.
VI
There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed on December 1, 1944, were as follows:
I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from his review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy.
The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.
I also stated on December 1, 1944, that “as to other alleged misconduct and, neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General.” Until those officials are ready to report I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman.
*]This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts, Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Reitired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney.]
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (August 29, 1945)
America’s chance to keep peace in Asia
By Sumner Welles, former Under Secretary of State
…
The Evening Star (August 29, 1945)
PEARL HARBOR REPORT HOLDING MARSHALL PARTLY TO BLAME REJECTED BY TRUMAN
Army board charges failure to put Hawaii on alert for attack
Stark and Hull criticizes along with Kimmel and Short, for bad judgment
By J. A. Fox
…
MacArthur reaches Okinawa, will land on Jap field tonight
USS San Diego to be first U.S. warship docking at Yokosuka base
…
Nimitz and staff in Tokyo Bay
USS Missouri, USS South Dakota and USS Iowa among ships off Okinawa
…
24 Nazis put on war crime list for trial at Nuernberg in fall
Goering, Hess, Keitel and Doenitz among those named by Allies
…