90 years ago today.... (9-18-31)

63

The Pittsburgh Press (September 23, 1931)

Soviet troops mass in East

Russians mobilizing along Manchurian border, Peiping hears

map.sovietmass.manchuria

PEIPING, China (UP) – Soviet troops were mobilizing today along the Manchurian border, unconfirmed reports from Harbin said.

Red Army units were assembling at Manchuli, a border town, the reports said.

The alarming news followed dispatches revealing that a Japanese army had entered North Manchuria and was nearing Harbin.

Harbin is several hundred miles from Mukden, which was seized Saturday in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

Peiping alarmed

The report of the Soviet mobilization greatly alarmed Peiping. The Chinese Eastern Railway, long a center of contention in the Far East, passes through Harbin and authorities here fear Russia may seize the line.

Soviet officials yesterday offered to furnish 3,000 troops and airplanes to guard the railway, which is owned jointly by Russia and China. The offer was refused.

The continued Japanese advance into Chinese territory indicates the Nipponese intend to seize Kirin as well as Liaoning province. The city of Kirin was captured yesterday.

Army defies Tokyo

Foreign military attaches here believe the Japanese commanders are advancing in defiance of cabinet instructions from Tokio. Dispatches from Tokio today said the cabinet had decided no troops were to be sent north of Changchun, a city in Liaoning province, 100 miles south of Harbin.

Japanese forces today captured Tunhua, completing seizure of Chinese railroads in Manchuria. Tunhua is near the Korean border.

The Nationalist government today refused to negotiate directly with Japan in the dispute and reiterated its demands that the League of Nations intervene under the Kellogg anti-war treaty and the League covenant against aggression.

High feeling against the Japanese was illustrated when China refused to accept 4,000 tons of food sent from Japan for relief of flood sufferers. Although supplies are urgently needed, the Japanese contribution was termed “bitter bread” in view of the occupation of Manchuria.

64

‘WAR’ IN CHINA TERRIFIC BLOW TO ARMS CUT
Whole structure of peace pact tottering after invasion

France is cynical; Japan’s action backs argument against nation’s unpreparedness
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

WASHINGTON – In diplomatic circles here, it is admitted that an hour of unprecedented gravity has struck for the whole movement for world peace and disarmament.

Japan’s “recourse to war for the solution of an international controversy” with China just three years from the time she solemnly renounced war “as an instrument of national policy” is seen as putting the whole new order to the rest.

Unless the Japanese invasion of Manchuria is promptly and justly terminated, it is agreed, the Kellogg Pact, the nine-power China treaty, the League of Nations and the whole post-war system of war prevention will collapse and the 1932 arms conference at Geneva will be doomed.

Invasion blow to move

Already, in the opinion of many, disarmament has been dealt a severe blow. The mere fact that one heavily armed nation invaded a poorly armed one before the rest of the world realized what was going on, provides an almost unanswerable argument against disarming prior to security.

France all along has insisted that she must have security before disarming. Other nations have cited the pact outlawing war as sufficient guarantee. What more did she want, they asked. And, nothing loath, France has told them.

“I want to know,” she has said, in effect, “precisely what would happen if, for example, a disarmed France were to be invaded by an aggressor. Pacts have been trampled underfoot before and probably will be again. There must be a distinct world understanding as to what will happen to an aggressor, otherwise I shall maintain my own system of national defense and keep my own powder dry.”

Now, just as preparations for an arms reduction interference are under way, Japan has provided a dramatic example of the very thing France has said might happen.

China, with more than six times the population of Japan, but militarily weak, has suddenly been set upon, bombed, cannonaded, invaded and humiliated by her tiny, but well-armed neighbor.

World’s peace threatened

If either of two things had been the case, French observers are already asserting, China would not have been molested: First, had she had a great, modern army of her own, or second, had the world been organized to punish an aggressor or to aid a victim.

If Japan gets away with this, it is widely feared here, it will set the world peace effort back to where it was in 1914. It will wipe out everything that has been accomplished since the Armistice.

Many contend even that the harm has already been done. After taking complete possession of the richest part of Manchuria, they point out cynically, Japan now manifests a certain willingness to negotiate.

If that is the alternative to strong armaments, it is remarked the outlook for next year’s parley is gloomy indeed. For it is difficult to imagine many nations being willing to risk invasion and lying on its back with the invaders heel on its neck pending arbitration.

Sees invasion as a warning

SAN FRANCISCO – The occupation of Mukden, Manchuria, by Japanese troops is a warning against any plan of disarmament that is not complete and for all nations, Sen. Hiram Johnson, R-Calif., claimed last night.

The senator issued a brief statement on the Manchurian situation. It said:

“Japan wages war on China, and with machine-like precision, evincing long and careful preparation, overruns Manchuria.

“Everybody is for disarmament but some of us really think disarmament should be for all and be reciprocal and simultaneous.

“Where now is the bugle call of the State Department trumpeted so loudly and prematurely but a short time ago when Russia and China were making faces at each other? Where is the League of Nations?”

65

U.S. State Department (September 23, 1931)

793.94/1831: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland, at Geneva

Washington, September 23, 1931 — 4 p.m.

123.

[Paraphrase]

Consulate’s 120, September 22, 4 p.m., and 123, September 22, 6 p.m.; your 156, September 22, 11 p.m.

Responding to inquiries which have been formally and informally made concerning the American attitude in this matter, you may first deliver to the President of the League Council the following note:

I have received from the American Minister at Berne the copy of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations which you transmitted to him.

I have noted the two parts of this resolution and the fact that they have been embodied in a note which you have addressed to the Governments of Japan and China.

I assure you that the Government of the United States is in wholehearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council’s resolution and will dispatch to Japan and China notes along similar lines.

I have already urged cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal from the present situation of danger and will continue earnestly to work for the restoration of peace.

For the reasons I gave in my telephone conversation with you, I am much troubled in regard to the proposition of an inquiry committee insofar as I understand it (see your 156 and Consulate’s 126). In my opinion, the proposition of creating from the outside an investigation committee for the China-Japan situation will not conduce to Japanese acceptance of our efforts on behalf of a peaceful solution of the situation. I very much fear, on the contrary, that the proposition, by inflaming Japan’s nationalistic spirit behind the men leading the militaristic movement in Manchuria, will make more difficult Baron Shidehara’s efforts and those of the other members of the Japanese Government who are peacefully disposed toward restoring peace and withdrawing from the existing untenable position. As proposed, the inquiry committee differs widely and radically from an impartial commission which is chosen by both parties in a controversy in accordance with methods already adopted in numerous well-known conciliation treaties. This latter type of inquiry was suggested by me in 1929 in the case of the Soviet Union and China, but this, while much less offensive than the present suggestion to national pride, even was opposed by Japan and failed of adoption by Russia and China.

This Government has every desire in its efforts to solve this difficulty to work along lines in harmony with those the League of Nations is following. There is no difference with your view of the facts insofar as such have been communicated to the Department, but it is felt here that the Japanese Foreign Minister, probably together with his Government’s civilian members, is earnestly working toward accomplishing a peaceful solution, and this Government is anxious lest their task be made more difficult through the arousing of false national pride. This Government thoroughly appreciates the invitation to sit on the League Council and on the special committee, but thinks that American assistance in the solution probably will be more effective if the United States works along the line to which it has already committed itself, namely, of independent conversations. Beginning Sunday morning, the 20th, the Department has repeatedly had conversations with both the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Chargé. As there may be a divergence of views concerning methods, for example such as respecting an investigating committee, it is my feeling that I should retain for this Government a degree of independence of action. In summary, the policy which, in my view, will be most effective for the United States Government under the difficult conditions involved in this case is, first, to urge, by diplomatic means and acting according to any similar methods used by the League of Nations, that Japan and China themselves effect a settlement through direct negotiation; second, in the event this method proves ineffective, making outside action necessary, to favor China and Japan’s submitting to machinery set up in the League of Nations Covenant, to which they both are parties and to which China already has appealed and which has already begun action; and, finally, should it develop for any reason that this line is impracticable, to consider the machinery of article 7 of the Washington Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, or action such as may be practicable under the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.

STIMSON

66 
793.94/1853¾

Memorandum of transatlantic telephone conversation 

September 23, 1931, 4 p.m.

WILSON: Hello – Mr. Secretary. I told Drummond of my conversation with you. As a result, the public session of the Council this afternoon was called off and a private session was held. In that session it came to light that no Japanese reply has been received to the telegram sent yesterday regarding the investigation committee.

SECRETARY: Have they telegraphed to Japan about an investigation committee?

WILSON: A telegram was sent to Japan yesterday suggesting an investigation committee. The Japanese Delegate said that the Japanese Government will refuse all responsibility for this. Lord Cecil then suggested another form of commission – the Japanese to appoint two neutral members, the Chinese to appoint two neutral members, and the Council to appoint three neutral members. The Japanese Delegate will send a telegram suggesting this to his government.

SECRETARY: Is the Japanese Delegate in favor of it?

WILSON: He did not express any opinion concerning it. Drummond adds that the Council very earnestly hopes for our participation in the work of the special committee. A resolution along the following lines will be presented to the Council at tomorrow’s session. The members of the special committee will have authority to seek the collaboration that may be helpful in their deliberation. Drummond says that the special committee will be glad to invite the United States in any form that may be agreeable to us. If you would like to have the invitation based on our interest as signatories either of the Nine Power Treaty or the Kellogg Pact or on the basis of general world interest it would be all right. The only other thing I have to add is this. The latest reports here from a Chinese source are that Japanese forces have gone south of the Great Wall.

I have made no press statement of any kind.

SECRETARY: In the first place, Japan I do not believe will ever accept any investigating committee.

WILSON: Do you think they may accept in the form of Cecil’s suggestion?

SECRETARY: No, I do not. I think that is chimerical. I do not think that is open to question and I do not believe in imposing a committee from the outside on Japan for I think that would play right into the hands of the enemies of peace. I have sent you a telegram today. It is on the wires now and I want to give you the sense of it. In it I am sending an answer to the action of the Council yesterday in their resolution about a note to China and Japan, in which I say I am in hearty sympathy with their action and that we will send a similar note, not an identical note, but a similar note to both parties urging a cessation of the hostilities and a withdrawal from the dangerous position in which they are. The rest of my telegram explains my attitude on the rest of the matters about which you have asked me. In general, my feeling is that the surest road to peace is by diplomatic methods in which we will try to back up any action taken by the League in such matters, to urge a settlement by the Chinese and Japanese themselves through direct negotiation between them. The first road to peace is to urge them to settle it by direct negotiation between China and Japan. In doing that, we will urge that method and cooperate with the League if they are urging it. Then if that method is not effective and if outside action becomes necessary why I think that in view of the fact that the League has the appropriate machinery under Article 11 and that it has already been invoked by China, the League ought to go ahead and that we will lend it all moral support that we can. We cannot participate, of course, in League action but we will make clear that it has our moral support. Then, and only in case that should prove ineffective for any reason, we would come to the other two treaties – the Nine Power Treaty or the Kellogg Pact. In other words, if the action of outside parties is necessary, I think it should be done by the League which is in session and acting now and it has our earnest sympathy and support. But I have made clear in this telegram the reasons for my fear for this outside committee of investigation. That is a word to the wise. I know something about the attitude of mind of those peoples. I have lived among them, and I believe (I want this thoroughly understood) that the Japanese Government, the civilian government, probably – of course we are all embarrassed by lack of evidence – is sincerely trying to settle this matter. I believe they ought to have a chance to do so and I believe that outside action by a lot of attachés or a commission appointed by anybody else would make trouble. I think that ought to be a last resort. Of course if any one of the parties should prove intractable to settlement, then under the machinery of the League the League will have to go its own way in opposition to that party, but as long as there is any chance of the parties settling the matter between themselves I think outside interference will make it more difficult.

WILSON: You understood about the Cecil resolution?

SECRETARY: Yes. But they would prefer negotiation. That is the method of Oriental people. They are not accustomed to judicial inquiry and I would not use that until you were sure you were going to get their opposition anyhow.

WILSON: As long as they are in the state of mind where they will negotiate you want to give them all the opportunities possible and if that fails then the League can go ahead with its own machinery and you will give it moral support.

SECRETARY: Precisely. But I think they should be given every opportunity to do it by direct settlement first. That is for your knowledge. I am making public here the note which I am sending in answer to the President of the Council. I am giving it out this afternoon here, because the President’s resolution has already been made public. The cable has gone to you already.

WILSON: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY: That is the situation. I am really afraid of the resolution of inquiry. I wish they would kill it for the present and not mention it.

WILSON: Maybe the Japanese will kill it themselves.

SECRETARY: I think they will, but it will make them feel badly to kill it. You can use your own discretion about telling confidentially the way I feel about this, but I do not want it made public because I think it is subject to misrepresentation. That is the best of my thought on the situation and I think that is the best way out of a very difficult position. Of course, do not have any misunderstanding; if either party proves recalcitrant and takes a position which is clearly in violation of the covenant of either of the two treaties to which America is a party we shall not flinch in our duty. But I very much hope that they will not do that.

WILSON: Thank you very much. That is clear.

67 
793.94/1918

Memorandum by the Secretary of State 

Washington, September 23, 1931.

I sent for the Japanese Ambassador and told him that I had received from the Council of the League of Nations, through the American Minister, a copy of the resolution which the Council had adopted in regard to Japan and China yesterday. I told him that I was sending a reply to this resolution and I handed him a copy of it in the form annexed. I said I had just sent it to Geneva and he then read it carefully and thanked me for giving him such prompt notice of it.

H[ENRY] L. S[TIMSON]

68 
793.94/1939

Memorandum by Mr. Ransford S. Miller of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs 

Washington, September 23, 1931.

Mr. Kato, of the Japanese Embassy, called with a copy of the Japanese text of a telegram from the Japanese Foreign Office which Mr. Kato said was the first full account of the Manchurian situation that the Embassy had received.

Mr. Kato gave a running translation, in English, of the Japanese text, the contents of which appeared to be identical with the text of the letter addressed by the Japanese representative on the Council to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, as reported in Mr. Gilbert’s telegram No. 133, of September 23, 8 p.m.

Mr. Kato intimated that he felt that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was having a very hard time in a very difficult situation and that the sympathies of the Embassy here were with Baron Shidehara in the circumstances in which he found himself placed.

Mr. Kato added that Ambassador Debuchi would delay his intended departure for Japan for a couple of weeks.

69 
793.94/1942

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking to the Chinese Legation 

Nanking, September 23, 1931.

With reference to the charge made by Japanese that our soldiers attempted to destroy a bridge of the South Manchurian Railway, the Superintendent’s office of the Peining (Peiping-Mukden) Railway reports that on the night of the 18th Japanese troops started the trouble by blowing up the Liu River bridge of the South Manchurian Railway and afterwards scattered dead bodies of our soldiers nearby so as to fasten the blame upon us for the destruction of the bridge.

The fact is that before destroying the bridge the Japanese had built a siding around this spot so that there would be no interruption in the running of trains. There was on the bridge a signal tower from which a strict watch was always kept.

This mode of manufacturing evidence defeats its own ends.

70

U.S. State Department (September 24, 1931)

793.94/1857: Telegram

The Minister in China to the Secretary of State

Peiping, September 24, 1931 — 8 a.m.
[Received September 24 — 6:38 a.m.]

640.

Reuter report from Nanking, 23rd:

Government spokesman here characterizes as groundless reports from Tokyo that China had proposed a joint Sino-Japanese commission to investigate the Manchurian affair and Mr. Yoshizawa’s similar allegation at Geneva.

This afternoon Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang telegraphed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek denying reports of Soviet troop movements on the border but adding that the Soviet Consul at Harbin had made representations to Japanese Consul there that Japanese military movements were hindering operation of Chinese Eastern Railway.

News of League’s action regarding Manchuria was very welcome here and had calming effect where anti-Japanese feeling was threatening to get out of hand. Mass meeting here this morning of 100,000 people demanded that Government should immediately mobilize.

Japanese community here was evacuated to Shanghai this morning.

JOHNSON

71 
793.94/1863: Telegram

The Minister in China to the Secretary of State

Peiping, September 24, 1931 — 10 a.m.
[Received 1:30 p.m.]

642.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

September 23, 2 p.m. Japanese reinforcements from Korea went through Mukden yesterday afternoon for Changchun where the chief concentration of reinforcements troops is taking place. A traveler reports seeing Japanese police at the first Chinese Eastern Railway station north of Changchun. It is believed that Japanese forces are preparing to move on Harbin. According to a report, reliable, Cheng-chiatun, Tungliao and Taonan have been occupied by Japanese forces. Japanese aircraft flew over Hsinmin and Taipingshan yesterday and it is reported dropped bombs on barracks at latter place. Also reliably informed that only one body of troops from Korea has been sent to Chientao region. On the Mukden-Kirin Railway only Japanese military trains are operating.

JOHNSON

72 
793.94/1922

Memorandum by the Secretary of State 

Washington, September 24, 1931.

The Japanese Ambassador called today, evidently due to a misunderstanding, to ask whether I had finished my note to Japan and to China. I told him that I had not yet finished the note. It was left so that if I finished it this morning I was to let him know by telephone before one o’clock, and if I did not it would go over until tomorrow morning, as I found that he was rather anxious to get out of town for the afternoon.

The Ambassador brought with him a clipping of the article of Hugh Byas in the New York Times of this morning and pointed out Byas’ statement denying that the Japanese had begun any advance on Harbin. The Ambassador said he had officially confirmed this denial; that no such advance had been made. In reference to the occupation of Kirin, he said that only a few soldiers were left there; that the rest of them had withdrawn. He said he thought that the Japanese Government were beginning to withdraw their forces and he hoped to have definite news for me very soon.

H[ENRY] L. S[TIMSON]

73 
793.94/1924

Memorandum by the Secretary of State 

Washington, September 24, 1931.

During the call of the Japanese Ambassador I told him that I had received word from the Radio Corporation of America as to the destruction at Mukden on September 19th of the radio station which they had built for the Chinese Government. I explained to him that the Radio Corporation regarded this as an important link in their chain of communication with the Orient and that its destruction had made a very unfortunate impression to the effect that the Japanese were trying to cut off communication with Manchuria. I told him that until that radio station was replaced this unfortunate suspicion would be likely to continue. He told me he would communicate with his government and let me know.

H[ENRY] L. S[TIMSON]

74 
793.94/1860: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland to the Secretary of State 

Geneva, September 24, 1931 — 1 p.m.
[Received September 24 — 11:30 a.m.]

159.

[Paraphrase]

Department’s 123, September 23, 4 p.m.

Great satisfaction was caused by the message to the Council President.

I have talked about your ideas to Sir Eric Drummond. He desires me particularly to make clear to you that as proposed by Lord Cecil in the secret Council meeting last night (which I mentioned by telephone to you last night) the contemplated commission, with Japan and China to name two neutrals each and the Council to name three, is intended merely as a fact-finding body. So contradictory have been the reports received regarding the numbers and present locations of Japanese troops that the Council has felt it essential to obtain the actual facts in this connection. Most narrow terms of reference would be given the commission. Drummond asks whether you would agree to an American member of the commission being nominated in the event of the proposal being accepted by Japan.

The correspondent of the New York Times obtained somewhere a fairly correct summary of my discussion last night with Drummond, and this morning I cautioned Drummond lest such publicity injure the confidential relations between him and you, so desirable now in this crisis. He will stress in the small committee the need to preserve the confidential nature of any communication which I may informally make to him respecting your views.

WILSON

75 
793.94/1865: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State 

London, September 24, 1931 — 4 p.m.
[Received September 24 — 12:35 p.m.]

385.

[Paraphrase]

I called on Lord Reading in order to get information on the Manchurian situation for you. He said that at Lord Cecil’s suggestion by telephone from Geneva he cabled a message to the Japanese Government to supplement the communication already dispatched by the League; he said that France, Germany, and Italy had done likewise. Beading’s own impression, based upon official information, is that the situation now is less disquieting, the disturbance being at least kept local. This he qualified with the statement that his news was somewhat conflicting and therefore could not serve as a basis for too firm an opinion. Regarding the position of the Soviet Union, he thought they looked upon the situation as local, and this was natural, since Japan still has, despite the reinforcement of its Army by the last 4,000 men, a smaller number of troops in Manchuria than is allowed by treaty. However, Reading also stated that in his judgment the Soviet Union would unquestionably be concerned if the continued activities of even this Japanese force, reportedly accompanied by a movement of Japanese ships to a strategic point, described by the Japanese as merely coincidental, should indicate Japanese pursuance of a plan of conquest. While it had been intimated to Reading that there might possibly be some secret understanding between the Japanese and the Soviets concerning a joint division and occupation of Manchuria, he regarded this idea as unfounded. In case the press dispatch published this morning proves correct in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops and the alleged attitude of Japan, Reading is not particularly apprehensive of the situation.

DAWES

76 
793.94/1875: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State 

Geneva, September 24, 1931 — 6 p.m.
[Received September 24 — 5:40 p.m.]

137.

[Paraphrase]

Consulate’s 133, September 23, 8 p.m.

It is learned from a reliable source that at the private Council meeting held yesterday at 7 p.m. the following took place:

  1. The Japanese representative was queried as to whether he had any information to give in regard to the suggested sending of observers to Manchuria.

  2. He answered that he had not.

  3. This Japanese reply was declared to be disappointing to the Chinese representative, who offered a new proposal authorizing the Council to name certain states to which the Chinese Government might apply for appointment of observers who would report to the League.

  4. In reply the Japanese representative stated his Government could not take responsibility for such a proposal.

  5. Adjournment of the discussion was suggested by Lord Cecil in the hope that a Japanese counterproposal might be received.

  6. The Japanese representative assented to adjournment.

  7. The Chinese representative insisted upon immediate treatment of the question of sending observers.

  8. Lord Cecil appealed to the Japanese representative to communicate with his Government by telegram and said it was his hope that Tokyo would agree, since the question of appointing observers was considered by the League as most urgent.

  9. It was suggested further by Cecil that such a mission might perhaps be composed of two neutral members appointed by Japan, two by China, and three by the Council.

  10. The Japanese representative inquired whether this proposal was identical with the “observer idea”.

  11. In reply Cecil said the proposal was not “to observe” but instead “to report” to the League.

  12. While not saying he would support Cecil’s proposal, the Japanese representative agreed to telegraph his Government in this sense.

  13. The arrangement is still open to discussion.

  14. It was stated by the Chinese representative that the Japanese have advanced within the Great Wall.

  15. To this the Japanese representative responded that certain strategic points had been occupied, though he was not informed of any “military advances” south of the Wall.

GILBERT

77 
793.94/1870: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State

Geneva, September 24, 1931 — 7 p.m.
[Received September 24 — 4:47 p.m.]

138.

Last paragraph Consulate’s 133, September 23, 8 p.m.

The following is the provisional translation obtained from the Secretariat of a communication made orally this morning before a plenary meeting of the Assembly by Lerroux, President of the Council.

As presidentin [presiding?] officer of the Council I desire to make a communication to the Assembly. The question of the difference between China and Japan is under consideration by the Council. Consultations with the representatives on the Council of China and Japan are taking place and we hope they will lead to a satisfactory conclusion. The Council hopes to be able to make a statement to the Assembly as soon as circumstances permit. Meanwhile, the Council has asked me to assure the Assembly that it is devoting to this question all the time and all the attention which is required in the interest of peace and the respect that the Council owes to the two parties to the dispute.

Immediately afterwards Titulesco, the President of the Assembly, made a declaration of which the following is a provisional translation:

I believe I can make a statement which for the present will enable us not to have a discussion. It is evident that as long as the dispute has not been brought before this Assembly, it is for the Council to discuss points of fact and endeavor to find the means for conciliation. However, in circumstances like these it is above all necessary that the League of Nations should be able to rely on the approval and help of public opinion in all countries. This approval and help will certainly be forthcoming if our action is in conformity with what is expected of us.

From this point of view it is not enough for the Council to sit permanently (as much as possible in public meetings) until the maintenance of peace is assured. The Assembly must also not finish its labors without having had an opportunity of showing the interest which all the members of our League feel for the success of an action so vital for our institution. We, therefore, hope that the Council will before the end of our session be good enough to make a new communication upon this affair so that the Assembly may express its opinion on the dispute.

I have learned on good authority above procedure was purposely adopted instead of passing a resolution as forecast in the Consulate’s telegram referred to in order to avoid a discussion in the Assembly on the question at this juncture.

GILBERT

78 
793.94/1876b: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan

Washington, September 24, 1931 — 2 p.m.

166.
  1. The Department has been giving the most careful consideration to the questions arising from the situation in Manchuria as described in your reports and those from Peiping and elsewhere.

Reports from other quarters, both official and unofficial, contain much more complete data than those emanating from Japan.

The Department has received from the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires, and is now giving consideration to, a note in which it is charged that “in this case of unprovoked and unwarranted attack and subsequent occupation of Chinese cities by Japanese troops” Japan has deliberately violated the Kellogg Pact.

The Chinese Government urgently appeals to the American Government to take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

The Department is giving the situation and the whole range of possibilities its most careful consideration. It has had three conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and three with the Chinese Chargé, in which the Department has urged cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal from the present situation of danger. It would welcome any comments and suggestions which you may care to make.

  1. In response to a communication from the Council of the League of Nations received through the American Minister at Berne, the Department has assured the Council that this Government is in wholehearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Council’s resolution adopted on September 22 and that the Department will dispatch to Japan and China notes along similar lines.

STIMSON

79 
793.94/1869: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland to the Secretary of State

Geneva, September 24, 1931 — 9 p.m.
[Received September 24 — 9 p.m.]

161.

Drummond has just handed me the answer of the President of the Council dated today in reply to your message contained in your 123, September 23, 4 p.m. The text was adopted at a full private meeting of the Council just terminated.

My Dear Mr. Wilson: On behalf of the President of the Council of the League of Nations I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th September enclosing a telegram addressed to [me] in regard to the appeal from the Chinese Government under article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. May I ask you [to] transmit to the Secretary of State its appreciation of the friendly answer which he was good enough to make in regard to the situation which has unhappily arisen between two highly respected members of the family of nations, China and Japan. The Council is gratified to note that the Government of the United States is in wholehearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council resolution, and that it will despatch to Japan and China, in addition to previous communications, notes on lines similar to those followed by the Council.

The Council has no preconceived method for solving the difficulties which have arisen; no procedure or formula to which it is irrevocably attached [bound?] other than its obligations to ‘take action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.’

To this end the Council will gladly continue to keep the United States Government informed of any action it may take or any information it may secure, and ventures to hope that that Government will also be disposed to communicate with it. The Council feels confident that, irrespective of any individual effort which any government may deem it desirable to make, it is by the continuance of common endeavor that a successful result is most likely to be achieved. The efforts which are now being made here will be continued by the Council in such form as circumstances may require.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Wilson,

Yours very sincerely,
A. LERROUX
[Acting?] President of the Council of the League of Nations

WILSON

80

The Pittsburgh Press (September 24, 1931)

Jap-Russian clash feared

Nipponese continue advance into Manchuria; U.S. sends note
By Martin Sommers, United Press staff writer

Developments today in the Chinese-Japanese dispute in Manchuria were:

  • The United States and the League of Nations acted today to settle the dispute peaceably.

  • Dispatches from Mukden revealed fear of a clash between Japanese and Russian troops in North Manchuria and said Soviet forces were mobilizing along the border. The murder of 14 Japanese women also was reported and it was feared Japanese troops would take vengeance on the retreating Chinese forces.

  • The League Council pressed Japan for a reply to its proposal of a commission to investigate the invasion of Chinese territory. Despite the hostile attitude of the great powers, the Japanese delegation refused to commit itself. Chinese delegates reiterated demands for immediate intervention.

  • Tokio remained silent, a censorship concealing news of troop movements in Manchuria. Chinese dispatches, however, reported Japanese forces were nearing Harbin, in North Manchuria.

MUKDEN, Manchuria (UP) – The threat of a clash between Japan and Soviet Russia in Manchuria was rumored today as Japanese troops extended their area of occupation.

Military authorities here were advised today of the murder of 14 Japanese women who were fleeing from the war zone in Tunglaio. The advices said four men accompanying the women were missing.

Although it was reported that an understanding had been reached to prevent interference of Japan in North Manchuria, where Russia holds joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, Japanese troops have entered that area and are approaching Harbin.

It was reported that Soviet forces were mobilizing at various points along the Manchurian border. One of these points was Manchuli, scene of military hostilities during the Chinese-Soviet clash two years ago.

The Japanese met little resistance in extending their control to the last of the Chinese railheads at Tunhwu, east of Kirin. They now control all Japanese and Chinese railroad zones in Manchuria.

Casualties in the five days’ hostilities were estimated at 200 for the Japanese.

81

CHINA TO LOSE OUT, EITHER BY PEACE OR WAR
Japan candidly admits intention to have more territory

May involve Russia; observer doubts if expanding nation would be permanently satisfied
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

WASHINGTON – Japanese annexation of Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, by peace, if possible, by war, if necessary, is merely a matter of time.

Only one thing can stop Japan from eventually taking over this region. That is a decisive defeat on the field of battle, either at the hands of the Chinese, the Russians or a coalition of powers.

And the one thing that can prevent bloodshed, sooner or later, over this corner of Asia is a general recognition of what Japan calls her right to make room for her expanding race, plus a peaceable agreement of some sort or other enabling her to do so.

Here is the case for Japan as explained by Yosuke Matsuoka, former vice-president of the South Manchurian Railway, probably the greatest living Japanese authority on China.

Japan proper has only 172,000 square miles of territory. The single state of Texas has more than that by enough to make three states as big as New York, Maryland and Ohio.

Four-fifths of the islands are so mountainous that they won’t grow anything but trees. The tillable soil would not cover a state as large as Indiana. Yet Japan must support 65,000,000 people as against Indiana’s 3,000,000. In another generation Japan will number 85,000,000.

Japan must expand

Unable to grow enough food stuffs to support her population Japan must expand or starve. Unable to produce enough raw materials to supply her industries, she must branch out or see her vital industries go bankrupt.

But in what direction can Japan expand? There is no unclaimed territory. Korea, annexed from China 20 years ago, is already crowded. Japanese immigration is either limited by foreign powers or altogether barred, as in the United States.

Manchuria and adjacent territory, then, seems to be the one possible outlet. Close to Japan proper it has the advantage, also of being easy to defend in the event of war.

Besides, in Japanese opinion, they have as much of a claim on Manchuria today as the Chinese. But for them, they assert, Manchuria would now belong to Russia. It was not the Chinese, but the Japanese, who went to war and drove the Russians from the country at a cost to Japan of a billion dollars in gold and 100,000 lives.

See new war with Russia

Whether the Japanese will be satisfied with Manchuria remains to be seen. If she has to fight Russia again, victory would leave not only Manchuria and eastern Mongolia in her hands but the maritime provinces of Siberia – belonging to Russia – as well.

More than one highly placed Japanese are intimated as much to the writer and ever since 1905, events in that part of Asia indicate the trend.

When will the showdown come? Two years ago, I put this question to a former member of the Japanese Diet. His prompt reply was: “The next time there is a world crisis.” His justification was that “every race is entitled to protect its existence.”

This may or may not be such a crisis. Certainly, both Russia and China seem weaker today than they are likely to be at any time in the measurable future. Equally certainly the great occidental powers of Europe and America come pretty near being hog-tied by their own troubles.

Anyhow the handwriting is on the wall. It has been there since 1894 when the Sino-Japanese war was fought over Korea.

To the militarists who, in the end, generally dictate Japanese policy, the Korean peninsula, just across the straits of Shimonoseki from Japan, is only a bridgehead and a boulevard, leading to a new and vaster empire for the Mikado.

82

Deadlock balks efforts of League

GENEVA – Efforts of the League of Nations to settle the China-Japanese dispute were deadlocked today.

Japan refused to consider League intervention in Manchuria after a plan had been worked out for a mixed commission to study the situation at Mukden. China refused direct negotiations with Japan.

Kenkichi Yoshizawa, head of the Japanese delegation and the world’s smallest diplomat, maintained today that he must await further instructions from Tokio.

Almost hidden by his customary enormous cigar, Yoshizawa held diplomats of the great powers at bay in the debate today. He puffed at his cigar constantly under the severest moral pressure, almost amounting to third degree methods.

Yoshizawa’s face remained inscrutable. Contrarily, the Chinese delegates, who obviously held the sympathy of the council, were very nervous.

Yoshizawa firmly refused to act until his instructions from Tokio arrive. Despite the pressure of council members, he remained suave.

“The honorable representative of China,” he said, “says it is imperative that the council act quickly to save lives. I reply, yes, if men, women and children are being killed, act quickly. But they are not. We must wait until I have instructions from my government.

“I am the first person to deplore the grave events in Manchuria, and intend to reply to the declarations of the Chinese delegate as soon as I receive instructions. China’s demands for repatriations are inconceivable, but I cannot reply to them until I have instructions.”

With Oriental courtesy Yoshizawa, who ordinarily speaks French, used English, because of the slight knowledge of French possessed by Dr. Alfred Sze, Chinese delegate.

Stimson seeking peace in Orient

WASHINGTON – The United States for the second time in two years was engaged today in an effort to bring peace to the Orient.

Secretary of State Stimson has urged China and Japan to cease hostilities in Manchuria and to withdraw their troops. In 1929, he invoked the Kellogg anti-war pact to end hostilities between China and Russia, when those two nations were fighting over the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Stimson talked to Japanese Ambassador Katsuji Debuchi and Chinese Charge d’Affaires Yung Kwai, asking that their governments preserve the peace in Manchuria.

The secretary informed the League of Nations of his action.