90 years ago today.... (9-18-31)

43 
793.94/1834: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State 

London, September 22, 1931 — 6 p.m.
[Received September 22 — 3:50 p.m.]

376.

[Paraphrase]

The Japanese Ambassador here has just called and says that on September 26 he departs for Tokyo aboard the Berengaria to New York. Upon the insistence of his Government Matsudaira has reluctantly agreed to serve as chairman of the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference next February. He states that representatives of the Army and [Navy?] will be in the delegation. In preparation for this assignment he expects to be away from his post here until the convening of the Conference.

The official advices the Ambassador has received pertaining to the trouble in Manchuria are, in his opinion, somewhat disturbing. In comparison with the estimated force of 10,400 men which Japan has in Manchuria he places the strength of the Chinese at over 200,000 and their heavy guns around Mukden alone at about double the amount available to the entire Japanese Army. Matsudaira states that the Japanese Government and that of China, too, in his opinion, are attempting to bring the conflict to an end. As to the concentration of Soviet troops, he is without knowledge, although he is perturbed by such reports in the press.

The action of the Japanese military commander at Mukden was not authorized by the War Office at Tokyo and obviously was without the knowledge of the Japanese Government, according to the understanding of the British Foreign Office. The latter feels that the ill effects of a Chinese boycott upon the industry of Japan will make the Japanese only too anxious to seek a solution compatible with their national dignity.

Answering an inquiry, the Foreign Office considers that any material Soviet assistance to the Chinese is not at all probable.

Matsudaira states it is urgent for him to reach Tokyo at the earliest moment, so he does not plan to stop over in Washington. It would be best for you to send me a cable now in case you wish to see him en route across the United States, so that he could alter his plans.

DAWES

793.94/1851

The British Embassy to the Department of State 

Washington, September 22, 1931.

Aide-Mémoire

The Chinese Government have appealed to the League under Article 11 of the Covenant to intervene in the Mukden affair and the Council were to discuss the question on the morning of the 23rd of September.

His Majesty’s Government and the French Government agree in favouring a proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops and the dispatch of the British and French Military Attachés from Tokyo to Mukden, whither the Military Attachés from Peking have already proceeded. The Military Attachés would act as neutral observers on the spot to verify withdrawal, so that each side might have assurances that the other side were carrying out their part. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops and the dispatch of neutral observers would have the object of preparing the ground for direct negotiations; if these failed or proved difficult, either side might then invoke outside intervention.

His Majesty’s Government desire to inform the United States Government of the action they are taking and they would be glad to learn whether or not the latter contemplate urging moderation on both sides.

44 
793.94/1849: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State 

Geneva, September 22, 1931 — 7 p.m.
[Received September 23 — 12:10 p.m.]

124.

Consulate’s number 120, September 22, 4 p.m.

The proceedings in the Council this morning with the exception of Lord Cecil’s statement at the close, referred to in the Consulate’s telegram under reference, were entirely confined to a series of statements on the part of the Chinese and the Japanese delegates on the Council. The Chinese delegate spoke first. The substance of these is as follows:

CHINA – Sze read two telegrams which he had just received from Nanking. These telegrams outlined factual developments in the conflict area, giving towns occupied, etc. He then stated that the total area which had been occupied by the Japanese troops was as extensive as that of Great Britain and Ireland. He said that these messages gave a very gloomy picture but he was afraid that even so it was incomplete, as the Japanese had cut communication between that area and Nanking, and that he believed the situation to be more grave than at the time he dispatched his note to the Secretary General (Consulate’s 118, September 21, 5 p.m.).

His position was that it had become a question whether application of other articles than article 11 of Paris Covenant might not be required, although this might be prevented by prompt and effective action on the part of Japan. He then brought forward again the steps which he had requested the Council to take in his note to the Secretary General: (1) To prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations, (2) to reestablish the status quo ante, (3) to determine the reparations due to China.

JAPAN REPORTED – Yoshizawa expressed his intention of replying to the Chinese delegate’s statement as soon as he had received instructions from his Government. In the meantime he wished to offer a few observations in an attempt to clear up the position and to determine the scope of the problem. He stated that in order to understand the situation, it was necessary to consider the nature of region where the incident occurred, and proceeded to lay stress upon the enormous Japanese interests there and rights guaranteed by treaties. He called attention to the great disproportion between the small garrison of soldiers maintained there by Japan and the very large Chinese army in that region. He declined to accept the Chinese affirmation that the incident took place without provocation on the part of Chinese troops and added that, according to official information in his possession, the incident was caused by the destruction by Chinese troops of part of the railway near Mukden, which necessitated the taking up of arms by the small Japanese garrison there. From this it became necessary to occupy important points in certain towns in order to prevent further incidents and to protect the railway and the life and property of Japanese nationals resident in the district. He then stated that this incident was not an isolated event but was rather an explosion due to a tension which had been created by a number of earlier occurrences such as the murder of Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers.

Referring to the Chinese demand for reparations, he considered it unjust to make any such claim until the Council had finished discussing the merits of the case. He contended that the settlement of the question of the reestablishment of the status quo ante could not be properly settled except on the spot and by taking into consideration the various factors in each locality.

He assured the Council that the incident was a local one and that immediately after its occurrence the Japanese Government had sent a formal order to the commander of the Japanese forces in Mukden to take the necessary steps to prevent an extension of the troubles. He added that his Government was far from the idea of making war on the Chinese Republic.

He asserted that, according to latest reports he had received, a proposal had been made by the Chinese that a solution should be sought by direct negotiations between the two Governments. He implied that this proposal was welcomed by his Government and added that in his judgment premature intervention would only have the result of needlessly exciting Japanese public opinion and thus impede the pacific settlement of the situation. He expressed the conviction that a pacific settlement could best be achieved by direct negotiations between the two Governments. Finally, in view of the fact that he had not yet received instructions, he requested the Council to postpone the matter until its next meeting.

CHINA – Sze replied by noting that Yoshizawa’s views were personal inasmuch as he had admitted that he had not yet received instructions from his Government. With respect to the accuracy of his own statements regarding the cause of the incidents as questioned by the representative of Japan, he declared that China was quite willing to submit to an inquiry to be carried out by a commission appointed by the League and to leave the entire matter in the hands of an impartial commission. In respect of the case of alleged murder of Nakamura and other cases as being brought forward by Japan as the causes leading to the present incident, he declared they were quite irrelevant, as there are diplomatic and juridical means provided for the settlement of such questions. As to the contention of the Japanese that their recent measures were defensive, he stated that that was not an excuse which could be accepted by the Council, as on previous occasions the Council had clearly specified that no nation could use defensive measures as excuses in such case and that this view had been indorsed by the representative of Japan who was on the Council at the time. In this he referred to the minutes of the 36th extraordinary session of the Council in October, 1925, pages 1699–1709.

With reference to the statement by the Japanese delegate that the Chinese had proposed direct negotiations, he denied this by implication declaring that China would not enter into diplomatic negotiations when a large portion of her territory was under military occupation by another country and further, when that very country had already resorted to means other than diplomatic measures. With reference to the Japanese delegate’s question whether this matter was within the competence of the Council, he declared that he did not think that there was the least doubt on that score, inasmuch as cases of a far less serious nature had previously been taken up, examined and adjusted by the Council.

JAPAN – Yoshizawa, referring to Sze’s contention that he was not acting under instructions from his Government and the information which he furnished was his own, clarified this point by saying that he meant only that he had not received instructions from Tokyo as to the policy he was to follow but that the information he had submitted came from his Government. With reference to Sze’s statement that communications had been cut off from Manchuria, [Yoshizawa?] had asserted that the first news regarding the incidents in question had come from Peiping and that he inferred that the telegram from Peiping was based upon information transmitted from Manchuria. Later telegrams appearing day after day in the press he believed to have been supplied by Chinese reporters Manchuria. Thus, although he did not assert that communications in Manchuria were intact, he thought it incorrect to say that information from Manchuria was meager. He also, with reference to Sze’s statement that the Japanese position was that the consideration of the question did not come within the competence of the Council, stated that what he had meant was that the incident was one which might be settled by means of direct negotiations between the two Governments. He added that he had reason to believe that the Chinese Government was also inclined to settle the question in that manner, inasmuch as he had received official information from his Government that a high official of the National Government at Nanking had spoken to the Japanese Minister to that effect. He added that according to the latest telegrams received, his Government was ready to accept this proposal though he had not yet been informed whether the answer had yet been communicated to the Government of China in that sense. He declared to the Council, however, that his Government was ready to accept this suggestion.

CHINA – Sze, referring to statements which the Japanese representative had said were made by a Chinese official looking to direct negotiations, would point out that at the present moment no direct negotiations were in progress. He implied that if such statements were made on the part of a Chinese official, they were unfounded. He repeated that speaking for his Government the case was left to the Council.

JAPAN – The Japanese delegate contented himself by saying that the Chinese official to whom he referred as making suggestions to the Japanese Minister looking to direct negotiations, was one holding one of the most important portfolios in the Chinese Government and that after mature consideration the Japanese Government is inclined to express its agreement with the suggestions made by this very responsible official.

GILBERT

45 
793.94/1811: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State 

Geneva, September 22, 1931 — 8 p.m.
[Received September 23 — 9:25 a.m.]

125.

Consulate’s No. 124, September 22, 7 p.m.

The afternoon session of the Council was delayed one hour later than anticipated due to difficulty in arriving at previous agreement concerning the terms of the resolution quoted in the Consulate’s No. 123, September 22, 6 p.m.

The Japanese delegate spoke first giving assurance of the purpose of Japan to remain faithful to the terms of its international engagements under the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. He reiterated briefly the statements which he had made in the morning concerning the tense situation leading up to the conflict.

The Chinese delegate followed with a statement emphasizing China’s peaceable intentions and referred to further telegrams which he had received from his Government indicating that the situation was becoming worse and worse every hour and that acts of a revolting character were being perpetrated by Japanese troops. He urged the Council to send a commission of inquiry to the spot at the earliest moment and insisted that the element of time was essential in a situation of this character especially in view of the information he had received to the effect that the extent of the occupation of Chinese territory had not diminished but was being extended.

The President of the Council then requested authorization to take the steps indicated in the Consulate’s No. 123, September 22, 6 p.m. The delegates of Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Great Britain, Panama, and Norway then spoke expressing approval of the action suggested by the President but stressed the fact that it constitutes only a preliminary step which must be followed up by other measures intended to achieve a final settlement. There is no difference of emphasis on the responsibility of the Council and the necessity of safeguarding its authority.

The Chinese delegate accepted this procedure as a provisional measure although it did not get as far as he desired and expressed the hope and expectation that this would be followed by such other acts of the Council as the circumstances demanded. He urged that the next meeting of the Council to consider further measures should take place as soon as possible and suggested an examination of the whole situation “under the auspices of and the control of the League of Nations.”

The Japanese delegate assented to the resolution and stated that with respect to the next meeting of the Council to consider this matter he could not indicate more fully than he had already done the attitude and policy of his Government until after he had received instructions from the latter.

GILBERT

46

The Pittsburgh Press (September 22, 1931)

League to act in China clash

Powers to send commission to investigate Japan’s invasion
By Frederick Kuh, United Press staff writer

Geneva, Switzerland –
The League of Nations moved swiftly today to prevent further hostilities between China and Japan in Manchuria.

The council hastily evolved a scheme to dispatch a commission, comprising military attachés of neutral powers, to Manchuria, to report on the proposed withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory.

Hinges on America

It is believed further developments hinge on the attitude of the United States. League leaders indicated they would ask Washington to participate.

The Japanese delegates were reported opposed to the dispatch of the proposed commission. However, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, chief delegate, cabled to Tokyo for instructions.

The project, suggested by Viscount Cecil of Great Britain, envisages a commission comprising the United States military attaché at Nanking and the British, French and Italian military attachés and the German consul all at Mukden.

Meanwhile, it was hoped both China and Japan would avoid aggravating the situation, and that the withdrawal of troops could be effected without further bloodshed.

Dr. Alfred Sao-ke Sze, Chinese Minister to London and chief of the Chinese delegation to the League, charged Japan with seizure and occupation of part of the Peiping Railway, seizure of Chinese officials and heavy destruction of life and property.

Claims 600 slain

He gave the latest casualties as 600 Chinese killed and charged that 1,000 were held prisoners.

Disregarding the Chinese insistence on the council’s immediate intercession, Yoshizawa demanded that further discussion be postponed until the next meeting. It would be premature to intervene, he said:

Intervention might overexcite public opinion in Japan and thus make settlement more difficult.

47

Russians agree to Japanese drive

Mukden, Manchuria (UP) –
Japanese and Russian officials appeared today to be in agreement over Japanese occupation of Mukden despite reports from Harbin of violent Russian reaction.

The Soviet consul here was not disturbed over movement of Japanese troops toward North Manchuria. Japanese military officials said an arrangement had been made to halt the troops at the Sungair River and that they would not enter North Manchuria.

Japanese deaths in fighting at Changchun were placed officially at 180. There was no estimate of Chinese casualties.

Telegraph lines were cut between here and Harbin but service continued on the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

The Chinese threw bombs at the Harbin branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank early today, but the bombs failed to explode.

Japanese troops today controlled the Supingkai-Taonan Railway, a Chinese-operated line connecting with the South Manchuria Railway.

48

U.S. State Department (September 22, 1931)

793.94/1839: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State

Geneva, September 22, 1931 — 9 p.m.
[Received 9:45 p.m.]

126.

At the end of the Council’s session this afternoon the President of the Council, the representative of Spain, asked if some of his colleagues would meet with him to consider certain steps which might be taken in the present situation. In conformity with this request the President met with the representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China. While this group was not formally constituted as a Council committee it is in effect a committee.

[Paraphrase] It is learned from confidential sources that the discussion centered chiefly on the advisability of sending to the disturbed area an investigation commission of military officers to report on the factual situation; that agreement with this course was expressed by the Chinese representative; but that time to query his Government was asked by the Japanese representative. Now apparently the committee is waiting for a Japanese reply.

It is currently rumored that the committee also discussed the question of an invitation to the United States to take part in this investigating commission and that this course was favored by a majority of the committee members. [End paraphrase]

GILBERT

793.94/1833: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State

Geneva, September 22, 1931 — 9 p.m.
[Received 9:15 p.m.]

127.

Consulate’s 123, September 22, 6 p.m.

The text of identic telegrams dispatched today by the President of the Council to the Governments of China and Japan is as follows:

I have the honor to inform you that the Council of the League of Nations in its session today devoted to the appeal of the Chinese Government based on article 11 of the Covenant with regard to the situation in Manchuria has authorized me unanimously,

  1. To address an urgent appeal to the Governments of China and of Japan to abstain from any action calculated to endanger the situation or to prejudice the pacific settlement of the problem.

  2. To promulgate, in consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives, adequate means to compel [enable?] both countries to proceed immediately to the withdrawal of their respective forces without compromising the security of their nationals and the protection of their belongings.

  3. The Council has furthermore decided to transmit, for purposes of information, the minutes of all the meetings of the Council and the documents concerning this affair to the Government of the United States of America. I hold the firm conviction that in response to the appeal that the Council has authorized me to address to you, your Government will take all necessary measures in order that no action susceptible of endangering the situation or of prejudicing the pacific settlement thereof may be taken.

Furthermore, I shall begin the consultations foreseen with the representatives of Japan and China for the execution of paragraph (2). I have consulted on the decision taken in paragraph (3) with the representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy.

GILBERT

49 
793.94/1831: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland to the Secretary of State 

Geneva, September 22, 1931 — 11 p.m.
[Received September 22 — 9:52 p.m.]

156.

[Paraphrase]

Reference Consulate’s 126 and 127, September 22, 9 p.m.

After the Council’s small committee meeting, I was asked by Drummond to call, and he stated that the committee had authorized him to inform me that it was contemplating sending to Manchuria an investigating body made up of military and/or civilian members as observers. The Chinese representative has given his consent, while the Japanese representative has made objections; however, he will press his Government for instructions. Drummond says the investigation will in any case be undertaken, if necessary under the authorization of China alone, the sovereign in Manchuria.

The small committee also discussed some action through identic or similar notes, though this was felt to be perhaps premature, because of the imperfect knowledge of the facts and of the uncertainty regarding cooperation by the United States.

It is earnestly desired by Drummond that you give me any expression of opinion you can and as urgently as possible by cable or telephone as to whether, if invited, the United States can consider cooperating in the action contemplated in either of the paragraphs above.

The Council is impressed profoundly with the urgency and the seriousness of the situation. Never have I seen here a situation so tense or in which American cooperation is desired so earnestly.

WILSON

50 
793.94/1827: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Nanking 

Washington, September 22, 1931 — 6 p.m.

75.

Your 624, September 22, 3 p.m.

First, the Secretary of State has not made the statement attributed to him; second, the American Government was in no way consulted or informed in advance. You may so inform your interlocutors.

STIMSON

51 
793.94/1820: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva

Washington, September 22, 1931 — 6 p.m.

58.

[Paraphrase]

Your 116, September 20, 4 p.m., final paragraph.

The press has been given no statement on this subject other than the following, which was dated September 19:

The Department is informed from American official sources that Japanese troops have occupied Mukden, Newchwang, Changchun, Antung and Kowpangtze and have taken over all Government services. The reports state that all foreigners are safe.

Correspondents at Department daily press conferences have raised the question of applying the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the Nine-Power (not Four-Power) Treaty of Washington, but a noncommittal attitude has been taken by the Department. See the Department’s 119, September 22, 1 p.m., to the Minister in Switzerland for the Department’s position thus far.

STIMSON

52 
793.94/1940

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking to the Chinese Legation 

Nanking, September 22, 1931.

Today’s Rengo report from Tokyo stating that the Japanese Government has decided to accept the Chinese Government’s formal proposal for the formation of a Sino-Japanese Joint Investigation Committee is not true.

The Chinese Government has never made such a proposal, formal or informal.

53

U.S. State Department (September 23, 1931)

793.94/1854: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State

Geneva, September 23, 1931 — 1 a.m.
[Received 2:30 p.m.]

129.

[Paraphrase]

Certain aspects of the China-Japan question as seen here may assist the Department to understand the situation at Geneva.

  1. The Japanese representative here is very apparently in a most difficult position; I learn on the best authority that such information as he has had from his Government regarding the current situation is meager and almost evasive.

  2. I am told by Sugimura that he sees in the present situation for Japan a fight to the finish between military and civil authorities there and that the obvious plight of the Japanese representative in Geneva is merely a reflection of what is transpiring in Tokyo.

  3. The Japanese representative, I understand, is pleading with his Council colleagues for more time and alleges as a reason that unless the Japanese civil authorities are allowed a reasonable length of time to prepare public opinion, the repercussions of the current situation will bring about internal dangers in Japan.

  4. At present the Council is taking two things into consideration, namely, Japan’s replies on her “policy” and on the proposed military investigating commission.

  5. Privately, the Chinese representative has stated that his Government did not wish to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact, since for technical reasons China did not desire to admit by inference the existence of a “state of war”, understood to be envisaged by provisions of the pact.

  6. The comment has been made that at no time has the Soviet Union been mentioned in the discussion here. However, it is rumored that there is an understanding between Japan and Russia, based upon the latter’s hostility to the present Chinese Government.

  7. The British delegate, Lord Robert Cecil, seized the initiative in the proceedings of the Council and largely dominated the action.

  8. I am having “constant appeals” made to me on the part of representatives here of the world powers, in the strongest and most serious terms, that their Governments look to the United States for action as the chief hope in a situation the gravity of which they consider cannot be overstated.

GILBERT

1 Like
54 
793.94/1837: Telegram

The Minister in China to the Secretary of State

Peiping, September 23, 1931 — 1 p.m.
[Received September 23 — 9:05 a.m.]

631.

Consul General, Harbin, telegraphs:

September 22, 1 p.m. Chinese authorities have informed me that the Chinese troops evacuated Kirin city night of September 21st and that Japanese troops entered city this morning at 8 o’clock.

JOHNSON

55 
793.94/1847: Telegram

The Minister in China to the Secretary of State

Peiping, September 23, 1931 — 2 p.m.
[Received September 23 — 10:20 a.m.]

632.

Following unsigned but apparently from American Consul at Mukden:

September 22, 9 a.m. Civil government in Mukden in process of organization along the following lines: Mayor will be a Japanese; the principal municipal departments will be under the joint control of Japanese and Chinese chiefs; all subordinate positions will be filled by Chinese. Doihara, formerly in Kuantung army, is to be Mayor of Mukden. Difficulty is being experienced in securing Chinese willing to participate. It is planned to have similar municipal governments in Antung, Newchwang, Changchun, Ssupingkai, and Kirin.

Occupation of Kirin city by Japanese was completed yesterday and the Chientao area is being similarly occupied. Japanese do not intend to send troops to Taonan and the Hsingan area, at least for the time being.

As all Chinese soldiers have moved out, the maintenance of order at Huangkutung, the present terminus of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, will probably necessitate Japanese occupation today or tomorrow.

Regular Japanese troops in occupation of Manchuria now number approximately 16,000, not including military police, train guards and civilian reserves under arms.

JOHNSON

56 
793.94/1844: Telegram

The Minister in China to the Secretary of State

Peiping, September 23, 1931.
[Received September 23 — 10 a.m.]

633.

Reuter reports from Nanking, 22nd:

Japanese women and children are evacuating Nanking tomorrow, Wednesday, at 11 a.m. Japanese Consul has requested that due protection be afforded them when embarking.

General Chiang Kai-shek, addressing mass meeting of Kuomintang today, declared in course of his speech:

For the moment we await judgment of the world and we must suppress our indignation and remain calm but if League of Nations and signatories of Kellogg Pact fail to uphold justice the National Government is prepared for a final and supreme struggle. I shall lead the Army to fight for preservation of our race and to uphold dignity of our people. I shall go to the front and if need be fall with other patriots.

JOHNSON

57 
793.94/1850: Telegram

The Minister in China to the Secretary of State

Peiping, September 23, 1931 — 4 p.m.
[Received September 23 — 1:15 p.m.]

635.

From Consul General at Harbin:

September 22, noon. Late last evening unknown person threw bombs into Japanese Consulate, Japanese military mission building, Chosen bank and Japanese newspaper office; but little damage was done. Chinese civil officials very much disturbed and have appealed to the British Consul General and myself for advice. Chinese police so far have the situation in hand.

  1. Reports concerning Kirin city conflicting, but it appears to be intention of the Japanese troops moving toward city to occupy same if they have not already done so.

  2. Soviet troops are no doubt gathering at frontier points especially near Manchuria Station, but no evidence that they have moved into Chinese territory.

Also September 22, 4 p.m.

  1. Local Chinese troops, some of whom have deserted, have been transferred from barracks to outskirts of Harbin, some to the Heilungkiang Province side of Sungari River. This is in preparation for withdrawal in case Japanese troops come to Harbin.

  2. Chinese officials at a meeting this morning decided to take stronger police measures to maintain order in the city.

  3. These officials and a portion of Chinese community becoming bitter against Soviet citizens and Soviet Government as they suspect an agreement between the latter and Japanese Government whereby Japan will receive Changchun-Harbin branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Soviet Government receive financial aid from Japan and compensation in North Manchuria. This may in part be true.

  4. Russian eyewitness states he saw young Chinese throw bomb into Japanese Consulate last night.

  5. A meeting of the interested consular service will be held this evening to discuss local situation.”

JOHNSON

58 
793.94/1836: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan to the Secretary of State 

Tokyo, September 23, 1931 — 5 p.m.
[Received September 23 — 5:53 a.m.]

159.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told me today that the total of Japanese troops in Manchuria was less than 15,000 and within the number allowed as railway guards by treaty. The only places occupied outside the railway zone were Mukden and Kirin. In both places the object was to disarm Chinese who had assembled there. The troops have been withdrawn from Kirin and would be from Mukden as soon as the civil authorities were prepared to take it over.

It seems that T. V. Soong personally made a proposal to the Japanese Minister to suggest a joint Chinese-Japanese commission to investigate the points at issue. This was acceptable to Japan, but the Vice Minister told me that Soong had lost his early enthusiasm and was not supporting the plan with his colleagues at Nanking. He added that the occupation in any case would not necessarily depend upon a solution of all points at issue.

The British Ambassador tells me that Baron Shidehara gave him the same information.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

59 
793.94/1848: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland to the Secretary of State 

Geneva, September 23, 1931 — 1 p.m.
[Received September 23 — 11:45 a.m.]

[Paraphrase]

I delivered to Drummond the message contained in your telegram No. 119, September 22, 1 p.m. Drummond says the reports this morning are still more serious, while rumors indicate Japanese occupation has reached the Great Wall. The urgent desire for cooperation by the United States is steadily increasing, and Council members have been insistent that the United States be urged to cooperate in an active way in the deliberations. Drummond has conveyed in the most tentative way the wish that you could be consulted in regard to the measure of cooperation which might be possible. In his opinion, there are two steps which the United States might consider adopting:

  1. An American to be invited to sit on the League Council – a step which he regards as the boldest and perhaps the most effective possible because of its effect on public opinion in Japan; and

  2. Definite appointment by the Council of a small committee (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, the latter presiding) to be a regular “Council committee”, and a request to the United States to appoint an American representative.

The first step, of course, is subject to action by the Council. In Drummond’s opinion, a suggestion that the United States participate would be accepted gratefully and eagerly, except perhaps by Japan, but the Japanese representative would not dare to protest publicly.

For the second step there is a precedent in the appointment of the Liberian Committee, and while Drummond thought you might find this step easier, he feels the first suggested course would naturally be more effective.

Should you be able to adopt the bolder step, there will be general gratitude and relief on the Continent, especially in France, but I realize, of course, that judgment as to the feasibility of such a step will depend upon the state of American public opinion.

Concerning possible resistance by Japan to American participation, suggesting such participation in deliberations of the Council might help to strengthen the resistance of the Japanese Foreign Minister to military influence.

WILSON

60 
793.94/1852: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State 

Geneva, September 23, 1931 — 2 p.m.
[Received 2:25 p.m.]

131.

Consulate’s 125, September 22, 8 p.m.

Telegrams referred to in statement of Chinese delegate before the Council yesterday afternoon have now been communicated together with additional messages received this morning. These telegrams declare Japanese are extending operations in Manchuria and give some details regarding casualties and extent of occupation. The situation in Harbin is declared to be tense as Chinese soldiers are concentrating after having evacuated other points in pursuance of Chang Hsüeh-liang’s orders to avoid clash with Japanese. The text of a statement issued by Chiang Kai-shek declaring that China has asked League to obtain as a first step the immediate withdrawal of the invaders and to help in finding a peaceful solution of this conflict, was included. He added that the National Army had received strictest orders to avoid clashes with Japanese.

The Chinese Government informs the Council that it is not conducting any direct negotiations with Japan since the case has already been laid before the League.

The telegrams received by Chinese delegates this morning report that relief authorities in China have refused foodstuffs and medicine offered by Japan for flood sufferers.

Does the Department wish the text of the Chinese telegrams referred to and those referred to in Consulate’s 124, September 22, 7 p.m.? They comprise approximately 2,500 words and will be probably followed by others.

Another Council meeting will be held at 6:45 this evening to consider the situation again.

GILBERT

61 
793.94/1853½

Memorandum of transatlantic telephone conversation 

September 23, 1931, 11:20 a.m.

SECRETARY: Is this Mr. Davis?

DAVIS: Yes, Mr. Secretary. I have put in a call for the President. I called on the Chairman of the Council and talked with him. I prepared a cable to the President, promising to call him. I did finish my work on the Financial Committee Monday and he asked me to stay here yesterday and today on this Chinese-Japanese situation. I know a lot of these men and I want to speak to them about that.

SECRETARY: Tell me what the nature [is?]. I have not the slightest objection to your telling me what you find there.

DAVIS: I never in my entire life have seen a situation which I think is so loaded with dynamite and where there is such great opportunity to do something perfectly wonderful. These men here in the Council are trying to battle with the situation. The reports are most alarming. Japan has gone down to the wall and here they look upon it as a conflict between Shidehara and the military clique in Japan.

SECRETARY: I understand that.

DAVIS: I understand you have all the details of this thing. Massigli, who is representing France on the Council came to me and he said there is only one way that I can see to stop Japan now to help overcome the military clique and that would be for the United States to take a very dramatic step here and to come and sit on the Council of the League and help compose this thing. I have talked to Hugh Wilson and they all feel that it would really solve the situation. Here is what I want to do. In disarmament one of the difficulties is how to get a formula on trading with the aggressor which would satisfy us and satisfy the other people. This has been very difficult. In getting a formula in the future, some sort of machinery is going to be necessary and I cannot imagine in a crisis of this kind where the Kellogg-Briand Pact has been violated and particularly where the Nine Power Treaty in China is involved (? a better opportunity than) for us to accept an invitation to work with a committee and sit at the Council. Of course, they are talking about your going on a committee. I think it would be the most dramatic thing. I think it would save disarmament and if you do not do it there is no use of holding the disarmament conference, in my judgment. I could not resist the temptation of doing anything I could to be helpful in any possible way.

SECRETARY: I appreciate the seriousness of the situation and I am now in conference on the telegrams coming in this morning, trying to work out the situation, but as you say it seems to be an issue between the peaceful civil elements of the government and the military, and one of the things that is to be avoided is the excitement of national feeling behind the military elements in Japan. We are trying to work out a way by which we can show our cooperation and sympathy with what the League is trying to do and yet not obscure.

DAVIS: It is a very old thing. It seems to me that it is an opportunity to solve this.

SECRETARY: I know something about this committee of investigation. They have suggested a committee of investigation. I think they have followed a false analogy there. I suggested two years ago a committee of investigation but of a different type. I think to try to impose a committee of investigation consisting of military officers upon Japan in the way that the telegram suggested would excite–

DAVIS: I think the United States should throw the weight of its influence by joining the Council in proposing this investigation. That is what they all speak of. I talked to Grandi and …ast night. They say that Great Britain and France feel that the only way to combat it is to get the Japanese to agree to it.

SECRETARY: I was very much afraid of the kind of proposition they are submitting for an investigating committee by the outside nations to investigate Japan. What has become of that proposal?

DAVIS: It was a committee appointed by the Council that the United States would join.

SECRETARY: I think that would be a mistake. Two years ago I, in the case of China and Russia, suggested an investigating committee of neutrals appointed by the two parties involved. That is an entirely different situation. That avoids the danger of exciting resentment on the part of the two parties involved or either of them. I think this one is a mistake in the form that they have taken and I think it would do more harm than good. I think it would arouse all the national spirit of Japan behind their military people who have gone off on this expedition.

DAVIS: Hugh Wilson has just come in.

SECRETARY: I have been trying to get him all the morning.

DAVIS: I am doing a little irregular thing here. I started this by really putting in a call for the President.

SECRETARY: I have been at work on this here already under the treaties in which my country is a party and I am doing the best I can, but it is a ticklish situation on which I want all the light I can get.

DAVIS: I knew you were working with it and would understand the spirit under which I am calling.

SECRETARY: I have been in conference with my people here in the Department all morning to determine how to show our sympathy with what the League is doing and carry on ourselves.

WILSON: Hello, Mr. Secretary. There are some further developments. The small committee of the big powers is meeting. (1) They have requested Drummond to notify me that they have determined to send a committee of investigation to Manchuria. (2) They have determined to send diplomatic notes to Japan and China.

SECRETARY: Are those notes to follow the form which the Council adopted last year?

WILSON: They have not determined the form yet. (3) They want to know whether you will name a representative to sit on the small committee.

SECRETARY: It sounds to me as if they have acted first and then ask us to sit and accept the responsibility for what they have already done.

WILSON: The only thing they will announce this afternoon is the committee of investigation.

SECRETARY: That is the one thing I am most disturbed about because I think they have gone off wrong on the character of the committee and the source of its powers. Two years ago in the China-Russia trouble I suggested a committee of investigation but I very carefully modeled it upon the forms of the committee which we were using in the treaties of conciliation all over the world, and that was a committee to be selected by the two powers involved in the controversy. It was not a committee from the outside imposed upon those two powers. The present committee, in my opinion, I am afraid will be resented by Japan as an attempt by the outside nations to impose an investigation from without and will ally all of the nationalistic elements in Japan against Shidehara in favor of the military elements which have done this. I think they have gone at it in the wrong way. For instance, they may be following the precedent set in the Greek-Bulgarian case, but that was an entirely different situation. In that case it was the determination of a geographical fact and they could send military officers on the subject to virtually draw a line. Here on the contrary it is a judicial ascertainment of a lot of political causes and I do not think either the method of the choice of the committee or the character of the personnel they suggest is appropriate and I think it would give Japan a very good reason for opposing it.

WILSON: I understand perfectly.

SECRETARY: Under those circumstances I do not think I could dream of authorizing a member to sit on that committee where we would be faced with a fait accompli in which we have had no voice or suggestion. It is contrary to the way in which I have been going at it here.

WILSON: The Council is meeting at 6:45. It is now 20 minutes to 6:00 o’clock. Can I tell your views to Drummond before that meeting.

SECRETARY: Yes, you can do that.

CASTLE: I think you ought to put up your idea very strongly to Drummond immediately on the chance that they might be willing to change the type of the committee.

SECRETARY: I am willing that you put up what I say very strongly and confidentially to Drummond so that he can put it before the committee. I have been at work all the morning here trying to work out a way by which we can assist you without running into your errors. I think they are making some mistakes that I do not want to run into.

WILSON: If it would seem to accord with your line of thought, they will probably call off the Council meeting this afternoon.

SECRETARY: What I was thinking of, subject to the approval of the President with whom I have not yet talked, was to send a cable to the effect that we were in accord with what you have done in the note that you sent me a copy of. That is the one addressed to both China and Japan yesterday, asking them to stop hostilities and as far as possible restore the status quo. This question of investigation in oriental matters is a very delicate one. People in the Orient like to work those things out by negotiation between the two parties and one of the things I noticed two years ago is being repeated here. The action by the outside powers has driven China and Japan together. The papers this morning report that Japan is now ready to negotiate with China. That will follow almost always when outside powers take a hand in the Orient, and you must bear that in mind and you do not want to commit yourselves so tight to a method of remedy to which they do not agree. You may end up by making the situation worse than it is now.

WILSON: I think that is sound.

SECRETARY: I am trying to back you up and yet I run into that mistake. Norman Davis asked me whether we could not have an American sit on the Council. That would have the same objection to which their offer to sit on the committee has. The Council has already acted. We would go into something in which we had no voice in the original statement and furthermore it would run into all of the other objections which exist in America about formal official action on the League. My idea is to cooperate in some wider action having its origin in some treaty provision with which we are associated, such as the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Pact. In other words, it seems to me that probably the best thing I can do is to express sympathy and approval with their efforts in a form that can be used publicly, and to reserve my technical cooperation to pull them out of trouble if they got into trouble.

WILSON: I am going to see Drummond now. If he asks me to explain this to his colleagues is it all right to do so?

SECRETARY: I think you had better do it privately to Drummond. I do not think you had better speak before the committee. Your appearance there would be misinterpreted.

WILSON: But it is a private meeting.

CASTLE: Even from a private meeting it would leak.

SECRETARY: You better talk to the Secretary General or the leaders privately. I do not think we can accept service on that particular committee, nor can we accept service on the Council, but I am trying to think of a way, if the emergency arises, we can possibly accept on a broader basis. The thing most important, because I think it is a clear mistake, is the character of the investigation that that committee is apparently determined to make. I think that is going to make trouble. I do not want that to get to Japan but you can use it with Drummond.

WILSON: Would you like me to call you back tonight after I talk with Drummond and after the Council meeting?

SECRETARY: Yes. Let them understand you have talked with me about my views on which I have not yet talked to the President.

WILSON: I will call you within about three hours probably.

62 
793.94/1855: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva to the Secretary of State

Geneva, September 23, 1931 — 8 p.m.
[Received 10:13 p.m.]

133.

Consulate’s 131, September 23, 2 p.m.

At the very last moment the decision was taken to hold in private the Council meeting this evening.

The following is the text of a letter addressed this afternoon by the Japanese representative on the Council to the Secretary General in explanation and defense of the Japanese position. He requested that this letter be communicated to the President and members of the Council and drew attention to the fact that the entire information covering the period from September 18 to 21 was derived from official sources.

On the night of September 18th, about 10:30 p.m., a Chinese detachment of some 350 men blew up part of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway north of Mukden at a point southwest of the Chinese barracks at Peitaying. This detachment led by its officers was proceeding in the direction of Lungkouchen, between Peitaying and Mukden, when it was discovered by a railway guard patrol which endeavored to stop it but, failing, was obliged to open fire. A battle ensued in which a company of the Japanese garrison of Mukden took part.

In view of the gravity of the possible consequences of such an incident in present circumstances and the disproportion between the Chinese and Japanese forces, the Japanese headquarters at Mukden promptly took such steps as it considered indispensable. At 2:30 a.m. it had the Chinese barracks occupied and the troops who were stationed [there] disarmed; subsequently the open town, the official buildings and the arsenal were occupied.

Immediately upon receiving notice of the incident the troops stationed at Tiehling, Kaiyuan, Ssupingkai and Liaoyang concentrated at Mukden; and the Kwantung staff proceeded in haste to that town at noon on September 19th.

On receiving news of the clash the guards stationed along the South Manchuria Railway took the precautions to protect the track and the safety of Japanese nationals and to deal with any possible attack by the large Chinese forces in Mukden.

At Changchun a Japanese was sent on September 19 to the Chinese troops stationed in the neighborhood of the town at Kwangchengtze and Nanling, to arrange for their disarmament, but the Chinese offered strong resistance to the Japanese troops who had 60 killed and 96 wounded. The garrison of Changchun however was disarmed without incident about noon on the same day.

On the 20th similar measures were taken at Antung, Fenghuang-cheng and Yingkow; various strategic points in the neighborhood of the railway zone were occupied. The customs offices at Antung, Yingkow, etc., were carefully respected.

In the places mentioned, order is being maintained in cooperation with the Chinese, and at Mukden the Chinese municipal police are continuing to discharge their duties under the direction of the Japanese authorities.

In places outside the railway zone the Japanese consuls have applied to the local authorities to provide for the protection of our nationals. As, however, Japanese subjects have suffered serious maltreatment at Kirin, the Japanese detachment has proceeded to that town but has [orders] to return to its garrison in a day or two as soon as calm has been restored.

We have been able so far to ensure the complete safety of foreigners resident in the area under Japanese control. In view, however, of the disquieting situation caused by the presence of undisciplined bands and the attitude of the population in looser [certain] areas, the small forces at our disposal have not been thought sufficient to provide effective protection for the railway lines and for Japanese and foreign residents and the Thirty Ninth Army Corps (4,000 men) was sent to Manchuria from Korea on September 21st.

[Paraphrase] Confidential information given me is that League members who are not represented on the Council plan to pass a resolution, probably when the Assembly holds its next plenary session, to indorse the Council’s action. This plan is intended to be a gesture of support for the Council and of emphasis of the world-wide concern which is felt. [End paraphrase]

GILBERT