793.94/2217
The Consul General at Mukden to the Minister in China
Mukden, September 26, 1931.
No. 449
Sir: Referring to this Consulate General’s dispatch No. 446, of September 20, 1931, in regard to the Japanese occupation of Mukden and to subsequent telegrams reporting the extension of this occupation to all centers along the South Manchuria Railway and to other places along the Chinese lines built with Japanese loans, I have the honor to submit further information on this subject. Mukden and Antung were occupied during the night of September 18th and during the next few days all cities along the South Manchuria Railway lines including Newchwang and Changchun were also occupied. Japanese troops subsequently seized Kirin and Tunhua, the eastern terminus of the Kirin-Tunhua Railway, Liaoyuan (Chengchiatun), Tungliao and Taonan, terminal points on the Ssupingkai-Taonan and Taonan-Angangchi Railways. It was learned yesterday (September 25th) that the Japanese battalion at Tunhua had been withdrawn to Kirin and that the occupation of Tungliao has also terminated. A report of the imminent evacuation of Kirin has also been heard. Indications are that the occupation of further territory is not contemplated under existing conditions. It is evident, too, that reinforcements would be required were the occupied area to be extended. Official information is to the effect that the Japanese troops in Manchuria number 15,000, which number is within the quota of railway guards permitted by treaty (15 men per kilometer). Reservists who were called to the colors, it is claimed, have been released from duty. In the opinion of some observers, the above figure is small.
The pretext for this occupation, as given out by the Japanese, was the blowing up by Chinese soldiers of the South Manchuria Railway tracks near the North Barracks (Peitaying). Consul Vincent visited the scene of the explosion yesterday and his memorandum on the incident is enclosed. The Chinese have denied that their troops blew up the railway tracks and state that the Japanese troops attacked without cause. Like the numerous other incidents which have occurred in recent years in Manchuria, the Japanese and Chinese versions are totally different and contradictory. In this connection it may be added that there is good reason to believe that the Chinese troops were ordered to offer no resistance and according to information believed trustworthy orders to this effect were received over the telephone from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang shortly after 11:30 p.m. on September 18th. The Japanese losses in the attack on Peitaying of two killed and about 20 wounded after four hours of “furious fighting” is sufficient testimony of the absence of any directed resistance on the part of the Chinese.
The immediate pretext, after all, is relatively unimportant. That the Japanese have been preparing for such an eventuality is plain from the rapidity with which the occupation was effected. Since the killing of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese have built concrete turrets or blockhouses at every bridgehead and tunnel on the South Manchuria Railway lines. Prior to that time trenches, reinforced in some cases with railway ties, were only to be seen. Barracks, too, in several places were enlarged in the past few years and it had been reported that the transfer of the headquarters of the Kwantung army from Port Arthur to Mukden or Liaoyang was planned. During several weeks just prior to the occupation, the local Japanese troops held manoeuvres almost every night in the railway settlement and on one or more occasions staged a sham fight to the accompaniment of rifle and machine gun fire. It seems possible, therefore, that the alleged pretext was a signal for action, following, as it did, so closely upon the Japanese Cabinet crisis over the Nakamura case. The present is no doubt an opportune time for effecting a solution of the outstanding questions between China and Japan over Manchuria and the recent announcement of the Japanese Government indicates that this is intended. The Japanese view that Manchuria is vital to the safety and welfare of Japan, a view which is widely or universally held in that country, will probably have to be recognized by the Chinese. Needless to say the situation is charged with possibilities.
The Japanese Government has stated that it regards this occupation as a local issue, one obviously to be negotiated with Mukden rather than with Nanking. The Japanese authorities here are anxious, it is understood, to secure the return of some of the high officials of the Mukden Government who are now at Peiping or elsewhere. Overtures to that end have been made, it is reported, both to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General Chang Tso-hsiang who is now in mourning at Chin Hsien, his home. It is not thought that the latter could be induced to accept the responsibility of forming a government and of handling these negotiations. Marshal Chang, on the other hand, seems to be the logical person for this difficult and thankless task. Unless he accepts it his position both in Manchuria and China is bound eventually to be impaired.
Chinese officials disappeared as rapidly as the occupation was effected and consequently Chinese administration in the occupied territory ceased to exist. However, in interior districts it is believed that it still functions. The efforts of the Japanese thus far to secure Chinese willing to cooperate with them in carrying on the primary functions of government have met with little success. A municipal bureau, with a Japanese mayor, has been formed at Mukden. It has organized a Chinese Police force with an ex-magistrate (Feng Ching-yi) as head, which so far has not been provided with arms but due to the spread of robbery further steps for the maintenance of peace and order will have to be taken. The latest step in this direction was the formation yesterday of a commission comprising nine Chinese ex-officials, among whom Yuan Chin-k’ai, Yü Ch’ung-han, Li Yu-lan and K’an Shao-hsi are the most prominent.
Respectfully yours,
M. S. MYERS
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Consul at Mukden
Mukden, September 26, 1931.
On September 25th, the writer was invited by the Japanese authorities to visit the scene of the explosion on the South Manchuria Railway which occurred the night of September 18th, and of the clash between Chinese and Japanese armed forces which ensued. The members of the party making the visit were Major General Miake, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Kuantung Army; Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General in Mukden; the British Military Attaché and Aide from Peiping; and the writer. Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto, who commanded the Japanese troops attacking the Chinese military camp on the night of September 18–19, was in charge of the party and acted as our informant. Major Watari, a retired army officer in the employ of the South Manchuria Railway, acted as interpreter.
The day before, September 24th, Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto had taken a group of newspaper correspondents and Captain Mayer and Lieutenant Brown of the Legation, and Lieutenant Cranford of the Embassy at Tokyo, to make an inspection of the same nature. As the two officers from the Legation are making reports to their respective offices which will be available to the Legation, the writer will not attempt to give a detailed account of the occurrences from the military standpoint.
Upon our arrival at the site of the explosion, about five miles north of Mukden on the South Manchuria Railway, Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto began his lecture by giving a summary of the violation of Japan’s treaty rights in South Manchuria and irritating incidents in general which have occurred during the past half year. Most of the incidents enumerated have been reported to the Legation in this Consulate General’s dispatches. They included such occurrences as minor clashes between Japanese and Chinese soldiers and police, attempts at damage to South Manchuria Railway trains by placing rocks on the track and throwing missiles at passing trains, insults to Japanese women, et cetera. It is interesting to note that no mention was made of the Nakamura case or of the Wanpaoshan incident although the enumeration was not confined to incidents directly affecting the South Manchuria Railway.
On the night of September 18th, six Japanese soldiers commanded by a lieutenant were holding patrol exercises along the railway. They were proceeding in a southerly direction away from their barracks which were about a mile and a half distant. They had just passed by the site of the explosion when they were startled by the detonation and running back saw several Chinese in uniform fleeing down the embankment. The Lieutenant ordered his men to open fire. We were subsequently shown the badly decomposed bodies of two Chinese in uniform near the site of the explosion. Blood stains along the side of the track were also pointed out to us. Shimamoto stated that for humane reasons the bodies should have been buried but that they had kept them there to prove that it was Chinese soldiers who were responsible for the explosion. Visual evidence spoke louder than words, he added.
Two new rails had been put in to replace the ones damaged by the explosion. Our attention was invited to these but in answer to the writer’s inquiry we were told that the rails which had been damaged had been removed. (The day before a section of the damaged rail was shown to the visitors and Lieutenant Brown gave it as his opinion that it did not appear to be a rail which had seen much use)
The lieutenant in charge of the patrol party sent one of his men back to the company barracks (a distance of one mile and a half) to notify the company commander while he, with the remaining five men exchanged rifle fire with Chinese who were hiding in a nearby field of kaoliang. The company was able to arrive on the scene in twenty minutes because they were drilling at the time. (The day before the visitors were not informed that the company were in readiness when the news was received, an oversight which excited comment because of the time element involved) Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto, who was out on a party, was also informed and brought up the other two companies of his battalion from near Mukden, arriving about midnight. He also sent to Fushun for the remaining company of his command which arrived some time later in the night.
Shimamoto then described the engagement which resulted in the capture of Pei Ta Ying, the Chinese military camp. The camp is located about a quarter of a mile from the site of the explosion, to the north. It is about an eighth of a mile to the east of the railway and is adjacent to and north of the kaoliang field. We were not taken to the camp, the description of the encounter being given to us from a vantage point on the railway embankment.
Shimamoto thought at the time he ordered the attack upon Pei Ta Ying, but was not certain, that there were ten thousand Chinese soldiers in the camp. He had something over four hundred men in his command at the time. Later when the Fushun company arrived he had a total of about six hundred and fifty men. The writer inquired whether at the beginning or at any subsequent time the Chinese soldiers in the barracks took the offensive, to which Shimamoto replied in the negative. The writer then asked Major General Miake, who spoke English very well, whether he did not think it rash for so small a body of men to start an offensive against such overwhelming odds, and whether or not reinforcements were not readily available in Mukden. The Major General stated that at this juncture an offense was the best defence and that the number of troops in Mukden was not sufficient to permit the dispatch of reinforcements. (At approximately the same time (midnight) that the attack was started on Pei Ta Ying, the investment by Japanese troops in Mukden of the Mukden Commercial Settlement, the Chinese walled city, and the arsenal and aviation field, was commenced)
One corner of the camp was occupied by the Japanese after a prolonged and sharp exchange of rifle fire. When the Fushun company arrived, a general attack on the barracks was begun which ended in the complete occupation of the camp by 5:30 a.m. The Lieutenant Colonel stated that although there were reports to the effect that the Chinese troops had been instructed to offer no resistance, he could testify that they had defended themselves furiously. He stated that fortunately he had found a loaded trench mortar inside the camp and that it was only by firing it as [at?] a passage way which the Chinese were defending that he was able to advance to the interior barracks. From the time the attack was commenced until the camp was completely occupied a period of approximately five hours had elapsed. Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto then (5:30 a.m.) personally led an attack on the kaoliang field and cleared it of Chinese soldiers. The writer asked Shimamoto why, since the Japanese had been originally attacked from the field by what they estimated as being three hundred soldiers, he had not attempted to clear it sooner. He replied that most of the Chinese therein had fled when the attack on Pei Ta Ying had started.
Shimamoto stated that about three hundred Chinese had been killed and an equal number captured. The writer asked how many Japanese casualties there were and received the reply that there were two killed and twenty odd wounded.
The party then returned to Mukden. The inquiries made by other members of the party were concerned with the military details of the engagement and have therefore not been included in this report.
Although there is strong suspicion that the Japanese account of the explosion and engagement are not authentic, it will be seen from the above that matters might have been as described above. It is not a convincing account and the carefulness with which evidence is displayed and the story is told tends more to arouse than to allay suspicion. Discrepancies have been found in various Japanese accounts of the incidents but they are of minor importance and might have occurred in any similar circumstances. What actually happened on the night of September 18-19 will probably never be known, unless, of course, one is prepared to accept the Japanese as the true version, which the writer is not.
The events of the week preceding the explosion, and the feeling and desire of the Japanese Army have no bearing on the events as related by the Japanese, but they are particularly pertinent to the unbiased observer. Without trying to place the responsibility for the explosion, the fact is that it was decidedly desirable from the Japanese Army standpoint and quite as undesirable from the Chinese viewpoint. The Japanese Army wanted, openly and anxiously, action in Manchuria. For a while it appeared that the Nakamura case and the Chinese attitude thereto would provide the desired provocation for action. However, on September 16th and 17th a settlement of the case which would have satisfied the Japanese demands seemed to be forthcoming at an early date. (Consul General Hayashi has stated, subsequent to the occurrences of Friday, the 18th, that he could have reached a settlement of the Nakamura case through negotiation within a short time if the explosion had not occurred.) The Japanese Army saw, in the probable settlement of the Nakamura case through negotiation, its opportunity for action vanishing. Therefore regardless of the responsibility for the explosion, its occurrence at the time was most desirable and opportune for the fulfillment of the wishes of the Japanese Army.
It, of course, should not be overlooked that the threat of military occupation was probably responsible in a large degree for Consul General Hayashi’s success in handling the Nakamura case. Furthermore, the Japanese, from their point of view, have had good reason for being irritated with the attitude and actions of the Chinese in Manchuria during the past year. However, while one may sympathize with the Japanese in their difficulties in Manchuria, one cannot condone the creation of a pretext for military action by the Army which, to the writer, seems to be the true explanation of the explosion and engagement which occurred on Friday night, September 18-19.
JOHN CARTER VINCENT