During the Korean War, CIA officers Frank Wisner, Hans Tofte, and Albert Haney continuously sent operators on airborne drop missions into North Korean territory. The issue with this is that it was difficult to know who was an anti-communist partisan and who was a North Korean informant. Additionally if there was a traitor, then the entire group dropped in would all be killed or sent to die in a POW camp. As early as 8 months into the Korean War these three men knew about this major problem that was nearly impossible to solve, yet throughout the war they continued to send hundreds of operators out onto missions with little intelligence gathering for the planning process. So my question is why did they keep doing this and sending hundreds to their deaths? Furthermore Wisner, Tofte, and Haney were sketchy guys before the Korean War so why would they be given such high positions?
Regarding other missions on the “ineffectiveness” side of things, one wild one was where they sent a Native American operative named “Buffalo” into Pyongyang to assassinate Kim Il-Sung. Why would anyone believe a Native American could blend in and walk about through North Korea? Needless to say Buffalo wasn’t heard from again.
Thank you, and keep up the great work Indy and Korean War Team! Also I love the name “Out of the Dugouts” it’s perfect.
I learned a little bit about this about 15 years ago from a Canadian historian who also served in Korea however I may not have all the right facts so forgive me for any errors.
The CIA had been only created 3-4 years before the conflict and was not prepared for a conflict especially one that they were not prepared for as their focus had been on the USSR. What was found out well after the war was that much like MacArthur they had a big chip on their shoulder and senior CIA personnel were vying for political favour and move ups in the chain of command so basically the CIA leadership was basically inept at spying and more focused on garnering favour.
When it came to Korea the intelligence services found out very fast that they had no clue how the local culture was and that local dialects could change literally from valley to valley and cultural values changed just as much. So when it came to intelligence gathering agents that were sent in often found themselves quickly found out because they were woefully unprepared for dealing with the average Korean be it north or South Korean.
Added to all this was the terrain was awful for radio communications as the humid weather often destroyed their communication equipment which left the agents often with no way out. The irony of it was that more intelligence was gotten from North Korean and Chinese POWs than agents sent behind enemy lines.
In the end American intelligence was very ineffective due to inept leadership and lack of knowledge in general of Korea or its people and geography. The CIA especially came out of the Korean War with little to show and there was serious discussions of disbanding the CIA but it was saved by the Cold War.