The Pittsburgh Press (September 21, 1941)
WENDELL WILLKIE AND 1944
By Bertram Benedict, editorial research reports writer
Persons in politics and outside of politics all over the country are asking themselves:
The way Wendell Willkie keeps himself in the spotlight, is he trying to get the presidential nomination again in 1944? Or is he only trying to dictate what the GOP foreign policy shall be?
The difficulty in the way of Willkie staying in the spotlight is that he is in private life. But since his defeat last November, he has nevertheless managed to put himself on the front page by at least four more or less spectacular enterprises.
There was his radio address to the public, immediately upon his defeat, on the rights and duties of a “loyal opposition.” There was his visit to England last January. There was his appearance in Washington the following month to support vigorously the Lend-Lease Bill. And now comes his appearance before the Senate subcommittee, as counsel for the motion picture industry, to defend that industry against charges of one-sided propaganda on the war.
If Mr. Willkie should get elected to public office in 1942, his chances for constant publicity would naturally be much better than while he remains a private citizen. Even so, he would find himself running up against the unwritten law of the Republican Party never to renominate a defeated presidential candidate.
The Democrats have no such unwritten law. Three times has the Democratic Party nominated a man for the presidency who had previously been defeated for that office – Grover Cleveland in 1892 (he had been defeated in 1888) and William Jennings Bryan in 1900 and 1908 (he had been defeated in 1896).
Shun past candidates
But the Republicans did not seriously consider Landon again in 1940, nor Hoover in 1936, not Hughes in 1920, not Taft in 1916. In fact, Landon, Hughes and Taft lost all interest in party politics in the years immediately following their defeat. Hoover, it is true, was almost the first Republican of note to dare attack the New Deal back in its early days, but Hoover made no active campaign for delegates to the 1936 Republican convention.
Defeated Democratic presidential candidates, on the other hand, have often tried to keep their grip on the party machinery. Bryan in 1912 was chiefly responsible for the nomination of Wilson. Even if James M. Cox, after defeat in 1920, and John W. Davis, after defeat in 1924, did wash their hands of politics, Alfred E. Smith stayed in the center of the political picture after his defeat in 1928.
A Smith man, John J. Raskob, remained as chairman of the Democratic National Committee and did his best to steer the Democratic Party toward the Smith policies, notably repeal. Smith himself entered the race for the nomination again in 1932 – not that he expected to get it, but in the hope of heading off Roosevelt. In 1936, he sent an open letter to the Democratic National Convention asking it to repudiate Roosevelt for a second term.
Opposition of Dewey
Unfortunately for any political aspirations which Willkie may still cherish, he has no political organization to support him. The Republican organization in New York seems in the grip of Thomas E. Dewey, and Dewey can probably have the Republican nomination for Governor of New York in 1942 if he wants it.
Even if Dewey doesn’t want the gubernatorial nomination for himself, he is not likely to let Willkie get it if he can prevent it. For one thing, Dewey won’t forget that Willkie squashed his hopes for the presidential nomination in 1940. For another, Dewey has flirted with the anti-interventionist position which Willkie has consistently attacked.
It is true that Willkie had no real political organization in 1940, even if his cohorts were beautifully organized at the Republican convention in Philadelphia. But in 1940, the Republican leaders were largely neutral toward Willkie, who was much of an unknown to them. The Dewey, the Taft, the Vandenberg delegations felt no particular animus against the Willkie crowd, if they couldn’t garner the prize for their own man.
Today the attitude toward Willkie within the Republican ranks is far different. The chairman of the Republican National Committee is Joseph W. Martin Jr., who is also the leader, and a potent leader, of the Republicans in the House of Representatives.
Whenever Willkie castigates the members of Congress, Democrats or Republicans who voted against the repeal of the mandatory arms embargo, the draft and the extension of the draft, and the Lend-Lease bill, he is by implication castigating Martin. For Martin voted against all those measures. If foreign policy is still to the fore in 1944, the Republicans couldn’t very well nominate Willkie without at the same time repudiating Martin and Martin’s leadership.
Landon heard from
Other Republican members of Congress who don’t like Willkie’s slant on the war, and whose slant Willkie doesn’t like, will control many delegates to the Republican convention in 1944. Landon still has some influence, and Landon has hauled Willkie over the coals, for in effect surrendering to Roosevelt on foreign policy.
Of course, if by 1944 the United States should have got itself into a shooting war with Germany, the whole political status of Willkie would change. Then the Republicans in Congress will probably have got behind the President as the Republicans in Congress did in 1917 and 1918. Willkie might then appear like a prophet ahead of his time.
Much will depend, too, on alternatives to Willkie. If Dewey is elected Governor of New York in 1942 and makes good, Dewey will be stronger in the 1944 Republican convention than in the 1940 convention. Taft and Vandenberg, on the other hand, will probably be weaker in 1944 than in 1940. Or will new potential Republican leaders have arisen in the meantime?
Finally, much will depend on whether the Republicans think they can win with Willkie in 1944 and with no one else. Unless all present signs fail, the Republican candidate in 1944 won’t have to face that vote-getter, Roosevelt.