ComTask-Unit 4.1.3 report (November 3, 1941)
USS BENSON (421)
At sea
November 3, 1941.
FB13/A4-1
Serial 23
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander Task Unit 4.1.3
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject:
Report of loss of USS REUBEN JAMES
Enclosures:
a) Convoy and escort stations â diagram of.
b) List of the survivors.
c) Pertinent facts gleaned from all sources.
I.
The following running account of the sinking of the USS REUBEN JAMES (DD-245) is submitted herewith. All the information concerning the disaster is not yet available to the Task Unit Commander, but in order that higher authority may be informed as early as possible, this report is submitted.
At 0530 (UTC+1) on October 31, 1941, the HX 156 Convoy (42 ships), in 51°59â˛N 27°05â˛W, was steaming on course 021 True, speed 3.3 with ships on good order except for two stragglers who were thirty to forty miles astern.
The weather was slightly overcast with a moderate sea running, wind 3 to 4 from SE and the visibility was hazy and dark but you could see other ships very definitely outlined for about one half to three quarters of a mile away. Sunrise was at 0741.
During the previous evening, the convoy had steered 20 degrees to the right of the base course for four hours in the hopes of shaking off any tracking submarines.
The escort for the convoy consisted of USS BENSON (DD-421) (CTU 4.1.3.), USS H. P. JONES (DD-427), USS NIBLACK (DD-424), USS REUBEN JAMES and the USS TARBELL (DD-142). The stations at night were in accordance with instructions as issued in Lant Fleet 9 â and considered the best positions for protection to the convoy during darkness. The stations as occupied at this time are shown on sketch enclosed as Enclosure A. It is believed all escort ships were on station. It is not known whether they were patrolling as orders permitted the Commanding Officer the discretion of determining when it was light enough to require patrolling. The BENSON was not patrolling and it is believed that the REUBEN JAMES was steering a steady course and not patrolling.
At about 0525, the quartermaster on watch reported to me that the TARBELL, RDF guardship, had just obtained a bearing on a vessel sending numbers and long dashes close aboard and bearing 214° True. This bearing was in the direction of the REUBEN JAMES. As this procedure is known for submarines to call others to assist in attacks on convoys, I was immediately interested. I was in my cabin fully dressed and immediately got my overcoat and started for the bridge. Just as I emerged from my cabin, the signalman on watch came running down the ladder and stated that there had been just been a large flash followed by a deep explosion on the port quarter of the convoy. As I reached the bridge, the TARBILL reported the flash and explosion and the NIBLACK reported an explosion and smoke. This was at 0539 at which time the BENSON went to General Quarters.
Using the bridge telephone, I ordered the NIBLACK to investigate at 0540. I then called all escort stations and all answered immediately except the REUBEN JAMES. I made one more call for the REUBEN JAMES and received no reply. I then stated that I was afraid the REUBEN JAMES was in trouble and ordered the H. P. JONES to turn immediately and assist the NIBLACK.
At 0555, the NIBLACK reported men swimming in the water and that she was taking them aboard. On questioning, he informed me that they were from the REUBEN JAMES. At 0612, the H. P. JONES circled the NIBLACK and assisted in the rescue operations.
As soon as the NIBLACK informed me that the men were from the REUBEN JAMES, I notified OpNav, CinClant, and ComTaskFor 4 that the REUBEN JAMES had been sunk by torpedoing and directed the TARBELL to cover the starboard side of the convoy and the BENSON to cover the port side which they both did immediately at high speed.
During rescue operations, both the NIBLACK and H. P. JONES reported sound contacts and were forced to get underway to try to deliver a counterblow to the submarine. The sound contact was apparently not positive.
During the next twenty minutes, the convoy drew away from the scene and the BENSON had three possible sound contacts which were in position for attack, so immediately counterattacks at high speed were made with no positive results except there were no more attacks on the convoy. The TARBELL carried out one or two attacks also under similar conditions.
The Commodore of the Convoy was informed by signal of what happened and he immediately changed course 20° to the right for approximately one half-hour.
The NIBLACK and H. P. JONES reported difficulties of rescue operations due to heavy oil in the vicinity and the necessity for investigating sound contacts. The NIBLACK picked up 36 men and the H. P. JONES picked up 10.
At 0858, when complete daylight was available, a thorough search was made and both ships reported no more rescue work required. I then ordered the NIBLACK to rejoin the H. P. JONES to remain on the spot until 1200 trying to gain contact and at the same time keeping the submarine down. He rejoined late that afternoon. I informed both vessels that the services of the Doctor were available.
Up to the present, there has been only meagre information relative to what happened. The torpedo probably was aimed at the REUBEN JAMES by a submarine either stopped or idling on the surface as he was not picked up by sound. He probably had spotted the convoy during the day and had come around ahead and waited.
The REUBEN JAMES generally took a generous distance from the convoy and he probably came in plain view and steamed right past the waiting submarine. In the semi-darkness, the submarine may have thought it was a big ship but the chances are that he knew what type vessel the REUBEN JAMES was. There was only one definite explosion which appeared prolonged, consequently there probably was only one torpedo. One of the rescued men stated that the forward part of the ship as far back as number four stack had been blown completely off by the explosion and that the after part floated approximately five minutes.
The only survivors who were in the forward part of the ship when the explosion occurred were the helmsman and the boatswainâs mate of the watch. The boatswainâs mate of the watch stated he was on the main deck near the ladder to the bridge. The helmsman stated that the ship was abeam of the center of the convoy on base course when a contact report was received. The captain directed the sound operators to search on port quarter and the officer of the deck to change course to the left. Pinging had been started but course had not been changed when torpedo struck port side abreast number one stack breaking ship in half. Forecastle sank immediately and the after part a few minutes later. At least two depth charges exploded when ship went down. This was timed as 0545 on other vessels, indicating that the after part of the ship went down about 0535 or 0540. These explosions evidently stunned and killed men who were in the water.
Safety forks to Y gun charges were wired to the deck, but had on several times previously been reported as jarring loose by the concussion of depth charges fired by other ships.
The contact report of which the helmsman spoke undoubtedly was the bearing sent out by the TARBELL. If this is correct, then the importance of these bearings especially when close aboard cannot be overestimated. Some means of meeting this menace will have to be devised in order to insure the safety of convoy and escorts to a reasonable degree under the present conditions.
Each night, several bearings of this general type, evidently coming form submarines homing other submarines, are gotten and regardless of the proximity the only thing now available to meet the menace is to wait.
The fact that the REUBEN JAMES commenced âpingingâ just before the torpedo hit indicates that the submarine was lying to waiting and when âpingingâ started he was afraid of being detected and located consequently he discharged his torpedo and got clear.
Subsequent to the disaster, vigorous patrolling on stations was directed for both night and day.
I have requested statements from as many survivors as will throw any light on the disaster and will study then with a view to getting as many facts as possible. Any additional information will be forwarded immediately.
R. E. WEBB
Copies to:
CinClant
ComTaskFor 4
ConDesLant
ComDesRon 7
...........................
CONFIDENTIAL
The following are the surveyors uninjured except where noted:
|
|
|
Appleton, C. L., Jr. |
F2c |
|
Appleton, P. G. |
F2c |
|
Beasley, G. N. |
MM2c |
|
Begley, C. |
MM2c |
Injuries slight |
Bergstresser, W. H. |
CMM |
Broken finger |
Boyd, S. G. |
MM1c |
|
Bridges, B. N. |
RM3c |
|
Bush, R. V. |
F2c |
|
Carr, R. J. |
F2c |
Injuries slight |
Coyle, F. B. |
F1c |
|
Del Grosso, D. J. |
S1c |
|
Delisle, G. J. |
Cox |
|
Elnitsky, J. F. |
F1c |
|
Giehr, G. F. |
F2c |
|
Gorziza, A. E. |
MM1c |
|
Graham, G. S. |
MM2c |
|
Hajowy, J. |
MM2c |
|
Hingula, N. F. |
F1c |
|
Howard, R. J. |
TM3c |
|
Jacquette, C. S. |
F1c |
Injuries slight |
Jaeggi, E. W. |
SF2c |
|
James, V. T. |
M1c |
|
Kapecz, R. T. |
GM1c |
|
Long, G. H. |
WT1c |
|
Molnar, J. |
F1c |
Injuries slight |
Nagle, E. G. |
S1c |
|
Niece, D. |
S2c |
|
Oaks, K. C. |
RM3c |
|
Olexa, S. |
S2c |
|
Phalen, C. W. |
F2c |
|
Richardson, L. E. |
F1c |
|
Robinson, C. F. |
S1c |
|
Rodgers, T. R. |
F3c |
|
Rose, C. R. |
S1c |
|
Sills, L. |
S1c |
|
Simms, L. E. |
WT1c |
Lung infection and shock |
Stencel, J. |
MM2c |
|
Stewart, A. H. |
GM3c |
|
Stewart, R. S. |
S1c |
|
Tate, C. |
EM3c |
|
Thompson, J. C. |
S2c |
Seriously injured |
Turnbull, T. P. |
EM2c |
Internal bleeding, in serious condition |
Tyger, L. E. |
F3c |
|
Westbury, W. C. |
MM1c |
|
Zapasnik, F. F. |
SF1c |
|
|
|
|
Merrell, W. H. |
F2c |
Dead when picked up â buried at sea |
Olmstead, D. E. |
F2c |
Injured seriously â died Nov. 2 aboard NIBLACK. Remains retained on board |
...........................
FB13/A4-1
Serial 23
November 3, 1941
Report of loss of USS REUBEN JAMES
Pertinent facts gleaned from all sources are listed in concise form and appear to be of interest in this case.
-
The REUBEN JAMES (DD-245) was hit by a torpedo at about 0540 (UTC+1) on the morning of October 31, 1941, in 51°59âN 27°05âW.
-
The torpedo evidently hit approximately at number one stack on the port side.
-
The sea was moderate, wind force 3-4, visibility hazy but approximately 1-2 to 1 mile in the early twilight.
-
The explosion was apparently of major proportions. The torpedo explosion may have exploded the forward magazine. One survivor stated the explosion blew off the fore part of the ship back to number four stack.
-
The after part of the ship floated approximately five minutes after the explosion.
-
It is probable that the forward end trapped all personnel below decks and that the explosion stunned or killed those in exposed positions.
-
The NIBLACK rescued 36 men, one of whom died and the H. P. JONES rescued 10 and picked up one body.
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No officers were rescued. Only one Chief Petty Officer was rescued. A Chief Machinist Mate who was probably on watch.
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When the after part of the ship went down, two depth charges were heard to explode in a continuous rumbling noise.
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The REUBEN JAMES was part of the escort for Convoy HX 156 at the time she was torpedoed. Her station was on the port quarter of the convoy.
-
The REUBEN JAMES was on station at the time of the disaster but probably not patrolling.
-
Rescue operations were hampered by the large amount of oil on the water, presence of the submarine, darkness, and hysterical and shocked condition of survivors.
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The convoy was on course 021, speed 8.5 knots.
-
Other escorting ships were the BENSON (CTU 4.1.3.), NIBLACK, H. P. JONES, TARBELL.
-
There was apparently only one torpedo fired which resulted in the destruction of the REUBEN JAMES.
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The submarine was not sighted or detected by any other vessel in the escort or convoy.
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The convoy altered course twenty degrees right.
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Two escort destroyers were immediately sent to investigate and carry out rescue operations.
-
A transmission was picked up by RDF guardship, ther TARBELL, only a few minutes before the disaster and it sounded very close aboard, bearing 214.5 T.
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Immediately after the explosion sound search was conducted vigorously toward attack by all escorts but nothing positive was developed.
-
Later several tentative sound contacts were heard and attacked vigorously in order to prevent more attacks.