The Pittsburgh Press (November 28, 1944)
Background of news –
Transfers of populations
By F. M. Brewer
Compulsory mass movements of minorities, already accepted in practice by the Soviet Union, are regarded by European leaders as a necessary part of any post-war scheme for the pacification of Europe.
Attempts at the end of the last war to solve minority problems by creating new states, by moving frontiers and through plebiscites proved inadequate; groups of Germans living outside the Reich provided their home government with excuses for the series of aggressions that led to the present war.
As compared with 1919 the problem today is further complicated by the necessity of pushing three categories of Germans back into the Reich: old German settles who provided centers of infection in other lands; German civilians who have been sent into occupied countries during the war, and the inhabitants of German territory to be annexed after the war by members of the United Nations.
The removal of “intruded” Germans, and the return to their homes of war prisoners, refugees and laborers deported by the Nazis, will involve a movement of peoples throughout Europe which it is believed will pave the way for other transfers long overdue.
Shift improves relations
Proposals made at Versailles for the arbitrary shifting about of peoples were opposed by President Wilson and other Allied leaders. The exchange of nationals between Greece and Turkey in 1923, made compulsory by the Turkish government, was condemned by British spokesmen as “a thoroughly bad and vicious solution,” and was resisted by officials of the League of Nations. The result, however, was a notable improvement in the relations between Turkey and Greece.
Present opposition to forced migration rests on three main contentions: (1) it would be futile because the mixture of populations in Europe is too great to be untangled; (2) it would ignore economic considerations which should be controlling, (3) it would be anti-democratic and would run counter to the Four Freedoms and the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
The Hitler government in 1939 arranged for withdrawal of Germans from the South Tyrol to meet Mussolini’s desire to “purify” his frontiers, and agreed to an exchange of Germans and Russians in occupied Polish provinces. To prevent expropriation of the property of German nationals under Soviet rule. Berlin concluded treaties with the Baltic States before their incorporation into the USSR under which Germans were withdrawn and their property liquidated.
Moscow recently approved agreements for population transfers made by the Soviet republics of White Russia and the Ukraine with the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Unlike German-controlled migrations, which are enforced on a few hours’ notice and with confiscation of property, those carried out by the Russian government provide in general for compensation for property, those carried out by the Russian government provide in general for compensation for property and adequate arrangements for settlement of migrants in new territory.
Germans pose hardest problem
The first and most difficult population program, it is generally agreed, will be the eviction of Germans from ceded German territory. East Prussia, according to reported plans, is to be divided between Poland and Russia; territory in western Germany is demanded by Holland in reparation for damage to land through deliberate bombing, and by Belgium to strengthen the defenses to Liège.
Older minority problems will be more essentially dealt with since in several cases transfers have already been begun. Among those proposed are the removal of Germans and Magyars from Czechoslovakia, exchanges between Hungary and Austria, Yugoslavia and Romania, and a separation of Italians and Slovenes in territory acquired by Italy at the end of the last war.
The United States as a party to the post-war settlement will be concerned in any European population arrangements and will have a fundamental interest in the relation of any solution proposed to the question of a lasting peace. Advocates of a sterner policy after this war than that adopted 20 years ago maintain that the “sorting out of a few million people may avert another world war.”