Third Washington Conference (TRIDENT)

Churchill meeting with members of Congress

Halifax had invited some 15 Senators and 15 Representatives to the British Embassy for the meeting. Halifax recalls a meeting which took place at 6 p.m. and was marked by a speech by Churchill.

U.S. State Department (May 23, 1943)

Phillips-Churchill meeting, forenoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Phillips Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt asked Phillips to see Churchill and give him his frank impressions of conditions in India. Churchill apparently took strong exception to Phillips’ proposal that Indian leaders be given a measure of authority to deal with domestic affairs. Phillips also relates that he immediately reported upon his private talk with Churchill to Roosevelt during a luncheon conversation with the President.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney Minister of War Transport Leathers
Lieutenant General Embick Lord Cherwell
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Horne Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke Admiral Noble
Major General Streett Lieutenant General Macready
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Air Marshal Welsh
Colonel Cabell Major General Holmes
Commander Freseman Captain Lambe
Commander Long Brigadier Porter
Mr. Douglas Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod
Secretariat
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 23, 1943, 2 p.m.

Secret

Conclusions of the Minutes of the 93rd Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 93rd Meeting held on Saturday, the 22nd May.

Anti-U-Boat Warfare (CCS 241 and 241/1) (Previous Reference: CCS 93rd Meeting, Item 2.)

Admiral Leahy suggested that CCS 241 and 241/1 should each be altered in certain respects and then noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Charles Portal suggested a minor amendment to paragraph 4 of CCS 241/1.

Admiral Leahy read out a draft conclusion with reference to the work of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 241 and deleted the phrase “and that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be responsible for recommending any such transfer” at the end of the last paragraph of page 1. (Subsequently published as CCS 241/3.)

b. Took note of CCS 241/1 and directed that the words “relieve British planes in certain areas” should be deleted and the words “provide planes” substituted. (Subsequently published as CCS 241/4.)

c. Agreed that in view of the fact that the directive under which the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board operates requires them to report on any aspect of the Allied Anti-Submarine Organization in which they consider the Allied resources are not being used to the best advantage, it is not considered necessary that the Board should have any special responsibility laid on them in the case quoted in CCS 241.

Movements of the Queens (CCS 246) (Previous Reference: CCS 93rd Meeting, Item 5.)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the proposals for the future movement of the Queens as set out in paragraph 6 of CCS 246.

Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities (CCS 185/4) (Previous Reference: CCS 93rd Meeting, Item 3.)

General Ismay informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister had agreed to the draft telegram to General Eisenhower, contained in CCS 185/4.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note that the President and Prime Minister had decided that the policy set forth in CCS 185/2/D should be adhered to.

b. Agreed to send the message contained in CCS 185/4 to General Eisenhower.

Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War in 1943-1944 (CCS 244)

The Committee had before them CCS 244 together with an addendum and corrigendum to it containing Annex VII, and a summary of conclusions and a corrigendum to Annex II.

Certain amendments to the paper were suggested and accepted.

Lord Leathers said that Annex VII represented the agreed views of himself, Mr. Lewis Douglas and General Somervell and was a submission of the shipping position for the period under discussion. He and his colleagues believed the deficiencies were relatively small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect would not be unmanageable. The requirements set out in the paper had, in most cases, been cut as far as was possible. The deficiency was only a small percentage of the total. This small percentage of deficiency when taking into consideration the various assumptions, including losses, building rates, etc., was so small that it could be spread and absorbed and gave, in his opinion, no grounds for anxiety.

Lord Leathers then suggested a minor amendment to the note following paragraph 3 of Annex VII, Part I.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the reduced troop lift due to the proposed opening out of the cycle of movement for the Queens had been taken into account – the bottleneck was dry cargo and not personnel shipping.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Lord Leathers explained that shortly after the Casablanca Conference the loss rate had been carefully examined and agreed rates accepted. These were 2.39 percent per month for the first half of the year and 1.9 percent per month for the second half. The present paper had been based on these calculations, though in fact the loss rate so far this year had worked out at slightly less than 1.9 percent. An agreed and accurate loss rate was a most important factor in all calculations dealing with shipping requirements and availability. He agreed with Admiral King that the loss rate should be subjected to frequent review.

Mr. Douglas said that he agreed with Lord Leathers that the deficit with regard to dry cargo shipping was not unmanageable.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, General Somervell said that he agreed with Lord Leathers and Mr. Douglas that shipping was available for the undertakings set out in CCS 244, subject to the slight deficit which he considered could be absorbed by spreading it over the entire period.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to express appreciation of the excellent work accomplished in so short a time by the Combined Staff Planners and shipping experts, both civil and military. All present agreed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 244, as amended in Annex “B” to these Minutes, except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Summary of Conclusions should be taken note of as recommendations only.

Despatch of U.S. Service and Engineer Troops to the United Kingdom

Sir Alan Brooke read out a brief memorandum on the importance of the early despatch of certain service and engineer troops to the United Kingdom. This movement would not interfere with the scheduled SICKLE buildup but was essential due to the shortage of manpower in England.

General Somervell said that he entirely agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s view that the early arrival of SOS and engineer troops was essential to prepare for the arrival of the fighting forces.

General Marshall said that the present plan already provided for the movement of 40,000 men per division which included a large proportion of service units. The required priority could be arranged for early sailing of necessary service elements.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was prepared to accept this movement provided that it was not at the expense of SICKLE, the priority of which must not be disturbed.

Admiral King said that the picture as a whole must be considered. It might prove necessary for the SICKLE movement to be modified slightly in the light of these requirements.

Lord Leathers pointed out the necessity for port battalions for discharging the ships at the landing points.

Both General McNarney and Sir Charles Portal pointed out that SICKLE was an essential prelude to and an integral part of cross-Channel operations as a whole and that the ground operations could not be undertaken without it.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the necessary service troops for the buildup of the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the buildup of the combat troops without prejudice to SICKLE.

At this point Lord Leathers, Lord Cherwell, and Mr. Douglas left the meeting.

Operation BRISK (Previous Reference: CCS 87th Meeting, Item 2)

The Committee had before them a draft report by the British Planning Staff. (JP(T) 17 (Final))

In the course of discussion, it was pointed out that the Prime Minister and President had made it clear that the decision with regard to diplomatic action should rest with them, and had asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement of the military reasons necessitating the occupation of the Portuguese Islands, a military plan to effect their capture and to give a target date on which this operation could be undertaken.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain alternative proposals for obtaining the use of these Islands at an earlier date than that indicated in the plan.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that the British Staff Planners were preparing a statement for inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, which would set forth the urgent military reasons for this operation.

Third Soviet Protocol (CCS 243)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that this matter should be considered after the conclusion of the TRIDENT Conferences.

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Washington, 23 May 1943.

CCS 239/1
Secret

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44

Reference: a. CCS 220
b. CCS 92nd Mtg., Item 4
  1. The enclosed report by the United States Joint Staff Planners, in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  2. The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall “Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan” as set forth in CCS 220, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan for 1943-1944 operations is based on the premises:
    a. That China must be retained as a base for operations against Japan.
    b. That Japanese lines of communication must be subjected to continuous attack.
    c. That Japanese Military forces must be subjected to continuous and increasing pressure to prevent consolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power.
    d. That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale operations when such operations can be undertaken.

H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE

Combined Secretariat

[Enclosure]

Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44

  1. An analysis has been made of possible United Nations courses of action in the Pacific-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in CCS 219. The analysis is contained in Enclosure “A.”

  2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:
    a. Far Eastern Theater

Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.

Air Operations in and from China

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

b. Pacific Theater

Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.

Operations in New Guinea

The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.

Operations in eastern Netherlands East Indies

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.

Operations in the Marshall Islands

Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.

Operations in the Caroline Islands

Necessary to gain control of Central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

  1. Conclusions:
    a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:
    i) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
    ii) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
    iii) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
    iv) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
    v) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
    vi) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

1 Like

It seems to me that the Pacific campaign that unfolded does not really look like what is talked about here.

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Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill conferred together until 2:30 in the morning. It is likely that at this meeting, Roosevelt and Churchill took up the Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems.

U.S. State Department (May 24, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Lieutenant General Ismay
Vice Admiral Horne Admiral Noble
Vice Admiral Willson Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral Cooke Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Streett Major General Holmes
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Captain Lambe
Colonel Cabell Brigadier Porter
Commander Freseman Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Long Brigadier Macleod.
Secretariat
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 24, 1943, 11:30 a.m.

Secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 94th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the 94th meeting except that the conclusion under Item 6 was changed to read as follows:

Agreed that the necessary service troops for the buildup of the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the buildup of the combat troops, without prejudice to SICKLE.

Draft Report to President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered CCS 242/2 paragraph by paragraph and agreed to certain amendments.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that the British proposal relating to the extension of pressure in the Pacific for the earliest defeat of the Axis was, in his opinion, unacceptable since, should the situation in the Pacific become dangerous to U.S. interests or to U.S. itself, it would be necessary to supplement U.S. forces in this theater even at the expense of the early defeat of Germany.

Sir Charles Portal said that the British proposal was not intended to restrict operations in the Pacific but rather to insure that any surplus forces which might become available could be concentrated on the early defeat of Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end more rapidly.

General Marshall said that with regard to air forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to put into the United Kingdom the maximum number of groups which could be maintained there. If, therefore, there was a surplus of air forces he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific which at present was operating on a shoestring and where great results could be achieved by relatively small additions to the forces in that area.

The U.S. Air Staff were more than anxious to implement the SICKLE plan since they believed that air superiority properly applied would produce devastating results. They were reluctant, therefore, to divert forces elsewhere at the expense of SICKLE. On the other hand, in the Pacific the Japanese with their good interior lines of communication could more rapidly concentrate their air forces and it was essential, therefore, to have a numerical as well as a combat ascendancy. No major concentration of Japanese forces had yet taken place in the Pacific; but if this should occur, our own forces might find themselves in a most difficult situation from which they would have to be retrieved. Public opinion in the United States would not permit the acceptance of major reverses in the Pacific. If, therefore, there was any surplus of forces above those required to undertake agreed operations, he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific to exploit and improve our position in that area.

Sir Charles Portal said that he entirely agreed that any surplus forces, which might exist, should be sent to the Pacific, either for agreed operations or to defend the United States; but what he had meant to imply was that if operations in the Pacific were going well, it would be wiser, in order to eliminate Germany from the war, to send any surplus there might be either to the United Kingdom or to the Mediterranean.

The Committee then accepted the addition of certain words to paragraph II b suggested by Sir Dudley Pound [Sir Charles Portal?].

In discussing the subparagraph of paragraph III dealing with the concentration of maximum resources in a selected area, Sir Charles Portal said that the words “in a selected area” might prove restrictive, since, as regards air forces, a saturation point might be reached in the United Kingdom. He believed that if additional forces were available they should attack the citadel of Europe from bases on all sides.

General Marshall pointed out that it had already been agreed that the air offensive in Europe should be intensified without restricting the bases from which the forces should operate. He believed that all the decisions of the Conference must be reviewed at the next meeting or earlier if necessary, since, should Russia fall or make peace with Germany, it would be impossible to accomplish ROUNDHAMMER. It might therefore be necessary to reorient our strategy with a view to undertaking the defeat of Japan prior to that of Germany.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed as to the necessity of reviewing at the next conference all the decisions now taken, since it was vital to exploit any opportunities which arose. The position in southern Europe might well be such that we should take advantage of it.

Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph VII b dealing with the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be amended to make it clear that the decisions reached at the present conference should be examined in the light of the situation then existing.

General Marshall suggested certain amendments to the Annex aimed at strengthening the case, on military grounds, for obtaining the Islands.

In discussing the amendment to paragraph III i of the Annex, which pointed out that the Islands provided the most direct all-weather air supply routes to Europe, Africa and the Far East, Sir Charles Portal said that he would like it to be agreed that the requirements of anti-U-boat warfare must take first priority.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in CCS 242/3.

b. Agreed that with reference to Section IV, paragraph 3 a (5), no additional administrative or logistic commitments would be entered into without the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that the security control agencies of the U.S. and U.K. should arrange for the necessary machinery for the production of deception policy and the coordination of cover plans for operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters (Including Burma).

d. Agreed, with regard to paragraph 3 i of the Annex to CCS 242/2, that when the use of the Azores is obtained, first priority must be given to the needs of anti-submarine warfare.

Directive on Organization and Operations of Military Government for HUSKY (CCS 247)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that consideration of this matter should be deferred until after the TRIDENT Conference.

Provision of New LSI(L)s (CCS 248)

Sir Dudley Pound asked that the following amendments should be made to this paper:

Paragraph 5 b (1), first sentence, to read:

…the allocation for use by the British services of as many Jay ships as are suitable for conversion to LSI(L)s.

The final sentence of paragraph 5 b (2) to read:

…and then after conversion temporarily allocated to British control.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like further time to consider this paper.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Agreed:
a. That certain amendments should be made to CCS 248 as incorporated in CCS 248/1.
b. That action on this paper should be deferred.

Requirements To Expand the Capacity of the Air Route to China

General Marshall presented a memorandum setting out certain requirements to enable the capacity of the air route to China to be expanded.

Sir Charles Portal said that in view of the fact that a directive setting out the priority to be accorded to the expansion of the air route had already been sent to the U.S. and British authorities concerned in India and China, these requirements should also be transmitted to the authorities concerned.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the suggestion at x above should be implemented by the U.S. and British Air Staffs in direct collaboration.

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Vice President Wallace Lord Cherwell
Mr. Hopkins

The following letter of May 30, 1943, from Cherwell to Hopkins indicates the general nature of the discussion:

I was so sorry not to see you again on Tuesday [May 25] to make my adieux, especially as I wanted to thank you for all you had done to make my stay pleasant and profitable.

I understand that the matter we discussed was concluded satisfactorily and I am sure that this is largely due to your efforts. I am very glad, as it is certainly to everyone’s advantage that the old conditions should be restored.

It was a great pleasure to have an opportunity of talking to the President and Vice-President on Post-war topics and I was delighted to find how closely I agreed with their line of thought. For arranging this once again, I am sure I must thank you.

I trust you will forgive this hasty typed note; it will at any rate save you the trouble of trying to decipher my handwriting.

The presence of Wallace, who was a member of the top American policy-making group on atomic energy, and Cherwell, who was intimately connected with the British atomic energy program, indicates that the atomic bomb project may also have been raised at this luncheon meeting.

The Pittsburgh Press (May 24, 1943)

Churchill, Roosevelt resume conferences

Washington (UP) –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill today resumed their conferences which are expected to result soon in final decisions on basic Allied war strategy.

Mr. Churchill and some members of his staff spent the weekend as guest of the British Embassy. The Prime Minister returned to the White House late last night, and went into immediate conference with Mr. Roosevelt. They talked from about 11 p.m. until 2:30 this morning.

White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early said most of today would be spent in talks between the President and the Prime Minister and in periodic consultation with some pf their staff commanders. The two leaders are studying recommendations submitted last week by their naval, military and air staffs.

U.S. State Department (May 24, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 4:45 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 24, 1943, 4:45 p.m.

Secret

Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/3)

The President indicated his satisfaction and that of the Prime Minister with regard to the unanimity of opinion and the satisfactory decisions that had been arrived at by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was particularly grateful that so much had been accomplished in such a short time. He said the Prime Minister recalled that in the last war decisions were made with undue speed. There was no organized group which corresponded to our Combined Chiefs of Staff which was able to provide continuity in the strategic direction of the war.

The Prime Minister said that “today we meet in the presence of a new fact”; namely, what might prove to be decisive progress in the anti-U-boat war. There were indications that there might be as many as 30 sinkings in May. If this continued, a striking change would come over the scene.

The President then read the draft report contained in CCS 242/3. There was complete agreement on all items until he came to paragraphs 6 and 7 under Section III. These were amended slightly.

Section III, Paragraph 9 – Rearmament of French forces

With regard to paragraph 9 under Section III, Admiral King pointed out that the original paper provided only for the equipment of French Army Forces in North Africa. At his suggestion the paragraph was changed to apply to French Forces in Africa.

The Prime Minister said that Admiral Godefroy had received an order from Vichy to scuttle his ships in Alexandria. He had replied that he had definitely thrown in his lot with General Giraud’s forces. As a result of this action the British Government would probably lift the pay ban on Godefroy’s squadron. It was now Admiral Godefroy’s desire that his heavy ships would proceed around the Cape, call at Dakar, and then proceed to the United States for refitting.

Section IV, Paragraph 1 a – Operation to seize the Azores

The Prime Minister said that the political considerations involved in the seizure of the Azores must be considered. There was a possibility that the Islands might be secured without the necessity of utilizing a force as strong as 9 battalions. He suggested that a smaller force might approach the Azores in June. From 7 to 10 hours before its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route. If they were received without opposition, the Portuguese Government would be reimbursed by whatever figure might be set. He thought the chances were possibly 3 to 1 that the Portuguese Government would submit.

The Prime Minister said that he personally favored an expedition in sufficient force to take the Islands. His government, however, had not as yet authorized him to approve such action. The British cabinet members felt that the matter should be further discussed on his return.

General Marshall said that if a smaller force could be assembled in June which would act as a threat to back up a diplomatic approach, he would favor such action. He thought the present success in the anti-submarine warfare made it even more imperative that the use of the Islands be obtained as soon as possible.

Admiral King pointed out that if President Salazar refused to give his assent and the smaller force failed to attack, the Allied Forces would be in a bad position. They would have the humiliation of withdrawing; the Germans would know of the diplomatic approach and, as a result, would stiffen the resistance of the Islands.

The President said that he had never liked the idea of being put in a position of permitting President Salazar to call our bluff. He was inclined to favor the approach with sufficient force to take the Islands in the event that President Salazar refused to permit a peaceful occupation.

General McNarney suggested the possibility of reinforcing the bluff by timing it with the sailing of a Husky convoy from the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister said that the earlier operation would have a good prospect of success as the Portuguese would have no way of knowing how strong the force was with which they were threatened.

General Ismay said that a plan was being examined to see if something less than a full-scale operation could be mounted.

The Prime Minister said that he was content to leave paragraph 1 a of Section IV as it was written, and that he would discuss the matter with his government upon his return to England and let the President know the outcome of these discussions. He suggested the addition of the following sentences to the end of the paragraph:

The possibility of an earlier move will receive further study. The political decision involved will be settled in the meanwhile by the two governments.\

The President suggested that in his discussions with the Cabinet the Prime Minister might bear in mind the alternative of an approach to the Portuguese Government by the USA and Brazil. In any case, the idea that Brazil might provide the occupying force would be a strong factor in influencing the Portuguese Government to submit.

Section IV, Paragraph 2 b – Cross-Channel operations

The President then read paragraph 2 of Section IV regarding the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom and the cross-Channel operations. He asked if the decision as written in paragraph 2 b precluded the use of French Divisions in the assault to be made on the Continent.

The Prime Minister suggested that the use of French Forces might be covered if the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 b could be changed to read “that the follow-up divisions might come from the United States or elsewhere.”

The President said, however, that he was considering the advisability of having a French Division as either one of the 9 assault divisions, or, at least, as one of the first 20 buildup divisions. He thought that politically it was of great importance to have the French represented in the first attempt to reconquer French soil.

General Marshall asked if there was any possibility of this decision being communicated to the French.

The Prime Minister replied that he thought that would be extremely dangerous. General Giraud and General de Gaulle were soon to have another meeting. He felt that this meeting might result in violent disputes. General Giraud had become stronger because of the Tunisian victories while de Gaulle would think, of course, that he was about to regain control. The important thing was not to let these two French generals create discord between the United States and the British. He did not feel reassured regarding the outcome of the Giraud-de Gaulle conference. He thought it extremely important not to inform the French of our decisions when there was the prospect of a split.

The President said he thought it was entirely satisfactory to leave any mention of the utilization of French Forces in the assault on the Continent out of the paper which was under consideration provided it was recorded in the minutes of the present meeting and if it was understood by the Staffs that serious consideration should be given to the participation of some French Forces early in the operation.

Admiral King pointed out that the decision regarding cross-Channel operations, as set forth in paragraph 2 b of Section IV, failed to make any mention of the month-by-month planning that was being undertaken by General Morgan in London for the purpose of insuring readiness on the part of such forces as were available in the United Kingdom in the event of the German crackup.

The President agreed that it would be a good idea to put agreed decisions concerning month by month planning in the report. He pointed out that it was impossible to tell when a break in the German resistance might take place. In the last war the first element of the German Forces to crack was the submarine crews. He felt that at the rate they were now losing submarines, that is, one a clay, the crews would be unable to stick it. German submarine losses in 1918 were not as great as those they are now experiencing and yet they had induced a break in the German morale. Recently airplanes have entered two theaters of operations with definite objectives. These had failed to reach their objective by 10 or 20 miles, but it is known that the reports they rendered when they returned to their bases stated that the objectives had been reached. He thought that this was indicative of a bad state of morale and efficiency in the German Air Force. These conditions were bound to spread. As soon as the German ground forces learned that they did not have adequate air protection and that the U-boat campaign had failed, the news would spread rapidly and a serious break in morale might come unexpectedly. For these reasons it was essential that the Allies be prepared to take advantage of such conditions whenever they might occur. The President also said that there had been rumors of a German evacuation of Norway. He thought that plans should be under preparation to take advantage of such a contingency.

The Prime Minister suggested that a subparagraph be put into the paper at the end of paragraph 2 b of Section IV which would read as follows:

Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date in order to take advantage of a collapse of the enemy in France, or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German withdrawal.

In reply to a question by the President, Sir Charles Portal said that for bombing operations, air bases in Norway would not be of great assistance. It would be more economical to utilize those in England than it would be to build new ones in Norway, especially since Norway would not greatly extend the bombing range. He added, however, that it would have a very beneficial effect if fighters could be based on air fields in southern Norway.

The Prime Minister pointed out that if Norway could be occupied, it would reopen our communications with Russia. This fact, in itself, would make it imperative that immediate advantage be taken of the situation.

The Prime Minister said that the United States authorities would be kept informed of studies being made by General Morgan’s Staff in this regard.

Section IV, Paragraph 2 c – Operations in the Mediterranean to eliminate Italy from the war

The Prime Minister inquired whether the Poles were included in the forces detailed in this paragraph as available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke confirmed that these were included in the 19 British or Allied Divisions.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that it was not the intention of this paragraph to commit us to carrying out particular operations. For example, he would be very much opposed to any idea of an operation to capture Sardinia as a sequel to HUSKY. This would be an eccentric operation, which would have no influence on the securing of the great prize open to us if we could take the toe and heel of Italy, and gain touch with the insurgents of the Balkan countries.

Admiral King pointed out that it was stated in the paragraph that cach specific operation would be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that General Eisenhower would not be able to tell which operation he could do after Husky until the situation had declared itself. The idea, therefore, was to plan several operations and to decide, at the meeting to be held after HUSKY had been launched, which of them to carry out.

The President said that it was certainly difficult to foretell what the conditions would be. For example, it might be that a movement in Sardinia to separate from Mussolini’s regime might gain way, and consequently comparatively small forces could gain possession of the island. Or again, as one report suggested, the Germans might decide to withdraw their forces behind the Po, in which case entry into southern Italy would be easy. It might be better to widen the instructions to General Eisenhower, and to tell him to prepare operations against all parts of southern Europe.

General Marshall said that General Eisenhower would prepare a number of different operations, and which of them was adopted would be determined when we saw how HUSKY went. General Eisenhower had already put in summaries of plans against the heel and toe of Italy, and against Sardinia, and had expressed a preference for Sardinia. Air Chief Marshal Tedder had dissented from this conclusion, mainly on account of the difficulties of staging an attack on Sardinia with adequate air support.

Sir Charles Portal said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had also thought that the value of northern Italy as a base from which to bomb Germany had been underrated.

The Prime Minister said that the prime factor which should be kept in mind was the position in the Balkans, where 34 Axis Divisions were held in play by rebels, who would become much more active if we could gain touch with them through Durazzo, or any other suitable point. Of course, if Italy went out of the war, then the Italian Divisions would have to withdraw, and Germany would either have to fill the gap, or retire to the Danube. The effect on Turkey would be very important. None of these effects could possibly accrue from an operation against Sardinia.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that General Eisenhower would be instructed to prepare those operations which were best calculated to eliminate Italy. It was the elimination of Italy which would place these prizes within our grasp, and the right operation to bring this about would depend upon the situation after HUSKY. Moreover, much would depend upon events on the Russian Front. It might be that the presence of large numbers of Germans in the toe and heel would make a direct assault on this unprofitable – in which case Sardinia would be a better choice.

The Prime Minister did not agree that Sardinia could be an acceptable alternative. Operations in the general direction of the Balkans opened up very wide prospects, whereas the capture of Sardinia would merely place in our possession a desirable island. There was nothing in the paper which would indicate to General Eisenhower that we held a view on this matter. The politico-strategic aspect would not be present in his mind.

The President said he did not feel ready to make up his mind on this matter. Certainly there were greater advantages in going to places other than Sardinia, but he did not think we were ready yet to say where.

Discussion then took place on the exact meaning of the word to mount an operation.

Sir Alan Brooke said that to mount an operation meant to draw up the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. HUSKY, for example, had been mounted during VULCAN. It was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite recently in the HUSKY plan.

The Prime Minister thought that the word mount meant the fixing on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with the same resources.

After some further discussion, The Prime Minister suggested that he should take further time to consider this paragraph, and said that he would propose certain amendments for consideration.

Section IV. Paragraph 2 d – The bombing of Ploești

The Prime Minister said that he hoped the bombing of Ploești would not be carried out if it meant a considerable inroad into the preparatory aerial bombardment for HUSKY.

General McNarney said that the bombers which would be taken from the North African Theater to bomb Ploești would only be away for four or five days. It was the units which would come from the United Kingdom which would be absent for a longer period.

General Marshall pointed out that the type of aircraft to be used was the B-24, which was not of such value for the Husky preparatory bombardment as the B-17. He thought that if Ploești could be seriously damaged, it would be a blow of tremendous importance in support of operations on the Russian Front. The decision depended upon the comments and recommendations of the Commander in Chief, North African Theater.

Section IV, Paragraph 3 a – Operations in the Burma-China Theater

The President asked Mr. Hopkins what he thought the Generalissimo’s reactions would be to these proposals.

Mr. Hopkins replied that he did not think that the Generalissimo should be told of the decisions reached in the Conference. He predicted that if he were told, he would not agree with them, although secretly he would not be unhappy about them. He would resent more than anything else not having been consulted. Mr. Hopkins suggested that Mr. Soong be told tomorrow that ANAKIM is to go on.

General Marshall said that he thought the Chinese would have to be told a little more about the operations than was proposed by Mr. Hopkins. The Chinese were constantly pressing to see him concerning the decisions that were made, and he felt it wise to tell them everything except the details concerning the capture of Akyab and Ramree Islands.

The President said in this regard they simply should be told that an occupation of a base on the Burma Coast by amphibious operations was included in the decision but that the details would have to be worked out after further consideration.

The Prime Minister proposed that the Chinese should be informed as follows:

Further study of ANAKIM has led to the following plan:

  1. A large-scale buildup of air combat forces and a rapid buildup of the air transport route to China.
  2. A vigorous offensive in the northern part of Burma with the purpose of opening the Burma Road and regaining contact with China.
  3. Amphibious operations against the coast of Burma with the view to controlling communications in the Bay of Bengal.

The Prime Minister however, indicated that he would prepare a written suggestion as to what should be told to the Chinese.

Section VI, Paragraph 1 – Equipment for Turkey

The Prime Minister said he wished it definitely understood that the Turks would be informed regarding the origin of any equipment that was given to them from United States production. He felt that the same rule should apply to equipment given to Russia.

General Marshall said that in discussing the paragraph regarding equipment for Turkey, the United States Chiefs of Staff had been concerned more with the availability of the equipment and its effects on our training than they were with who received the credit for giving it to the Turks.

The Prime Minister said he understood the situation perfectly.

The President went on to consider the remainder of the paper which was agreed to in all its details by both him and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister then said that he would like to give further consideration to the paper. He proposed to submit a suggestion regarding the post-HUSKY operations in the Mediterranean and also a proposal regarding the information that was to be given to the Chinese concerning the Burma decisions. He suggested, therefore, that the meeting adjourn at this time to meet again at 1130 on Tuesday morning, 25 May 1943.

This was agreed to.

Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, 24 May, 1943.

Secret

Camp in North Africa for Refugees From Spain

With reference to your Minute on my note at Flag A. The present position is shown in Lord Halifax’s telegram to the Foreign Office at Flag B.

I submit that you should now go into action with the President on this matter.

H. L. ISMAY

[Attachment 1]

Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, May 21, 1943.

Most secret

Camp in North Africa for Refugees From Spain (Flag ‘A’)

At the International Refugees Conference recently held in Bermuda, the British Delegates suggested the setting up of a small refugee camp in North Africa to which refugees in Spain, who had escaped from France, could be moved. The proposal was that these refugees should be moved on to some more distant place of refuge when shipping was available. The reasons underlying these proposals are set out in ALCOVE 305.

The U.S. Delegation to the Refugee Conference felt themselves unable to agree without the approval of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This was sought through the State Department.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that the British proposals should not be accepted for the following military reasons:
a) shortage of personnel shipping;
b) shortage of cargo shipping;
c) additional burden placed on the shoulders of the theatre commander;
d) possibility of Arab resentment to the influx of Jews which might cause disorder.

The Joint Staff Mission took the matter up with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and pointed out how important it was that the only effective channel of escape for refugees of all nationalities from occupied Europe should not be blocked, since if it were, admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government; the Allies would be deprived of useful personnel and public opinion throughout the world would believe that the Allies were making no serious effort to deal with the refugee problem. It was argued further that the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa, far from the Allied lines of communication and under proper supervision, would be no embarrassment to the theatre commander.

It was also pointed out that if these refugees remained in Spain, the Spanish Government would be under continual pressure by the German Government to return them and that the shipping of relatively small numbers from Spain to North Africa would not be difficult.

The Joint Staff Mission suggested that, in view of the above arguments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the State Department and Foreign Office that they saw no objection, on military grounds, to the setting up of an internment camp in North Africa, at a spot to be selected in consultation with the theatre commander.

Later the U.S. Chiefs of Staff informed the Joint Staff Mission that they adhered to their view that it was militarily undesirable to set up a refugee camp in North Africa for the reasons they had already stated.

The Embassy then took the matter up with the State Department and the latter are understood to have suggested to the President that he should override the objections of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This they believe he will do.

The Ambassador was proposing to ask Mr. Hull tomorrow morning how the matter stood. You may wish to await the results of this interview before approaching the President.

H. L. ISMAY

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by President Roosevelt’s Adviser

Washington, undated.

Settlement in Northern Africa: Re Refugees:

The President’s suggestion to look up Italian plans for settlement might bring immediate practical results.

Inquiry to be made as to titles of land, soil and possibilities of compounding water for power irrigation.

If titles are found to be in the Italian Government, matters will be simplified. It will also be satisfactory, if the Italians took over the land from the inhabitants.

I am wondering if the doors of all countries cannot be opened to a few of the refugees. Each one taking a few, would soon take care of many.

The present position of the United States and Britain and the United Nations victories would make the opening up of that possibility greater now than at any other time. They might be persuaded in order to show their adherence to the four freedoms.

B M BARUCH

[Attachment 3 -- Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill

London, 19 May, 1943.

Secret
Immediate
Alcove No. 305.

Following for the Prime Minister from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Personal.

I am dismayed and depressed by the refusal of the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to our recommendation that a small camp should be established in North Africa into which to draft refugees from Spain. This suggestion has long been pressed forward by us, on the most urgent representations from H.M. Ambassador in Madrid, and has, I understand, the energetic support of the State Department. It is our main hope of getting refugees out of Spain and so not only satisfying British and American Public opinion, but also keeping open the escape routes from France into Spain which are essential to our military and intelligence services.

  1. This is the only remaining way of getting our pilots and other prisoners out of France. The reasons given by the Chiefs of Staff for rejecting this suggestion are not very convincing, and should I think be overridden by the higher considerations mentioned. The numbers involved are not large and agreement to open a camp even for 1,000 would ease the situation. It is difficult to believe that this would put any particular strain on shipping, while as for admistration it could be undertaken by Governor Lehman’s organisation or we, as was suggested at the Bermuda Conference, would be willing to run the camp with our own officials. As for last objection, namely resentment on the part of the Arabs this could surely be eliminated by putting the camp in a place sufficiently remote from important Arab centres.

  2. The refugees, even while they are in Spain, have to be fed and maintained to a considerable extent from American and British sources, and removal to North Africa, which appears to us essential if we are not to have a serious risk of the Spaniards closing their frontier tight, is we think the most economical suggestion from the point of view of both shipping and supplies. It must inevitably become known in due course that failure to get the “Hard Core” of refugees in Spain removed to the nearest and most convenient alternative destination is due to American military objections which will hardly be accepted as plausible. In that case I foresee extremely serious Parliamentary criticism.

  3. If you see no objection, I should be most grateful if you could put all this personally to the President – it is our last hope of carrying through a modest suggestion to which we attach great political and military importance.

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Lieutenant General Ismay
Mr. Harriman

Harriman’s memorandum to Churchill indicates that such matters as tank production were considered. Ismay’s presence at this meeting suggests that the British proposal for the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa may also have been discussed. Ismay, who was responsible for keeping Churchill apprised of the American-British negotiations on this issue, urged the Prime Minister on May 24 to “go into action” with Roosevelt on this question.

At this meeting, but quite possibly after their advisers had departed, Churchill requested of Roosevelt that Marshall be allowed to accompany the Prime Minister’s party on a visit to Algiers following the conclusion of the Conference in Washington. The Stimson Diary relates the following information regarding the Churchill request:

Before luncheon I learned that last night in a solitary debate between the President and the Prime Minister over some one of the points in which they both differed and differed vigorously, the Prime Minister… fought to the end and finally said, “Well, I will give up my part of this if you will let me have George Marshall to go for a trip to Africa;” and the President traded on the spot, took the point, and let Marshall go. Marshall told me of it and said he rather hated to be traded like a piece of baggage. I think I know pretty well what the Prime Minister has in prospect. He is going to take Marshall along with him in order to work on him to yield on some of the points that Marshall has held out in regard to the Prime Minister’s desired excursions in the eastern Mediterranean; but to think of picking out the strongest man there is in America, and Marshall is surely that today, the one on whom the fate of the war depends, and then to deprive him in a gamble of a much needed opportunity to recoup his strength by about three days’ rest and send him off on a difficult and rather dangerous trip across the Atlantic Ocean where he is not needed except for Churchill’s purposes is I think going pretty far. But nobody has any say and Marshall is going to pack up his bag tonight and start on his hard trip tomorrow morning on about twelve hours’ notice.

1 Like

Poor poor Marshall subjected to the inhumanity of a trip to North Africa to consider the refugee problem.

1 Like

U.S. State Department (May 25, 1943)

Hopkins-Churchill meeting, forenoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Hopkins Prime Minister Churchill

Hopkins persuaded Churchill to give up his attempt to obtain a radical revision of the Final Report and to settle, instead, for some minor changes. Churchill recalls having been warned by Hopkins of the futility of pressing his recommendations regarding post-HUSKY operations.


Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Lieutenant General Ismay
Vice Admiral Horne Admiral Noble
Major General Fairchild Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral Cooke Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Streett Major General Holmes
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Captain Lambe
Colonel Cabell Brigadier Jacob
Commander Freseman Brigadier Porter
Commander Long Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod
Secretariat
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 25, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

Secret

Conclusions of the Minutes of the 95th Meeting

Admiral King suggested an amendment to Conclusion c of Item 2.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the Conclusions of the 95th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes, but with the substitution of the word “Pacific” for “Indian” in Conclusion c of Item 2 and the addition of the words “(including Burma)” after the words “Far Eastern Theaters.”

Final Report to President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/4 and 242/5)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them CCS 242/4, together with certain amendments suggested by the Prime Minister (CCS 242/5).

Certain other minor amendments were suggested and approved.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as modified by CCS 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion.

Implementation of Decisions Reached at the Trident Conference (CCS 250)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering suggested directives and instructions to General Eisenhower and General Morgan, prepared in the light of the decisions reached at the TRIDENT Conference.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 1 c of the Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered certain amendments to the draft directives contained in Enclosures “A” and “B.”

General Marshall presented a proposal that an additional statement be added at the end of paragraph 1 of CCS 250 to the effect that shipping available for Post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations would amount to 15 combat loaders and 90 cargo ships.

Sir Charles Portal indicated that he thought that before the British Chiefs of Staff could agree to specify an exact number of ships the matter would have to be explored further.

Admiral King suggested adding the statement at the end of paragraph one:

Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.

Admiral King’s proposal was agreed to.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the recommendations in the covering Memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners, as amended, be approved, but that the final directives be prepared by the Secretariat in the light of the discussion and of the latest decisions.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners as amended in the course of discussion.

b. Approved the draft directive to General Eisenhower (Enclosure “A”) and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) (Enclosure “B”), subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives.

Suggested Statement to Be Made to the Chinese (Unnumbered CCS Memorandum dated 25 May 1943)

General Marshall said that since he had a meeting with the Chinese Representatives at 3 p.m. that afternoon he would like guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference should be conveyed to the Chinese. He urged that the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with reference to Burma be presented as proposals since it would be improper to imply a decision had been made regarding the use of the Generalissimo’s forces.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the formal transmission of the decisions to the Chinese should be made by the President and Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

Certain amendments to the draft contained in the memorandum under discussion were then inserted in order to conform to this conception.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved with minor amendments, the suggested statement to be made to the Chinese.

Proposals for Improving Combined Planning (CCS 251)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain proposals for improving Combined Planning.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 2 a of the Memorandum designed to make it clear that the war against Japan should be considered as a whole.

Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph 2 b should be eliminated since, in his view, the function of the Combined Staff Planners was to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff on plans prepared by theater commanders and not to personally assist theater commanders. He felt that the presence of the Combined Staff Planners at theater headquarters might interfere with the function of theater commanders and their staffs.

Admiral Cooke and Captain Lambe explained that this paragraph had been inserted since it was believed that the Combined Staff Planners could, if they visited General Eisenhower’s headquarters, prove useful by imparting information and data as regards resources which would assist him in drawing up his plans and, at the same time, themselves learn at an early stage of the possible plans and requirements.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in CCS 251/1.

Conclusion of the Conference

Sir Alan Brooke said that, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would like to express most heartfelt thanks for the kindness, both official and unofficial, which the British Chiefs of Staff had received during their visit. They had been met in a spirit of cooperation which had proved most helpful. The fundamental value of the exchange of views between the Chiefs of Staff of the two Nations had been proved by the fact that they had agreed to hold the next Conference at an early date. Short periods between meetings were, he felt, essential. If the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent.

Sir Alan Brooke paid tribute to the Combined Staff Planners who had worked at great pressure and whose high standard of work had gone far to assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reaching rapid decisions.

With regard to the results of the Conference, agreement had been reached on all vital points and through the process of reaching agreement, each side had achieved a clearer appreciation of the outlook and conception of the other. Finally, the Conference had strengthened those ties of friendship between the two Staffs, which was so essential to true cooperation in the war.

Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, said that they too had an equal appreciation of the value of this conference and looked forward with assurance to equally successful results from future conferences. Frequent meetings were, in his opinion, essential. It had been a great pleasure to him to assist, for the first time, in personal consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff. This Conference had enabled the Chiefs of Staff to clarify the outlook for the immediate future and subsequent conferences would enable them to deal as successfully with future problems.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 25, 1943, 11:30 a.m.

Secret

Employment of the Poles

The Prime Minister said that he had had a strong appeal from General Sikorski for the employment of the Polish troops in battle in the near future. He hoped that these good troops could be made use of.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the Polish troops in the United Kingdom, which amounted to one armored division and one brigade, had been included in the forces earmarked for ROUNDHAMMER; and the two Polish divisions and certain minor formations now in Iraq had been included in the 19 British and Allied divisions available for further operations in the Mediterranean.

Final Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/4); and Amendments Thereto Suggested by the Prime Minister (CCS 242/5)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported that they were in entire agreement with the amendments proposed by the Prime Minister and would incorporate these in the final edition of the report.

The Prime Minister suggested that it would be necessary to give a version of the report to the Russians. This version could be drawn up in suitable form for handing to the Russians through the normal official channels. This would obviate the necessity for an explanatory telegram from the President and himself. The message could simply be sent saying that a full report would be reaching them through the American and British representatives in Moscow.

The President and the Prime Minister:
a. Gave final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended in accordance with the Prime Minister’s suggestions.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare for their approval a version of the report suitable for communication to the Russians through the normal official channels.

Communication of Certain Decisions to the Chinese

The Conference had before them a suggested phraseology to be employed in communicating to the Chinese the decisions regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater, which had been suggested by the Prime Minister. (Shown in the Annex to these Minutes.)

General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had certain minor modifications to propose (which he read to the President and the Prime Minister), apart from which they were in entire agreement with the Prime Minister’s suggestion.

After further discussion, it was agreed: That the President and General Marshall should make use of the form of words contained in the Annex to these minutes in conversation with Dr. Soong and General Chu respectively, and should hand them copies of the document for their retention.

Official Statement for the Press

The President said that it would be necessary to consider the terms of a statement to be given to the Press at a suitable moment after the Prime Minister had left Washington.

Mr. Harry Hopkins said that he had drafted a statement, and he proceeded to read his draft to the Conference.

General agreement was expressed with the terms of the draft, and Mr. Hopkins was asked to prepare it in final form for issue.

Visit of General Stilwell and General Chennault to the United Kingdom

The Prime Minister said that it would be of very great value if General Stilwell and General Chennault, with their unrivaled knowledge of the Burma-China Theater, could return to their posts via London. He understood that the route through London was actually three days shorter than the route across the Southern Atlantic; and since Field Marshal Wavell and Admiral Somerville would also be going to London, the visit of the two generals would serve to give a great impetus to the work necessary to enable the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Burma-China Theater to be implemented.

General Marshall said that he was entirely agreeable to this suggestion and would issue the necessary orders.

Post-HUSKY Operations

The President said that the Prime Minister would shortly have an opportunity of talking to the Commanders in Chief in North Africa on post-HUSKY policy, and had suggested that it would be of great value if General Marshall could accompany him. He (the President) had accordingly spoken to General Marshall, and asked whether he could defer his visit to the Southwest Pacific in order to fall in with the Prime Minister’s request. General Marshall had said that he was perfectly willing to do this.

The Prime Minister explained that he would feel awkward in discussing these matters with General Eisenhower without the presence of a United States representative on the highest level. If decisions were taken, it might subsequently be thought that he had exerted undue influence. It was accordingly a source of great gratification to him to hear that General Marshall would accompany him; and he was sure that it would now be possible to arrange everything satisfactorily in Algiers, and for a report to be sent back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

Code Names for Future Operations

Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended the adoption of certain code names, a list of which he handed to the President.

In discussion, certain modifications to the list were agreed upon.

The final list as approved has been given to those immediately concerned.

The PLOUGH Scheme

General Marshall read to the Conference a report which he had received upon the state of training and readiness for action of the force which had been specially set aside and trained for the PLOUGH scheme. It was the firm opinion of all the United States and British officers concerned in the matter that this force, which numbered some 2,500 men, should be given battle experience as soon as possible. The force, which had been given amphibious training in addition to the special training for the PLOUGH scheme, had been worked up to a high pitch of readiness, and provided it were not uselessly dissipated, it would greatly benefit by coming into action. It could be reassembled for its proper role before the winter. There were a number of possible places where the force might be utilized, such as the Aleutians, or post-HUSKY operations, or for commando raids from the U.K. or even in the Azores. It was perhaps a pity that they had not been employed in the operations against Attu, but an opportunity might occur for using them in another operation in that area.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that the value of the force would be greatly increased by early participation in battle.

General McNarney said that the improved type of vehicle for use by the force would be ready about the middle of October.

The Prime Minister said that this force had been designed for a particular type of warfare and it would be a great pity to dissipate it if there were a chance of its real role coming to the fore. Nevertheless, he thought that it would be quite easy to create an opportunity for its employment if it was sent to the United Kingdom. It might be possible, for example, to repeat a raid on the coast of Norway of the type of the raid on the Lofoeten Islands.

The President suggested that it would be necessary also to consider the utilization of the Norwegian battalion now in the United States.

The Prime Minister agreed. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter immediately and make specific proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This suggestion was agreed to.

Consultations With the Russians

The President asked whether any steps had been taken to concert measures with the Russians in case of an attack by Japan on Russia.

General Marshall said that an attempt had been made to discuss this eventuality with the Russians, and General Bradley had been sent to Moscow for the purpose. After three months’ negotiation, it had been agreed that he should survey the airfields in Siberia, but the Russians had then reversed the decision and the whole proposal had fallen to the ground.

The President said that the Russians naturally did not wish to permit any act which might compromise them in the eyes of the Japanese. Nevertheless, it would be a pity if the occasion arose and no plans had been made. It might be desirable, for example, to send forces to help the Russians to hold Kamchatka.

The Prime Minister agreed, but thought the Russians would be unlikely to be forthcoming. He suggested that one way of making progress would be to say to the Russians that we would be prepared to send them so many squadrons of aircraft so many days after the outbreak of the war with Japan. We could tell the Russians that they could count on this reinforcement in making their plans. This might lead them on to discussion.

General McNarney said that this proposal had in fact been made, but the only Russian response had been to suggest that the aircraft should be given to them so that they could fly them themselves.

Admiral King said that a running study was in existence of the possibilities presented by a Russo-Japanese war, and this had been reviewed three months previously. Little, however, could be done without additional data.

The Conference took note of the above discussion.

Adjournment of the Conference

The TRIDENT Conference then adjourned, the Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the warm welcome which he had received and his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

Roosevelt-Soong meeting, 2:45 p.m.

Present
United States China
President Roosevelt Foreign Minister Soong

At this meeting, Roosevelt presumably transmitted to Soong the report to the Chinese authorities on the results of the Conference.

Memorandum Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Washington, May 25, 1943.

Secret

Proposals To Be Made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

The following are the proposals which will be made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to operations in the ANAKIM Theater:

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air Route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:
a. Intensifying Air operations against Japanese in Burma;
b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and
c. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air Route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China.

Roosevelt-Churchill joint press conference, 4:03 p.m.

Washington, May 25, 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: (to the Prime Minister) If you don’t mind, I will make these three little announcements first.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Yes.

A long wait here as newspapermen continue to file in.

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, if our old-time friend will pardon me for about five minutes or less, I will give you one or two things that really ought to be said.

Here follow statements by the President regarding certain domestic matters.

And at this point I think I had better go off the record, and turn the meeting over to my distinguished colleague.

We are awfully glad to have Mr. Churchill back here. I don’t have– I don’t have to tell him that. All he has to do is to read the papers, and look into the faces of any American. He is very welcome.

I don’t think we have very much to tell you, except that we are making exceedingly good progress, and taking up a– a matter which I spoke of the other day, the total war – the global war, which considering the– the size of our problems, these discussions have been done in practically record time.

And so I am going to turn the meeting over to Mr. Churchill, and I– I think that he will be willing to answer almost – with stress on the almost – any question, (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in Australia there is a very great fear as to the Japanese threat in that area. What is your feeling about the matter?

THE PRIME MINISTER: The threat is certainly, in our opinion, less serious than it was when I saw you last in this room [December 23, 1941].

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what can you tell us generally about the plans for the future, probably beginning with Europe?

THE PRIME MINISTER: A very expansive topic– (laughter)

Q. (interjecting) Yes, sir.

Q. (aside) Expansive?

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –and one which leads very early to difficult country; but our plans for the future are to wage this war until unconditional surrender is procured from all those who have molested us, and– and this applies equally to Asia and to Europe. It used to apply to – quite recently – to Africa.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that word “molestation,” or “molesting” is one of the best examples of your habitual understatement that I know, (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, could you say anything about how well satisfied you are with the way things are going on the fighting fronts?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much more satisfied than I was when I was here last [June 18, 1942]. (laughter) It was within this– this– not in this room – that the President handed me the telegram of the surrender of Tobruk. And as I have mentioned to him, I don’t think there was anybody – any Englishman in the United States so unhappy, as I was that day, since Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga, (loud laughter)

But the situation is very different now. The– the plans which were made then in June, and before June, and the movements of troops which were set in motion before June last, enabled us to alter the balance of the affairs in Africa entirely. And we opened our offensive in Alamein on the 23rd of October. The United States and British descent upon North Africa began on the eighth of November, and since then we have already had a very great measure of– of success, culminating in decisive victory of proportions equal to any of the great victories that have been– that have been won: complete obliteration of the enemy.

And too, while this has been going on, our Russian Ally who this time last year was subject to very– well, who in June last year was subject to the beginning of a very heavy and possibly deadly offensive by the Germans, and it seemed that they might well lose the Caucasus, has gained another series of successes, culminating in Stalingrad.

And Hitler has been struck with two– two immense blows, tremendous shattering blows: in Tunisia, and at Stalingrad. And from every point of view, we must regard the last ten or eleven months as examples of highly successful war – a perfectly indisputable turning of the tide.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, on this question of Russia. After you spoke to Congress, Senator (Albert B.) Chandler (Democrat of Kentucky), who is from my State, issued a statement saying that while you had promised Great Britain would stay to fight Japan to the end, you could not promise Russia would. Of course, there are reasons for this, but do you care to say anything? In your opinion of Russia’s self-interest, would it lead her to fight Japan after the European war?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Oh well, it’s one of those oversights that I haven’t been placed in the position to give directions to Russia, as he mentions, (laughter)

And I have this feeling, that those people have been doing such a tremendous job facing this enormous mass – they have done what nobody else was in a position to do: torn a large part of the guts out of the German Army. And they have suffered very grievous losses. They are battling with, as I said to the Congress, 190 German divisions – not up to strength, of course – and 28 satellite divisions from the different countries that Hitler gathered around him in his attack on Russia. They are bearing all that weight, and I certainly have not felt that I ought to suggest to my government asking more of them.

But their strength may grow as time goes on. They must know that Japan has watched them with a purely opportunist eye. But it isn’t for me at all to make any suggestions to them at all.

They have been grand Allies; and of course, they have shown it in heroic fashion. They have struck blows that no one else could strike, and they have endured losses that no one power has ever been capable of enduring, and continuing an effective and even a growing factor in the field.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what do you think of the dissolution of the Comintern?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I like it– (laughter) –I like it.

Q. To get back to Russia, sir, are you confident that the Russians will be able to hold out this year, as they have in past years?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I certainly think that they have a much better prospect of holding out this year than they had the previous time. Indeed, I must express my full confidence that they will hurl back any attack which is made upon them.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in the light of developments since your speech to Congress, would you care to make any general statement concerning the experiment of bombing Germany into submission?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I haven’t had very much time to go on with the experiment since I spoke to Congress, (laughter)

We have had the heaviest raid we have ever had, the– the raid on Dortmund (Germany), where 2 thousand tons were cast down upon them with, I believe, highly satisfactory results.

And also, it has been an extremely good week for the United States Air Forces in Great Britain– in the United Kingdom. They– they made, I think, four heavy daylight attacks, which are judged to be extremely successful. Precision bombing in the daylight, of course, in proportion to the weight of bombs dropped, produces a more decisive effect – more than the night bombing, because it goes to more specific targets precise and accurate.

THE PRESIDENT: You know, I think that’s something that hasn’t been brought out, and that is that the night bombing over Europe carries more weight of explosives; but of course, being nighttime, the precision of the actual bombing can’t be so great as the day bombing, which carries less explosives but with more precision because it’s daylight. On the whole, the combination of the two, day and night, is achieving a more and more satisfactory result.

THE PRIME MINISTER: It’s like running a twenty-four-hour service, (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you any comment to make upon relations between General (Henri Honoré) Giraud and General (Charles) de Gaulle?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I have– I am very glad to see that apparently it’s improved, and that there is to be a meeting, judging only from what I read in the– in the organs which you gentlemen sustain– (laughter) –and serve.

But certainly it is – it will be very satisfactory if all this backchat comes to an end, and Frenchmen who are fighting to relieve and liberate their country get together and look forward to the future instead of backward on the past, and think of the great duty they owe to France rather than to any factional interest.

MR. GODWIN: Mr. Prime Minister, the last time you spoke to us you used a term that I have remembered, because you said that you were not going to rely on an internal collapse of Germany, rather would you rely on an external knockout, at that time. Well, since then you have worked on Germany and the Occupied countries a good deal, and there are constantly recurring evidences that the German people may be getting close to “had enough.” We still are working for this knockout, but have you any further light on that for us – on the internal collapse?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I stand pat on the knockout, (laughter) But, of course, any windfall will be gratefully accepted, (more laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, some quarters interpret your remarks to Congress on bombing to mean that other methods, which you said should not be excluded, should be postponed until the termination of the experiment.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Oh, no. That would be a most– a most distorted deduction to draw. I said– I said there is no reason why the experiment should not be continued, provided other methods are not excluded– I mean other simultaneous methods, or current methods, are not excluded.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, whenever you and the President confer, the rumor always goes around that you are about to pick an Allied commander in the European theatre. Could you tell us whether you have done that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Done what?

Q. Picked an Allied commander for the European theatre?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, we have– we have an Allied commander in the theatre that is at present in force in Northwest Africa.

Q. I was thinking of the next one, sir? (laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: No step of that kind has been taken at the present moment, because the great preparations that are going forward–

Q. (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, back to Australia–

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –haven’t got to the point where the executive commander has to be chosen.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister–

MISS MAY CRAIG: (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, this may be an oversight, or you might not have been informed of this either, but I am curious to know what you think is going on in Hitler’s mind now? (much laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have very little doubt that if he could have the past back he would probably play his hand a little differently. I think he would have hesitated long, before he rejected all the repeated peace efforts that were made by Great Britain, which even brought the name of our government into disrepute, so far did we go on the path of trying to placate and appease.

But he then got out of the period where he was restoring his country to its place among the countries of Europe. He had achieved that, but that wasn’t what he was after at all. Appetite unbridled, ambition unmeasured – all the world! There was no end to the appetite of this– of this wicked man. I should say he repents now that he did not curb his passion before he brought such a great portion of the world against him and his country.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you think it’s a sound assumption that he still has a mind? (laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: Do I think what?

Q. Do you think it’s a sound assumption that he still has a mind?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have no reason to suppose that he isn’t in control of his faculties, and of the resources of his country. But, of course, I haven’t the same facilities of acquainting myself with what is going on there, as I fortunately have on what is going on in the United States, (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you care to say anything about Mussolini, and Italy? Is there any hint or news that you can bring us on that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: You know as much as I do about that. I think they are a softer proposition than Germany–

Q. (interposing) What kind of proposition?

THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) softer.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Softer – but I wouldn’t count on anything but the force of anus. It may be aided at any time by a change of heart on the part of the enemy’s country– countries, a weakening of morale.

Italy– nobody proposes to take the native soil of Italy away from the Italian people. They will have their life. They will have their life in the new Europe. They have sinned – erred – by allowing themselves to be led by the nose by a very elaborate tyranny which was imposed upon them so that it gripped every part of their life. The one-party totalitarian system, plus the secret police applied over a number of years is capable of completely obliterating the sense of personal liberty.

And thus they were led by intriguing leaders – who thought they had got the chance of five thousand years in aggrandizing themselves by the misfortunes of their neighbors who had not offended them in any way – into this terrible plight in which they find themselves.

I think they would be very well advised to dismiss those leaders, and– and throw themselves upon the– upon the justice of those they have so grievously offended. We– we should not stain our names before posterity by cruel and inhuman acts. We have our own reputation to consider. But after all it really is a matter for them to settle among themselves, and settle with their leaders.

All we can do is to apply those physical stimuli– (laughter) –which in default of moral sanctions are– are sometimes capable of inducing a better state of mind in recalcitrant individuals and recalcitrant nations, (more laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there has been a lot of interest in the experts from India you brought with you. Would you care to comment about the situation in India, or China?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I am very anxious to increase the intensity of the war effort against Japan, and therefore brought these commanders-in-chief in order that they could meet with the United States officers, and particularly with those who have been serving with such effect in China, like General (Claire) Chennault and General (Joseph W.) Stilwell, and the high officers here, because it is evident that the war in that theatre must be prosecuted with the very greatest vigor, and on the best lines. And we have been talking a great deal about that, and thinking a great deal, and have arrived at conclusions which I believe are sound – are good.

When I was here – when I saw you last in– in December 1941, or January 1942 – I forget which it was– when I did, of course, this question of priority – which was first and which was second of the two great theatres and antagonists – assumed a much more sharp form than at the present time. Our resources have greatly expanded. If the war continues on both fronts the war will be waged with equal force as our resources grow. Instead of being consecutive our efforts will be concurrent, and that great degree of effort will be capable of being applied at the same time in both directions. They have been already applied.

The forces that we have are becoming very respectable in munitions, and in men trained to war of all kinds; but as I pointed out to Congress, the problem is one of application, and that problem of application is limited by distance, and the U-boat war, the amount of shipping, the character of the communications, the vast distances of the ocean. Our forces are growing and gathering their ambition, but to apply it is a matter of time, and it is exceedingly difficult to apply.

But we follow out this principle, that all soldiers must be engaged, and ships and airplanes must be engaged on the widest possible fronts, the broadest possible superficies, and maintain the fighting with the utmost intensity, because we are the stronger animal; we are the stronger combination; we are shaking the life out of the enemy; and as we are able to continue, we will not give him a moment’s surcease.

This is particularly true of the air, where they are already beginning to fail to keep up at all to the necessary strength on the various fronts. Neither Japan nor Germany is able to maintain equality with Britain, the United States and Russia on all the fronts.

Still less are they able to do so in the field of production. Immense plurality – the superiority of production – is on our side. And although it takes a certain number of months after planes are made before they come into action – perhaps a good many months, having regard to all the distances to be covered, and to the large ground staffs that have to be transported – but in spite of that, at the end of certain periods, the great superiority in numbers of our manufacture and of our trading is bound to have effect, which so far as the air war is concerned will be decisive.

Whether the ending of the air war – the deciding of the air war will entail a similar ending of the other forms of warfare has yet to be seen. But the air was the weapon these people chose to subjugate the world.

Q. (interjecting) That’s right.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) This was the weapon they struck at Pearl Harbor with. This was the weapon with which they boasted– the Germans boasted they would terrorize all the countries of the world. And it is an example of poetic justice that this should be the weapon in which they should find themselves most out-matched and first outmatched in the ensuing struggle.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you anything to say about the submarine side of the situation?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much encouraged by all that has happened there since the turn of the year. Really, it has been– it has been very encouraging. The– the output from the United States’ shipyards is prodigious and has fulfilled all hopes, hopes which, when the– the plans were first made and published, seemed to be excessive. But they have been made good. The movement of supplies across the ocean has been on an increasing scale. The surplus of– of new building over sinkings over the last six months has been substantial, especially in the later months; and the killings of U-boats have improved and reached a very high pitch – never better than in the last month.

MR. GODWIN: What was that word, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) Killings.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Killings–

MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –of U-boats. I mean the killings of U-boats by our forces.

MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) That is due, of course, to the increasing numbers of U-boats,–

MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) –but it is also due to the improved methods, and some wonderful things– wonderful things that have been thought of on both sides of the Atlantic. And, of course, we interchange everything immediately. Anything we have we share and bring into action. A lot of clever people are thinking a lot about these things.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there is– there is a great deal more confidence in the Allied commanders in the field than there was a year ago. Would you care to comment on that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, they have had a chance to come into action on reasonable terms. Indeed, on advantageous terms, because we– we struck with superior forces at the right spot. We– as your Conferedate general (Nathan Bedford Forrest, a Cavalry commander in the Civil War) used to say:

We got there firstest with the mostest.

(laughter)

MR. GODWIN: (aside) That’s right.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) And also, because our troops have – since I was here last – been equipped with all the best weapons. You have only got to turn the industry of the United States and Britain over from peace to war. It undoubtedly takes a couple of years or more to get it running, but when it does run it gives you a flow of weapons which certainly neither Germany nor Japan possibly can beat us.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, would you undertake to make a prediction on the progress of the war for the rest of this year? I have in mind your– this statement you and the President made at Casablanca, on new and heavier blows against all of the Axis members in 1943?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think– I think that seems to be a very sound prediction, and couched in terms which are unexceptionable from the point of view of military security, (laughter)

Q. Thank you very much, sir.

Q. Thank you.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Thank you very much.

The newspapermen started to leave rather slowly, and the Prime Minister climbed onto his chair and gave the “V” for Victory sign with his fingers, which was accompanied by much applause.

THE PRESIDENT: May I say one word, please? Don’t get the idea that the conferences are concluded. They are not. They are continuing. (laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: We have a lot of ground to cover.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Thank you.

1 Like

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

The meeting was given over to a prolonged consideration of several drafts of a message to Stalin on the results of the conference. Finally, at 2 a.m., it was agreed that Churchill would take the draft message with him and work on it during his flight to Newfoundland en route to Africa. Marshall appeared at the meeting and was persuaded to accompany Churchill on his flight and help prepare the draft message to Stalin.

Draft Message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin

Washington, May 25, 1943.

Secret

Upon the conclusion of the conferences which we have been holding in Washington with our combined military staffs, we think it proper that the following comprehensive report concerning our decisions should be sent to you.

Throughout our conferences full recognition was given to the most important part which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is playing in the defeat of the European Axis Powers. Nearly all of the decisions enumerated below were made only after they had been measured against the yardstick of their aid to your country’s war effort. Briefly, our decisions may be summarized as follows:

Overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

a. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.

b. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

c. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

d. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

e. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

Specific operations for 1943-44 in execution of overall strategic concept

a. Certain detailed operations were decided upon to combat the U-boat menace. These operations, we feel certain, will enable us to increase our capacity to transport troops and supplies to active theaters and to our allies.

b. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE.
We have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

c. CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS.
We have resolved: That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting a large-scale operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. French forces from North Africa may be represented in the initial assault or in the immediate build-up.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the buildup forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the fastest possible rate.

Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date to take advantage of a collapse in France or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in case of a German withdrawal.

d. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
We have resolved to conduct such operations in exploitation of the forthcoming operation, of which you are aware, as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Alternative plans are to be prepared at once. Specific operations will be determined upon in the light of the situation developing from the coming operations. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for these operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom.

e. OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN.
Our plans also provide for extensive operations against Japan in the Far Eastern and Pacific Theaters. While these operations will, of necessity, have repercussions on our efforts in the European Theater, they are within the scope of the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war as set forth above.

Availability of resources to meet the requirements of our specific undertakings

After full and careful examination, we have found that the above operations utilize our resources to the full. It has been our earnest desire to make the utmost use of our resources wherever they can be brought to bear upon the enemy and we believe that our object has been fulfilled in the statement of operations as set out above.

It appears likely that it was also at this meeting that Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the resumption of the exchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom on the atomic bomb project. Churchill received messages from London during the Conference regarding the increased urgency of restored American-British collaboration in this field.

At this meeting Roosevelt and Churchill also apparently sought to perfect a draft joint statement or final conference communiqué.

Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, May 25, 1943.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on:
A. The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
B. The war in China – southern Asia
C. War in the Near East
D. War in all parts of the Mediterranean
E. War in the Atlantic N.-South

All related to each other in regard to transportation.

After successful completion of N. African campaign one phase of the Casablanca plans was completed and the next phase was initiated.

The need of a further staff conference was therefore clear in order to take up further steps. And the C. C. of S. has agreed on further steps in the overall planning.

It is important to state that these further steps included every theatre of the war.

This phase of the conduct of war affairs [is?] in a more satisfactory condition than when the C. C. of S. met in Casablanca.

This integrated with anti-submarine campaign which is showing greater success last month.

The Pres, the Prime Minister and the staffs also discussed in greater detail the temporary civil–military organization to be put into effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Jap occupied territories are freed.

Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, May 25, 1943.

The complete destruction of the Nazi Afrika Korps and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, are proceeding satisfactorily. Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore, the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.

They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. It is important to state that the operations which have been agreed to include every theater of war all over the world.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on:
a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
b) The war in China and Southern Asia
c) The war in the Near East
d) The war in all parts of the Mediterranean
e) The war in the North and South Atlantic
f) The war in Europe

All of these plans are related to each other in regard to shipping, air support and the command of the seas by our navies.

The state of the war at this time is in a far more satisfactory condition than when the Chiefs of Staff met with the President and the Prime Minister in Casablanca. The unrelenting anti U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated.

The vast production of war materials assures the United Nations of weapons with which to destroy the enemy.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed with the Chiefs of Staff the temporary civil and military organizations to be put in effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.

A complete report of the conference has been sent to Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

Statement by President Roosevelt

Washington, May 25, 1943.

The recent conference of the Combined Staffs in Washington has ended in complete agreement on future operations in all theatres of the war.

To be given out in Washington on arrival of Prime Minister in TORCH.

TRIDENT: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Washington, 25 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 242/6
Secret

In a previous memorandum (CCS 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

Overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

  1. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

  2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

  3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

  1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

  2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

  3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.

  4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

  5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

  6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

  7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

  8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

  9. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

Specific operations for 1943-44 in execution of overall strategic concept

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE U-BOAT WAR

a. Operation to Seize the Azores Islands
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be settled by the two Governments.

b. Other Anti-U-boat Measures
All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken.

c. Flexibility of Forces
The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

a. Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
2 Infantry Divisions – Follow-up.
2 Airborne Divisions.
Total 9 Divisions in the Assault.
Buildup: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.
Total 29 Divisions.

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.

c. Operations in the Mediterranean to Eliminate Italy from the War
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean area subsequent to HUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

d. Bombing of Ploești
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U.S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

a. Operations in the Burma-China Theater
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

  1. The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam–Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:
    a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
    b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and
    c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

  2. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

  3. The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

  4. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

  5. The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

b. Operations in the Pacific
Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

  1. Conduct of air operations in and from China.
  2. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
  3. Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
  4. Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese-held New Guinea.
  5. Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

Availability of resources to meet the requirements of basic undertakings and specific operations in execution of overall strategic concept 1943-44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

Ground Forces

  1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

Naval Forces

  1. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces

  1. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

  2. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

  3. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

  4. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft

  1. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

Supply of Critical Items

  1. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

Shipping

  1. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943-1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil

  1. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.

Conclusions on miscellaneous subjects

Equipment for Turkey

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

Re-Arming of the French in North Africa

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U.S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

Other conferences

  1. Decisions of the Casablanca Conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

  2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

Annex

Advantages To Be Gained by the Use of the Azores

  1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for the U.S.-U.K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage. There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the U.S. Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the Azores as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.

  2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:
    a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira for operating VLR aircraft;
    b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal.

  3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:
    a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:
    (1) USA or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
    (2) West Indies and the U.K.;
    (3) South America and the U.K.;
    (4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
    (5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U–boats were concentrated in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route.

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U–boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting, refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from USA to Europe, Africa, and the Far East.