500 brought back to U.S. hospital suffer same symptoms – they’re jumpy, fear noise and weep easily
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Ickes incensed at costs that are ‘out of reason’ and promises thorough study
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U.S. State Department (May 23, 1943)
Washington, 23 May 1943.
CCS 239/1
Secret
| Reference: | a. CCS 220 |
| b. CCS 92nd Mtg., Item 4 |
The enclosed report by the United States Joint Staff Planners, in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall “Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan” as set forth in CCS 220, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan for 1943-1944 operations is based on the premises:
a. That China must be retained as a base for operations against Japan.
b. That Japanese lines of communication must be subjected to continuous attack.
c. That Japanese Military forces must be subjected to continuous and increasing pressure to prevent consolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power.
d. That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale operations when such operations can be undertaken.
H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE
Combined Secretariat
[Enclosure]
An analysis has been made of possible United Nations courses of action in the Pacific-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in CCS 219. The analysis is contained in Enclosure “A.”
The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:
a. Far Eastern Theater
Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.
Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.
b. Pacific Theater
Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.
The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.
Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.
Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.
Necessary to gain control of Central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.
All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.
b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill |
Roosevelt and Churchill conferred together until 2:30 in the morning. It is likely that at this meeting, Roosevelt and Churchill took up the Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems.
U.S. Navy Department (May 24, 1943)
North Pacific.
On May 23:
The pressure of U.S. Army forces against pockets of Japanese resistance on Attu Island continues. A number of enemy points of resistance have been liquidated.
During the afternoon, sixteen Japanese twin‑engine bombers were attacked by six Army Lightning (Lockheed P‑38) fighters over the eastern part of Attu. Five of the enemy bombers were shot down. One U.S. fighter is missing. Another fighter was shot down, but the pilot was rescued.
U.S. State Department (May 24, 1943)
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Horne | Admiral Noble | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Streett | Major General Holmes | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Captain Lambe | |
| Colonel Cabell | Brigadier Porter | |
| Commander Freseman | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Long | Brigadier Macleod. | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup |
May 24, 1943, 11:30 a.m.
Secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the 94th meeting except that the conclusion under Item 6 was changed to read as follows:
Agreed that the necessary service troops for the buildup of the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the buildup of the combat troops, without prejudice to SICKLE.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered CCS 242/2 paragraph by paragraph and agreed to certain amendments.
Admiral Leahy pointed out that the British proposal relating to the extension of pressure in the Pacific for the earliest defeat of the Axis was, in his opinion, unacceptable since, should the situation in the Pacific become dangerous to U.S. interests or to U.S. itself, it would be necessary to supplement U.S. forces in this theater even at the expense of the early defeat of Germany.
Sir Charles Portal said that the British proposal was not intended to restrict operations in the Pacific but rather to insure that any surplus forces which might become available could be concentrated on the early defeat of Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end more rapidly.
General Marshall said that with regard to air forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to put into the United Kingdom the maximum number of groups which could be maintained there. If, therefore, there was a surplus of air forces he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific which at present was operating on a shoestring and where great results could be achieved by relatively small additions to the forces in that area.
The U.S. Air Staff were more than anxious to implement the SICKLE plan since they believed that air superiority properly applied would produce devastating results. They were reluctant, therefore, to divert forces elsewhere at the expense of SICKLE. On the other hand, in the Pacific the Japanese with their good interior lines of communication could more rapidly concentrate their air forces and it was essential, therefore, to have a numerical as well as a combat ascendancy. No major concentration of Japanese forces had yet taken place in the Pacific; but if this should occur, our own forces might find themselves in a most difficult situation from which they would have to be retrieved. Public opinion in the United States would not permit the acceptance of major reverses in the Pacific. If, therefore, there was any surplus of forces above those required to undertake agreed operations, he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific to exploit and improve our position in that area.
Sir Charles Portal said that he entirely agreed that any surplus forces, which might exist, should be sent to the Pacific, either for agreed operations or to defend the United States; but what he had meant to imply was that if operations in the Pacific were going well, it would be wiser, in order to eliminate Germany from the war, to send any surplus there might be either to the United Kingdom or to the Mediterranean.
The Committee then accepted the addition of certain words to paragraph II b suggested by Sir Dudley Pound [Sir Charles Portal?].
In discussing the subparagraph of paragraph III dealing with the concentration of maximum resources in a selected area, Sir Charles Portal said that the words “in a selected area” might prove restrictive, since, as regards air forces, a saturation point might be reached in the United Kingdom. He believed that if additional forces were available they should attack the citadel of Europe from bases on all sides.
General Marshall pointed out that it had already been agreed that the air offensive in Europe should be intensified without restricting the bases from which the forces should operate. He believed that all the decisions of the Conference must be reviewed at the next meeting or earlier if necessary, since, should Russia fall or make peace with Germany, it would be impossible to accomplish ROUNDHAMMER. It might therefore be necessary to reorient our strategy with a view to undertaking the defeat of Japan prior to that of Germany.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed as to the necessity of reviewing at the next conference all the decisions now taken, since it was vital to exploit any opportunities which arose. The position in southern Europe might well be such that we should take advantage of it.
Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph VII b dealing with the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be amended to make it clear that the decisions reached at the present conference should be examined in the light of the situation then existing.
General Marshall suggested certain amendments to the Annex aimed at strengthening the case, on military grounds, for obtaining the Islands.
In discussing the amendment to paragraph III i of the Annex, which pointed out that the Islands provided the most direct all-weather air supply routes to Europe, Africa and the Far East, Sir Charles Portal said that he would like it to be agreed that the requirements of anti-U-boat warfare must take first priority.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in CCS 242/3.
b. Agreed that with reference to Section IV, paragraph 3 a (5), no additional administrative or logistic commitments would be entered into without the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
c. Agreed that the security control agencies of the U.S. and U.K. should arrange for the necessary machinery for the production of deception policy and the coordination of cover plans for operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters (Including Burma).
d. Agreed, with regard to paragraph 3 i of the Annex to CCS 242/2, that when the use of the Azores is obtained, first priority must be given to the needs of anti-submarine warfare.
Without discussion,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that consideration of this matter should be deferred until after the TRIDENT Conference.
Sir Dudley Pound asked that the following amendments should be made to this paper:
Paragraph 5 b (1), first sentence, to read:
…the allocation for use by the British services of as many Jay ships as are suitable for conversion to LSI(L)s.
The final sentence of paragraph 5 b (2) to read:
…and then after conversion temporarily allocated to British control.
Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like further time to consider this paper.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Agreed:
a. That certain amendments should be made to CCS 248 as incorporated in CCS 248/1.
b. That action on this paper should be deferred.
General Marshall presented a memorandum setting out certain requirements to enable the capacity of the air route to China to be expanded.
Sir Charles Portal said that in view of the fact that a directive setting out the priority to be accorded to the expansion of the air route had already been sent to the U.S. and British authorities concerned in India and China, these requirements should also be transmitted to the authorities concerned.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the suggestion at x above should be implemented by the U.S. and British Air Staffs in direct collaboration.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Vice President Wallace | Lord Cherwell | |
| Mr. Hopkins |
The following letter of May 30, 1943, from Cherwell to Hopkins indicates the general nature of the discussion:
I was so sorry not to see you again on Tuesday [May 25] to make my adieux, especially as I wanted to thank you for all you had done to make my stay pleasant and profitable.
I understand that the matter we discussed was concluded satisfactorily and I am sure that this is largely due to your efforts. I am very glad, as it is certainly to everyone’s advantage that the old conditions should be restored.
It was a great pleasure to have an opportunity of talking to the President and Vice-President on Post-war topics and I was delighted to find how closely I agreed with their line of thought. For arranging this once again, I am sure I must thank you.
I trust you will forgive this hasty typed note; it will at any rate save you the trouble of trying to decipher my handwriting.
The presence of Wallace, who was a member of the top American policy-making group on atomic energy, and Cherwell, who was intimately connected with the British atomic energy program, indicates that the atomic bomb project may also have been raised at this luncheon meeting.
The Pittsburgh Press (May 24, 1943)
More than 2,000 tons of explosives rained on war industries by fleet of nearly 1,000 aircraft
By William B. Dickinson, United Press staff writer
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Sure… buddy sure.
Ground forces wipe out number of enemy positions
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New weapons to provide surprises for Axis
By Richard D. McMillan, United Press staff writer
…
Wow… That is stupid.
6,000 more quit in Akron; Chrysler workers vote to end protest
By the United Press
…
You could also include this in your critic of the racism thread
I’ll finish that article soon. 