Third Washington Conference (TRIDENT)

[NormanStewart]

American-British luncheon meeting, 1:15 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Vice President Wallace		Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of War Stimson		Ambassador Halifax
Secretary of the Interior Ickes
Senator Connally
Under Secretary of State Welles

Memorandum Prepared by the British Embassy

May 22, 1943, 1:15 p.m.

The Prime Minister met the following at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22, 1943: The Vice President (Mr. Wallace), the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson), the Secretary of the Interior (Mr. Ickes), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (Senator Connally) and the Under Secretary of State (Mr. Sumner Welles).

World and Regional Councils

In the course of a general talk about the structure of a post-war settlement, Mr. Churchill said that the first preoccupation must be to prevent further aggression in the future by Germany or Japan. To this end he contemplated an association of the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If, as he understood, the United States wished to include China in an association with the other three, he was perfectly willing that this should be done; but however great the importance of China, she was not comparable to the others. On these Powers would rest the real responsibility for peace. They together with certain other Powers should form a Supreme World Council.

Subordinate to this World Council there should be three Regional Councils, one for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific.

Europe

Mr. Churchill thought that after the war Europe might consist of some twelve states or confederations who would form the Regional European Council. It was important to recreate a strong France, whatever we might think about French deserts or the probable difficulty of achieving our purpose. For the prospect of having no strong country on the map between England and Russia was not attractive. Moreover, the Prime Minister could not easily foresee the United States being able to keep large numbers of men indefinitely on guard in Europe. If such an experiment were tried, he could not believe it would last for more than one Presidential election. Great Britain could not do so either. No doubt it would be necessary, and he thought it would be possible, that the United States should be associated in the same way in the policing of Europe, in which Great Britain would obviously also have to take part; but France also must assist.

Then there would be Spain and Italy. He also hoped that in South Eastern Europe there might be several confederations; a Danubian federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria might join this group. Then there should be a Balkan federation.

He would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty million Prussians being a manageable European unit. Many people wished to carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into component parts, but on this question the Prime Minister reserved judgment. Poland and Czechoslovakia he hoped would stand together in friendly relations with Russia. This left the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, which last might or might not be willing with Greece to play some part in the Balkan system.

Mr. Wallace asked about Belgium and Holland suggesting that they might join France. Mr. Churchill said that was a possibility, or alternatively they might form a group of the Low Countries with Denmark. Mr. Wallace asked whether the Prime Minister contemplated the possibility of Switzerland joining with France, but the Prime Minister was disposed to regard Switzerland as a special case.

In his view each of the dozen or so of the European countries should appoint a representative to the European Regional Council thus creating a form of United States of Europe. He thought Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas on this subject had much to recommend them.

The American Hemisphere

Similarly, there might be a Regional Council for the Americas of which the Prime Minister thought Canada would naturally be a member and would represent the British Commonwealth.

The Pacific

There should be a Regional Council for the Pacific in which he supposed that Russia would participate. He thought it was quite possible that when the pressure on her western frontiers had been relieved Russia would turn her attention to the Far East.

Relation of the Regional Councils to the Supreme World Council

The Regional Councils should be subordinate in the Prime Minister’s view to the World Council. The members of the World Council should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly interested and he hoped that in addition to being represented on the American Regional Council and the Pacific Regional Council, the United States would also be represented on the European Regional Council. However this might be, the last word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of interest to the World Council and bring the World Council in.

Mr. Wallace thought that the other countries would not agree that the World Council should consist of the four major Powers alone. Mr. Churchill agreed and expressed the view that to the four Powers should be added others by election in rotation from the Regional Councils. The central idea of the structure was that of a three-legged stool – the World Council resting on three Regional Councils. But he attached great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion.

Mr. Wallace asked what in practice would be the procedure if, for example, there were a dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Churchill said that such a dispute would fall to be dealt with in the first place by the American Regional Council but always under the general overriding authority of the World Council. In the instance chosen the interests of countries outside the American Hemisphere would hardly be affected; but plainly a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in.

Neutrality

Mr. Churchill was asked whether the association of nations which he contemplated would be confined to the United Nations, or include the neutrals. He said that in his view there was advantage in trying to induce those nations at present neutral to join the United Nations before the end of the war. He thought we ought to use all possible persuasion and pressure to secure this when it could be done with safety to the nation concerned. An example was Turkey. His policy was to help Turkey to build up her own forces to the point where, at the right moment she could and would effectively intervene. When the United Nations brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice, he could see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for Mr. de Valera and others who might remain neutral to the end.

The Lessons of the League of Nations

Mr. Churchill maintained that we had much to learn from the experience of the League of Nations. It was wrong to say that the League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed the League. Senator Connally agreed and pointed to the achievements of the League in the years immediately after 1919. Mr. Stimson also agreed and thought that if the original guarantee to France had not fallen through subsequent French policy and also the history of the League would have been very different.

National and International Forces

Mr. Churchill said that force would clearly be required to see that peace was preserved. He suggested that there should be an agreement between the United Nations as to the minimum and maximum armed forces which each would maintain. The forces of each country might be divided into two contingents, the one to form the national forces of that country, and the other to form its contingent to an international police force at the disposal of the Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World Council. Thus, if one country out of twelve in Europe threatened the peace, eleven contingents would be ready to deal with that country if necessary. The personnel of the international contingent provided by each country would be bound, if it were so decided by the World Council, to undertake operations against any country other than their own. Mr. Wallace said that bases would be required for these contingents. Mr. Churchill agreed. In this connection he said that he would place a total prohibition for an indefinite time upon the practice in the enemy countries, and certainly in Germany, of the art of flying. There should be international air lines, for example, operating in and through Prussia which would give the Prussians as good a service at as cheap rates as obtained elsewhere, but they should neither be allowed to fly themselves nor to build aircraft.

Fraternal Association Between Great Britain and the United States

Mr. Churchill said that there was something else in his mind which was complementary to the ideas he had just expressed. The proposals for a world security organization did not exclude special friendships devoid of sinister purpose against others. He could see small hope for the world unless the United States and the British Commonwealth worked together in what he would call fraternal association. He believed that this could take a form which would confer on each advantages without sacrifice. He would like the citizens of each without losing their present nationality to be able to come and settle and trade with freedom and equal rights in the territories of the other. There might be a common passport or a special form of passport or visa. There might even be some common form of citizenship, under which citizens of the United States and of the British Commonwealth might enjoy voting privileges after residential qualification and be eligible for public office in the territories of the other, subject of course to the laws and institutions there prevailing.

Then there were bases. He had himself welcomed the Destroyer-Bases deal not for the sake of the destroyers, useful as these were, but because he felt it was to the advantage of both countries that the United States should have the use of such bases in British territory as she might find necessary to her own defence, for a strong United States was a vital interest of the British Commonwealth and vice versa. He looked forward therefore to an extension of the practice of common user [use] of bases for the common defence of common interests. Take the Pacific where there were countless islands possessed by enemy powers. There were also British islands and harbours. If he had anything to do with the direction of public affairs after the war, he would certainly advocate that the United States had the use of those that they might require for bases.

American Opinion. Importance of Concluding an Agreement During the War

All the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines propounded by the Prime Minister, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them. The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles whether he thought that the establishment of a Regional Council for Europe would have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs. Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils. Mr. Stimson said most emphatically that in his opinion there would be a tendency to relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experience. He believed that it would be much easier to secure American agreement during the war; indeed that it was a case of during the war or never. The others were disposed to agree, and all felt that the best approach to future cooperation was to present such plans for the future as a continuation of the cooperation now in force, and to do so while the war was still proceeding.

The Prime Minister made two other suggestions both of which carried the warm assent of those present. First, that after the war we should continue the practice of Combined Staff conversations, and second, that we should by constant contact, take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that the main lines of our foreign policy ran closely together.

Mr. Wallace said to the Ambassador as he left that it was the most encouraging conversation in which he had taken part for the last two years.

Mr. Churchill on all occasions stated that he was expressing only personal views.

[NormanStewart]

Stimson-Churchill meeting, 3 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Secretary of War Stimson		Prime Minister Churchill

Stimson’s preparations for his meeting with Churchill are described in the Stimson Diary as follows:

I at last got a chance to put in my oar and do my stick of work for the cause covered by these conferences today and I have an idea that I accomplished something. My reading of the minutes has shown pretty well what the situation is. The European situation is covered fairly well, but the Burma situation, as shown by the resolution adopted yesterday, is in very poor shape and that of course is vitally important on account of China. So this morning I spent time on that. I talked with Jack McCloy who had dined with the Prime Minister and had heard him say that he wanted to talk with me. I had in General Stilwell and went over the situation in Burma, getting his ideas as clearly as I could of what was necessary to make the resolutions which had been adopted have a little life in them. The thing had been pretty well gummed up. A step backward has even been taken in giving all of the capacity of the Burma air route to Chennault as against Stilwell. Therefore the only help that we can see in sight is to increase the capacity of the road and that depends upon getting more steam into the British commanders out there. So Stilwell and McCloy and I went over our maps in my room and we called in Colonel Timberman who had just been out there for the Operations Division of the General Staff and I got myself pretty well primed up by the time of the approach for my going to lunch at the Embassy where I was for the first time to get a whack at the Prime Minister.

The Stimson Diary records the course of the meeting in the following manner:

Then after the round table conference was over about three o’clock I had a half hour more alone with the Prime Minister and I took up with him the Burma problem. I gave him my views on that, talking very frankly, and he answered me frankly. He told me he was thoroughly dissatisfied with the way his commanders there had acted; he was going to change them all and put in some new punch to it. I said that was the only way in which the thing could be made to work. I brought out the resolutions which he hadn’t seen yet and he asked me to prepare a map showing the place where the new airfields were to be built to strengthen the Burma air route and what work the difficulties required. I told him I would do so.

The Secretary of War to Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, May 22, 1943.

Secret

My Dear Prime Minister: I send you herewith the map which you requested, showing the four airfields to be completed in the neighborhood of Ledo in Assam.

The names of the sites are shown in large type as follows: Chabua, Mohanbari, Sookerating and Jorhat. These four fields have been selected by men of our General Staff and Air Corps who have recently personally visited the spot, and the sites have been checked up with and approved by General Stilwell. These fields have been chosen after a careful examination of all those in that locality and these officers estimate that, if first priorities are given on the shipment of cement, gravel, asphalt and equipment for the completion of these airfields, and an intense effort is concentrated upon these four fields, they may be ready by July first.

They also estimate that, if this is accomplished, our people will be able by intense effort to increase materially the capacity of the air route to Kunming during July possibly up to a capacity of seven thousand tons per month. They also think that it is possible but not probable that, if three additional fields are made available, they will be able to raise this capacity up to ten thousand tons in September. Success will depend upon the keenest concentrated effort in bringing in the fields and in the subsequent management of the route.

The Brahmaputra River is reported to me as now high, thus making difficult the obtaining of gravel from its bed. I am told that during the course of the monsoon it will tend to rise higher. If so, this means that the gravel will have to be obtained from quarries and this would necessitate its being hauled to the fields by overtaxed railway and highway routes.

But the possibility of General Stilwell’s receiving enough equipment under his allotment to arm and equip the divisions which are to defend Kunming, as well as those which are to be in readiness to enter the Burma campaign from Yunnan, depends upon this enlargement of the capacity of the route at the times estimated. This indicates the importance of speed in the project.

Faithfully yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON

[NormanStewart]

Hull-Halifax conversation

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Secretary Hull		Ambassador Halifax

740.0011 EW/29737

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Washington, May 22, 1943.

Confidential

The British Ambassador called at his request. He inquired if I had seen Mr. Churchill and I proceeded to give him the substance of what was said between Churchill and myself:

I said that I had brought up our trade agreements program and our entire commercial and related policies, such as monetary exchange and others. It is not necessary here to repeat any of these statements in detail.

I then took up Russia and said that Great Britain and the United States must by persistent effort talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell, so to speak, that is, out of his aloofness, secretiveness and suspicion. I elaborated on what I had said on previous occasions with respect to each of these points, including the vital step of calling off all communistic activities in other countries under the direction of the Third Internationale at Moscow.

Mr. Churchill had expressed the view that Russia would aid us in defeating Japan after Germany is defeated. I stated that I hoped she would, but added that this illustrates her secretive attitude compared with that of Great Britain and the United States; that Russia has not, so far as I knew, intimated even in a confidential way what she may have in mind in this connection.

The Ambassador said that the President requested him to talk to me about de Gaulle. I thereupon related substantially what I had said during my recent conversation with the Prime Minister, which need not be repeated here.

CORDELL HULL

---

840.48 Refugees/4034½

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, May 22, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President: I recently had occasion to direct your attention to the refugee situation in connection with the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference which proposed a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee to carry on the work.

As my mind approaches the subject matter to be discussed and the questions to be decided by the Committee which it is now proposed to start in London and to continue in Washington, certain doubts assert themselves.

A meeting of that character would attract worldwide attention. It could not be allowed to fail. Unless the American and British Governments were determined in advance as to the purposes which they would pursue and as to the extent to which they would commit themselves on financial accounts, the Conference could not come to any satisfactory conclusions.

Attached is a telegram directed to London which was prepared after the receipt of your recent memorandum on this matter. The Department has been in telegraphic correspondence with the British Foreign Office and has discussed the matter on several occasions with Mr. Law, Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, now in the United States. Before proceeding further with it the thought occurs to me that its extreme importance from the psychological point of view would probably justify consultation by you with Mr. Churchill.

1. Expressed concretely, refugees who may need attention and protection are found in the following places in the following approximate number:

Iran	19,000
Cyprus	4,650
Spain	20,000
Bulgaria	4,500
France	10,000
Switzerland	13,500
Portugal	1,400
—	—
Total	73,050

2. It is impractical to estimate accurately the cost of transfer by vessel and maintenance of the individual on a yearly basis, but considering the short haul to some part of Africa, a figure of $2,000 per capita per annum is considered not unreasonable. The moving of all these 73,000 on that basis would cost $150,000,000. The estimate should include repatriation at the end of the war.

3. The determination is to be made whether it would be possible to limit the Intergovernmental Committee’s participation in the plan for the succor and transit of the refugees to a place of temporary refuge where Governor Lehman’s relief organization could take up the relief activities during their temporary residence, provided there is legal authority under existing legislation to permit it and provided further that the British join on equal terms.

If you could present this matter to the consideration of Mr. Churchill and arrive at some common decision with him as to what extent our respective Governments could be committed at the suggested Intergovernmental Committee meeting it would seem to be justifiable to proceed with that meeting, with the assurance of achieving some success. Lacking an understanding of the attitudes of our respective Governments it would seem that the Conference could not accomplish a very useful purpose.

Those persons who have escaped from German control or who may escape in the future can be forwarded to places of temporary refuge till the successful ending of the war will assure them the right to return to their homes.

I am attaching a telegram which I would propose to send to London in case it is justified by the conclusions you will reach with the Prime Minister.

Respectfully,
CORDELL HULL

[NormanStewart]

Meetings of American and British shipping experts, beginning at 4 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Deputy War Shipping Administrator Douglas		Minister of War Transport Leathers
Mr. Bissell		Mr. Maclay
Lieutenant General Somervell		Major General Holmes
Major General Gross		Brigadier Williams
Colonel Stokes		Mr. Harvey

Douglas Notes

May 22, 1943, 4 p.m.

Lord Leathers, Mr. Maclay, Brig. [Major] General Holmes, Brig. General Williams, Mr. Harvey joined the meeting, which, therefore became Combined, at 4:00.

Considerable discussion was had on the subject of the U.K. port capacity, with the American military insisting in effect that it was illogical for Lord Leathers to insist that more than 150 ships could not be accommodated on U.S. Army account in the ports while more than that number could be accommodated on account of the U.K. import program. It seemed to be clear that the Army was trying to use port capacity to restrict the U.K. import program. LWD observed that the matter might well be resolved by advancing the volume of the U.K. import program into the summer months of 1943 when the U.S. Army program was at its lowest tide, thus making available places during the winter months in the U.K. ports for ships carrying U.S. Army cargo.

India was then discussed. Brigadier Williams very tenaciously but pleasantly inquired as to whether or not there had been duplications in the American statement of requirements of the items carried in the British statement. He pointed out that the British had reduced their deficit by 155 and had brought their shipping position into a complete balance. Most of the shrinkages had been made on the military side, and he thought our military, too, might do some shrinking.

The Italian requirement was discussed, and, interestingly enough, Lord Leathers took very much the same position that the WSA at the Joint meeting had expressed.

Paragraph 47 of the CCS paper, the part regarding the Army statement was brought up by General Somervell. Maclay finally got the point of it and indicated that the British would have to disagree to the language of the paragraph as Somervell interpreted it.

The meeting then adjourned. The WSA and the British retired to prepare a consolidated statement and the Army retired to revise their statement of requirements.

Several modifications were telephoned subsequently to Mr. Schneider. India was reduced, etc. About 2:30 Sunday morning Colonel Stokes and General Gross came over with their finished statement. Shortly thereafter Mr. Bissell’s estimate of availables was completed for the year 1943. When matched together the deficit of 155 was shown on the American side and no deficit on the British side. General Somervell, who arrived about 4:00 a.m. suggested that the British pick up half of the deficit. Brigadier Williams and Maclay very categorically stated that they had already eliminated their deficit of 155 and had brought their shipping position into equilibrium, and that they positively would not and could not shrink any further. General Somervell then remarked to me that he thought it could be picked up on his side. He indicated that very substantial shrinkages had taken place in the Army requirements but that it would be possible to reduce further the requirements. He made specific reference to Alaska, but qualified that Kiska had not yet been taken; that, moreover, there were no ships in the Alaskan service which were suitable to overseas voyages. I pointed out to him that there were something like 20 to 22 Liberty ships and that they, of course, were exactly what we needed in the long ocean trips. At any rate, he made it very clear to me and to others that this deficit of 155 could be managed by reductions in the military requirements. He concurred that the deficit of 155 would be eliminated in practice.

The requirements for the first nine months of 1944 on the British side, including the U.K. import program and the usual Lend-Lease aid had been discussed and reduced very substantially below the original figure, hastily calculated, if indeed calculated at all, by the British.

Statements were prepared, one by Lord Leathers and LWD, one by the military, and at about 6:30 a.m. the meeting broke up with everyone well satisfied.

[NormanStewart]

Churchill meeting with members of Congress

Halifax had invited some 15 Senators and 15 Representatives to the British Embassy for the meeting. Halifax recalls a meeting which took place at 6 p.m. and was marked by a speech by Churchill.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (May 23, 1943)

Phillips-Churchill meeting, forenoon

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Mr. Phillips		Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt asked Phillips to see Churchill and give him his frank impressions of conditions in India. Churchill apparently took strong exception to Phillips’ proposal that Indian leaders be given a measure of authority to deal with domestic affairs. Phillips also relates that he immediately reported upon his private talk with Churchill to Roosevelt during a luncheon conversation with the President.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney		Minister of War Transport Leathers
Lieutenant General Embick		Lord Cherwell
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Horne		Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke		Admiral Noble
Major General Streett		Lieutenant General Macready
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Air Marshal Welsh
Colonel Cabell		Major General Holmes
Commander Freseman		Captain Lambe
Commander Long		Brigadier Porter
Mr. Douglas		Air Commodore Elliot
		Brigadier Macleod
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Redman
	Brigadier General Deane
	Commander Coleridge
	Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 23, 1943, 2 p.m.

Secret

Conclusions of the Minutes of the 93rd Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 93rd Meeting held on Saturday, the 22nd May.

Anti-U-Boat Warfare (CCS 241 and 241/1) (Previous Reference: CCS 93rd Meeting, Item 2.)

Admiral Leahy suggested that CCS 241 and 241/1 should each be altered in certain respects and then noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Charles Portal suggested a minor amendment to paragraph 4 of CCS 241/1.

Admiral Leahy read out a draft conclusion with reference to the work of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 241 and deleted the phrase “and that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be responsible for recommending any such transfer” at the end of the last paragraph of page 1. (Subsequently published as CCS 241/3.)

b. Took note of CCS 241/1 and directed that the words “relieve British planes in certain areas” should be deleted and the words “provide planes” substituted. (Subsequently published as CCS 241/4.)

c. Agreed that in view of the fact that the directive under which the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board operates requires them to report on any aspect of the Allied Anti-Submarine Organization in which they consider the Allied resources are not being used to the best advantage, it is not considered necessary that the Board should have any special responsibility laid on them in the case quoted in CCS 241.

Movements of the Queens (CCS 246) (Previous Reference: CCS 93rd Meeting, Item 5.)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the proposals for the future movement of the Queens as set out in paragraph 6 of CCS 246.

Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities (CCS 185/4) (Previous Reference: CCS 93rd Meeting, Item 3.)

General Ismay informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister had agreed to the draft telegram to General Eisenhower, contained in CCS 185/4.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note that the President and Prime Minister had decided that the policy set forth in CCS 185/2/D should be adhered to.

b. Agreed to send the message contained in CCS 185/4 to General Eisenhower.

Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War in 1943-1944 (CCS 244)

The Committee had before them CCS 244 together with an addendum and corrigendum to it containing Annex VII, and a summary of conclusions and a corrigendum to Annex II.

Certain amendments to the paper were suggested and accepted.

Lord Leathers said that Annex VII represented the agreed views of himself, Mr. Lewis Douglas and General Somervell and was a submission of the shipping position for the period under discussion. He and his colleagues believed the deficiencies were relatively small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect would not be unmanageable. The requirements set out in the paper had, in most cases, been cut as far as was possible. The deficiency was only a small percentage of the total. This small percentage of deficiency when taking into consideration the various assumptions, including losses, building rates, etc., was so small that it could be spread and absorbed and gave, in his opinion, no grounds for anxiety.

Lord Leathers then suggested a minor amendment to the note following paragraph 3 of Annex VII, Part I.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the reduced troop lift due to the proposed opening out of the cycle of movement for the Queens had been taken into account – the bottleneck was dry cargo and not personnel shipping.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Lord Leathers explained that shortly after the Casablanca Conference the loss rate had been carefully examined and agreed rates accepted. These were 2.39 percent per month for the first half of the year and 1.9 percent per month for the second half. The present paper had been based on these calculations, though in fact the loss rate so far this year had worked out at slightly less than 1.9 percent. An agreed and accurate loss rate was a most important factor in all calculations dealing with shipping requirements and availability. He agreed with Admiral King that the loss rate should be subjected to frequent review.

Mr. Douglas said that he agreed with Lord Leathers that the deficit with regard to dry cargo shipping was not unmanageable.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, General Somervell said that he agreed with Lord Leathers and Mr. Douglas that shipping was available for the undertakings set out in CCS 244, subject to the slight deficit which he considered could be absorbed by spreading it over the entire period.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to express appreciation of the excellent work accomplished in so short a time by the Combined Staff Planners and shipping experts, both civil and military. All present agreed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 244, as amended in Annex “B” to these Minutes, except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Summary of Conclusions should be taken note of as recommendations only.

Despatch of U.S. Service and Engineer Troops to the United Kingdom

Sir Alan Brooke read out a brief memorandum on the importance of the early despatch of certain service and engineer troops to the United Kingdom. This movement would not interfere with the scheduled SICKLE buildup but was essential due to the shortage of manpower in England.

General Somervell said that he entirely agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s view that the early arrival of SOS and engineer troops was essential to prepare for the arrival of the fighting forces.

General Marshall said that the present plan already provided for the movement of 40,000 men per division which included a large proportion of service units. The required priority could be arranged for early sailing of necessary service elements.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was prepared to accept this movement provided that it was not at the expense of SICKLE, the priority of which must not be disturbed.

Admiral King said that the picture as a whole must be considered. It might prove necessary for the SICKLE movement to be modified slightly in the light of these requirements.

Lord Leathers pointed out the necessity for port battalions for discharging the ships at the landing points.

Both General McNarney and Sir Charles Portal pointed out that SICKLE was an essential prelude to and an integral part of cross-Channel operations as a whole and that the ground operations could not be undertaken without it.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the necessary service troops for the buildup of the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the buildup of the combat troops without prejudice to SICKLE.

At this point Lord Leathers, Lord Cherwell, and Mr. Douglas left the meeting.

Operation BRISK (Previous Reference: CCS 87th Meeting, Item 2)

The Committee had before them a draft report by the British Planning Staff. (JP(T) 17 (Final))

In the course of discussion, it was pointed out that the Prime Minister and President had made it clear that the decision with regard to diplomatic action should rest with them, and had asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement of the military reasons necessitating the occupation of the Portuguese Islands, a military plan to effect their capture and to give a target date on which this operation could be undertaken.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain alternative proposals for obtaining the use of these Islands at an earlier date than that indicated in the plan.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that the British Staff Planners were preparing a statement for inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, which would set forth the urgent military reasons for this operation.

Third Soviet Protocol (CCS 243)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that this matter should be considered after the conclusion of the TRIDENT Conferences.

[NormanStewart]

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Washington, 23 May 1943.

CCS 239/1
Secret

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44

Reference:	a. CCS 220
	b. CCS 92nd Mtg., Item 4

1. The enclosed report by the United States Joint Staff Planners, in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall “Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan” as set forth in CCS 220, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan for 1943-1944 operations is based on the premises:
   a. That China must be retained as a base for operations against Japan.
   b. That Japanese lines of communication must be subjected to continuous attack.
   c. That Japanese Military forces must be subjected to continuous and increasing pressure to prevent consolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power.
   d. That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale operations when such operations can be undertaken.

H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE
Combined Secretariat

[Enclosure]

Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44

1. An analysis has been made of possible United Nations courses of action in the Pacific-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in CCS 219. The analysis is contained in Enclosure “A.”

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:
   a. Far Eastern Theater

Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.

Air Operations in and from China

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

b. Pacific Theater

Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.

Operations in New Guinea

The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.

Operations in eastern Netherlands East Indies

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.

Operations in the Marshall Islands

Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.

Operations in the Caroline Islands

Necessary to gain control of Central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

3. Conclusions:
   a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:
   i) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
   ii) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
   iii) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
   iv) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
   v) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
   vi) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

[dan.harnden]

It seems to me that the Pacific campaign that unfolded does not really look like what is talked about here.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill conferred together until 2:30 in the morning. It is likely that at this meeting, Roosevelt and Churchill took up the Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (May 24, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney		Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell		Lieutenant General Ismay
Vice Admiral Horne		Admiral Noble
Vice Admiral Willson		Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral Cooke		Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Streett		Major General Holmes
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Captain Lambe
Colonel Cabell		Brigadier Porter
Commander Freseman		Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Long		Brigadier Macleod.
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Redman
	Brigadier General Deane
	Commander Coleridge
	Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 24, 1943, 11:30 a.m.

Secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 94th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the 94th meeting except that the conclusion under Item 6 was changed to read as follows:

Agreed that the necessary service troops for the buildup of the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the buildup of the combat troops, without prejudice to SICKLE.

Draft Report to President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered CCS 242/2 paragraph by paragraph and agreed to certain amendments.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that the British proposal relating to the extension of pressure in the Pacific for the earliest defeat of the Axis was, in his opinion, unacceptable since, should the situation in the Pacific become dangerous to U.S. interests or to U.S. itself, it would be necessary to supplement U.S. forces in this theater even at the expense of the early defeat of Germany.

Sir Charles Portal said that the British proposal was not intended to restrict operations in the Pacific but rather to insure that any surplus forces which might become available could be concentrated on the early defeat of Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end more rapidly.

General Marshall said that with regard to air forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to put into the United Kingdom the maximum number of groups which could be maintained there. If, therefore, there was a surplus of air forces he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific which at present was operating on a shoestring and where great results could be achieved by relatively small additions to the forces in that area.

The U.S. Air Staff were more than anxious to implement the SICKLE plan since they believed that air superiority properly applied would produce devastating results. They were reluctant, therefore, to divert forces elsewhere at the expense of SICKLE. On the other hand, in the Pacific the Japanese with their good interior lines of communication could more rapidly concentrate their air forces and it was essential, therefore, to have a numerical as well as a combat ascendancy. No major concentration of Japanese forces had yet taken place in the Pacific; but if this should occur, our own forces might find themselves in a most difficult situation from which they would have to be retrieved. Public opinion in the United States would not permit the acceptance of major reverses in the Pacific. If, therefore, there was any surplus of forces above those required to undertake agreed operations, he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific to exploit and improve our position in that area.

Sir Charles Portal said that he entirely agreed that any surplus forces, which might exist, should be sent to the Pacific, either for agreed operations or to defend the United States; but what he had meant to imply was that if operations in the Pacific were going well, it would be wiser, in order to eliminate Germany from the war, to send any surplus there might be either to the United Kingdom or to the Mediterranean.

The Committee then accepted the addition of certain words to paragraph II b suggested by Sir Dudley Pound [Sir Charles Portal?].

In discussing the subparagraph of paragraph III dealing with the concentration of maximum resources in a selected area, Sir Charles Portal said that the words “in a selected area” might prove restrictive, since, as regards air forces, a saturation point might be reached in the United Kingdom. He believed that if additional forces were available they should attack the citadel of Europe from bases on all sides.

General Marshall pointed out that it had already been agreed that the air offensive in Europe should be intensified without restricting the bases from which the forces should operate. He believed that all the decisions of the Conference must be reviewed at the next meeting or earlier if necessary, since, should Russia fall or make peace with Germany, it would be impossible to accomplish ROUNDHAMMER. It might therefore be necessary to reorient our strategy with a view to undertaking the defeat of Japan prior to that of Germany.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed as to the necessity of reviewing at the next conference all the decisions now taken, since it was vital to exploit any opportunities which arose. The position in southern Europe might well be such that we should take advantage of it.

Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph VII b dealing with the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be amended to make it clear that the decisions reached at the present conference should be examined in the light of the situation then existing.

General Marshall suggested certain amendments to the Annex aimed at strengthening the case, on military grounds, for obtaining the Islands.

In discussing the amendment to paragraph III i of the Annex, which pointed out that the Islands provided the most direct all-weather air supply routes to Europe, Africa and the Far East, Sir Charles Portal said that he would like it to be agreed that the requirements of anti-U-boat warfare must take first priority.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in CCS 242/3.

b. Agreed that with reference to Section IV, paragraph 3 a (5), no additional administrative or logistic commitments would be entered into without the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that the security control agencies of the U.S. and U.K. should arrange for the necessary machinery for the production of deception policy and the coordination of cover plans for operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters (Including Burma).

d. Agreed, with regard to paragraph 3 i of the Annex to CCS 242/2, that when the use of the Azores is obtained, first priority must be given to the needs of anti-submarine warfare.

Directive on Organization and Operations of Military Government for HUSKY (CCS 247)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that consideration of this matter should be deferred until after the TRIDENT Conference.

Provision of New LSI(L)s (CCS 248)

Sir Dudley Pound asked that the following amendments should be made to this paper:

Paragraph 5 b (1), first sentence, to read:

…the allocation for use by the British services of as many Jay ships as are suitable for conversion to LSI(L)s.

The final sentence of paragraph 5 b (2) to read:

…and then after conversion temporarily allocated to British control.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like further time to consider this paper.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Agreed:
a. That certain amendments should be made to CCS 248 as incorporated in CCS 248/1.
b. That action on this paper should be deferred.

Requirements To Expand the Capacity of the Air Route to China

General Marshall presented a memorandum setting out certain requirements to enable the capacity of the air route to China to be expanded.

Sir Charles Portal said that in view of the fact that a directive setting out the priority to be accorded to the expansion of the air route had already been sent to the U.S. and British authorities concerned in India and China, these requirements should also be transmitted to the authorities concerned.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the suggestion at x above should be implemented by the U.S. and British Air Staffs in direct collaboration.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Vice President Wallace		Lord Cherwell
Mr. Hopkins

The following letter of May 30, 1943, from Cherwell to Hopkins indicates the general nature of the discussion:

I was so sorry not to see you again on Tuesday [May 25] to make my adieux, especially as I wanted to thank you for all you had done to make my stay pleasant and profitable.

I understand that the matter we discussed was concluded satisfactorily and I am sure that this is largely due to your efforts. I am very glad, as it is certainly to everyone’s advantage that the old conditions should be restored.

It was a great pleasure to have an opportunity of talking to the President and Vice-President on Post-war topics and I was delighted to find how closely I agreed with their line of thought. For arranging this once again, I am sure I must thank you.

I trust you will forgive this hasty typed note; it will at any rate save you the trouble of trying to decipher my handwriting.

The presence of Wallace, who was a member of the top American policy-making group on atomic energy, and Cherwell, who was intimately connected with the British atomic energy program, indicates that the atomic bomb project may also have been raised at this luncheon meeting.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (May 24, 1943)

Churchill, Roosevelt resume conferences

Washington (UP) –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill today resumed their conferences which are expected to result soon in final decisions on basic Allied war strategy.

Mr. Churchill and some members of his staff spent the weekend as guest of the British Embassy. The Prime Minister returned to the White House late last night, and went into immediate conference with Mr. Roosevelt. They talked from about 11 p.m. until 2:30 this morning.

White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early said most of today would be spent in talks between the President and the Prime Minister and in periodic consultation with some pf their staff commanders. The two leaders are studying recommendations submitted last week by their naval, military and air staffs.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (May 24, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 4:45 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney		Lieutenant General Ismay
	Secretariat
	Brigadier General Deane
	Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 24, 1943, 4:45 p.m.

Secret

Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/3)

The President indicated his satisfaction and that of the Prime Minister with regard to the unanimity of opinion and the satisfactory decisions that had been arrived at by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was particularly grateful that so much had been accomplished in such a short time. He said the Prime Minister recalled that in the last war decisions were made with undue speed. There was no organized group which corresponded to our Combined Chiefs of Staff which was able to provide continuity in the strategic direction of the war.

The Prime Minister said that “today we meet in the presence of a new fact”; namely, what might prove to be decisive progress in the anti-U-boat war. There were indications that there might be as many as 30 sinkings in May. If this continued, a striking change would come over the scene.

The President then read the draft report contained in CCS 242/3. There was complete agreement on all items until he came to paragraphs 6 and 7 under Section III. These were amended slightly.

Section III, Paragraph 9 – Rearmament of French forces

With regard to paragraph 9 under Section III, Admiral King pointed out that the original paper provided only for the equipment of French Army Forces in North Africa. At his suggestion the paragraph was changed to apply to French Forces in Africa.

The Prime Minister said that Admiral Godefroy had received an order from Vichy to scuttle his ships in Alexandria. He had replied that he had definitely thrown in his lot with General Giraud’s forces. As a result of this action the British Government would probably lift the pay ban on Godefroy’s squadron. It was now Admiral Godefroy’s desire that his heavy ships would proceed around the Cape, call at Dakar, and then proceed to the United States for refitting.

Section IV, Paragraph 1 a – Operation to seize the Azores

The Prime Minister said that the political considerations involved in the seizure of the Azores must be considered. There was a possibility that the Islands might be secured without the necessity of utilizing a force as strong as 9 battalions. He suggested that a smaller force might approach the Azores in June. From 7 to 10 hours before its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route. If they were received without opposition, the Portuguese Government would be reimbursed by whatever figure might be set. He thought the chances were possibly 3 to 1 that the Portuguese Government would submit.

The Prime Minister said that he personally favored an expedition in sufficient force to take the Islands. His government, however, had not as yet authorized him to approve such action. The British cabinet members felt that the matter should be further discussed on his return.

General Marshall said that if a smaller force could be assembled in June which would act as a threat to back up a diplomatic approach, he would favor such action. He thought the present success in the anti-submarine warfare made it even more imperative that the use of the Islands be obtained as soon as possible.

Admiral King pointed out that if President Salazar refused to give his assent and the smaller force failed to attack, the Allied Forces would be in a bad position. They would have the humiliation of withdrawing; the Germans would know of the diplomatic approach and, as a result, would stiffen the resistance of the Islands.

The President said that he had never liked the idea of being put in a position of permitting President Salazar to call our bluff. He was inclined to favor the approach with sufficient force to take the Islands in the event that President Salazar refused to permit a peaceful occupation.

General McNarney suggested the possibility of reinforcing the bluff by timing it with the sailing of a Husky convoy from the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister said that the earlier operation would have a good prospect of success as the Portuguese would have no way of knowing how strong the force was with which they were threatened.

General Ismay said that a plan was being examined to see if something less than a full-scale operation could be mounted.

The Prime Minister said that he was content to leave paragraph 1 a of Section IV as it was written, and that he would discuss the matter with his government upon his return to England and let the President know the outcome of these discussions. He suggested the addition of the following sentences to the end of the paragraph:

The possibility of an earlier move will receive further study. The political decision involved will be settled in the meanwhile by the two governments.\

The President suggested that in his discussions with the Cabinet the Prime Minister might bear in mind the alternative of an approach to the Portuguese Government by the USA and Brazil. In any case, the idea that Brazil might provide the occupying force would be a strong factor in influencing the Portuguese Government to submit.

Section IV, Paragraph 2 b – Cross-Channel operations

The President then read paragraph 2 of Section IV regarding the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom and the cross-Channel operations. He asked if the decision as written in paragraph 2 b precluded the use of French Divisions in the assault to be made on the Continent.

The Prime Minister suggested that the use of French Forces might be covered if the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 b could be changed to read “that the follow-up divisions might come from the United States or elsewhere.”

The President said, however, that he was considering the advisability of having a French Division as either one of the 9 assault divisions, or, at least, as one of the first 20 buildup divisions. He thought that politically it was of great importance to have the French represented in the first attempt to reconquer French soil.

General Marshall asked if there was any possibility of this decision being communicated to the French.

The Prime Minister replied that he thought that would be extremely dangerous. General Giraud and General de Gaulle were soon to have another meeting. He felt that this meeting might result in violent disputes. General Giraud had become stronger because of the Tunisian victories while de Gaulle would think, of course, that he was about to regain control. The important thing was not to let these two French generals create discord between the United States and the British. He did not feel reassured regarding the outcome of the Giraud-de Gaulle conference. He thought it extremely important not to inform the French of our decisions when there was the prospect of a split.

The President said he thought it was entirely satisfactory to leave any mention of the utilization of French Forces in the assault on the Continent out of the paper which was under consideration provided it was recorded in the minutes of the present meeting and if it was understood by the Staffs that serious consideration should be given to the participation of some French Forces early in the operation.

Admiral King pointed out that the decision regarding cross-Channel operations, as set forth in paragraph 2 b of Section IV, failed to make any mention of the month-by-month planning that was being undertaken by General Morgan in London for the purpose of insuring readiness on the part of such forces as were available in the United Kingdom in the event of the German crackup.

The President agreed that it would be a good idea to put agreed decisions concerning month by month planning in the report. He pointed out that it was impossible to tell when a break in the German resistance might take place. In the last war the first element of the German Forces to crack was the submarine crews. He felt that at the rate they were now losing submarines, that is, one a clay, the crews would be unable to stick it. German submarine losses in 1918 were not as great as those they are now experiencing and yet they had induced a break in the German morale. Recently airplanes have entered two theaters of operations with definite objectives. These had failed to reach their objective by 10 or 20 miles, but it is known that the reports they rendered when they returned to their bases stated that the objectives had been reached. He thought that this was indicative of a bad state of morale and efficiency in the German Air Force. These conditions were bound to spread. As soon as the German ground forces learned that they did not have adequate air protection and that the U-boat campaign had failed, the news would spread rapidly and a serious break in morale might come unexpectedly. For these reasons it was essential that the Allies be prepared to take advantage of such conditions whenever they might occur. The President also said that there had been rumors of a German evacuation of Norway. He thought that plans should be under preparation to take advantage of such a contingency.

The Prime Minister suggested that a subparagraph be put into the paper at the end of paragraph 2 b of Section IV which would read as follows:

Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date in order to take advantage of a collapse of the enemy in France, or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German withdrawal.

In reply to a question by the President, Sir Charles Portal said that for bombing operations, air bases in Norway would not be of great assistance. It would be more economical to utilize those in England than it would be to build new ones in Norway, especially since Norway would not greatly extend the bombing range. He added, however, that it would have a very beneficial effect if fighters could be based on air fields in southern Norway.

The Prime Minister pointed out that if Norway could be occupied, it would reopen our communications with Russia. This fact, in itself, would make it imperative that immediate advantage be taken of the situation.

The Prime Minister said that the United States authorities would be kept informed of studies being made by General Morgan’s Staff in this regard.

Section IV, Paragraph 2 c – Operations in the Mediterranean to eliminate Italy from the war

The Prime Minister inquired whether the Poles were included in the forces detailed in this paragraph as available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke confirmed that these were included in the 19 British or Allied Divisions.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that it was not the intention of this paragraph to commit us to carrying out particular operations. For example, he would be very much opposed to any idea of an operation to capture Sardinia as a sequel to HUSKY. This would be an eccentric operation, which would have no influence on the securing of the great prize open to us if we could take the toe and heel of Italy, and gain touch with the insurgents of the Balkan countries.

Admiral King pointed out that it was stated in the paragraph that cach specific operation would be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that General Eisenhower would not be able to tell which operation he could do after Husky until the situation had declared itself. The idea, therefore, was to plan several operations and to decide, at the meeting to be held after HUSKY had been launched, which of them to carry out.

The President said that it was certainly difficult to foretell what the conditions would be. For example, it might be that a movement in Sardinia to separate from Mussolini’s regime might gain way, and consequently comparatively small forces could gain possession of the island. Or again, as one report suggested, the Germans might decide to withdraw their forces behind the Po, in which case entry into southern Italy would be easy. It might be better to widen the instructions to General Eisenhower, and to tell him to prepare operations against all parts of southern Europe.

General Marshall said that General Eisenhower would prepare a number of different operations, and which of them was adopted would be determined when we saw how HUSKY went. General Eisenhower had already put in summaries of plans against the heel and toe of Italy, and against Sardinia, and had expressed a preference for Sardinia. Air Chief Marshal Tedder had dissented from this conclusion, mainly on account of the difficulties of staging an attack on Sardinia with adequate air support.

Sir Charles Portal said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had also thought that the value of northern Italy as a base from which to bomb Germany had been underrated.

The Prime Minister said that the prime factor which should be kept in mind was the position in the Balkans, where 34 Axis Divisions were held in play by rebels, who would become much more active if we could gain touch with them through Durazzo, or any other suitable point. Of course, if Italy went out of the war, then the Italian Divisions would have to withdraw, and Germany would either have to fill the gap, or retire to the Danube. The effect on Turkey would be very important. None of these effects could possibly accrue from an operation against Sardinia.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that General Eisenhower would be instructed to prepare those operations which were best calculated to eliminate Italy. It was the elimination of Italy which would place these prizes within our grasp, and the right operation to bring this about would depend upon the situation after HUSKY. Moreover, much would depend upon events on the Russian Front. It might be that the presence of large numbers of Germans in the toe and heel would make a direct assault on this unprofitable – in which case Sardinia would be a better choice.

The Prime Minister did not agree that Sardinia could be an acceptable alternative. Operations in the general direction of the Balkans opened up very wide prospects, whereas the capture of Sardinia would merely place in our possession a desirable island. There was nothing in the paper which would indicate to General Eisenhower that we held a view on this matter. The politico-strategic aspect would not be present in his mind.

The President said he did not feel ready to make up his mind on this matter. Certainly there were greater advantages in going to places other than Sardinia, but he did not think we were ready yet to say where.

Discussion then took place on the exact meaning of the word to mount an operation.

Sir Alan Brooke said that to mount an operation meant to draw up the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. HUSKY, for example, had been mounted during VULCAN. It was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite recently in the HUSKY plan.

The Prime Minister thought that the word mount meant the fixing on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with the same resources.

After some further discussion, The Prime Minister suggested that he should take further time to consider this paragraph, and said that he would propose certain amendments for consideration.

Section IV. Paragraph 2 d – The bombing of Ploești

The Prime Minister said that he hoped the bombing of Ploești would not be carried out if it meant a considerable inroad into the preparatory aerial bombardment for HUSKY.

General McNarney said that the bombers which would be taken from the North African Theater to bomb Ploești would only be away for four or five days. It was the units which would come from the United Kingdom which would be absent for a longer period.

General Marshall pointed out that the type of aircraft to be used was the B-24, which was not of such value for the Husky preparatory bombardment as the B-17. He thought that if Ploești could be seriously damaged, it would be a blow of tremendous importance in support of operations on the Russian Front. The decision depended upon the comments and recommendations of the Commander in Chief, North African Theater.

Section IV, Paragraph 3 a – Operations in the Burma-China Theater

The President asked Mr. Hopkins what he thought the Generalissimo’s reactions would be to these proposals.

Mr. Hopkins replied that he did not think that the Generalissimo should be told of the decisions reached in the Conference. He predicted that if he were told, he would not agree with them, although secretly he would not be unhappy about them. He would resent more than anything else not having been consulted. Mr. Hopkins suggested that Mr. Soong be told tomorrow that ANAKIM is to go on.

General Marshall said that he thought the Chinese would have to be told a little more about the operations than was proposed by Mr. Hopkins. The Chinese were constantly pressing to see him concerning the decisions that were made, and he felt it wise to tell them everything except the details concerning the capture of Akyab and Ramree Islands.

The President said in this regard they simply should be told that an occupation of a base on the Burma Coast by amphibious operations was included in the decision but that the details would have to be worked out after further consideration.

The Prime Minister proposed that the Chinese should be informed as follows:

Further study of ANAKIM has led to the following plan:

1. A large-scale buildup of air combat forces and a rapid buildup of the air transport route to China.
2. A vigorous offensive in the northern part of Burma with the purpose of opening the Burma Road and regaining contact with China.
3. Amphibious operations against the coast of Burma with the view to controlling communications in the Bay of Bengal.

The Prime Minister however, indicated that he would prepare a written suggestion as to what should be told to the Chinese.

Section VI, Paragraph 1 – Equipment for Turkey

The Prime Minister said he wished it definitely understood that the Turks would be informed regarding the origin of any equipment that was given to them from United States production. He felt that the same rule should apply to equipment given to Russia.

General Marshall said that in discussing the paragraph regarding equipment for Turkey, the United States Chiefs of Staff had been concerned more with the availability of the equipment and its effects on our training than they were with who received the credit for giving it to the Turks.

The Prime Minister said he understood the situation perfectly.

The President went on to consider the remainder of the paper which was agreed to in all its details by both him and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister then said that he would like to give further consideration to the paper. He proposed to submit a suggestion regarding the post-HUSKY operations in the Mediterranean and also a proposal regarding the information that was to be given to the Chinese concerning the Burma decisions. He suggested, therefore, that the meeting adjourn at this time to meet again at 1130 on Tuesday morning, 25 May 1943.

This was agreed to.

[NormanStewart]

Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, 24 May, 1943.

Secret

Camp in North Africa for Refugees From Spain

With reference to your Minute on my note at Flag A. The present position is shown in Lord Halifax’s telegram to the Foreign Office at Flag B.

I submit that you should now go into action with the President on this matter.

H. L. ISMAY

[Attachment 1]

Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, May 21, 1943.

Most secret

Camp in North Africa for Refugees From Spain (Flag ‘A’)

At the International Refugees Conference recently held in Bermuda, the British Delegates suggested the setting up of a small refugee camp in North Africa to which refugees in Spain, who had escaped from France, could be moved. The proposal was that these refugees should be moved on to some more distant place of refuge when shipping was available. The reasons underlying these proposals are set out in ALCOVE 305.

The U.S. Delegation to the Refugee Conference felt themselves unable to agree without the approval of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This was sought through the State Department.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that the British proposals should not be accepted for the following military reasons:
a) shortage of personnel shipping;
b) shortage of cargo shipping;
c) additional burden placed on the shoulders of the theatre commander;
d) possibility of Arab resentment to the influx of Jews which might cause disorder.

The Joint Staff Mission took the matter up with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and pointed out how important it was that the only effective channel of escape for refugees of all nationalities from occupied Europe should not be blocked, since if it were, admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government; the Allies would be deprived of useful personnel and public opinion throughout the world would believe that the Allies were making no serious effort to deal with the refugee problem. It was argued further that the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa, far from the Allied lines of communication and under proper supervision, would be no embarrassment to the theatre commander.

It was also pointed out that if these refugees remained in Spain, the Spanish Government would be under continual pressure by the German Government to return them and that the shipping of relatively small numbers from Spain to North Africa would not be difficult.

The Joint Staff Mission suggested that, in view of the above arguments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the State Department and Foreign Office that they saw no objection, on military grounds, to the setting up of an internment camp in North Africa, at a spot to be selected in consultation with the theatre commander.

Later the U.S. Chiefs of Staff informed the Joint Staff Mission that they adhered to their view that it was militarily undesirable to set up a refugee camp in North Africa for the reasons they had already stated.

The Embassy then took the matter up with the State Department and the latter are understood to have suggested to the President that he should override the objections of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This they believe he will do.

The Ambassador was proposing to ask Mr. Hull tomorrow morning how the matter stood. You may wish to await the results of this interview before approaching the President.

H. L. ISMAY

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by President Roosevelt’s Adviser

Washington, undated.

Settlement in Northern Africa: Re Refugees:

The President’s suggestion to look up Italian plans for settlement might bring immediate practical results.

Inquiry to be made as to titles of land, soil and possibilities of compounding water for power irrigation.

If titles are found to be in the Italian Government, matters will be simplified. It will also be satisfactory, if the Italians took over the land from the inhabitants.

I am wondering if the doors of all countries cannot be opened to a few of the refugees. Each one taking a few, would soon take care of many.

The present position of the United States and Britain and the United Nations victories would make the opening up of that possibility greater now than at any other time. They might be persuaded in order to show their adherence to the four freedoms.

B M BARUCH

[Attachment 3 -- Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill

London, 19 May, 1943.

Secret
Immediate
Alcove No. 305.

Following for the Prime Minister from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Personal.

I am dismayed and depressed by the refusal of the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to our recommendation that a small camp should be established in North Africa into which to draft refugees from Spain. This suggestion has long been pressed forward by us, on the most urgent representations from H.M. Ambassador in Madrid, and has, I understand, the energetic support of the State Department. It is our main hope of getting refugees out of Spain and so not only satisfying British and American Public opinion, but also keeping open the escape routes from France into Spain which are essential to our military and intelligence services.

2. This is the only remaining way of getting our pilots and other prisoners out of France. The reasons given by the Chiefs of Staff for rejecting this suggestion are not very convincing, and should I think be overridden by the higher considerations mentioned. The numbers involved are not large and agreement to open a camp even for 1,000 would ease the situation. It is difficult to believe that this would put any particular strain on shipping, while as for admistration it could be undertaken by Governor Lehman’s organisation or we, as was suggested at the Bermuda Conference, would be willing to run the camp with our own officials. As for last objection, namely resentment on the part of the Arabs this could surely be eliminated by putting the camp in a place sufficiently remote from important Arab centres.

3. The refugees, even while they are in Spain, have to be fed and maintained to a considerable extent from American and British sources, and removal to North Africa, which appears to us essential if we are not to have a serious risk of the Spaniards closing their frontier tight, is we think the most economical suggestion from the point of view of both shipping and supplies. It must inevitably become known in due course that failure to get the “Hard Core” of refugees in Spain removed to the nearest and most convenient alternative destination is due to American military objections which will hardly be accepted as plausible. In that case I foresee extremely serious Parliamentary criticism.

4. If you see no objection, I should be most grateful if you could put all this personally to the President – it is our last hope of carrying through a modest suggestion to which we attach great political and military importance.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Lieutenant General Ismay
Mr. Harriman

Harriman’s memorandum to Churchill indicates that such matters as tank production were considered. Ismay’s presence at this meeting suggests that the British proposal for the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa may also have been discussed. Ismay, who was responsible for keeping Churchill apprised of the American-British negotiations on this issue, urged the Prime Minister on May 24 to “go into action” with Roosevelt on this question.

At this meeting, but quite possibly after their advisers had departed, Churchill requested of Roosevelt that Marshall be allowed to accompany the Prime Minister’s party on a visit to Algiers following the conclusion of the Conference in Washington. The Stimson Diary relates the following information regarding the Churchill request:

Before luncheon I learned that last night in a solitary debate between the President and the Prime Minister over some one of the points in which they both differed and differed vigorously, the Prime Minister… fought to the end and finally said, “Well, I will give up my part of this if you will let me have George Marshall to go for a trip to Africa;” and the President traded on the spot, took the point, and let Marshall go. Marshall told me of it and said he rather hated to be traded like a piece of baggage. I think I know pretty well what the Prime Minister has in prospect. He is going to take Marshall along with him in order to work on him to yield on some of the points that Marshall has held out in regard to the Prime Minister’s desired excursions in the eastern Mediterranean; but to think of picking out the strongest man there is in America, and Marshall is surely that today, the one on whom the fate of the war depends, and then to deprive him in a gamble of a much needed opportunity to recoup his strength by about three days’ rest and send him off on a difficult and rather dangerous trip across the Atlantic Ocean where he is not needed except for Churchill’s purposes is I think going pretty far. But nobody has any say and Marshall is going to pack up his bag tonight and start on his hard trip tomorrow morning on about twelve hours’ notice.

[dan.harnden]

Poor poor Marshall subjected to the inhumanity of a trip to North Africa to consider the refugee problem.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (May 25, 1943)

Hopkins-Churchill meeting, forenoon

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Mr. Hopkins		Prime Minister Churchill

Hopkins persuaded Churchill to give up his attempt to obtain a radical revision of the Final Report and to settle, instead, for some minor changes. Churchill recalls having been warned by Hopkins of the futility of pressing his recommendations regarding post-HUSKY operations.

---

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney		Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell		Lieutenant General Ismay
Vice Admiral Horne		Admiral Noble
Major General Fairchild		Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral Cooke		Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Streett		Major General Holmes
Brigadier General Wedemeyer		Captain Lambe
Colonel Cabell		Brigadier Jacob
Commander Freseman		Brigadier Porter
Commander Long		Air Commodore Elliot
		Brigadier Macleod
	Secretariat
	Brigadier Redman
	Brigadier General Deane
	Commander Coleridge
	Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 25, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

Secret

Conclusions of the Minutes of the 95th Meeting

Admiral King suggested an amendment to Conclusion c of Item 2.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the Conclusions of the 95th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes, but with the substitution of the word “Pacific” for “Indian” in Conclusion c of Item 2 and the addition of the words “(including Burma)” after the words “Far Eastern Theaters.”

Final Report to President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/4 and 242/5)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them CCS 242/4, together with certain amendments suggested by the Prime Minister (CCS 242/5).

Certain other minor amendments were suggested and approved.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as modified by CCS 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion.

Implementation of Decisions Reached at the Trident Conference (CCS 250)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering suggested directives and instructions to General Eisenhower and General Morgan, prepared in the light of the decisions reached at the TRIDENT Conference.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 1 c of the Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered certain amendments to the draft directives contained in Enclosures “A” and “B.”

General Marshall presented a proposal that an additional statement be added at the end of paragraph 1 of CCS 250 to the effect that shipping available for Post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations would amount to 15 combat loaders and 90 cargo ships.

Sir Charles Portal indicated that he thought that before the British Chiefs of Staff could agree to specify an exact number of ships the matter would have to be explored further.

Admiral King suggested adding the statement at the end of paragraph one:

Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.

Admiral King’s proposal was agreed to.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the recommendations in the covering Memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners, as amended, be approved, but that the final directives be prepared by the Secretariat in the light of the discussion and of the latest decisions.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners as amended in the course of discussion.

b. Approved the draft directive to General Eisenhower (Enclosure “A”) and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) (Enclosure “B”), subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives.

Suggested Statement to Be Made to the Chinese (Unnumbered CCS Memorandum dated 25 May 1943)

General Marshall said that since he had a meeting with the Chinese Representatives at 3 p.m. that afternoon he would like guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference should be conveyed to the Chinese. He urged that the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with reference to Burma be presented as proposals since it would be improper to imply a decision had been made regarding the use of the Generalissimo’s forces.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the formal transmission of the decisions to the Chinese should be made by the President and Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

Certain amendments to the draft contained in the memorandum under discussion were then inserted in order to conform to this conception.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved with minor amendments, the suggested statement to be made to the Chinese.

Proposals for Improving Combined Planning (CCS 251)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain proposals for improving Combined Planning.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 2 a of the Memorandum designed to make it clear that the war against Japan should be considered as a whole.

Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph 2 b should be eliminated since, in his view, the function of the Combined Staff Planners was to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff on plans prepared by theater commanders and not to personally assist theater commanders. He felt that the presence of the Combined Staff Planners at theater headquarters might interfere with the function of theater commanders and their staffs.

Admiral Cooke and Captain Lambe explained that this paragraph had been inserted since it was believed that the Combined Staff Planners could, if they visited General Eisenhower’s headquarters, prove useful by imparting information and data as regards resources which would assist him in drawing up his plans and, at the same time, themselves learn at an early stage of the possible plans and requirements.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in CCS 251/1.

Conclusion of the Conference

Sir Alan Brooke said that, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would like to express most heartfelt thanks for the kindness, both official and unofficial, which the British Chiefs of Staff had received during their visit. They had been met in a spirit of cooperation which had proved most helpful. The fundamental value of the exchange of views between the Chiefs of Staff of the two Nations had been proved by the fact that they had agreed to hold the next Conference at an early date. Short periods between meetings were, he felt, essential. If the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent.

Sir Alan Brooke paid tribute to the Combined Staff Planners who had worked at great pressure and whose high standard of work had gone far to assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reaching rapid decisions.

With regard to the results of the Conference, agreement had been reached on all vital points and through the process of reaching agreement, each side had achieved a clearer appreciation of the outlook and conception of the other. Finally, the Conference had strengthened those ties of friendship between the two Staffs, which was so essential to true cooperation in the war.

Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, said that they too had an equal appreciation of the value of this conference and looked forward with assurance to equally successful results from future conferences. Frequent meetings were, in his opinion, essential. It had been a great pleasure to him to assist, for the first time, in personal consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff. This Conference had enabled the Chiefs of Staff to clarify the outlook for the immediate future and subsequent conferences would enable them to deal as successfully with future problems.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:30 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney		Lieutenant General Ismay
	Secretariat
	Brigadier General Deane
	Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 25, 1943, 11:30 a.m.

Secret

Employment of the Poles

The Prime Minister said that he had had a strong appeal from General Sikorski for the employment of the Polish troops in battle in the near future. He hoped that these good troops could be made use of.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the Polish troops in the United Kingdom, which amounted to one armored division and one brigade, had been included in the forces earmarked for ROUNDHAMMER; and the two Polish divisions and certain minor formations now in Iraq had been included in the 19 British and Allied divisions available for further operations in the Mediterranean.

Final Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 242/4); and Amendments Thereto Suggested by the Prime Minister (CCS 242/5)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported that they were in entire agreement with the amendments proposed by the Prime Minister and would incorporate these in the final edition of the report.

The Prime Minister suggested that it would be necessary to give a version of the report to the Russians. This version could be drawn up in suitable form for handing to the Russians through the normal official channels. This would obviate the necessity for an explanatory telegram from the President and himself. The message could simply be sent saying that a full report would be reaching them through the American and British representatives in Moscow.

The President and the Prime Minister:
a. Gave final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended in accordance with the Prime Minister’s suggestions.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare for their approval a version of the report suitable for communication to the Russians through the normal official channels.

Communication of Certain Decisions to the Chinese

The Conference had before them a suggested phraseology to be employed in communicating to the Chinese the decisions regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater, which had been suggested by the Prime Minister. (Shown in the Annex to these Minutes.)

General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had certain minor modifications to propose (which he read to the President and the Prime Minister), apart from which they were in entire agreement with the Prime Minister’s suggestion.

After further discussion, it was agreed: That the President and General Marshall should make use of the form of words contained in the Annex to these minutes in conversation with Dr. Soong and General Chu respectively, and should hand them copies of the document for their retention.

Official Statement for the Press

The President said that it would be necessary to consider the terms of a statement to be given to the Press at a suitable moment after the Prime Minister had left Washington.

Mr. Harry Hopkins said that he had drafted a statement, and he proceeded to read his draft to the Conference.

General agreement was expressed with the terms of the draft, and Mr. Hopkins was asked to prepare it in final form for issue.

Visit of General Stilwell and General Chennault to the United Kingdom

The Prime Minister said that it would be of very great value if General Stilwell and General Chennault, with their unrivaled knowledge of the Burma-China Theater, could return to their posts via London. He understood that the route through London was actually three days shorter than the route across the Southern Atlantic; and since Field Marshal Wavell and Admiral Somerville would also be going to London, the visit of the two generals would serve to give a great impetus to the work necessary to enable the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Burma-China Theater to be implemented.

General Marshall said that he was entirely agreeable to this suggestion and would issue the necessary orders.

Post-HUSKY Operations

The President said that the Prime Minister would shortly have an opportunity of talking to the Commanders in Chief in North Africa on post-HUSKY policy, and had suggested that it would be of great value if General Marshall could accompany him. He (the President) had accordingly spoken to General Marshall, and asked whether he could defer his visit to the Southwest Pacific in order to fall in with the Prime Minister’s request. General Marshall had said that he was perfectly willing to do this.

The Prime Minister explained that he would feel awkward in discussing these matters with General Eisenhower without the presence of a United States representative on the highest level. If decisions were taken, it might subsequently be thought that he had exerted undue influence. It was accordingly a source of great gratification to him to hear that General Marshall would accompany him; and he was sure that it would now be possible to arrange everything satisfactorily in Algiers, and for a report to be sent back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

Code Names for Future Operations

Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended the adoption of certain code names, a list of which he handed to the President.

In discussion, certain modifications to the list were agreed upon.

The final list as approved has been given to those immediately concerned.

The PLOUGH Scheme

General Marshall read to the Conference a report which he had received upon the state of training and readiness for action of the force which had been specially set aside and trained for the PLOUGH scheme. It was the firm opinion of all the United States and British officers concerned in the matter that this force, which numbered some 2,500 men, should be given battle experience as soon as possible. The force, which had been given amphibious training in addition to the special training for the PLOUGH scheme, had been worked up to a high pitch of readiness, and provided it were not uselessly dissipated, it would greatly benefit by coming into action. It could be reassembled for its proper role before the winter. There were a number of possible places where the force might be utilized, such as the Aleutians, or post-HUSKY operations, or for commando raids from the U.K. or even in the Azores. It was perhaps a pity that they had not been employed in the operations against Attu, but an opportunity might occur for using them in another operation in that area.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that the value of the force would be greatly increased by early participation in battle.

General McNarney said that the improved type of vehicle for use by the force would be ready about the middle of October.

The Prime Minister said that this force had been designed for a particular type of warfare and it would be a great pity to dissipate it if there were a chance of its real role coming to the fore. Nevertheless, he thought that it would be quite easy to create an opportunity for its employment if it was sent to the United Kingdom. It might be possible, for example, to repeat a raid on the coast of Norway of the type of the raid on the Lofoeten Islands.

The President suggested that it would be necessary also to consider the utilization of the Norwegian battalion now in the United States.

The Prime Minister agreed. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter immediately and make specific proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This suggestion was agreed to.

Consultations With the Russians

The President asked whether any steps had been taken to concert measures with the Russians in case of an attack by Japan on Russia.

General Marshall said that an attempt had been made to discuss this eventuality with the Russians, and General Bradley had been sent to Moscow for the purpose. After three months’ negotiation, it had been agreed that he should survey the airfields in Siberia, but the Russians had then reversed the decision and the whole proposal had fallen to the ground.

The President said that the Russians naturally did not wish to permit any act which might compromise them in the eyes of the Japanese. Nevertheless, it would be a pity if the occasion arose and no plans had been made. It might be desirable, for example, to send forces to help the Russians to hold Kamchatka.

The Prime Minister agreed, but thought the Russians would be unlikely to be forthcoming. He suggested that one way of making progress would be to say to the Russians that we would be prepared to send them so many squadrons of aircraft so many days after the outbreak of the war with Japan. We could tell the Russians that they could count on this reinforcement in making their plans. This might lead them on to discussion.

General McNarney said that this proposal had in fact been made, but the only Russian response had been to suggest that the aircraft should be given to them so that they could fly them themselves.

Admiral King said that a running study was in existence of the possibilities presented by a Russo-Japanese war, and this had been reviewed three months previously. Little, however, could be done without additional data.

The Conference took note of the above discussion.

Adjournment of the Conference

The TRIDENT Conference then adjourned, the Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the warm welcome which he had received and his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Soong meeting, 2:45 p.m.

	Present
United States		China
President Roosevelt		Foreign Minister Soong

At this meeting, Roosevelt presumably transmitted to Soong the report to the Chinese authorities on the results of the Conference.

Memorandum Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Washington, May 25, 1943.

Secret

Proposals To Be Made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

The following are the proposals which will be made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to operations in the ANAKIM Theater:

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air Route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:
a. Intensifying Air operations against Japanese in Burma;
b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and
c. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air Route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China.