The Syria–Lebanon Campaign (1941)

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (August 1, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/13602: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, July 27, 1941 — 10 a.m.
[Received August 1 — 11:25 a.m.]

313.

General de Gaulle asked me to call on him yesterday afternoon as we had not had an opportunity to talk much at the reception and he was leaving for Damascus today.

He began by saying that the Free French were here to uphold and continue the rights of France in the Levant. This was generally understood and approved not only by the British but also by the Syrians and Lebanese. He had received the necessary assurances from the British Government and quite recently these assurances were renewed and confirmed. However, he had observed that while men like Churchill and Eden seem to understand the situation thoroughly, there was evidence of less comprehension on the part of some of the British military authorities in the Middle East. He regretted this because it rendered the principal task a little more difficult. Few people seemed to realize he had to watch public opinion in France most carefully in order to counteract German propaganda that the Free French movement was merely a tool of the British (I gathered from the tone and manner in which he said this that he wished to convey the thought that occasionally he had to appear less disposed toward the British than he personally felt because everything he said and did had its reaction among the French people). I thanked the General for taking me into his confidence in connection with a matter which was extremely delicate but which all of us had so much at heart. I said I hoped he realized that in the Levant he found himself in an atmosphere of characteristically oriental intrigue and that he would not take too seriously the multifarious accusations, denunciations, innuendos, et cetera, which had doubtless already come to his ears. There were a great many people in Syria and the Lebanon who would like nothing better than to see serious friction develop between the Free French and the British quite apart from a relatively numerous group who were either in Axis pay or had pro-German sympathies and would therefore take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord and suspicion.

It seemed to me, I said, there was one — and perhaps only one — solid tongue which could provide a common starting point for everybody right now, whether French or British, Christian or Muslim or any other nationality or race, and that was the immediate necessity of defense. For the present nothing mattered except the purely physical and strategic position of keeping the Axis out of Syria. And in so far as the situation in Syria was linked up with Britain’s general war effort and could be made to contribute to the overthrow of Hitlerism and any other reason to think of direct interests and concern to the American Government and people.

I therefore ventured to hope that neither his relations with the British nor the admittedly complex and trying relationships of both occupying forces with the natives would be permitted to impede the military effort of the Allies. I did not mean that political problems should not be discussed even now especially as everybody was agreed that Syria and the Lebanon were entitled to independence. But it was futile to allow political schemers to stir up internal dissensions while the present potentially dangerous situation continued, for not only would it be playing into Hitler’s hands but it would jeopardize the very existence and integrity of the territories for whose independence the same politicians profess so much solicitude.

General de Gaulle said he was in entire accord with me but it remained to be seen whether it would prove practicable to postpone indefinitely the implementation of certain political promises which had been made to the natives. I replied the essential thing was that they should temporarily be relegated to the background and that irrevocable commitments should as much as possible be avoided before the successful conclusion of the war.

Repeated to London and Cairo.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (August 2, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/13608: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, July 30, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received August 2 — 2 p.m.]

319.

General de Gaulle made a speech in Damascus yesterday in which he said the time had come to put an end to the mandate and to negotiate with the Syrians regarding the conditions for their:

…full and complete sovereignty and independence and to establish the terms of an alliance which both sides most sincerely desire.

He added that in this war the liberties and even existence of all peoples were at stake. France would prevent Syria from being enslaved in cooperation with her brave British allies:

…who have come here exclusively for strategic reasons. In this connection, I am pleased to refer to the declarations and undertakings of the Government in London by which Great Britain expresses herself completely free from all political aims in Syria and the Lebanon and determined to respect in its entirety the position of France.

Even these unequivocal diplomatic instruments might not stop enemy propaganda or inconsiderate words,

…but I am counting on the complete union of England and France which existed in the past and simultaneous actions of their armies in the Levant states to contribute toward the reassurance of Syria and the Lebanon in the certainty that they will preserve from the Tigris to the Mediterranean and from Transjordan to Turkey their national liberty and integrity.

The General concluded by expressing his firm conviction that the powerful British armies and determination, the mobilized resources of America and the losses inflicted on Germany by Russia were all bound to lead to victory.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (August 7, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/13750: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, August 5, 1941 — 11 p.m.
[Received August 7 — 11:15 a.m.]

323.

General de Gaulle sent for me again this afternoon and said he had done so because he knew I was a sincere friend of England and France and he authorized me to make use of our conversation as I saw fit.

He said his relations with the British had reached such a critical stage that he was beginning to doubt whether he could go on like this much longer. Despite all promises made to him by the British Government as recently as July 25, by Lyttelton in Cairo, British military seemed determined to thwart and defy him wherever they could. In the first place the armistice terms in themselves were a betrayal of the Free French cause and had been dictated by the British against his own wishes. As far as he was concerned they were, therefore, practically null and void. In the second place, the solemn assurances given him by the British Government and his recent agreements with Lyttelton were being deliberately disregarded by the British military on the spot. And thirdly, British political officers were traveling all over the Jebel Druz, Hauran and Jezideh which gave the natives the impression that the British were the real masters of the country.

General de Gaulle then showed me a letter Lyttelton had sent him July 25 to which were attached two agreements regarding British and French collaboration in Syria and Lebanon. After reading them I remarked that they seemed to me quite fair and logical and if both parties acted in good faith I could not see why there should be trouble. The General replied that he accepted London’s good faith but the good faith of the British military in Syria was more questionable. I said I could not possibly enter into a discussion of this nature and expressed the hope he would tell his British friends quite frankly whenever he thought they were at fault and I knew they would appreciate it. He then startled me by saying he had found it quite useless to talk to them and from now on he would insist on Free French rights “even if this should lead to a rupture of relations with the British.” At first I thought it best to ignore this statement but when a few minutes later he repeated it with emphasis, I said:

I deeply deplore your statement, for if you should make it to an indiscreet person you would be playing into the hands of Hitler which I know is furthest from your thoughts. I personally refuse to believe that the situation is such as to justify a threat of this kind. I am certain that with good will and common sense and a little tact on both sides there is no problem between French and British in Syria which cannot be satisfactorily settled. We in America are naturally interested in the preservation of harmony and effective cooperation between all the Allies, because only so will the Axis be defeated.

We talked for an hour and a quarter but I fear he instinctively distrusts the British and is by nature quite incapable of understanding British character and purpose.

I have informed Generals Wilson and Spears of this conversation but Department may wish to repeat above to London.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

890D.01/420a Supplemental

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

No. 433
Washington, August 7, 1941.

Sir:
The Department has been informed that negotiations have been or are about to be initiated by the British authorities in Beirut, looking towards the establishment of independent governments in Syria and the Lebanon. In this connection, there is enclosed herewith a copy of an instruction which was sent to the American Ambassador at Paris on August 4, 1936, when treaty negotiations were in progress between the French Government and representatives of Syria and the Lebanon regarding the independence of those mandated territories. The American Government maintains the attitude set forth at that time concerning the necessity for the adequate safeguarding of existing American treaty rights in any arrangements which may be made for the independence of the areas concerned.

The Department has no reason to believe that the authorities now in control in Syria and Lebanon will fail to respect the full rights which the American Government enjoys with respect to Syria and Lebanon by virtue of the American-French Convention of April 4, 1924. Furthermore, the Department is confident that those authorities will bear in mind the fact that no modification in the terms of the Mandate, including termination thereof of course, will affect existing American treaty rights in the area unless such modification has been assented to by the United States.

You are requested to discuss the matter with the British Foreign Office and to inquire what arrangements the British Government contemplates with respect to consultation with the United States concerning the termination of the Mandate.

A copy of this instruction is being forwarded to the American Consul General at Beirut for his information.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (August 10, 1941)

CIVILIZATION: THEN AND NOW

This picture shows British troops in a Bren gun carrier searching the ruins of the Roman Colonnade in Palmyra, which was built during the days ancient civilization flourished in Syria. The British occupied Palmyra after heavy fighting with the French.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (August 15, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14008: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, August 15, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received 10:07 p.m.]

332.

Local newspapers published yesterday exchange of letters dated August 7 between General de Gaulle and Oliver Lyttelton signed during Lyttelton’s recent visit to Beirut. The British Government reiterates its disinterestedness in Syria and the Lebanon except to win the war and to recognize their independence. It admits that France should enjoy in these countries a preeminent position compared to any other European power.

General de Gaulle expresses satisfaction that Great Britain recognizes in advance the preeminent and privileged position of France as soon as the Levant States are independent, and in return he gives assurances that Free France is resolved to continue the war at Great Britain’s side until complete victory has been won.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/14012: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, August 15, 1941 — noon.
[Received 10:05 p.m.]

333.

Exchange of letters mentioned in my telegram 332, August 15, 11 a.m., was the outcome of recent conversations between Lyttelton and de Gaulle in Beirut in order to convince the latter of the good faith of the British Government and if possible to prevent further reckless observations such as he made to me on August 5 and reported in my 323.

It may amuse the Department to learn that General Wilson claims he found de Gaulle much more reasonable and tractable after I had my chat with him but I doubt whether the present extraordinary complexity of the daily contacts between the British and French political and military authorities in the Levant States can in the near future be expected to become less acute.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (August 21, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14203: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, August 20, 1941 — 6 p.m.
[Received August 21 — 4:03 p.m.]

336.

Following upon the exchange of letters the British turned over to the French such administrative control in Syria and Lebanon, including public security, intelligence service, censorship, et cetera, as they were still exercising. But what is more serious the British have now also given the French complete military control south of a line running roughly east from Latakia though excluding the Syrian desert.

No publicity has been given to these latest concessions but in discussing them with me a senior British officer said he was told in high quarters in Cairo a few days ago that they had been made “in deference to the wishes of the American Government”. I said I felt quite sure my Government had never expressed any wishes in the matter and that it would be interesting to trace the statement to its source.

I consider the question of some importance because the concessions made to the French — especially intelligence service and military control of south Syria — are far wider than anticipated or believed necessary. Considering that a great many Vichy French are still in the country and may remain even in official positions without declaring themselves for Free France, not to mention doubtful or unfriendly native elements, the danger in an emergency becomes a very real one. A report, therefore, that the United States had induced the British Government to surrender rights which the British military believed necessary for their safety would be calculated to cause uneasiness among the British and may perhaps even be the result of local German propaganda which is still quite active.

Repeated to Cairo.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (August 22, 1941)

890D.01/526: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, August 22, 1941 — midnight.
[Received August 22 — 6:52 a.m.]

3822.

Foreign Office states orally that negotiations looking towards the establishment independent governments in Syria and the Lebanon will be undertaken solely by the Free French authorities. The British Government will not take part in the negotiations but would be pleased to make on our behalf any representations to the Free French that we may desire. Such representations would probably be made through the British Minister of State in the Middle East.

WINANT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (August 24, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14323: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt to the Secretary of State

Cairo, August 23, 1941 — 8 p.m.
[Received August 24 — 11:40 p.m.]

1218.

An official of the British Embassy, who has been intimately connected with the elaboration of British policy in respect of Syria and who recently accompanied Lyttelton to Syria, states that the allegation of the senior officer mentioned in the telegram under reference has absolutely no basis in fact insofar as British policy in Syria is concerned, and furthermore that he knows of no circumstance which could have been so misconstrued as to give such an impression. He added he would look into the matter with a view to ascertaining if possible the source of this false report and to taking appropriate steps to check its propagation.

Repeated to Beirut.

KIRK

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (September 8, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14800: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, September 8, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received 1:45 p.m.]

354.

I learn from an authoritative source that the arrangements between the British and the Free French referred to in the first paragraph of my 336, August 20, 6 p.m., provides that the French shall be paramount in all matters concerning civilian administration, with the support whenever necessary of the British military authorities, both in Syria and in the Lebanon.

However, north and east of a line running from Latakia to Aleppo, thence via Kariatine and Sababiar to the junction of the Iraq, Syria and Transjordan boundaries, the internal security will be the responsibility of the British military authorities although when possible the French administration will be used to implement such security measures as may be necessary.

I understand that in the above so-called frontier zone, the requirements of the British military commander will be considered paramount. But in order to maintain the closest possible liaison with the Free French, even he will work through the French civil administration. Should this fail he will make a demand and if the French authorities decline or are unable to implement his wishes, he will report to headquarters and immediate steps will be taken to have his orders enforced.

Repeated to London. Code texts by mail to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (September 17, 1941)

SYRIA GETS INDEPENDENCE
…
First president named for new republic
…
Damascus, Syria, Sept. 16 (AP) –
The independence of Syria was proclaimed today by the occupying Free French authorities and Sheikh Taj al-Din al-Hasani was named the first president of the republic.

In a letter to the new president, Commanding General Georges Catroux said:

Free France, acting in agreement with her ally, Great Britain, has undertaken to terminate the mandate and grant Syria the status of an independent sovereign state and to guarantee the new state by treaty.

A new cabinet is expected to be formed Tuesday.

The Free French and British won control of Syria and Lebanon last June in a brief campaign from the Vichy French, who had continued to rule these Levant states under the League of Nations.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (September 21, 1941)

AUSTRALIANS PRAISED BY VICHY GENERAL

Vichy, Sept. 20 –
Australians are “athletes and good soldiers,” General Henri Fernand Dentz, recently liberated after being held hostage in Syria, declared in an interview with the foreign press here today.

General Dentz, who as Vichy’s high commissioner led French forces in the Syrian campaign, paid high tribute to both the loyal French warriors under his command as well as to the Australians. He avoided the word enemy and used “adversaries” instead in his references to the Australians who, he said, are:

…athletes and good soldiers who fought with the toughness and hardness they applies to their own lives.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (September 29, 1941)

890D.00/852: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, September 28, 1941 — 10 p.m.
[Received September 29 — 11:30 a.m.]

381.

The first President of independent Syria Sheikh Taj al-Din al-Hasani, was yesterday inaugurated at Damascus. General Catroux read a proclamation from which I summarize the following points.

1. Syria to exercise at once all rights and prerogatives of an independent and sovereign state, limited only by the exigencies of the war and the security of its territory.

2. Its position as ally of Free France and of Great Britain requires close conformity of its policy with that of the Allies.

3. “By assuming independent international life Syria assumes of course the rights and obligations heretofore subscribed to in its name.”

4. Syria has the right to appoint diplomatic representatives wherever it considers it necessary. Elsewhere Free France will use its good offices to protect Syrian interests and nationals.

5. Great Britain having already undertaken to recognize Syrian independence Free France will immediately approach other friendly or Allied Powers to obtain recognition from them too.

6. Free France favors closer ties between the different parts of Syria and will therefore modify the special status of certain regions so as to put them politically under a central Syrian government while maintaining their financial and administrative autonomy (this obviously refers to the Jebel Druze and the Alaouites).

7. It is understood that all guarantees under public law in favor of individuals and religious communities will be respected.

8. Free France will assist in establishing better economic collaboration between Syria and the Lebanon.

9. For the duration of the war the Allies will take charge of the defense of the country. To that end the Syrian national forces will cooperate and place at the disposal of the Allies all communications, landing fields and ports. Gendarmerie and police will collaborate with the Free French in protecting Syria against internal enemies.

10. Syria being included in the war zone and in the economic and financial system of the Allies the closest collaboration is also necessary regarding all measures of economic warfare. Syria having entered the sterling bloc will accord the greatest possible freedom of trade with the countries of that bloc and will adopt the necessary economic, financial and exchange measures in harmony with the pledging of the sterling bloc.

11. The above stipulations are inspired by the sole thought of winning the war and thereby assuring to Syria the future of a free people. Despite the war Free France did not wish to delay the fulfillment of Syrian national aspirations but it is necessary that as soon as possible a Franco-Syrian treaty definitely consecrate the independence of the country.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 2, 1941)

890E.05/3: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, October 2, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received 1:13 p.m.]

392.

Decree No. 242 dated September 26 signed by General Catroux published today modifies temporarily many provisions of Decree No. 324, November 22, 1939, relative to the organization of the Mixed Courts in the Lebanon. Principal changes are to the effect that a majority of French judges is no longer necessary in any court and in some of them the judges may be either French or Lebanese. Prerogatives of the Inspector-General are now delegated to the Chief of the Lebanese State or to the Under Secretary of Justice.

A similar Decree modifying the composition of the Mixed Courts in Syria, No. 96 dated August 18, 1941, is now en route with my despatch No. 132, August 22. It modified Decree No. 316, December 2, 1940, and referred to Decree No. 290, October 19, 1939.

As the files of this office do not show that either the two last mentioned Decrees or No. 324, November 22, 1939, were ever transmitted to the Department I am forwarding copies of all by the pouch.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 4, 1941)

890D.00/855: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, October 4, 1941 — 10 a.m.
[Received 11:51 a.m.]

395.

I have just received a formal note from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Damascus dated October 2 in which he announces the proclamation of the independence of Syria on September 27. He continues:

This event which corresponds to the profound aspirations of the people of Syria inaugurates in this country a new political era and enables Syria to consolidate and develop the very cordial relations which it maintains with your country.

It is to this end that the Syrian Government has established a Ministry of Foreign Affairs which has immediately taken in hand all matters coming within its competency.

This Ministry will henceforth be happy to communicate with you.

When [What?] reply if any does the Department wish me to make? The only two colleagues I have questioned so far are also asking for instructions from their Governments.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 6, 1941)

890D.00/852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut

Washington, October 6, 1941 — 5 p.m.

182.

You are instructed to inform General Catroux in a written communication that his proclamation of September 27 has been brought to the attention of this Government and that while the United States, in accordance with its traditional policy, is in full sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples, this Government considers it necessary to remind not only the authorities who may assume responsibility for granting independence to Syria and Lebanon but also the Syrian and Lebanese authorities that the United States has certain treaty rights in the area which cannot be abrogated or modified without the consent of this Government. Fundamental among these rights, as provided in Article 6 of the Convention between the United States and France signed at Paris on April 4, 1924, is that no modification in the terms of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon shall affect American treaty rights in the area unless such modification has been assented to by the United States. Termination of the mandate would constitute, of course, the most extreme modification possible. General Catroux is doubtless aware that Article 5 of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, provides that the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including consular jurisdiction and the capitulations, shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately reestablished unless those Powers which enjoyed them in 1914, including the United States, shall have previously renounced the right to their reestablishment. The United States has of course made no such renunciation. While the American Government has no reason to believe that the regime to be set up in Syria and Lebanon will make necessary the resumption of consular jurisdiction, it is necessary to recall the provisions of Article 5 of the mandate in any full consideration of the subject at hand.

You should inform General Catroux that your communication to him is made solely as a result of his public declaration and has no other purpose or significance than to invite attention to the treaty rights of the United States in Syria and Lebanon and to make a full reservation of those rights. Pending a clarification of the situation in the area, the United States does not consider that the circumstances existing at present offer a suitable occasion for this Government to enter into any negotiations for the conclusion of appropriate agreements covering relations between the United States and the area concerned.

Unless you perceive objection, please request General Catroux to bring the foregoing to the attention of the appropriate local authorities.

For your own information, you will find in the Department’s instruction to Paris, no. 734 of March 8, 1938, a copy of which was handed to Consul General Palmer and presumably placed in the Beirut files, a full discussion of the arrangements which we have had in mind to regularize our position in Syria and Lebanon in the event their independence is recognized.

HULL

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 8, 1941)

890D.01/540: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, October 8, 1941 — 10 a.m.
[Received 2:40 p.m.]

404.

In connection with the proclamation of Syrian independence I am quoting below from a letter General de Gaulle addressed to General Catroux under date of June 24, 1941, i.e., 3 weeks before the Allies entered Beirut. Text is contained in my despatch number 131 which may not reach the Department for some time.

The mandate for which France was made responsible by the League of Nations in 1924 must come to an end. For this reason you will take as a starting point for the negotiations with the States of the Levant the Treaty of Alliance concluded with them in 1936. I take it upon myself to transmit to the League of Nations at the proper time the substitution in the Levant of the regime of the mandate by a new regime which will be in accord with the purposes for which the mandate was created.

ENGERT

890D.00/858: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, October 8, 1941 — 5 p.m.
[Received October 8 — 3:46 p.m.]

405.

I have today handed General Catroux a note containing the substance of the Department’s 182, October 6, 5 p.m.

He said he entirely understood the Department’s points of view and would reply in writing. He particularly appreciated the friendly tone of the Departments observations and would do what he could to see that the treaty rights of the United States and other powers were protected.

I then asked him if he would be so good as to bring the note to the attention of the Syrian and Lebanese authorities and he said that he would be glad to do so.

I am also giving a copy of my note to the British authorities.

In my conversation with Catroux I took the occasion to refer to the Mixed Courts — see my 392, October 2 — and informed him that I naturally was obliged to reserve all rights on behalf of American citizens whose interests might be affected by the new legislation. He replied it was a purely temporary measure and gave me his personal promise that if an American case should come up he would see that a majority of judges was French even if he had to send to Egypt to obtain them.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 13, 1941)

890D.00/855: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut

Washington, October 13, 1941 — 10 p.m.

186.

You should acknowledge the receipt of the communications in an informal letter without according any title to the addressee, stating that you have referred his communication to your government, where the general subject of American relations with the area of Syria and Lebanon are under consideration. You should add that your government, meanwhile, has instructed you to make a full reservation of American treaty rights in Syria and Lebanon, and should include the observations contained in your note to General Catroux drafted in accordance with the Department’s telegram no. 182, October 6, 5 p.m., making necessary changes, mutatis mutandis, to apply to the Syrian official rather than Catroux.

HULL

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 14, 1941)

890D.00/859: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut to the Secretary of State

Beirut, October 14, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received 1:30 p.m.]

412.

I have today received a note from General Catroux dated yesterday in which he acknowledges mine of October 8th. He quotes the sentence from his proclamation of September 27 mentioned in numbered paragraph 3 of my 381, September 28 and states that this provision applies of course to the obligation assumed for the benefit of the United States and “is of a nature to give every reassurance to the American Government.”

He adds that the new regime in Syria will later be supplanted by “a definitive regime to be established by treaty. I can already now give you the assurance that when the negotiations for that treaty take place full account will be taken of the rights conferred upon the United States by the above mentioned convention”, i. e., our treaty of 1924.

He states he informed the Syrian Government of my note. I am giving a copy of his reply to the British.

Repeated to London.

ENGERT

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 18, 1941)

890D.00/861

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile to the Secretary of State

No. 58
London, October 6, 1941.
[Received October 18.]

Sir:
I have the honor to report that M. Maurice Dejean, National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in the recently formed De Gaulle National Committee, has asked me to forward the attached copy and translation of an Aide-Mémoire, dated October 2, 1941.

In handing me these documents, M. Dejean pointed out that the American Consul General in Beirut had inquired what opportunity would be offered our Government for consultation on the possible termination of the French Mandate in Syria. Moreover, the Consul General there asked what guarantees would be given for the safeguard of American rights acquired by virtue of the existing treaties and of the present position of the United States in relation to Syria.

M. Dejean believed that the attached Aide-Mémoire clearly set forth the Free French position in relation to these questions.

Respectfully yours,
A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

[Enclosure — Translation]

Aide-Mémoire by the National Commission for Foreign Affairs of Free France

London, October 2, 1941.

The United States Consul-General in Beirut has enquired what opportunities would be offered to his Government for consultation on the subject of the possible termination of the French mandate in Syria. Moreover, he has asked what guarantees would be given for the safeguard of American rights acquired by virtue of the existing treaties and of America’s present position in Syria.

Free France has no intention whatsoever of encroaching on the rights and position of the United States in Syria. In particular, she means to respect the Franco-American Convention of August [April] 4, 1924. Nevertheless, however desirous Free France may be to grant in fact to the States of the Levant the maximum independence compatible with the necessities of the war, she holds that there can be no question of legally putting an end to the mandate régime as instituted by an act of the Council of the League of Nations, dated July 22, 1922, which entered into force on September 29, 1923.

Free France, which is only recognised — in certain conditions — by Great Britain and the USSR, is not qualified to ask for the discharge of this mandate, which could only be granted by the Council of the League of Nations.

The régime to be set up in Syria during the war cannot be anything but provisional. Nonetheless, the Free French authorities could not at any time tolerate that special rights should be set aside or neglected in the case of a nation which, by the help it is giving to Great Britain and the USSR, is making such an important contribution to the struggle for the liberation of France.