The Evening Star (December 15, 1945)
Disagrees with Justice Jackson concerning Nuernberg
To the editor: Too little attention has been given to the serious setback threatening our entire framework of law by the star chamber procedure of the Nuernberg trial. It is a foregone conclusion that all who stand accused will be found guilty by a court which arrogates to itself a jurisdiction it does not have and enforces laws which do not exist.
Let us examine in some detail the “judicial” bases of this trial. Justice Jackson, the spokesman for the American representation on the court, has told us in his original report to the President and in his recent address to the war crimes court that he is resting his case on the common sense of justice. Admitting the paucity of precedents in the early concepts of international law, he makes the point, that although this branch of law has been hampered in its development, it has grown by adopting settled principles to new situations. In support of this reasoning he invokes the doctrines of Grotius of the just and unjust war – the war of defense and the war of aggression. He makes the statement that “a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business.” This statement he supports by the authority of the Geneva protocol, the Kellogg-Briand pact and a resolution of the Sixth International Conference of American States. A careful reading of all three of these instruments fails to reveal how they can be held to apply to individuals. Furthermore, only the Geneva protocol makes any provision with respect to a court competent to determine the existence of such transgressions. The other two documents simply condemn aggression as such but provide no procedure or punishment.
One of the basic principles of all established legal systems is the competency of the court trying the accused. Another equally important factor is a body or system of law which has been legally constituted and instituted. Both are lacking in the Nuernberg trial. These principles were carefully considered by the Institute of International Law and the Interparliamentary Union, which in the days following the First World War, worked out drafts for an international crimes court. It was during the discussion of Baron Descamps’ draft for a court that the late Elihu Root pointed out that before an international tribunal is competent to try individuals for international offenses can be established, states must create the law and procedure applicable in such a court. The old legal maxim: Nulla poena sine lege is called to mind.
Returning to the validity of the instruments on which the Nuernberg court is leaning so heavily, the Geneva protocol, signed on October 2, 1924, never has been ratified. It therefore is difficult to see how such a document, which by its very terms call for ratification. carries any weight in a legal procedure. The Kellogg-Briand pact, August 27, 1928, by its provisions simply condemns recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounces it as an instrument of national policy, and provides, in article 2, for settlement of disputes of whatever nature by pacific means. But these statements are not implemented in any way. Just how are the principles of this pact to be applied to individuals, and where is the provision for a court competent to determine guilt or mete out punishment?
Finally, we come to the resolution of the Sixth International Conference of American States cited by Justice Jackson, which says: “Considering that war of aggression constitutes an international crime against human species, the Conference resolves: That all aggression is considered illicit and as such declared prohibited.” Resolutions of international conference, are at best of an ephemeral nature. They usually are simply rather idealistic and laudatory expressions which the representatives of the countries present at the particular conference know fully well never will be ratified in treaty form, hence they are expressed in terms of resolutions, decrees or motions. Likewise, in this case, there has been no formal ratification, no enabling legislation and no court set up which is competent to determine guilt or innocence.
In conclusion, it seems to me that it would have been wiser to turn all German violators of the established rules of war over to strictly military courts rather than risk setting back international law by vigilante procedure.
WALTER H. ZEYDEL