Summary of Nuernberg trial verdict
By the Associated Press
NUERNBERG (AP) – The text of the summary of the verdict of the International Military Tribunal delivered here today follows. It was prepared for the convenience of the press and forms no part of the official record, but presents in a condensed form the text of the judgment.
HISTORY OF THE PROSECUTION
The judgment begins by dealing with the making of the agreement and charter of August 8, 1945, between Great Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union.
The governments of 19 of the United Nations have expressed their adherence to the agreement.
The provisions of the charter dealing with the constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the tribunal are discussed. The indictment against the accused defendants and organizations was lodged in Berlin on the 18th of October, 1945. A copy of the indictment in the German language was served upon each defendant in custody at least 30 days before the trial opened and the charges are there set out in great detail.
One of the defendants, Robert Ley, committed suicide on October 25, 1945. Another defendant, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, was found unable to stand his trial because of his physical and mental condition, and the charges against him were retained for trial hereafter, if his physical and mental condition should permit. The defendant (Martin) Bormann was absent, but the trial proceeded against him in his absence under a relevant provision of the charter.
All the defendants were represented by counsel, for the most part chosen by themselves but in a few cases counsel were appointed by the tribunal at the request of the defendants. The tribunal also appointed counsel for the absent defendant Bormann and for all the named groups of organizations which the prosecution asked the tribunal to declare criminal.
The trial began on November 20, 1945, and ended on August 31, 1946, during which time 403 open sessions of the tribunal were held, 33 witnesses were heard for the prosecution against the individual defendants, and 61 witnesses were heard for the defense in addition to 19 of the defendants. A further 143 witnesses gave evidence for the defense by means of written answers to interrogatories.
In order to hear the cases against the organizations more expeditiously the tribunal appointed commissioners before whom 101 witnesses were heard for the defense, and 1,809 affidavits from other witnesses were submitted. In addition to these affidavits, a very large number of further affidavits were submitted and their contents presented to the commission in a summarized form. The tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the organizations. The documents tendered in evidence upon both sides were most voluminous.
A complete stenographic record of everything said in court was made as well as an electrical recording of all the proceedings. Copies of all the documents put in evidence by the prosecution were supplied to the defense in the German language. The majority of these documents were captured by the Allied armies in German Army headquarters, government buildings and elsewhere. Some of them were found in salt mines, buried in the ground or hidden behind false walls.
Except in one or two isolated cases the authenticity of these documents was never challenged and the case against the defendants rested in a large measure upon documents of their own making.
HISTORY OF THE NAZI REGIME
The tribunal then deals with the origin and aims of the Nazi Party and the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany. It deals with certain points of the party program in these words:
“The demand for the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany was to play a large part in the events preceding the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles was to become a decisive motive in attempting to justify the policy of the German government; the demand for land was to be the justification for the acquisition of living space at the expense of other nations; the expulsion of the Jews from membership of the race of German blood was to lead to the atrocities against the Jewish people, and the demand for a national army was to result in measures for rearmament on the largest possible scale and ultimately war.”
The tribunal then discussed the constitution and the procedure within the party dealing especially with the leadership principle (Fuehrerprinzip).
The tribunal then dealt with the Munich putsch of November 1923, the use of the SA, the formation of the SS in 1925 and the publication of “Mein Kampf” in the same year; the formation of youth organizations and their education; the efforts made by the party to win political support from the German people, the methods of the NSDAP leaders, and the attacks upon the democratic structure of the Weimar Republic.
The negotiations leading to the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich by President von Hindenburg on January 30, 1933, were recorded. The parts played by individual defendants, such as Goering, Schacht and Von Papen were analyzed.
After Hitler’s accession to power the Reichstag building in Berlin was set on fire in February 1933. This fire was used by Hitler and his cabinet as a pretext for suspending the constitutional guarantees of freedom, the persecution of other political parties, the use of the concentration camps, the founding of the Gestapo as a secret police, the elimination of political opponents and reduction of the powers of regional and local governments throughout Germany were all designed to keep absolute political power in the hands of the government.
The government secured control of the civil service, subjected the judiciary to strict control. Destroyed the trade unions and confiscated their property and imprisoned their leaders, persecuted the churches and began the campaign against the Jews. The government controlled the press, the radio and industry,
MEASURES OF REARMAMENT
The tribunal then proceeded to deal with the measures of rearmament and the reorganization of the economic life of Germany.
At the party rally in Nuernberg in 1936 Hitler announced the establishment of the four-year plan and the appointment of Goering as the plenipotentiary in charge. Thereafter Goering began to build a strong air force and announced on July 8, 1938, that the German air force was already superior in quality and quantity to the English.
He said he had been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force five times as large, to increase the speed of army and navy rearmament and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and heavy tanks. The extent to which this vast rearmament had been accomplished was stated by Hitler on October 19, 1939:
“The military application of our people’s strength has been carried through to such an extent that, within a short time at any rate, it cannot be markedly improved upon by any manner of effort.”
In an endeavor to reassure public opinion in other countries this government announced in 1935 that while the disarmament clauses had been renounced. Germany would still respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles treaty and would comply with the Locarno pacts. On the very day that the announcement was made a secret Reich defense law was passed and its publication forbidden by Hitler.
The German Navy built up in breach of the treaty of Versailles, particularly in the construction of the new submarine arm and so as early as May of 1934 Adm. Raeder issued a secret rearmament plan which contained this sentence: “All theoretical and practical preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period,” although the German government had announced in May 1935, its intention to respect the territorial limitations of the treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, on March 6, 1936, in defiance of that treaty the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was entered by German troops.
The tribunal then turned to the question of aggressive war and discussed the law relative to it. The tribunal stated that the law of the charter was binding upon the tribunal and that it was not necessary to consider whether and to what extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the London agreement, but, because the questions of law involved were so important, the tribunal expressed its view upon the points wh.ch had been raised:
The mailing of the Charter was the legitimate exercise of sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered. With regard to the constitution of the court, all that the defendants were entitled to ask was to receive a fair trial on the facts and the law in accordance with the principles of justice.
The main argument of the defense had dealt with the question of aggressive war. It was contended that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had defined aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its commission and no court had been created to try and punish offenders in these circumstances.
It was said that, to punish defendants for the crime of aggressive war, was to indulge in ex-post facto legislation abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations. In the judgment of the tribunal, these contentions ignore the true nature of international law which is continually developing, adapting itself to the needs of a changing world as the wisdom and experience of the succeeding generation dictate. The tribunal had been concerned with matters of substance and not mere procedure.
The Hague Convention contains no statement that a breach of its provisions is a crime, nor is any sentence imposed nor is there any mention of the court in which offenders will be tried. Yet the acts outlawed in The Hague Convention are recognized to be crimes as fully as though they had been expressly defined as such.
The general treaty for the renunciation of war of the 27th of August, 1928, generally known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was binding upon 63 nations, including Germany, Italy and Japan.
At the outbreak of war in 1939 that pact which had for its object “a frank denunciation of war as an instrument of national policy,” condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced war as an instrument of national policy.
It further enacted that “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts shall never be sought except by pacific means.”
After 1928 it was an illegal thing, in the opinion of the tribunal.
The solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing.
War for the solution of international controversies undertaken as an instrument of national policy certainly includes a war of aggression, and such a war is therefore outlawed by the pact.
The contention was made that the official position of defendants as heads of state should free them from responsibility and that international law did not apply to individuals. The tribunal declared that the doctrine of the immunity of heads of state had no application where a state had violated international law and that for many years past military tribunals had tried and punished individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare laid down by The Hague Convention.
The defense of “superior orders” has never been recognized as a defense to a crime but is considered in mitigation as the charter here provides. The first acts of aggression were the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Captured documents have revealed that Hitler held four secret meetings dealing with his plans of aggression, when he made declarations which were quite unmistakable in their terms.
On November 23, 1939, in the presence of his supreme commanders at a time when Austria and Czechoslovakia had been incorporated into the German Reich and Poland had been conquered by the German armies. Hitler reviewed his political task since 1919 and in the course of his address he said.
“One year later Austria came. This step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid…”
That address removed any question of doubt as to the aggressive character of the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia and the war against Poland.
At another meeting on November 5, 1937, when the defendants Goering, Von Neurath and Raeder, among others were present, Hitler said: “The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost.”
SEIZURE OP AUSTRIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The evidence relating to the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia proved that both these seizures were acts of naked aggression.
In the case of Czechoslovakia, the British Prime Minister flew to Germany and had a conference with Hitler at Munich, Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg on September 26, 1936. Hitler said in a speech in Berlin with reference to these conversations: “I assured him moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be more territorial problems for Germany in Europe.”
Very soon after these conferences Hitler asked the defendant Keitel for information about the military force which would be required to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia and the answer of Keitel was given on October 11, 1938, and on October 21, 1938, barely a month after the Pact of Munich, a directive was issued by Hitler and countersigned by the defendant Keitel to the armed forces on their future tasks which stated:
“Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia: it must be possible to smash up in time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile toward Germany.”
On May 23, 1939, after Austria and Czechoslovakia had been seized, Hitler announced at a meeting in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin that he would attack Poland for the reasons which he then gave.
In view of these declarations, the tribunal entertains no doubt that the war against Poland was an aggressive war and therefore a crime within the meaning of the charter.
WAR AGAINST DENMARK AND NORWAY
The invasions of Denmark and Norway were aggressive wars made in violation of existing treaties and assurances. When the plans for attacking Norway were made the evidence showed that they were not made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but at the most that they might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date.
The Allied plans discovered by the Germans in the course of the war were not the cause of the German invasion of Norway. Norway was occupied by Germany to gain bases from which a more effective attack on England and France might be made pursuant to the plans made long in advance of any Allied plans. No suggestion was ever made by the defendants that there was any plan to occupy Denmark cither than that made by the Germans.
The invasions of Denmark and Norway were acts of aggressive war.
The tribunal characterized the invasions of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as acts of aggressive war.
On the 12th of August, 1939, Hitler had a conversation with Ciano and the defendant Ribbentrop. He then said, “Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral.
“Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind.”
This observation was made only two months after Hitler had given assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier as final and inviolate. On the 29th of October, 1940, Italy invaded Greece but the military operation met with no success. In the following month Hitler wrote to Mussolini and said that no military operations could take place in the Balkans before the following March and therefore Yugoslavia must be won over by other means and in other ways. Later in the year Hitler issued directions for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea and the sending of task force by way of Bulgaria if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland. On the 25th of March, 1941, Yugoslavia adhered to the tripartite pact and thereupon the German government confirmed their determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.
But on the 26th of March, after a coup d’etat in Belgrade, the new government which was set up repudiated the pact. Thereupon Hitler declared that preparations must be made to destroy Yugoslavia with unmerciful harshness. Accordingly on the 6th of April the German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia without warning and Belgrade was bombed by the Luftwaffe. The aggressive war against Greece and Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, certainly as early as August of 1939.
AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.
The tribunal then proceeded to deal with the aggressive war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A nonaggression pact was signed on the 23rd of August, 1939. As late as the 6th of January, 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow in formed his government that the Soviet Union would only go to war if attacked by Germany. Germany began to make preparations for the invasion of the USSR as early as the late summer of 1940.
Plans were made beforehand for the economic exploitation of the territories of the Soviet Union and for the destruction of the Soviet Union as an independent state. After she had drawn Hungary, Romania and Finland into the contemplated attack on the 22nd of June, 1941, Germany invaded Soviet territory without any declaration of war. This was the fulfillment of what Hitler had written in “Mein Kampf.”
“If new territory were to be acquired in Europe, it must have been mainly at Russia’s cost.”
It had been contended for the defendants that the attack upon the USSR was justified because the Soviet Union was contemplating an attack upon Germany and making preparations to that end. The tribunal declared that it was impossible to believe that this view was very honestly entertained.
The plans for the economic exploitation of the USSR for the wholesale removal of masses of the population, for murder of commissars and political leaders, were all part of the carefully prepared scheme which was launched without the shadow of a legal excuse.
The tribunal found the invasion of the Soviet Union to be an act of plain aggression.
The tribunal next reviewed the international treaties which had been broken by Germany in the course of the aggressive wars and concluded the section upon aggressive war by discussion of the law applicable to the common plan or conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The common plan put forward by the prosecution covered a period of 25 years from the foundation of the Nazi Party to the year 1945.
The evidence established the existence of many separate plans to wage aggressive war. Continued planning with aggressive war as the objective had been established beyond all doubt. The tribunal rejected the idea that a common plan could not exist because Hitler was a dictator.
Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the cooperation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats and businessmen. When, with knowledge of his aims, they gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had initiated.
That they were assigned to their tasks by a dictator does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The tribunal then proceeded to deal with the war crimes and crimes against humanity. The evidence relating to these matters had been overwhelming in its volume and detail.
War crimes had been committed on a vast scale never before seen in the history of war. The majority of them arose from the Nazi conception of total war, and they were, for the most part, the result of cold and criminal calculation. Some of the war crimes had been planned long in advance. In the case of the Soviet Union, for example, the plunder of the territories to be occupied and the ill-treatment of the civilian population had been settled in minute detail before the attack was begun. Similarly, with regard to the plan for slave labor, the German government conceived the project of exploiting the inhabitants of the occupied countries as an essential part of the war economy. Other war crimes, such as the murder of prisoners of war who had escaped and been recaptured, then the murder of commandos or captured airmen, or the destruction of the Soviet commissars were the result of direct orders circulated to the highest official channels.
With regard to the prisoners of war, article 6B, of the charter had defined war crimes to be violation of the laws or customs of war. The judgment reviewed some of the principal violations which had been committed. Among these were the bullet degree of March 1944, which ordered that on recapture every escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoner of war, with the exception of British and American prisoners of war, were to be handed over to the SIPO and sent to the concentration camp at Mauthausen, to be executed upon arrival.
The order of the 18th of October, 1942, provided that all members of the commando units, even when in uniform or members of sabotage groups, armed or not, were to be slaughtered to the last man, either in battle, in flight or while attempting to surrender. When Allied airmen were compelled to make forced landing in Germany they were sometimes killed by the civilian population, a fact known to the authorities, who instructed the police as a matter of policy not to interfere with these killings and the minister of justice was informed that no proceedings should be taken against anybody who took part in them. But it was in the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war that the worst inhumanities were committed. The statement of Gen. Reinecke, the head of the prisoner of war department of the high command, dated the 8th of September, 1941, indicated the nature of the treatment to be accorded to Soviet prisoners of war. He then said: “The Bolshevist soldier has, therefore, lost all claim to treatment as an honorable opponent. In accordance with the Geneva Convention prisoners of war attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired. The use of arms against prisoners is, as a rule, legal.”
The Soviet prisoners of war were left without suitable clothing and the wounded without medical care.
They were starved and in many cases simply left to die. The defendant Rosenberg wrote the defendant Keitel on the 28th of February, 1942. A little more than eight months after the invasion of the Soviet Union: “The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is, on the contrary, a tragedy of the greatest extent. A large part of them has starved or died because of the hazards of the weather.” There was evidence that prisoners of war were wantonly murdered and tortured. They were made the subjects of medical experiments of the most cruel kind.
In July 1943, when experimental work was begun in the preparation for a campaign of bacteriological warfare, Soviet prisoners of war were used in the medical experiments which, more often than not, proved fatal.
For example, when preparations were being made for the spreading of an epidemic of typhus fever behind the Soviet lines, it was the Soviet prisoners of war who were used to determine the most efficient method of spreading the plague. The fatalities among the Soviet prisoners of war were the result of systematic murder on a very great scale.
On the 17th of July, 1941, the Gestapo issued an order providing for the killing of all Soviet prisoners of war who were or might be dangerous to National Socialism and the evidence showed how thoroughly this had been carried out.
ILL-TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS
The second class of war crimes dealt with in the judgment was the murder and ill-treatment of the civilian populations.
Again the evidence was quite overwhelming of a systematic rule of violence, brutality and terror. All persons were arrested who were even suspected of opposing any of the policies of the German occupation authorities. They were interrogated by the Gestapo and these and third-degree methods were authorized to be applied. Severe measures were not merely confined to members of resistance groups, but were also extended to their families. The practice of keeping hostages was inaugurated.
An order issued by the defendant Keitel spoke in terms of 50 or a hundred lives from the occupied countries for one German life. The policy of killing hostages was carried to its logical conclusion in the destruction of entire towns, such as those of Oradour and Lidice.
Another method of striking terror into the inhabitants of the occupied countries was the order issued on the seventh of December 1941, which has become known as the “night and fog” decree.
Persons who committed offenses in occupied territories except where the death sentence was certain were to be taken secretly to Germany and handed over to the security police and SD for trial or punishment in Germany. After these civilians arrived in Germany no word of them was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or their relatives.
