Hi all! I have written a piece on why and how Italy decided to wage war against Greece in 1940. I used as main sources the book of Mario Cervi “La Campagna di Grecia” and Galeazzo Ciano’s diary. I posted the piece also on my personal blog, chek it out: https://medium.com/@g.poggia90
The doomed invasion: Greece 1940
How a mix of personal ambitions, misinformation and overconfidence put in motion one of the most ill-fated military campaigns in recent history.
Introduction
The invasion of Greece in 1940 is remembered as one of the greatest defeats suffered by Italy in WW2 and one that caused a long-lasting shame on the Italian military. The embarrassment was even greater when the Germans marched south in aid of Mussolini, putting Greece to its knees in less than 4 weeks.
It is however important (and usually overlooked) to analyse why Italy invaded the Hellenic country, which preparations were made in late summer-early autumn of 1940 and which elements led to the disaster. In this research I will mainly refer to the book of Mario Cervi “ La campagna di Grecia ” (1965) and to the diary of Galeazzo Ciano, foreign minister of Italy from 1937 to 1943. I will not describe the military operations, which have been extensively covered elsewhere.
The situation in summer 1940
After declaring war on France and Britain on the 10th of June 1940, Mussolini and most of the ruling elite believed that the war would soon be over and that after the imminent fall of France, which occurred on the 20th of June, Britain would have come to peace terms. Although the armed forces were not ready to wage a total war after the expensive endeavours in Ethiopia and Spain, Mussolini rushed the country into war with this idea in mind: “ We have to be ready in order to get our fair share of loot ” (from Ciano’s diary, 22nd of August 1939).
This sentence, reported by Ciano, is of the utmost importance because shows how Mussolini used to think. Always chasing glory, prestige, new pieces of land, with no regards to the means necessary to get it nor the consequences on the military or economic side, Mussolini was a skilled politician, but grand strategy and military affairs were an unknown matter to him. In addition, he had started to suffer from the increasing weight and dominance of Nazi Germany within the “Steel pact”, perceiving and witnessing the superiority of the Teutonic ally but never admitting it (yet). Every German gain or victory on the field was perceived by Mussolini as an indirect hit to his prestige, progressively overshadowing him within the Axis pact.
With Britain showing absolutely no willingness to come to peace terms, Mussolini needed an urgent victory[1], something that (in his own words) “ would have rebalanced the situation ”. The planned offensive in North Africa was set to start in September but it did not look like an easy endeavour given the evident logistical problems. Since a quicker and easier victory was required, the attention then shifted eastwards on Yugoslavia and Greece and a group of somewhat tragicomic figures started to play their role in the upcoming drama.
Prologue and protagonists of the tragedy
The aggressive foreign policy of the fascist regime in the 30s led to the incorporation of Albania in the kingdom of Italy in April 1939, this endeavour was extensively sponsored by Galeazzo Ciano , foreign minister of Italy, son-in-law of Mussolini, and an extremely rich man always eager to acquire new power, wealth and influence. Ciano was among the less enthusiast about a close alliance with Nazi Germany, but he was nevertheless supportive of the war, especially of an independent and “parallel” war which would have produce a significant turnout (especially a personal one).
Another important figure in our story is Francesco Jacomoni , Italian ambassador in Albania until 1939 and, after the occupation, lieutenant general of the King in Albania. Since he was appointed Ambassador, Jacomoni worked with Ciano on the progressive incorporation of Albania in the Italian sphere of influence and, since 1938, started to work on the idea to annex Albania just like Hitler did with Austria ( annotation on Ciano’s diary on the 26th of March 1938 ). Already in May 1938 Ciano and Jacomoni had convinced Mussolini of the action in Albania and of its undoubted success. The eagerness to conquer Albania was motivated by the vast business (or bribe) opportunities that the control of such poor country, in need of investments, would have required. Albania would have witnessed the same “game” on display in Italy, where fascist officials used to make huge profits and gains in exchange of favours, construction permits and distorted or manipulated public procurements[2]. Albania was occupied with almost no shots fired and the “game” made its debut on the eastern side of the Otranto channel.
When Italy entered the war in June 1940, the idea of a “parallel war” had already started to conquer many fascists like Ciano but most of all Mussolini, always concerned of gaining “ his fair share of loot ”. Eyes set on Tunisia, Corsica, Yugoslavia and Greece. The first two were discarded when Hitler decided to preserve the (reduced) territorial integrity of France, by accepting the Vichy regime, in the attempt to ensure the “neutrality” of the French colonial empire. All the attention shifted on the Balkans and on the 12th of August 1940, during a high-level meeting in Rome, Mussolini traced the guidelines for an operation against Greece, scheduled for late September. The meeting was attended by Ciano, Jacomoni and Army Corp general Sebastiano Visconti Prasca , the still missing protagonist of our story. Visconti Prasca was a man of the Ciano group[3], it was in fact the foreign minister who had suggested his appointment to Mussolini as chief of the Italian forces in Albania (May 1940). It is nonetheless strange that the guidelines of an action against Greece were discussed in a meeting with only political leaders and “just” an Army Corp commander, with no other army, navy or air force expert or high-level commanders. Ciano and Jacomoni assured Mussolini (presenting no real evidence)[4], that Greece was an easy prey, the government was weak, the army in bad shape with commanders inclined to receive bribes and the population in Chameria (the coastal area of Epirus, part of Greece, but inhabited by Albanians) ready to rise against the Athens’ regime and join the Italian “liberators”. Visconti Prasca on his side assured Mussolini that the armed forces in Albania would have granted a successful occupation of the Epirus valley (with landings in Preveza) covered by an advance through the Pindus mountains towards Coryza and Ioannina. Such operation would have required 10 divisions at full complement and was based on the (big) assumption that Greece would have opposed almost no resistance and that the government and the state machine would have collapsed soon after the invasion (this attack plan was named “ Emergenza G ”). If such breakdown would not have happened, the Italian army would have proceeded, in a second moment, to a full out invasion of the whole Greece, for which the Army calculated the need of 20 divisions (according to a much more realistic plan drafted in 1939 by General Alfredo Guzzoni).
It is impressive how such operation was based on a huge amount of false or flawed information and how the reports coming from Ambassador Grazzi in Athens and from the military information service, which stated that Greece was ready and willing to fight, were completely ignored. Mario Cervi in his book states that this was possible thanks to a combination of the following factors which prevailed among the Italian decision-makers: underestimation of the enemy, overestimation of their own capabilities, hurry, opportunism, general misinformation on the status of the army, willingness to achieve personal gains, little understanding of military affairs, little regards for adverse opinions.
Escalation, de-escalation, new escalation
A few days later the meeting in Rome, on the 15th of August 1940 an “unknown” submarine torpedoed and sunk the old Greek cruiser Helli while at anchor near the island of Tinos. The ship was officially participating to the religious celebration of the feast of the dormition of Theotokos, it was hit to the boiler room by a torpedo and quickly sank. In order to not further escalate the situation, Greek authorities officially declared that the Helli was sunk by an “unknown” submarine, but public opinion had little doubt that the old ship was sunk by an Italian unit. It was indeed the Italian submarine Delfino which delivered the fatal hit, the commander of the submarine was instructed to do so by Cesare Maria De Vecchi, governor of the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean (under Italian rule) and a strong sponsor of the invasion of Greece. For a long time, it was believed that De Vecchi acted independently but in 1972 Mario Cervi revealed that the order came directly from Mussolini (likely following De Vecchi’s false reports of Greek ships smuggling British cargos) who then instructed Navy Chief of Staff Domenico Cavagnari to pass the task to De Vecchi. The sinking of the Helli extensively outraged the Greek public opinion and surely it contributed to increase the nation’s willingness to resist and react to foreign aggression, fading away any possible element of surprise that could have helped the Italian invasion.
On the 17th of august, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri, reported to Ciano and Mussolini a long discussion that he held with Ribbentrop. From the discussion emerged that Germany was against any action that would have sparked troubles and conflicts in the Balkan region, specifically warning against hostile actions towards Yugoslavia and Greece. Ribbentrop, and Hitler through him, re-affirmed that Great Britain was the main enemy and that all war efforts should have devoted to that front. Once received the German “ Nein ”, Mussolini accepted such point of view and decided to abandon the idea of the action against Greece, to a great discontent of Ciano which was generally more inclined to upset the Germans than Mussolini; the foreign minister writes in his memoirs that the Duce himself, always afflicted by a great degree of indecision, drafted the official reply to Berlin. Interesting to underline, on the same day Ciano reports that he met the press officer of the German Embassy at the seaside; the man extensively spoke about the upcoming landings in Britain and that the war would have been over by the end of September.
After the German “ Nein ”, Mussolini took another unexpected decision, in September he ordered the de-mobilization of 600.000 reservists of the army, thus resulting also in the weakening of the forces in Albania, some division deployed on that front saw the substitution of the more experienced soldiers with young recruits which had never seen action.
In this saga of indecision, counter-orders, mobilization, de-mobilization, false reports, over optimistic assumptions, escalation and de-escalation, the plan Emergenza G remained just a piece of paper in the shelves of the Supreme Command until the turning point of our story, which came on the 11th of October 1940. On that day Mussolini received news that Romania had requested a military mission from Germany and that Luftwaffe fighters had been deployed in defence of the Ploesti oil fields. This new act of German primacy in the Axis pact infuriated Mussolini as never before (he had hoped for a while that Romania requested the protection of Italy). On the 12th of august Ciano reports on his diary these quotes from Mussolini:
“Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the press that I have occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be re-established”
Ciano asks then if the Duce agrees with Marshall Badoglio (Chief of Staff of the armed forces) on the upcoming (renewed) endeavour, Mussolini replies:
“Not yet […] but I shall send in my resignation as an Italian if anyone objects to fighting the Greeks [5] ”.
Then Ciano writes “ The Duce seems determined to act now. In fact, I believe that the military operation will be useful and easy ”.
From these quotes and from the events that followed, it can be (tragically) acknowledged that the campaign against Greece was finally initiated because of Mussolini’s anger following the Romanian affair, and it was fuelled by the overoptimistic reports from Ciano and his men (Jacomoni and Visconti Prasca above all, as we will see).
The fatal meeting
On the 14th of October the Duce set the 26th (only 12 days later) as the starting date of the operation, this decision came in a context where Italy was already overstretching. The Regia Marina (the navy) was already busy in supplying Graziani’s troops in Libya and the forces in Albania, the Regia Aereonautica (the air force) was completing the deployment of an Air Corp in Belgium which was tasked to help the Germans in the (already lost) Battle of Britain, while 300.000 soldiers were already demobilized (and others in the process) after Mussolini’s dispositions back in September.
Not all the responsible military leaders were aware or fully informed of the new pivot decision of the Duce and only on the 15th of October a high-level meeting was held in Rome[6]. The participants were: Mussolini, Ciano, Marshall Badoglio (Chief of Staff), Mario Roatta (deputy chief of staff of the army), Ubaldo Soddu (Undersecretary of war), Jacomoni and Visconti Prasca, note that even this time no navy or air force representatives were summoned to the meeting. Mussolini was in hurry, he wanted to pay Hitler back in his own coin, and feared another German “ Nein ” to his ambitions, for this reason he brought back to the table the plan “Emergenza G” prepared by Visconti Prasca in august, for which the forces available in Albania would have ensured the occupation of the Epirus valley. He also assured that Yugoslavia would have remained neutral and would have invited Bulgaria to join the action (receiving in exchange a piece of eastern Macedonia and its access to the sea). Jacomoni and Ciano spoke after him, stating that the Greek morale was weak, and the population would have been indifferent to an Italian invasion. The meeting moved then to the military aspect and Visconti Prasca claimed that everything was ready, the troop morale was high and in 15 days he would have defeated the Greeks in the Epirus valley (which he believed amounting to 30.000, while they were already more than 40.000). The euphoric general stated that after the success of “ Emergenza G” and the conquest of the strategic port of Preveza, the arrival of new reinforcements and consequently the march towards Athens would have been possible. It was then the turn of the much more sceptical Marshal Badoglio which affirmed that only the full occupation of Greece would have justified the whole endeavour. For a such complete occupation no less than 20 divisions were required while only 9 were present back then in Albania and 3 more months were considered necessary for the appropriate build-up. Visconti Prasca counterargued and reassured Mussolini that after the Epirus occupation, only six additional divisions would have granted the occupation of the entire country
Mario Cervi in his book suspects that the old Marshal was trying to delay the action as much as he could and wait (or hope) for another pivot decision from Mussolini, however he (and the other army commanders) failed to mount an effective opposition to this ill-conceived operation. Additionally, Cervi points out that Visconti Prasca (Army Corp general) did not want too many divisions under his command because a higher-ranking general could have then taken from him the command of all the invasion forces. Cervi describes a rule established within the Italian army for which an army Corp General commanding an entire army during a military campaign would have been automatically promoted to army general. With this promotion opportunity in mind, together with the complete underestimation of the enemy, Visconti Prasca fuelled Mussolini with prospects of an easy and quick victory, something that the Dictator wanted to hear. With Jacomoni and Ciano, on the other side, stressing the weaknesses of Greece, Mussolini did not listen to Badoglio’s remarks and confirmed the 26th of October as the starting day for the invasion. During this meeting, where personal perceptions, individual ambitions, overconfidence and misinformation put in motion a military campaign that would have (undoubted) resulted in disaster, nobody (incredibly) mentioned or gave any weight to the reports coming from Ambassador Grazzi in Athens and from the Military intelligence service. These reports (dated 3rd of October) stated that Greece was ready to fight and had already mobilized 250.000 fighting men of which 45.000 were deployed in western Macedonia and 40.000 in Epirus; these numbers were increasing day by day and the element of surprise was lost since august.
Disaster
The machine was set in motion and nobody seemed able to stop it, not even Marshal Badoglio, which however did not mount an effective opposition during the meeting of the 15th of October. In the next couple of days Badoglio tried to organize a meeting with Mussolini involving also the chief of staff of the Navy and of the Air force (which both opposed the endeavours as soon as they were briefed). According to Mario Cervi, the meeting was sabotaged by Ubaldo Soddu, undersecretary of war, which had finally joined the “pro war party” and undermined Badoglio’s attempts to stop it. The old Marshal also presented his concerns to Ciano on the 17th of October, reporting the opposition of the other heads of general staff, in particular stating that the navy could not organize landings in Preveza because of the too shallow waters. Ciano reports Badoglio’s opinion on his diary and then writes:
[…] I listen, and do not argue. I insist that, from a political point of view, this is the right moment. Greece is isolated. Turkey will not move. Neither will Yugoslavia. If the Bulgarians enter the war it will be on our side. From the military point of view, I express no opinion. Badoglio must, without any hesitation, repeat to Mussolini what he has told me.
Badoglio finally managed to meet Mussolini on the 18th of October, but he did not repeat what had to say to Ciano, instead, he only asked the Duce to delay the operation by at least two days. This contradicting behaviour during those fatal days leaves Badoglio with a piece of responsibility for the disaster that followed, a responsibility which must be attributed primary to Mussolini, Ciano and his “pro war” party.
Since then, none or nothing else stopped or tried to stop the invasion of Greece, which finally started on the morning of the 28th of October 1940. The Invasion began under terrible weather conditions, with rain dropping heavily on the Epirus, transforming roads and terrain into an impenetrable mud, forcing the Regia Aereonautica in its airfields, denying any support to the ground forces.
The Italian troops which were tasked to carry out the invasion, had received only a fraction of the equipment needed for the operation, from food supplies to ammunition and winter clothing, all of this because of the hurry with which “ Emergena G” was set up. A simple number can speak alone, of the 11.000 Camions and vehicles assigned to the Invasion, only 107 were present in Albania on the 28th of October.
The 9 divisions commanded by Visconti Prasca started their march in such conditions, advancing towards an enemy which was willing and ready to fight already since August. Not surprisingly, after just a week of fighting the Italian advance was halted and the Greek forces under General Papagos started to repel the invaders, which were driven back in December within the borders of Albania. Only the German intervention in April 1941 saved the situation for the Axis and Italy from the total defeat.
The fascist war of aggression, which was conceived and organized with such an incredible carelessness and supported by totally flawed intelligence, costed Italy 13.775 dead soldiers, 25.067 missed in action, 50.875 wounded and 12.368 frozen to death[7]. Just for a dictator hurt in his pride.
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NOTES:
[1] Under this perspective, the Italian occupation of Albania in 1939 can be indeed interpreted as a response to the Anschluss of Austria and Sudetenland. For sure the Fascists leadership felt authorize to so, as Ciano wrote in his diary.
[2] This topic has been extensively covered by professor Mauro Canali in his book “ Mussolini e i ladri di regime ” (2019)
[3] Which can somehow be regarded as an internal faction of the Fascist elite
[4] After the war it was found evidence that a considerable amount of money was spent by the ministry for “operations in Greece” but nothing more precise has been found
[5] He had to say this because Badoglio and the military leaders usually opposed to the adventurous endeavour dreamed by Mussolini since they were aware of the short supplies and the limited military capabilities of the Italian forces.
[6] The text records of the meeting are available
[7] Official numbers of the Ministry of War