Tehran Conference (EUREKA)

U.S. State Department (November 30, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Captain Freseman Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

November 30, 1943, 9:30 a.m.
Secret

Sir Alan Brooke began by saying that the problem was to arrive at an agreed basis for discussion with the Soviets at this afternoon’s Plenary Meeting. He then went on to consider operations in the Mediterranean from west to east. It had always been agreed that some operation should take place against the South of France. In Italy he felt that it was agreed we should not stay in the position now reached and must advance farther. For political and other reasons, it was important to get Rome, and he thought it was probably generally accepted that we should advance as far as the Pisa-Rimini line. For operations in Italy, it was clear that landing craft would be wanted. General Eisenhower had asked for the retention of the landing craft due to return to OVERLORD until 15 January. This would have a repercussion on the OVERLORD date.

In Yugoslavia it was important to give all possible help to the Partisans and there was general agreement regarding this. As regards Turkey and operations in the Aegean, agreement was much more in question. If Turkey were to be brought into the war, it would be desirable to open the Dardanelles and operations in the Aegean would be necessary. If Turkey were not to come into the war, the operations in the Aegean would not be called for.

If examination showed the operation against the South of France to be feasible, sufficient landing craft might be provided for the purpose. The sequence would then be Italian campaign, Rhodes (only if Turkey comes into the war), South of France, landing craft from Rhodes returning in time for the South of France. The date for the South of France operation would therefore be affected by the undertaking of the Rhodes operation.

Admiral Leahy said that the problem seemed to be a straightforward one of the date of OVERLORD. The Russians wanted OVERLORD on a fixed date in May. They also wanted an expedition against the South of France at the same time, or perhaps a little earlier or a little later. As far as he could see, the date of OVERLORD was the only point confusing the issue. If this matter was settled, everything would be settled. If OVERLORD was to be done by the date originally fixed, other operations could not be carried out. It was entirely agreed, he felt, that the operations in Italy must be carried on. On the U.S. side, it was felt that this could be done without interfering with OVERLORD and, indeed, the U.S. Planners were of the opinion that the operation against the South of France could be undertaken as well, without interfering with OVERLORD. If the landing craft were to be kept in Italy until 15 January, the U.S. calculation was that they could still be back in time for OVERLORD.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this was not thought by the British to be the case. Landing craft would need repair and there were also training demands. According to British calculations, even the date of 15 December for returning landing craft to OVERLORD was rather tight and it would be a great help if U.S. repair facilities could be made available for the British landing craft returning.

General Marshall then said that the paper submitted the day before by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operation against the South of France had been produced at Cairo but was based on logistic and other data prepared in detail before SEXTANT. He said that four questions had been put to the U.S. Planners. Firstly, assuming that the operations against the South of France, set out in the paper in question, were undertaken, could OVERLORD take place on 15 May? In this connection the answer had been that, with the possible exception of transport aircraft, this date would still be possible for OVERLORD. There was reasonable expectation that the transport aircraft would be available from elsewhere. It was possible, moreover, that an airborne division might be brought from the U.S. by cargo ship infiltration, thus making it unnecessary to bring an airborne division from the United Kingdom.

As regards the timing of the operation against the South of France, he considered that it should not be carried out more than two to three weeks before OVERLORD.

The second question asked the U.S. Planners was how long the 68 LSTs could remain in the Mediterranean and still arrive in time for an OVERLORD date of 15 May. The U.S. calculation was that the landing craft must be released 2½ months before OVERLORD in order both that the necessary repair of craft could be effected and that the craft might be available for training purposes. This gave a date of 1 March. The time for training might be reduced by using more fully the craft already in the United Kingdom. It was clear that all U.S. resources must be used to assist in the repair of the landing craft returning late from the Mediterranean.

The U.S. calculation was that, after allowing for losses, the landing craft remaining in the Mediterranean after the departure of the 68 LSTs for OVERLORD would be sufficient to lift 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the British felt that 100 days were necessary instead of the 2½ months calculated by the U.S. This put 15 February as the latest date to which the landing craft could be retained.

Admiral King agreed and said that therefore it should be safe to leave the landing craft in the Mediterranean until 1 February.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that this also might allow for some small refits to be carried out in the Mediterranean before returning to the United Kingdom.

General Marshall then went on to the third question which had been asked the U.S. Planners, which was that if the Rhodes operation had to be undertaken as well as the operation against the South of France, how would OVERLORD be affected? It was difficult to get an answer to this question. In the first place, the dates were quite uncertain. Rome had not yet been taken and the date of the amphibious operation in Italy must be dependent on land operations. Moreover, in an amphibious operation such as might be carried out in the Italian campaign maintenance across the beaches might be necessary, which would delay accordingly the availability of landing craft. It was understood, however, that the amphibious operation contemplated was such that the main forces would join up quickly with it. Assuming that the Rome operation would have been completed by the end of January, the landing craft required for Rhodes could be in the Middle East by 15 February; the Rhodes operation could take place then on 21 March. Allowing a month for the operation, the landing craft could return to Corsica on 21 April, arriving 30 April. A month would probably be necessary for the repair of landing craft before the operation against the South of France which could, therefore, be undertaken at an earlier stage [at the earliest, say?] – 15 July. Moreover, the total landing craft available would be barely sufficient for operations against the South of France, and this was not allowing for any losses that might occur.

The Planners were also asked how long OVERLORD would be delayed if the 68 LSTs were never returned to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. The answer to this was that these craft represented a three months’ production and, in consequence, three months’ delay to OVERLORD. As the landing craft could be made available alternatively only by withdrawing them from allocations to the Pacific, operations there would also be put back by three months.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the only landing craft that had not been mentioned were those allocated to Operation BUCCANEER, in which 20 LSTs and 12 LSI(L)s were involved. He then read certain extracts from Naf 492, giving General Eisenhower’s views on operations against the South of France.

General Marshall expressed himself as being opposed to an early date for the attack against the South of France in advance of the OVERLORD date. He was more inclined to a simultaneous operation.

Admiral King considered that D-Day should be the same for both operations and that this would provide a much better basis for planning. This met with general agreement.

Sir Alan Brooke then referred to the U.S. paper on the operation against the South of France and said that the paper would need careful examination as to the number of divisions that were available from Italy for such an operation, and the number that would need to be retained for the operations in Italy.

General Marshall explained that the figure of four British divisions represented garrison requirements in Italy outside the immediate zone of operations.

Sir Alan Brooke thought the figure of 10 divisions and an amphibious lift of 2 divisions, available from Italy for the South of France operation, to be too high.

Admiral King stressed the importance of insuring that landing craft were employed for the purposes for which they were designed and not diverted to other uses for convenience. This had happened in the Pacific and no doubt also in the Mediterranean and it was necessary to be firm in view of the importance of the landing craft factor.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed and said that once the assault was over and ports were open, all landing craft should be withdrawn for refit for the next operation. It was true that although in the Mediterranean the Commanders were alive to the situation and had tightened up matters considerably, there was still some misuse of landing craft.

In this connection, Sir Charles Portal referred to the tendency to be too conservative in the buildup. He referred particularly to the large stocks that had been accumulated in Sicily as an insurance. Probably there was a tendency to over-insure.

There was general agreement on the above considerations and some discussion ensued in which two extremes were quoted, one, in which the 8th Army landing in Sicily had taken a bare minimum of transport and in consequence had been delayed in their subsequent advance; and the other, in the planning for OVERLORD in which so many vehicles had been put down to accompany the leading formations, that the whole operation would tend to be hampered thereby.

As regards relief work, Admiral King considered that it was necessary to be hard-hearted and to cut out anything that was being taken across beaches which was not absolutely necessary. There was general agreement regarding this.

Sir Charles Portal then referred to the aspect of fighter cover for the operation against the South of France. He said he was not satisfied that the range from the available air bases would allow of adequate air support and thought the matter would need to be examined carefully. In AVALANCHE two alternative plans had been considered and one of these had had to be turned down because fighter cover could not be insured. Salerno had been 180 miles from available fighter strips in North Sicily. Marseilles was 190 miles from the nearest part of Corsica and 225 miles from the eastern side on which the best air bases were sited. We might want to go farther than Marseilles.

Admiral Leahy questioned as to why we should need to go as far west as Marseilles. There were good beaches at various places along the coast.

General Arnold agreed that the whole question would have to be studied very carefully. He stated that the estimates in the U.S. draft paper on operations against Southern France had been based on the use of long-range fighter aircraft.

Admiral King then asked whether he was correct in understanding that, should all other operations be dropped, the landing craft would not be available for OVERLORD to take place on 1 May.

Sir Alan Brooke replied that this was the case and that if the landing craft due to return to OVERLORD did not leave the Mediterranean until 15 January, 1 June would be the earliest date possible for Overlord because of the need for repairing the landing craft and using them for training purposes.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that the U.S. figures did not agree with this and that if the landing craft were retained until 15 February, OVERLORD would still be possible by 15 May.

Admiral King said that any U.S. facilities available for the repair of landing craft would be placed at the disposal of the Commander of OVERLORD for this urgent task.

Sir Charles Portal then made the suggestion that [if?] an amphibious lift of one division were left in Italy until the capture of Rome and one division with its amphibious lift were kept mounted in the Middle East until the middle of February, by then it would be known whether Turkey would come in. If Turkey did not come in, the division could be dismounted and the landing craft made available for OVERLORD.

Sir Alan Brooke said, in reply to this, that he felt that the landing craft that would be required for this division for the Aegean were already being used for the Italian campaign.

Admiral Leahy said that if the proposed operation were to take place after 15 February, this would surely delay OVERLORD.

Sir Charles Portal agreed but suggested that we might have two alternative dates for OVERLORD – the one if Turkey were to come into the war, and the other if Turkey were not to come in.

Admiral King made it clear that whereas the operations against Rhodes and the Dodecanese were contingent upon Turkey entering the war and were not concerned with OVERLORD, the operations against the South of France and in Italy were completely interlocked with OVERLORD. It should be possible for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to work out roughly on these bases two alternative dates for OVERLORD, as suggested by Sir Charles Portal.

Sir Charles Portal remarked that while he agreed with Admiral King, he could not accept that the entry of Turkey into the war would have no effect on OVERLORD.

General Marshall then said that disregarding the question of postponing the date for OVERLORD and considering the matter of landing craft only, it seemed to him that the suggestion of Sir Charles Portal would involve the dividing of the resources of landing craft available in the Mediterranean so that no real strength would be left anywhere. This, he thought, was serious as it would be splitting the most potent means of influencing the war. It would reduce correspondingly the effort in Italy and might have serious consequences. General Eisenhower’s views were different from those expressed formerly, and he now talked of a two-division amphibious lift whereas formerly he had only asked for one.

General Marshall felt, moreover, that there was the chance that the landing craft so withdrawn to the Aegean, to which Sir Charles Portal referred, might never be used. He said that he agreed completely with the Prime Minister as to the importance of keeping a tighter hold on supply. There was general agreement in this connection.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the OVERLORD plan should be coordinated with the plans for a Russian offensive. No Russian offensive had ever started before the end of May. Marshal Stalin clearly, and quite reasonably, would like us to draw the German strength away from the Russian front before the Russian offensive started.

A general discussion then ensued as to the answer that could be given to the Russians regarding the date on which it would be possible to undertake OVERLORD.

Sir Alan Brooke said that unless we could give the Russians a firm date for OVERLORD, there would be no point in proceeding with the Conference. As far as he could see, we could do OVERLORD in May if we did not undertake other operations. Sir Alan Brooke said that he did not think that 1 May would be possible although 1 June might be. This brought us back to the BUCCANEER operation to which, of course, there was a political background. He still thought that it would be better to use the landing craft allocated to BUCCANEER for this main effort against the Germans. In response to a question of Admiral Leahy as to whether the BUCCANEER landing craft would help OVERLORD at all, Sir Alan Brooke replied that it would, as it could be used both in the Aegean and against the South of France. Moreover, the amphibious lift for OVERLORD was itself all too small. It was even smaller than it had been at Salerno.

Admiral Leahy said that this affected the validity of the whole of the OVERLORD plan.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that if OVERLORD were delayed it would make more landing craft available.

Sir Charles Portal remarked that whatever operations were undertaken in the European theater, the OVERLORD operation would undoubtedly be helped indirectly.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that unless BUCCANEER landing craft were to be used, it would not be possible, except at the expense of OVERLORD, to have more than a one-division lift for the South of France operation, a lift which, in his opinion, was not sufficient.

Admiral King said that the Prime Minister had laid great stress on the importance of keeping actively employed all forces now in the Mediterranean. He agreed with this in principle but drew attention to the 2½ months’ inactivity that would ensue for 35 divisions in the United Kingdom if the OVERLORD date was postponed from 1 May to 15 July. He had always felt that the OVERLORD operation was the way to break the back of Germany.

Sir Andrew Cunningham questioned the 2½ months referred to by Admiral King, saying that the earliest date possible for OVERLORD would be 1 June. Both Admiral King and Admiral Leahy then said that this came to them as a complete surprise as 1 May was the date agreed upon.

Admiral Leahy asked Sir Alan Brooke whether he believed that the conditions laid down for OVERLORD would ever arise unless the Germans had collapsed beforehand.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he firmly believed that they would and that he foresaw the conditions arising in 1944, provided the enemy were engaged on other fronts as well.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was still in the balance as to whether we would overcome the German increase in fighter production. The success of the combined bomber offensive had not been as complete as had been hoped for. The Germans were making tremendous efforts and were aiming at a production of 1,600 to 1,700 fighters per month. If they succeeded, the OVERLORD operation might be faced by a very strong fighter force acting against it.

General Arnold then said how important it was to examine carefully the whole question of air strengths throughout the world in order to ensure that our great air superiority could be applied to best advantage.

Sir Charles Portal expressed his opinion that from the air point of view a June or July date for OVERLORD would seem to be better, as regards weather, than one in May.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the Russians would not refuse a 1 June date for OVERLORD but that we would have to be firm about it.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the date would have to be fixed earlier than 1 June because of the need to retain landing craft for Italy until 15 January. It would be possible to fix a RANKIN date for 1 May when probably an attack could be made across the Channel with about two-thirds the strength now envisaged for OVERLORD. It was generally felt that the Russians would not understand the RANKIN operation if it were put to them. He reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 1 May had been settled at TRIDENT as the date for OVERLORD by splitting the difference between the U.S. suggestion of 1 April and the British suggestion of 1 June. It had not been based on any particular strategic consideration.

General Ismay said that at Moscow the Russians had been told that the operation was scheduled for some time in May. They had not been told 1 May.

Sir Alan Brooke said that we might tell the Russians that OVERLORD could be undertaken not later than 1 June but that we would expect, in that case, the Russian offensive to take place also not later than 1 June.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed that 1 June could be adhered to.

Sir Charles Portal said that Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Russians would enter the war against Japan when Germany had been defeated, seemed to alter the whole relative importance of the war in Europe and the Pacific, and to shift the emphasis rather towards Europe for the time being.

There was some further discussion in which the dependence of the attack upon moon and tide and weather conditions was considered, and also the desirability of giving a bracket of dates instead of a fixed target date for the operation.

Agreed:

a. That we should continue to advance in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini line.

This means that the 68 LSTs which are due to be sent from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD must be kept in the Mediterranean until 15 January.

b. That an operation shall be mounted against the South of France on as big a scale as landing craft permit. For planning purposes D-Day to be the same as OVERLORD D-Day.

c. To recommend to the President and Prime Minister respectively that we should inform Marshal Stalin that we will launch OVERLORD during May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the South of France on the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time.

NOTE: The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to inform each other before the Plenary Meeting this afternoon of the decisions of the President and Prime Minister respectively on the above point.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were unable to reach agreement on the question of operations in the Aegean until they had received further instructions from the President and Prime Minister respectively.

1 Like

Meeting of President Roosevelt with the Shah of Iran, noon

Present
United States Iran
President Roosevelt Shah Pahlevi
General Hurley Prime Minister Soheily
Mr. Dreyfus Foreign Minister Sa’ed-Maragheh’i
Colonel Roosevelt Mr. Ala

Apparently the principal subjects discussed were Iran’s economic problems and the desire of the United States to assist in their solution.

Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Berezhkov

Bohlen Minutes

November 30, 1943, 1:30 p.m.
Secret

Before luncheon, at the Prime Minister’s request, the President read to Marshal Stalin the recommendations of the combined British and American Staffs, which had been approved by himself and the Prime Minister.

Marshal Stalin expressed his great satisfaction with this decision. He added that the Red Army would at the same time undertake offensive operations, and would demonstrate by its actions the value it placed on this decision. He asked when the Commander-in-Chief would be named.

The President said he had to consult with his Staff, but that he was sure that the Commander-in-Chief would be named in three or four days or, in other words, immediately following his return, and that of the Prime Minister, to Cairo. The President said that there were a number of questions in regard to command which he had had to discuss with Mr. Churchill. He added that the Commander-in-Chief of OVERLORD would operate from England, and that there would be a Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean area. And one question was, under whose command the operations in Southern France would fall.

At this point The Prime Minister interrupted to say that the operations in Southern France should be under the Commander-in-Chief of OVERLORD, but the operations in Italy, which must be intensified to coordinate with the operations in France, would be under the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean theater.

Marshal Stalin expressed agreement with this idea, and said it was sound military doctrine.

For the next part of the luncheon the conversation was general, until the Prime Minister asked Marshal Stalin whether he had read the proposed communiqué on the Far East of the Cairo Conference.

Marshal Stalin replied that he had and that although he could make no commitments, he thoroughly approved the communiqué and all its contents. He said it was right that Korea should be independent, and that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China. He added, however, that the Chinese must be made to fight, which they had not thus far done.

The Prime Minister and the President expressed agreement with Marshal Stalin’s views.

After some discussion of the great size of the Soviet Union, during which Marshal Stalin admitted frankly that had Russia not had at her disposal such a vast territory the Germans would have probably won the victory, the Prime Minister said that he felt that such a large land mass as Russia deserved the access to warm water ports. He said that the question would of course form part of the peace settlement, and he observed that it could be settled agreeably and as between friends.

Marshal Stalin replied that at the proper time that question could be discussed, but that since Mr. Churchill had raised the question he would like to inquire as to the regime of the Dardanelles. He said that since England no longer objected, it would be well to relax that regime.

The Prime Minister replied that England had now no objections to Russia’s access to warm water ports, although he admitted that in the past she had. He questioned, however, the advisability of doing anything about the Straits at the time, as we were all trying to get Turkey to enter the war.

Marshal Stalin said there was no need to hurry about that question, but that he was merely interested in discussing it here in general.

The Prime Minister replied that Great Britain saw no objections to this legitimate question, and that furthermore we all hoped to see Russian fleets, both naval and merchant, on all seas of the world.

Marshal Stalin said that Lord Curzon had had other ideas.

The Prime Minister replied that that was true, and that it would be idle to deny that in those days Russia and England did not see eye to eye.

Marshal Stalin replied that Russia also was quite different in those days.

The President reverted to the question of the approaches to the Baltic Sea, which he had previously discussed with Marshal Stalin. He said he liked the idea of establishing the former Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck into some form of a free zone, with the Kiel Canal put under international control and guaranty, with freedom of passage for the world’s commerce.

Marshal Stalin said he thought that that was a good idea, and then asked what could be done for Russia in the Far East.

The Prime Minister replied that it was for this reason that he had been particularly glad to hear the Marshal’s views on the Cairo communiqué, since he was interested to find out the views of the Soviet government on the Far East and the question of warm water ports there.

Marshal Stalin replied that of course the Russians had their views, but that it would perhaps be better to await the time when the Russians would be taking an active representation in the Far Eastern war. He added, however, that there was no port in the Far East that was not closed off, since Vladivostok was only partly ice-free, and besides covered by Japanese-controlled Straits.

The President said he thought the idea of a free port might be applied to the Far East besides, and mentioned Dairen as a possibility.

Marshal Stalin said he did not think that the Chinese would like such a scheme.

To which the President replied that he thought they would like the idea of a free port under international guaranty.

Marshal Stalin said that that would not be bad, and added that Petropavlovsk or [on?] Kamchatka was an excellent port, and ice-free, but with no rail connections. He pointed out in this general connection that Russia had only one ice-free port, that of Murmansk.

The Prime Minister then said that it was important that the nations who would govern the world after the war, and who would be entrusted with the direction of the world after the war, should be satisfied and have no territorial or other ambitions. If that question could be settled in a manner agreeable to the great powers, he felt then that the world might indeed remain at peace. He said that hungry nations and ambitious nations are dangerous, and he would like to see the leading nations of the world in the position of rich, happy men.

The President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

It was then decided that after a short session this afternoon at 4:30 there would be no more full sessions of the conference, but at 4:00 o’clock tomorrow the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, together with Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Hopkins, would meet to discuss political matters, and reference was made to Poland, Finland and Sweden as possible subjects of discussion.

Hopkins-Eden-Molotov luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Captain Ware Captain Lunghi Mr. Pavlov

Ware Minutes

November 30, 1943, 1:30 p.m.
Secret

Mr. Hopkins brought up the question of the “strong points” to which reference had evidently been made previously in discussions with Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin about post-war Europe.

Mr. Molotov specifically mentioned Bizerte and Dakar and was interested in the question of the sovereignty of Bizerte. He said it would be difficult to realize how the war could not but affect such places, and that this was Marshal Stalin’s point of view also.

He added that it would be difficult also to comprehend how France, specifically, could be considered for treatment which would exclude punishment for her hostile acts committed in the past – in other words, how France could go unpunished for these acts.

Mr. Hopkins, specifically mentioning Belgium and Holland, brought out the implications of the fact that these countries were in close proximity to Germany and questioned the ability of such countries to defend themselves after this war.

Mr. Molotov said it had been shown once more that they are unable to defend themselves. Regarding France, however, he stated that this was a different matter. He said that France did not want to defend herself and in this respect she could be held much more responsible for her hostile acts than could Belgium and Holland.

Mr. Eden very willingly admitted that Great Britain should have given France more help.

Mr. Molotov indicated that France was not merely a country overpowered by the Germans but in fact was now with the Germans actively supporting German strategy. He added that France was not weak and that France did not want to join the Allies but wanted to collaborate with Germany. He said that the former French government had collapsed and that France made an alliance with Germany.

Mr. Eden , in reference to possible future attitudes toward France, said that nothing was too bad for the Lavals and Petains.

Mr. Molotov repeated that they are supporting Hitler now and that regarding France it is not just a matter of weakness.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned as an example the possibility of a strong point and airbase in Belgium and wanted to know what sort of agreement could be worked out in regard to who would operate such a base and under what right or authority.

It was pointed out that it would perhaps be easier just to arrange for the use of such bases for the Allies following the war in countries which had been enemy countries, and that in order to get the use of such bases in friendly countries, certain complications and rights of sovereignty might arise.

Mr. Eden suggested that the leasing of bases in the West Indies to the United States by Great Britain might serve as a rough example of these future arrangements.

Turning to Mr. Hopkins he said that it seemed that this was an exchange of bases for United States ships but really it was because “We like the United States to be there.” He asked Mr. Hopkins if he did not think that was really it.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that he would object to any such conclusion.

Mr. Molotov indicated that it would be hard to realize how such future arrangements for strong points could not but affect the countries where such bases were located but that at the present time it seemed uncertain what countries would be so affected. He said that he felt he was expressing the views of Marshal Stalin in stating that after the war in order to assure that there would be no future big war, the States particularly responsible for securing the peace will have to see to it that the main strategic bases will be in their control.

Regarding the strong points which will be taken from Germany or Japan, he remarked that these could be under the control possibly of Great Britain or the United States or both.

Specifically concerning Bizerte and Dakar, he mentioned United States or British control.

It appeared that he assumed there would be United States control in the Atlantic, and he asked if this was the correct understanding.

Mr. Eden said that the Prime Minister had stated that he did not want any more territory and that in regard to strong points taken from Germany and Japan, there might be joint control by the United States and Great Britain or United Nations control.

Regarding French bases, he could not say, since this matter would take great consideration, particularly in view of the fact that for many years England had been very close to France.

It might be supposed that the French could make a contribution by placing their bases under some United Nations control. In this way it would be possible for France to give something, and this should not in any way hurt the pride of France.

Mr. Molotov agreed that these sounded like legitimate demands.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that the place and strength of these future strong points would have to be worked out with a view as to who would possibly be a potential future enemy. He said that the President feels it essential to world peace that Russia, Great Britain, and the United States work out this control question in a manner which will not start each of the three powers arming against the others.

He indicated that the people would select as likely future enemies, Germany and Japan.

He said that the question of building up bases in the Pacific would not be a difficult one. Specifically in regard to the Philippines, he indicated that following their independence we would still consider it advisable to have naval and air bases there. He indicated that we feel such bases in the Philippines would not be under United Nations control but rather United States control.

In the event that Formosa was returned to China, naval and air bases would be desired there also.

The size, character, and duties of occupying forces on such bases would have to be worked out.

Mr. Eden said he agreed also.

Mr. Hopkins said that there are two problems which disturb the President in this connection. We do not want sovereignty over any islands which will be free [freed?] from Japanese domination. The United Nations may perhaps exercise some sort of protective influence.

The problem remains as to the type of base and as to who will operate them. The three great powers should decide these basic questions regarding strong points and who will control these. This control will involve air, naval, and ground forces.

Mr. Hopkins pointed out that it is relatively easy for the United States to discuss the question of strong points because the United States is not located under any possible immediate danger from Germany. The difficult problem will be to enforce peace upon Germany. The Russian and British strong points located nearer to Germany would involve more immediate problems in connection with the enforcing of peace on Germany.

The question of the location of strong points should not be too difficult once the most difficult problems in this connection have been basically agreed upon here. This whole question of strong points is one of the most important post-war problems.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned that there had been a brief discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin on this subject and that it would be fully worthwhile, he believed, if the President, Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin could further discuss this problem but that he understood that time was short and that possibly we could go into this matter now.

Mr. Molotov indicated that of course the heads of the governments had greater authority and would be more fully competent to talk through the issue but that possibly we could clarify the matter now.

Mr. Eden said he would like to know what Mr. Molotov recommends on the matter. Then he turned to the problem of Turkey.

He said that the Turkey problem had been thought over carefully and that it was his suggestion that we should make a joint summons to Turkey to enter the war. This summons would be made to Turkey, making clear what consequences would follow if Turkey refused, with all three of us backing the demand. He indicated that if it were agreeable to Mr. Molotov, an invitation could be extended to President Inonu of Turkey to come to Cairo where he could meet with the Prime Minister and the President if the President would be willing to stop over for this purpose in Cairo on his way back.

Mr. Eden said to Mr. Molotov that he would like to have Russian participation also and that it would be good if they would send someone representing the Soviet Government to the proposed meeting with the Turkish President in Cairo.

Mr. Eden added that it may be likely that President Inonu would not come; that he might make a constitutional excuse. But in case President Inonu does refuse to come to Cairo, he would suggest that the President or the Prime Minister should not go to Turkey. If President Inonu does not come, perhaps an Ambassador or better yet, some special messenger should be sent to President Inonu in Turkey with our demands.

Mr. Eden emphasized that he thought there should be a special person sent and asked who this person should be.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was in favor of bringing Turkey into the war not in the distant future, but now, this year.

Mr. Eden remarked that the problem then is not what we want but how. He stated that he understood that Marshal Stalin does not believe that Turkey will go to war, but Mr. Eden added it should be tried.

He said to Mr. Molotov that it was his feeling that the Soviet position was of much greater optimism in regard to the possibility of getting Turkey into the war at the time of the Three Power Conference in Moscow.

Mr. Molotov indicated that following the Numan request and the negotiations with Turkey conducted by Mr. Eden in the name of the Three Powers, that the reply which Great Britain had received from Turkey had caused the Russian loss of optimism.

Mr. Hopkins said that he understood that the Russians had wanted Turkey to enter the war particularly for immediate military benefit which the Russians had felt they would derive from having this action force more German troops away from the Soviet front.

He understood that the Prime Minister had discussed with Marshal Stalin on several occasions, the Turkey problem and that Marshal Stalin had emphasized his desire to have Turkey in the war now.

He said that the President would want to know more about the present Soviet attitude on this question. He assumed that all of us would want Turkey in the war and wanted to know whether there was actually a change in emphasis in the Soviet analysis of this situation.

Mr. Eden, in answer to a question put to him, stated that he had spoken in Turkey on behalf of the three countries.

Mr. Molotov remarked that under the authority of the protocol of the Three Power Conference, this was as it should be.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that it was quite all right for Mr. Eden to speak for the United States.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the reply made by Turkey was very bad and could not but affect the Soviet point of view which he understood had been made clear to Mr. Churchill by Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Molotov then added that if Turkey does declare war on Germany and if Bulgaria continues to take a hostile attitude, the Soviet Union will not only break diplomatic relations with Bulgaria but will be at war with Bulgaria. This all goes to show, he indicated, that the Soviet Government does attach importance to the participation of Turkey in the war.

Mr. Eden said that when he first learned of this Soviet analysis in regard to Bulgaria in this connection, and that he had heard about this at the conference yesterday, that he was frankly surprised.

Mr. Molotov said that this was a brief exposition of the Soviet point of view.

He asked Mr. Eden if he could elucidate a statement made at the conference yesterday by Prime Minister Churchill to the effect that if Turkey refuses the demands, that Turkey’s post-war rights in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be affected. He asked Mr. Eden what Mr. Churchill meant by this.

Mr. Eden replied “frankly I do not know.”

Then he went on to add that he supposed the Prime Minister had meant that the present cordiality and support being offered Turkey would be changed; in fact that the whole basis of relationship with Great Britain would be changed.

He offered to ask Mr. Churchill for further elucidation if Mr. Molotov would so desire.

Mr. Molotov indicated that he would like to know.

Mr. Eden then asked Mr. Molotov if specifically his government would agree to the suggestion to try to bring President Inonu of Turkey to Cairo.

Mr. Molotov said that he thought it would be a good idea but that he would ask Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Eden thanked Mr. Molotov very much.

Mr. Hopkins, turning to Mr. Eden, stated that he had good reason to believe that a substantial understanding on these points under discussion would be arrived at between Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister, and the President.

Mr. Molotov said he was convinced that the results of this conference would add vigor to the people of our respective countries and that the coming together of the three heads of government would do still more toward improving the morale in our countries.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that if large undertakings were started following Turkey’s entry into the war, and if in this connection the island of Rhodes were occupied and attacks were made on the Dodecanese Islands, that such large commitments which would inevitably follow, would possibly cause at least a delay of OVERLORD. However, he stated that aside from the military situation which might be of sufficient importance that also there might be a psychological advantage in developing the war in this area at this time which would justify a delay in OVERLORD. Among other things, this might force Finland to ask for peace from Russia.

Mr. Molotov asked if he was to understand that the entry of Turkey into the war at this time was connected with a delay in the timing of OVERLORD in the opinion of Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. Hopkins said that the President was under this impression and so also our Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Molotov said that Marshal Stalin would be against getting Turkey into the war now if this necessarily meant a delay of OVERLORD.

Mr. Hopkins said he hesitated to be too encouraging but that he might be mistaken and that possibly a formula was being worked out whereby this possible action in the Eastern Mediterranean could take place without interfering with OVERLORD.

Mr. Hopkins said that he understands there were three questions of urgent importance to the Russians in regard to OVERLORD as stated at the conference yesterday:

  1. The assurance that OVERLORD will take place and on time.
  2. The Commander of OVERLORD.
  3. The supporting action in Southern France.

Mr. Eden then turned to the question of aid to Tito in Yugoslavia. He made mention of a mission with United States Officers in it and suggested to Mr. Molotov that the Russians might also want to send a mission and that maybe the Russians would want to have an airbase in Northern Africa.

Mr. Eden stated that the British were ready to provide that base.

Mr. Molotov said thank you.

Mr. Eden went on to explain that the British airbase for sending supplies to Tito is located at Cairo and asked Mr. Molotov where he would like to have a base for the Russians.

Mr. Molotov answered that he would leave that to the discretion of Mr. Eden and that as Mr. Eden suggested Cairo he thought that would be a good location for the Russians too.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet General Staff plans to send a mission to Yugoslavia and that on his return to Moscow he will be able to state who is taking part in this mission.

Mr. Eden said that he would try to get preliminary arrangements made and a place ready for an airbase for the Russians at Cairo and assured that such a base would be made available.

Mr. Molotov asked whether it would not be better to have a mission to Michaelovich [Mihailović] rather than to Tito in order to get better information.

Mr. Eden said that he would know better tomorrow but that from reports he had received from British Officers, Michaelovich would not be good to deal with, but he said that maybe it would be good for the Russians to send some of their people to Michaelovich.

Then he brought up the question as to whether the territory occupied by Tito was or was not separated by German forces from the area or areas occupied by Michaelovich.

Mr. Eden then referred to Mr. Molotov, making reference to what he termed an “indiscreet conversation” held between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin the other day on the subject of Poland.

He added that the British have only one desire – to prevent the problem from becoming a source of friction between our countries. He said that if the question of two steps to the left was to be considered for Poland, then he would want to know how large these steps would be. He said that if he knew what was in the minds of the Russians on this question he would then be able to ask them for some sort of an agreement of opinion. Therefore, he suggested that this problem should be carefully looked over.

Mr. Molotov added that he agreed.

Mr. Hopkins said that he was under the impression that the President had spoken quite openly and frankly with Marshal Stalin and that he had told him or would tell him all that he had on his mind on this subject and that he was sure the President and Prime Minister had talked over the question of Poland.

Third plenary meeting, 4 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Marshal Voroshilov
Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Dill Mr. Pavlov
General Marshall General Brooke Mr. Berezhkov
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Major General Deane Lieutenant General Ismay
Captain Royal Lieutenant General Martel
Captain Ware Major Birse
Mr. Bohlen

Bohlen Minutes

November 30, 1943, 4 p.m.
Secret

The President opened the proceedings by stating that while most of those present were aware of what had occurred this morning at the meeting of the British and American Staffs, he wished personally to express his happiness at the decision reached which he hoped would be satisfactory to Marshal Stalin. He proposed that Sir Alan Brooke, British Chief of Staff, report for the Combined Chiefs.

General Brooke said that sitting in combined session the United States and British Staffs had reached the following agreement, which had been submitted for the approval of the President and the Prime Minister. It was agreed:

  1. That OVERLORD will be launched during the month of May 1944.

  2. That there will be a supporting operation in southern France on as large a scale as possible, depending on the number of landing craft available for this operation.

The Prime Minister stated that it was important that close and intimate contact be maintained with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff since it was important that in closing on the wild beast all parts of the narrowing circle should be aflame with battle. All operations must be considered, and if Turkey entered the war her action as well as the resistance operations in Yugoslavia should also be coordinated with the actions of the allied army.

Marshal Stalin said he fully understood the importance of the decision reached and the difficulties which would be encountered in the execution of OVERLORD. He added that the danger in the beginning of the operation was that the Germans might attempt to transfer troops from the eastern front to oppose OVERLORD. In order to deny to the Germans the possibility of maneuvering he pledged that the Red Army would launch simultaneously with OVERLORD large scale offensives in a number of places for the purpose of pinning down German forces and preventing the transfer of German troops to the west. He said that he had already made the foregoing statement to the President, and Mr. Churchill but he thought it necessary to repeat it to the conference.

The President said that we were all aware of the importance of maintaining the closest cooperation between the three Staffs, and now that they had gotten together he hoped they would stay together. He went on to say that he had already told Marshal Stalin that the next step would be the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for OVERLORD, and that he was confident that this appointment would be made within three or four days or immediately after he and the Prime Minister had returned to Cairo. He suggested that if Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister had no objection it might be advisable for the British and American military staffs to return to Cairo tomorrow as they had a great deal of detail work to do in working out the decisions reached here. Both Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister agreed.

The Prime Minister stated that having taken this important decision the main question now was to find enough landing craft for all our needs. He said he could not believe that the great resources of the United States and England could not make available what was needed. He said he had caused an inquiry to be made in regard to the total number of landing craft in the Mediterranean, and that upon their return home his military staff would have this information. Mr. Churchill added that he wished to state that now the decision had been taken he felt that OVERLORD should be delivered with smashing force and he hoped that it would be possible to add to the strength of the operation as he wished to place that man in a position where there was no way out for him; if he put force in the west he would be smashed on the Soviet front, and if he attempted to hold firm in the east he would be smashed on the west. He went on to say that the present conclave might now break up as the military questions had been settled. Some political questions remained to be discussed and he hoped it would be possible on December 1st and 2nd to discuss these questions since he felt it would be of great value to be able to tell the world that full agreement had been reached on all questions at this conference. He expressed the hope that the President and Marshal Stalin would be willing to remain in Tehran through December 2 if necessary. Both the President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

The President then said it would be necessary to consider the text of the communiqué to be issued and suggested that the military staffs before their departure work out a draft of the military aspects of the conference for their consideration. This was agreed.

The Prime Minister then said some form of cover plan should be worked out in order to confuse and deceive the enemy as to the real time and place of our joint blows. He said that the vast preparations in England could not be concealed from the enemy, and it was therefore important that every effort be made to confuse and mislead him. He said that “truth deserves a bodyguard of lies.”

Marshal Stalin then described the methods used on the Soviet front to conceal the location and timing of Soviet offenses. This was done through the use of dummy tanks, aircraft, fake landing fields and false information on the military radio.

The formal conference then closed with the agreement that the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hopkins would meet tomorrow to discuss political questions.

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

November 30, 1943, 4 p.m.
Secret

In opening the meeting, the President said he assumed that most of those present were familiar with what had transpired at the meeting of the British and American staffs earlier in the day, but he suggested that General Brooke be asked to read the conclusions which were reached at that meeting.

Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister agreed.

General Brooke said that at the meeting of the British and American staffs they had agreed to recommend to the President and Prime Minister that they should inform Marshal Stalin that the Anglo-American forces would launch OVERLORD during the month of May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the South of France, on the largest scale that would be permitted by the landing craft available at that time.

The Prime Minister said it is of course understood that we shall keep in close touch with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet military authorities in order that all operations may be coordinated with each other. He said that the Anglo-American-Soviet forces would be closing in on Germany from all parts of a circle and it was essential that the pressure be exerted by all forces at the same moment. For this purpose, he proposed to keep the Soviet authorities informed of the Anglo-American plans. He added that it would be possible to hold 8 to 10 German divisions on the Italian front, and he expressed the hope that the Yugoslavs could continue their good work in holding German divisions in that country. He said that if Turkey could be brought into the war, so much the better, and emphasized again the necessity for the three great Powers to work together as one team.

Marshal Stalin said that he understood the importance of the decision that had been reached by the Anglo-American staffs. He emphasized that there would be difficulties in the beginning and possibly dangers. The greatest danger would be that at the time of the attack the Germans might endeavor to transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to meet it and attempt to prevent its success. In order to deny the Germans freedom of action and [not to?] permit them to move their forces to the West he stated that the Soviets would undertake to organize a large-scale offensive against the Germans in May in order to contain the maximum number of German divisions on the Eastern Front and thus remove the difficulties for OVERLORD. He added that he had already made such a statement to the President and Prime Minister but felt it necessary to repeat it at the Plenary Session of the conference.

The President said that the Marshal’s statement concerning the timing and coordination of operations was extremely satisfactory and it forestalled a question on that subject he was about to ask. He suggested that now that the staffs of the three nations had gotten together it was essential they should maintain close contact with each other, with particular emphasis on making certain that all future operations were timed with relation to each other.

The President then said he had told Marshal Stalin that the next step was the appointment of the Supreme Commander for the OVERLORD operation. He said that he and the Prime Minister would take up this matter with their staffs and make the decision within three or four days, certainly soon after their arrival in Cairo.

The President said that the only military matters remaining for consideration were details of the OVERLORD operation which would have to be worked out between the combined British and American staffs, and suggested it might be more convenient for them to return to Cairo at once for this purpose.

After ascertaining from Marshal Stalin that he had no more matters which he wished presented to the Combined British and American Staffs, the President and Prime Minister agreed that the staffs should return to Cairo on the following day.

The Prime Minister said there are many details about the OVERLORD operation which remain to be settled. He said that the necessary landing craft would have to be found, but he could not believe that the two nations, with their great volume of production, could not make the necessary landing craft available. He said also that he would like to add weight to the operation as it is now planned, especially in the initial assault. In all events, he wished to make sure that the armed forces of the three nations would be in heavy action on the Continent of Europe during the month of June. If this were so, he added, it would make it very difficult for “that man.” If Hitler attempts to meet the Soviet attack from the east, the Anglo-American forces will move in on him. On the other hand, if he attempts to stop the Anglo-American forces, the Soviet forces will be able to advance into Germany.

Marshal Stalin said that he understood the necessity for the detailed staff planning and concurred that it would be a good idea for the staffs to return to Cairo at once.

The Prime Minister then indicated that since the military business of the conference was concluded, there were some political matters of extreme importance which remained to be decided. He hoped it would be possible for the three Heads of State to meet on the first and second of December and not to leave Tehran until December 3. He said it would be well if they remained until all questions of importance had been decided. He indicated that he was prepared to delay his departure, and the President and Marshal Stalin agreed to stay the extra day.

The President brought up the subject of the communiqué, particularly as it referred to the military decisions. He suggested that the military staffs draft something for the President and Prime Minister’s approval.

Marshal Stalin agreed that this should be done insofar as military matters taken up at the conference were concerned.

The Prime Minister said he thought the communiqué should strike the note that all future military operations were to be concerted between the three great Powers.

Marshal Stalin added, certainly those in Europe from both the east and west.

The Prime Minister said that the preparations for OVERLORD are bound to be known to the enemy. Numerous depots are being constructed in Southern England, the entire appearance of the coast is changing and photographs indicate these changes in detail.

Marshal Stalin said that it was difficult, if not impossible, to hide such a large operation from the enemy.

The Prime Minister then asked if any arrangements had been made to provide a combined cover plan for the operations in May as between the three great Powers.

Marshal Stalin said that on such occasions the Soviets had achieved success by the construction of false tanks, airplanes and airfields. They move these items to sectors in which no operations are planned, and such movements are immediately picked up by the German intelligence. In sectors from which blows are to be launched, all movements are made quietly and mostly under cover of darkness. In this manner they had often succeeded in deceiving the Germans. He noted that at times up to 5,000 false tanks and 2,000 false airplanes had been used, as well as the construction of a number of airfields which were not actually intended to be used. Another method of deception practiced by the Red Army was by the use of radio. Unit commanders communicate freely by radio giving the Germans false information and evoke immediate attacks from the German air forces in areas where such attacks can do no harm.

The Prime Minister observed that truth deserves a bodyguard of lies.

Marshal Stalin said, “This is what we call military cunning.”

The Prime Minister said that he considered it rather military diplomacy. He suggested that arrangements be made for liaison to be established between the three great Powers as regards the deception and propaganda methods to be adopted.

It was agreed that the Chiefs of State and their Foreign Ministers should meet on the following day at 1600.

Sketch by Roosevelt to illustrate his concept of the United Nations Organization

rooseteh

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

Tehran, 30 November 1943
Secret

Memorandum for the President

From: The United States Chiefs of Staff.
Subject: ALLOCATION OF ITALIAN SHIPS TO THE USSR

The question of the allocation of Italian ships to the USSR, as requested at the Moscow Conference, may be brought up during the EUREKA proceedings.

The original Russian request was for 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 displacement tons of merchant shipping. This request is the subject of the exchange of a number of dispatches between our delegation in Moscow and the President. During these exchanges the allocation, or possible allocation, of one-third of the Italian Fleet for the use of the USSR was concurred in by the United States. However, it is understood that the USSR would not be prepared at this time to man and employ one-third of the Italian Fleet.

If the allocation of Italian ships to the USSR is brought up at this time, the action agreed upon should be solely with regard to its influence on the prosecution of the war. The following factors are to be considered:

a. The turning over of Italian ships to the Russians at this time would have a serious adverse effect on the prosecution of the war in Italy and in such other places as Italian forces are now cooperating. It seems quite possible that the Italian crews, before surrendering the ships to the Russians would scuttle. Italy has been accepted as a cobelligerent. The surrender of Italian ships would provide valuable propaganda for use by the enemy with the Italians in Germany, occupied Italy, even elsewhere.

b. Italian ships would not come provided with spare parts and ammunition. Further, they would probably require some modernization, especially as regards antiaircraft armament, which the USSR has no means of effecting.

It is recommended that it continue to be agreed in principle that one-third of the Italian warships that are allocated for transfer to powers other than Italy be allocated for the use of the USSR It is further recommended that any question of the allocation of Italian naval ships to other powers be deferred, at least until after the conclusion of Allied offensive operations in Italy.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy

Draft declaration on Iran

Tehran, November 30, 1943

Suggested draft declaration

The Governments of Iran, the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom, having consulted together, desire to make plain their common policy with regard to the prosecution of the war and their complete agreement with respect to the special economic questions with which the war has confronted Iran.

By subscribing to the Declaration by United Nations, all four governments have already declared their joint determination to press the war to a victorious conclusion. They are further agreed that Iran can make its most useful contribution to this end by facilitating the movement of essential supplies from overseas to the USSR and they recognize the assistance along this line which Iran has already rendered. All four governments intend to continue and intensify the cooperation in this respect which has been established. It is clearly understood that any armed forces of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom which are, or may be, established on Iranian territory are solely for the purpose of furthering the common war effort and will be withdrawn as soon as the needs of that effort permit, in accordance with the published agreements already concluded between Iran and the other three Governments.

The four Governments are in agreement that the maximum benefit from their combined efforts can be obtained only if the essential economic needs of Iran are met, and they reaffirm their intention to cooperate closely to achieve this objective. The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such financial and material assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their worldwide military operations and to the worldwide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption. The four Governments will work together in planning the importation of essential goods into Iran, and, in general, they will act in close consultation with regard to all economic matters which may affect the war effort in Iran.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the conclusion of hostilities should receive full consideration, on an equal basis with those of other members of the United Nations, by any conferences or international agencies which may be set up to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are as one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the complete independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, along with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, November 30, 1943

For the President from Secretary Hull

Winant would certainly be a fine choice. Our representative on the Commission will have a full-time job and much detailed drafting and discussion will be essential. I don’t see, therefore, how one man can combine the exacting duties of American Ambassador to Great Britain with those of our representative on the Commission if these two important jobs are to be effectively done. Have you any further comment or suggestions in the light of the foregoing, in other words do you still desire him to hold both positions?

CH


The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, 30 November 1943

From the Secretary of State for the President

Following the sinking by a German submarine of a small Colombian Vessel in the Caribbean (The second such sinking) the Colombian Government with the approval of the Senate proclaimed a state of belligerency with Germany. This will involve the adherence of Colombia to the United Nations declaration.

President Lopez of Colombia is in the United States on leave of absence. The reason for his trip is his wife’s need for medical attention. However, the President’s political position, while improved, has not entirely recovered from the recent political crisis. It is generally believed that he will return to Colombia to resume his office within a few weeks.

Senator Butler’s article in Readers Digest and his address and reports to the Senate on his trip to the other American Republics have caused a sensation. However, his charges which are as sweeping as they are unfounded have been vigorously challenged by the Vice President and by Nelson Rockefeller. The general effect in the other American Republics cannot be minimized although the majority of those commenting have shown a good understanding of the situation here. Senator Butler’s elaborate report will when available be analyzed in detail by the different agencies concerned.

Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

Present
Major Boettiger Mr. Holman
Lieutenant General Ismay Mr. Martin
General Arnold Lieutenant General Somervell
Lord Moran General Brooke
Mr. Harriman Mr. Berezhkov
Field Marshal Dill Marshal Voroshilov
Major Birse Sir Reader Bullard
Marshal Stalin Mr. Molotov
Prime Minister Churchill Mr. Eden
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Bohlen Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham Mr. Winant
Admiral Leahy Air Chief Marshal Portal
Section Officer Sarah Churchill Oliver General Marshall
Admiral King Captain Randolph Churchill
Sir Alexander Cadogan Colonel Elliott Roosevelt
Sergeant Robert Hopkins Commander Thompson

Boettiger Minutes

November 30, 1943, 8:30 p.m.

Thirty-three members of the American, British and Russian representatives [delegations?] at the Tehran Conference gathered with Mr. Churchill for dinner on the occasion of his 69th birthday. A list of the guests, and the seating arrangement at the dinner-table, is attached.

It was clear that those present had a sense of realization that historic understanding had been reached and this conception was brought out in the statements and speeches. Back of all was the feeling that basic friendships had been established which there was every reason to believe would endure.

This strong feeling of optimism appeared to be based on the realization that if the three nations went forward together, there was real hope for a better world future, and that their own most vital interests dictated such a policy.

President Roosevelt sat on the Prime Minister’s right, and Marshal Stalin on his left. All speeches took the form of toasts, following the Russian custom and the policy established at the Stalin dinner at the Soviet Embassy on Sunday [Monday] night.

The President opened the proceedings with the first toast, an unusual departure from rote in that he, instead of the host, proposed the traditional toast to the King. The President said that as an old friend of King George he had requested of Mr. Churchill the privilege of offering the toast.

The Prime Minister then paid a warm official and personal tribute to the President, whom he characterized as a man who had devoted his entire life to the cause of defending the weak and helpless, and to the promotion of the great principles that underlie our democratic civilization. Following this with a toast to Marshal Stalin, he said the latter was worthy to stand with the great figures of Russian history and merited the title of “Stalin the Great.”

The President spoke of his long admiration for Winston Churchill and his joy in the friendship which had developed between them in the midst of their common efforts in this war.

Marshal Stalin said the honors which had been paid to him really belonged to the Russian people; that it was easy to be a hero or a great leader, if one had to do with people such as the Russians. He said that the Red Army had fought heroically, but that the Russian people would have tolerated no other quality from their armed forces. He said that even persons of medium courage and even cowards became heroes in Russia. Those who didn’t, he said, were killed.

The Prime Minister spoke of the great responsibility that rested on the three men who have the power to command some 30 million armed men, as well as the vast number of men and women who stood behind these men in their work in field and factory, which makes possible the activities of the armies. In a personal toast to Franklin Roosevelt, the Prime Minister expressed his opinion that through the President’s courage and foresighted action in 1933, he had indeed prevented a revolution in the United States. He expressed his admiration for the way the President had guided his country along the “tumultuous stream of party friction and internal politics amidst the violent freedoms of democracy.”

Among the many toasts of the evening was one by President Roosevelt to Sir Alan Brooke, the British Army Chief of Staff. Marshal Stalin stood with the others, but he held his glass in his hand, and when the others had drunk he stayed on his feet. He said he wished to join in the toast of General Brooke, but wished to make certain observations.

Acknowledging the General’s greatness, Marshal Stalin, with a twinkle in his eye, said he regretted that Sir Alan was unfriendly to the Soviet Union, and adopted a grim and distrustful attitude toward the Russians. He drank the General’s health in the hope that Sir Alan “would come to know us better and would find that we are not so bad after all.”

Sometime later, in reply to Stalin, General Brooke rose and with some stiffness of manner declared that the Marshal had made note of the means used by the Russians in deceiving the enemy on the Eastern Front. For the greater part of the war, he went on, Great Britain had adopted cover plans to deceive the enemy, and it was possible that Marshal Stalin had mistaken the dummy “tanks and airplanes” for the real operations. “That is possible” interjected Stalin, dryly, bringing chuckles around the table. His real desire, continued Brooke, was to establish closer collaboration with the Russians. “That is possible,” Stalin repeated, “even probable.” And there were more chuckles. It was thought that General Brooke would wind up with a toast to Marshal Voroshilov, the Russian chief of staff, but instead he broke away completely from his [this?] vein and abruptly proposed the health of Admiral Leahy.

Mr. Churchill took indirect note of the incident and seemed inclined to soften the effect of it, and in a subsequent toast he observed that he had heard the suggestions concerning changing political complexions in the world. He said that he could not speak with authority concerning the political view which might be expressed by the American people in the coming year’s elections, and that he would not presume to discuss the changing political philosophy of the Russian nation. But, he continued, so far as the British people were concerned, he could say very definitely that their “complexions are becoming a trifle pinker.” Stalin spoke up instantly: “That is a sign of good health!”

In what he declared would be the concluding toast of the evening, Mr. Churchill referred to the great progress which had been made at Tehran toward solution of world affairs, and proposed a joint toast to the President and Marshal Stalin.

But before the dinner could break up, Stalin requested of his host the privilege of delivering one more toast. Mr. Churchill nodded assent and Stalin then said he wished to speak of the importance of “the machine” in the present war, and to express his great admiration for the productive capacity of the United States. He had been advised, he said, that the United States would very soon be producing 10,000 planes every month. This compared, he said, with 2,500 to 3,000 planes which the Soviet Union was able to produce, after making every effort to speed the task, and with a somewhat similar number of planes produced monthly by Great Britain.

Without these planes from America the war would have been lost, said Stalin with emphasis. He expressed his gratitude and that of the Russian people for the great leadership of President Roosevelt which had developed the great production of war machines and made possible their delivery to Russia. He wound up with a warm toast to the President.

Then the President sought the privilege of adding a last word, and he said these meetings at Tehran had raised all our hopes that the future would find a better world, an ordered world in which the ordinary citizen would be assured the possibility of peaceful toil and the just enjoyment of the fruits of his labors.

He said:

There has been discussion here tonight of our varying colors of political complexion. I like to think of this in terms of the rainbow. In our country the rainbow is a symbol of good fortune and of hope. It has many varying colors, each individualistic, but blending into one glorious whole.

Thus with our nations. We have differing customs and philosophies and ways of life. Each of us works out our scheme of things according to the desires and ideas of our own peoples.

But we have proved here at Tehran that the varying ideals of our nations can come together in a harmonious whole, moving unitedly for the common good of ourselves and of the world.

So as we leave this historic gathering, we can see in the sky, for the first time, that traditional symbol of hope, the rainbow.

President Roosevelt’s log of the trip

Tuesday, November 30 (at Tehran)

10:45 a.m. Ambassador Winant called on the President.
11:30 a.m. The President visited the branch post exchange which had been installed in the Russian Embassy for his convenience through the efforts of Major General Connolly and Captain George B. Silton, USA, and inspected the articles on display. These articles were principally of Persian manufacture.
12:00 (noon) The President received Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi, the Shah in Shah of Iran, together with his Prime Minister (Mr. Saheily), his Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Saed), and his Minister of the Imperial Court (Mr. Hossein Ala). While at the Russian Embassy, the Shah and his party also called on Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, in that order. The Shah presented the President with a very beautiful Persian carpet of Isfahan make. The carpet (18′x30′) was designed by the celebrated Iranian artist Imami.
1:30 p.m. The President was host at a luncheon at the Russian Embassy to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Pavlov, Major Birse and Mr. Bohlen.
4:00 p.m. Plenary meeting of American, British and Russian Chiefs of Staff and other delegates with the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. Those present were the same as at the 4:00 p.m. meeting Monday, November 29. This meeting adjourned at 6:15 p.m.
8:30 p.m. The President attended a dinner at the nearby British Legation given in honor of the Prime Minister on the occasion of his 69th birthday anniversary. Those present: The Prime Minister, the President, Marshal Stalin, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Commander Thompson, Mr. Bohlen, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral King, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Major Birse, Field Marshal Dill, Ambassador Harriman, Lord Moran, General Arnold, Lt-General Ismay, Major Boettiger, Mr. Holman, Mr. John F. [M.] Martin, Lt-General Somervell, General Brooke, Mr. Berezhkov, Marshal Voroshilov, Sir Reader Bullard, Commissar Molotov, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador Winant, Air Chief Marshal Portal, General Marshall and Captain Randolph Churchill. Of particular interest are the following remarks made by Marshal Stalin during the Prime Minister’s birthday dinner: “I want to tell you, from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war. The most important things in this war are machines. The United States has proven that it can turn out from 8,000 to 10,000 airplanes per month. Russia can only turn out, at most, 3,000 airplanes a month. England turns out 3,000 to 3,500, which are principally heavy bombers. The United States, therefore, is a country of machines. Without the use of those machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.” President Roosevelt presented the Prime Minister with a Kashan bowl for a birthday gift.
11:45 p.m. The President returned to the Russian Embassy and retired for the evening.

Well… that is the most Stalin thing Stalin could think of. Well… let’s see how many officers does stalin kill in East Germany.

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Wow wow wow. Nice concept, though I can’t read it. FDR should have typed it.

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U.S. State Department (December 1, 1943)

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iran

Tehran, Azar 9, 1322 (December 1, 1943)

Aide-Mémoire

On this occasion when with the help of God Almighty this happiness and honor have come to this ancient land of Iran, our dear homeland, which is the place of conference of the august leaders of the three big allies of Iran, when one of the important events of history in this era happens in Iran for the solution of international difficulties and the establishment of permanent peace and tranquility and insurance of the future life of all of the nations of the world on the foundation of justice and equality which are the ideals of the United Nations, and on which the Atlantic Charter is based, it is a most suitable opportunity to bring to your knowledge the longings of the Iranian people.

The present condition of Iran, which has come to exist as a result of the efforts, pains and sacrifices of all the classes of this country for several years and which has been fully utilized by the allies for the promotion of the designs and speeding up of victory, necessitates that the Iranian Government and people should be certain that the allies will not refrain from lending Iran any kind of assistance at the present and in the future.

In view of the hearty desires and prominent and effective steps that Iran has taken in helping the allies Iran has shown in practice her desire that the war should come to an end as soon as possible with the victory of the allies.

Iran which by showing cordial and sincere cooperation in conformity with the tripartite pact and by full collaboration with the allies shares in this victory and triumph, is positively certain that the allies would take into full consideration all the troubles and damages which have been inflicted on Iran through conditions of war.

In view of the tests of cordial cooperation and sincere collaboration shown during this period by the Iranian people and Government in all fields and stages, and in view of her efforts to insure allied victory and to eradicate cruelty and oppression from the world to an extent which has been above Iran’s ability and power, supporting as she did innumerable economic difficulties, and consequently by declaring war against Germany having won the full confidence of the allies, Iran expects that the allies would make a special effort in turning over the vital threads of the affairs of the country which are at present in their hands and in leaving to the military and security forces of Iran herself the maintenance of security in the country and safeguarding all the means of this work in order that existing trust and confidence may assume a practical shape.

The Iranian Government and people confidently hope that the written promises and oral assurances given by the Allies in regard to the integrity and full independence of Iran will be strengthened through moral and material help in all political and economic realms and that Iran may be able in this way to continue to play in the future the honorable role which she had in the past among the civilized countries of the world.

The Iranian Government and people, in consideration of this demonstration of sincerity and unity, give the assurance that in the same way that in the most difficult times of war they did not refrain from lending cordial cooperation and showing sincere friendship for a speedy Allied Victory, hereafter, too, they will continue this traditional policy in respective international questions and will fully cooperate with their Allies.

Now that the august leaders of the three big powers are staying in Iran, the Iranian Government and people expect that a communiqué will be issued substantiating the foregoing and, in this way, specifying once more the good will that they have repeatedly shown toward Iran orally and in writing.

FDRUNmap

State Department footnote:

The words in the upper right corner “T[ehran]-misc[ellanous]” were added subsequently as a file indicator. The writing enclosed in the circles reads: “40 U. N.,” “Exec[utive] Com[mittee],” and “4 Police [men].” The words below the left-hand circle are “I[nternational] L[abor] O[rganization]-Health Agric[ulture]-Food.”

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The Administrator General of Finances of Iran to President Roosevelt

Tehran, December 1, 1943

My Dear Mr. President: In our conversation today, you were good enough to give me permission to write you a personal note about the American effort in Iran.

Iran has on three occasions obtained American administrative assistance:

  1. The Shuster Financial Mission in 1911, dismissed the same year following a Russian ultimatum.

  2. The first Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1922-27, with other missions for agriculture, highways and railway construction.

  3. The second Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1943 – with other missions in the Ministries of War, Interior (Gendarmerie and Police), Agriculture, and Health.

Each of these Missions came at or following a time of political, economic and financial disturbance and danger. Each had, from the Iranian point of view, two main purposes:

  1. A political purpose – to hold the balance between British and Russian imperialisms and thus safeguard the independence of the country.

  2. A financial and economic purpose – to help Iran to put its own house in order, to conserve its financial and economic resources, and in this way to prevent Britain and Russia from having an excuse to take over the country.

In general, the Americans in Iran are employees of the Iranian Government, with a period of service that will terminate in about four years. But we feel that we are here and that we can and do appropriately act, not only as administrative employees of the Iranian Government, but also as the practical instruments for implementing your international policies.

Iranians welcome American assistance because they know that Americans are neutral, non-imperialistic, honest, and sincere. But I am convinced that, if Americans are to work effectively over a period of years in this country and really implement your policies, the independence of the country must be safeguarded by an understanding among the three powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

Because of fifteen years of dictatorship, because of the War, and because of the Allied occupation, Iran and the Iranians are at present in a condition of inconceivable disorganization, demoralization and corruption. If American assistance is withdrawn at the end of four years, our effort will be largely wasted. To do a permanent job, fifteen or twenty years will be required.

As I see it, therefore, the suggested understanding should provide:

  1. For exclusively American administrative and technical assistance to Iran over a period of fifteen or twenty years;

  2. For the divorcement of this American effort from American commercial interests;

  3. For the harmonizing of this effort with the political independence of Iran, with Iranian self-government through constitutional democratic forms and procedures, and with some form of protection against the reestablishment of dictatorship; and,

  4. For assurances to be given Great Britain and the Soviet Union that Americans in Iran are to be neutral as between these two powers and friendly to both.

The Iranians look to you, Mr. President, to guarantee them freedom from fear. With American administrators to help the Iranians to help themselves, the Iranians can, should and will do the rest. Iran seems to me to be a clinic – a testing ground – for the practical execution of your international policies. Finally, the doing of the job here need not cost the American taxpayers a cent, and need not require any armed intervention.

Permit me to thank you, Mr. President, for seeing me in the midst of your immense responsibilities and let me convey to you on behalf of my Mission our best wishes for your health and continued high accomplishment.

Respectfully yours,
A. C. MILLSPAUGH

President Roosevelt to the Shah of Iran

Tehran, December 1, 1943

Your Majesty, I was very much pleased to see you yesterday when you welcomed me to your country in the name of the Iranian people. Your gesture is one that emphasizes again the more than friendly feeling that has always existed between our two nations. I was delighted to have had this chance to make Your Majesty’s acquaintance.

I have received the magnificent carpet, the gracious gift of Your Majesty. This carpet will serve to remind both myself and the American people of the generous hospitality of the Iranian nation. I am truly grateful.

Your Majesty’s invitation to be a guest at your palace as well as your offer to meet me at the airport upon my arrival and to provide a guard of honor have been conveyed to me and I am most appreciative. Much to my regret, the circumstances of my visit, as you are no doubt aware, have made it impossible for me to avail myself of these kind offers, much as I would have liked to have done so.

I cannot emphasize too strongly how much I have been touched by all of these truly friendly gestures on the part of Your Majesty. I shall leave Iran with regret at not having had an opportunity to extend my acquaintance with you and to have seen more of your country and your people. The American people have for many years been cognizant of the friendly sentiments of the Iranian people, and the hospitality shown by Your Majesty in their name will serve to keep this realization alive for many years to come.

Iran has always occupied a warm spot in American hearts, more than ever now that we are brothers in arms. We know the part Iran is playing in the common struggle and our hope is that when peace at last comes, the spirit of working together that now exists between our two peoples will continue unchecked in peaceful labors.

I take this opportunity to thank Your Majesty again for all the gestures of friendliness and hospitality you have shown me and to wish Your Majesty the greatest happiness both for yourself and for the people of your ancient land.

With my sincere regards, I am,
Faithfully yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

I greatly hope that we shall have the pleasure of a visit from you to Washington.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Tehran, 1 December 1943

My Dear Franklin, I was indeed touched by your kind present. It is a beautiful bowl, and I shall always treasure it as a reminder of our sunlit days in Tehran and of the most memorable of my Birthdays.

I cannot thank you enough for all your friendship and support in the years in which we have worked together, and I am glad of this occasion to send you a message of sincere affection and gratitude.

Yours always,
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Tripartite luncheon meeting, 1 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Harriman Major Birse
Mr. Bohlen

Bohlen Minutes

December 1, 1943, 1 p.m.
Secret

During the first part of luncheon the text of a telegram to be dispatched to the British and American Ambassadors in Ankara to deliver orally an invitation to the President of Turkey to meet the President and Mr. Churchill in Cairo on December 3rd, 4th or 5th, was discussed and was agreed to.

Mr. Hopkins then stated that before any meetings with the Turkish President, it was essential that we were agreed as to exactly what form of military assistance could be rendered to Turkey in the event she agreed to enter the war.

The President agreed with Mr. Hopkins, and said that the American Staff had not yet worked out anything in detail on that question.

The Prime Minister said that he only intended to offer the Turks 20 squadrons, mostly of fighter aircraft, and some 3 anti-aircraft regiments, but he had no intention of offering any land forces at this time.

The President remarked that the big problem confronting his Staff was the number of available landing craft in the Mediterranean and how much would be needed for the Italian operations, those in Southern France and in England, as well as for the operations in the Indian Ocean.

Marshal Stalin then said that as he understood it, if Turkey entered the war there would only be made available the air force and anti-aircraft force mentioned by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister agreed and spoke of the great assistance to the Allied cause that would result from obtaining Turkish air bases, with the possibility of continual bombing of the Ploesti oil fields. He added that he wanted landing craft only for the assault on the Island of Rhodes, which would be a temporary operation in the month of March.

The President stated that he desired to have military advice on the subject, as he did not know whether it would be possible to sandwich in, between the Italian and OVERLORD operations, for any operation in the Aegean, the landing craft which the Prime Minister desired.

The Prime Minister repeated that he had made no promises to Turkey, and would make none beyond the aircraft and anti-aircraft of which he had spoken.

He said if the Turkish President, which is possible, would be unable to come to Cairo, that he proposed himself to go to Ankara subsequently and present to him the ugly case which would result from the failure of Turkey to accept the invitation to join the war, and the unappetizing picture of what help could be afforded her if she did.

Mr. Hopkins again pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had not given consideration to the detailed requirements of the Turkish operation. The whole of the Mediterranean was soon to come under the Combined Chiefs of Staff – hence the resources must be examined in the light of that fact.

It should be clearly understood that the American side believe that there are no landing craft available for an attack on Rhodes – and more important still that even if the landing craft were available, no decision has been reached as to whether or not the landing craft could not be used to better advantage in some other operation.

Under any circumstances it should be clearly understood that no mention can be made to President Inonu, implied or otherwise, that an amphibious landing can be made on Rhodes.

The Prime Minister said he thought we could have the precise information desired by Mr. Hopkins within three days, and in any event before any meeting with the Turkish President. He went on to say that landing craft was the bottleneck, and it might be possible to divert some from the Pacific theater, but that one thing was certain after yesterday’s decision, and that was that OVERLORD not suffer.

The President said, with reference to the Southwest Pacific, that it was absolutely impossible to withdraw any landing craft from that area. The distance alone from the Mediterranean would make it impossible, and besides all landing craft out there were urgently needed for the operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and for the Burma campaign.

Mr. Eden then explained that in his conversations in November with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo he had only asked for bases from Turkey, and had made no mention of any assistance other than the air forces mentioned by the Prime Minister, and no reference whatsoever to any other forces. He said that he had expressed the view that Turkey could make available these bases to the Allies without being attacked by Germany, but the Foreign Minister had not agreed with this opinion.

The Foreign Minister then repeated what he said about the advantages of acquiring bases in Turkey; that it would permit healthy battles with the German Air Force in that region, and in all probability starve out the German garrisons on the Aegean Islands. It might not even be necessary to take Rhodes by assault.

Marshal Stalin expressed agreement with this view, and felt that the German garrisons would be so demoralized following the loss of air superiority that they would be easy prey. He added, however, that he thought some bombers would be necessary for any such operations.

The President then said he was in favor of meeting the Turkish Prime Minister, but he intended to make no offer of any amphibious operations to Turkey whatsoever, and that any commitments should be confined to the air forces referred to by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister then summed up the advantages to Turkey which would accrue if she accepted the invitation to join the war, and mentioned particularly the possibility of sitting alongside the Soviet Union at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden’s question as to the exact attitude of the Soviet Union towards Bulgaria, which Marshal Stalin had referred to at the formal conference, Marshal Stalin replied that if Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria, or if Bulgaria attacks or goes to war with Turkey, the Soviet Union will break relations or declare war on Bulgaria.

He also inquired what other assistance would be required of the Soviet Union in such an event.

The Prime Minister replied that they were seeking nothing more of the Soviet Union, but that it was obvious that if the Soviet Armies approached Bulgaria, the pro-German Bulgarian circles would be in great fear.

Marshal Stalin inquired what particularly the Turkish Army lacked in the way of armaments.

The Prime Minister replied that the present Turkish Army would have been a good army at the end of the last war, but that when they had seen the modern Bulgarian equipment received from French arsenals, the Turks realized that their army was not a modern one.

He pointed out that they had brave infantry, but lacked anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft, and airplanes. He mentioned that 25 million pounds worth of military equipment, mostly American, had been sent to Turkey.

Marshal Stalin then said it was possible that Turkey would not have to go to war if she granted bases to the Allies; that she need not attack; and that it was possible that neither the Bulgarians nor the Germans would do so.

The President then mentioned the case of Portugal as an example of the granting of bases without the involvement in war.

With reference to Mr. Eden’s remarks that the Turkish Foreign Minister had preferred to go right into war rather than to be dragged in by bases, The Prime Minister said that was Turkey’s usual behaviour. If you suggested a small move they said they preferred the big. And if you suggested the big, they said they were not ready. Mr. Churchill said that he personally preferred that we offer something substantial to the Turks, and that if they refused, then they would wash their hands of Turkey, both now and at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden’s question, Marshal Stalin stated that it was expected that Turkey would declare war only on Germany, and not on Bulgaria. If Bulgaria attacks or declares war on Turkey, the Soviet Union goes to war with Bulgaria.

Marshal Stalin mentioned that there was one other possibility, and that was that if Turkey declared war on Germany, and Bulgaria refused to accede to German demands to go to war, the Germans might occupy Bulgaria. In which case Bulgaria might ask help from the Allies, and what then would be our position?

The Prime Minister replied that in such an event great strain would be put on Germany’s strength, and undoubtedly result in the removal of some German divisions from the Eastern front.

Mr. Molotov said that he had talked the day before yesterday with the Prime Minister, who had referred to the idea that if Turkey would refuse an invitation to enter the war, Great Britain would tell her that her interests in the Straits and in the Bosporus would be adversely affected. He wished to know what this meant.

The Prime Minister replied that he was far from his cabinet, but he personally favored a change in the regime of the Straits if Turkey proved obdurate.

Mr. Molotov said that he had merely meant to indicate that the Black Sea countries were very much interested in the regime of the Straits.

The President said he would like to see the Dardanelles made free to the commerce of the world and the fleets of the world, irrespective of whether Turkey entered the war or not.

After agreeing [after agreement had been reached?] that the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey would come to Cairo and Mr. Bushinsky [Vyshinsky] would come to Cairo from Algiers for the meeting with the Turkish President, if it occurred that the Turkish president was present, the President then said he would like to take up the question of Finland. He said that he wished to help in every way to get Finland out of the war, and he would like to have the views of Marshal Stalin.

Marshal Stalin replied that recently the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Boheman, had inquired of the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm as to what were the Soviet Union’s intentions regarding Finland, saying that the Finns were afraid that the Russians intended to make good the Russian promise and destroy the independence of Finland, and added that the Finns would like an opportunity to talk to the Russians.

The reply from Moscow was to the effect that Russia had no designs on the independence of Finland, if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so. Also that the Soviet Government had no objection to the Finns coming to Moscow for conversations, but would like to have the conditions in [on?] which the Finns would negotiate, in advance.

He added that only today they had had word of a Finnish reply through the Swedish [Swedes], but did not yet have the full text. The gist of the reply was, however, to the effect that the Finns desired to take as a basis the 1939 frontier, and made no mention of disassociation from Germany. Stalin said in his opinion that this inacceptable reply indicated that the Finns were not anxious to conduct serious negotiations, since they knew that such conditions would be inacceptable.

The President said that the Marshal’s statement had been most interesting, but also unsatisfactory.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Finnish ruling groups obviously had hopes still of a German victory.

The President inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought it would be any help if the United States suggested that the Finns send a delegation to Moscow.

Marshal Stalin said he personally had no objections.

The Prime Minister outlined the change in his own and British feeling that had occurred toward Finland from 1939 to the present as a result of the Finnish associations and the German attack on Russia. He said that Great Britain was at war with Finland, and the first consideration was that the city of Leningrad would be secure, and also that the position of the Soviet Union as the leading naval and air power in the Baltic Sea should likewise be secure.

He said, on the other hand, he would greatly regret to see anything done to impair the independence of Finland, and would therefore welcome the Marshal’s statement on that point. He went on to say that an indemnity would not be much good from a country as poor as Finland.

Marshal Stalin expressed disagreement, and said that payments in kind over a period of from 5 to 8 years, such as timber, paper and other materials, would cover some of the damage done by Finland during the war, and that the Soviet Government intended to demand such reparation.

Mr. Churchill developed at some length the reasons why he did not consider reparations, in regard to such a country as Finland, either desirable or feasible. And he said in his ears there was an echo of the slogan “No Annexations and No Indemnities.”

Marshal Stalin laughed, and replied that he had already told Mr. Churchill that he was becoming a Conservative.

The Prime Minister stated that he attached a great importance to Finland’s being out of the war and Sweden’s being in, at the moment of the great attack in May.

To which Stalin expressed assent.

The President then inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought that the Finns could expel the Germans from their country by their own efforts.

Marshal Stalin replied that there were 21 Finnish divisions on the Soviet front, and that while they were expressing their desire to negotiate, they had recently increased their divisions to this number from 16.

Marshal Stalin agreed on the desirability of getting the Finns out of the war, but not at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that for 27 months the Finns and the Germans had had Leningrad under artillery fire.

The President said that according to his information the Finns were willing to remove the frontier a long distance from Leningrad, but hoped to have Vivorg [Viborg] (Marshal Stalin interrupted to say that this was impossible). The President went on to say that Hango should be demilitarized and made into a bathing beach.

The Prime Minister said he did not wish to press his Russian friends, but he would like to know what their conditions were; that the British Government was leaving the initiative entirely in the hands of the Russians.

Marshal Stalin replied that in February the Soviet Government had told the United States Government what the conditions were, and the British Government had been likewise informed, and that since the United States Government did not transmit these terms to the Finns it was obvious that it was not believed that the Finns would accept them.

The President agreed that at that time it was felt that the Finns would not go along with any proposals.

Marshal Stalin said that the Treaty of 1940 was broken and must be restored, but if Hango were belonging to the Finns he was willing to accept Petsamo instead, which would give them a common boundary with Norway. He added that Petsamo had been in the first instance a gift from Russia to Finland.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government desired first of all to see the Soviet Government satisfied with the border in the west, and secondly would like to see Finland remain independent.

Marshal Stalin thought that it was all right to let the Finns live as they wished, but they must pay half of the damages they had caused.

The President asked if it would be helpful if the Finns would go to Moscow without any reservations or conditions.

Marshal Stalin replied that if there was no prospect of success, such a move might play right into the hands of the Germans, since the reactionary group in Finland would exploit such a failure and pretend that it was impossible to talk with the Russians. He added, however, that if the President insisted, let the Finns come to Moscow, but who could they send?

Mr. Churchill interjected that the British Government was not insistent on anything regarding the Finns.

Marshal Stalin said that allies could occasionally use pressure on one another, and repeated that if the President thought it was worthwhile, an attempt might be made.

The President said that in his opinion the present Finnish Government was pro-German, and that nothing could be done with them, but that it might be possible to send other Finns.

Marshal Stalin replied that of course that would be better, that they had no objection to anyone the Finns wanted to send, even Ruti [Ryti], or even, he added, the devil himself. Stalin then outlined the Soviet terms, as follows:

  1. The restoration of the Treaty of 1940, with the possible exchange of Petsamo for Hango. However, whereas Hango had been leased, Petsamo would be taken as a permanent possession.

  2. Compensation for 50% of the damage done to the Soviet Union by the Finns, the exact amount to be discussed.

  3. Break with Germany, and the expulsion of Germans from Finland.

  4. Reorganization of the army.

The Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin entered into a friendly discussion as to the advisability of reparations from Finland, and Marshal Stalin made clear his determination that Finland should pay.

The meeting adjourned until 6 o’clock.

[Annex]
December 1, 1943

At the beginning of luncheon today after the President had mentioned to Marshal Stalin that his son, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt was in charge of 250 observation and scouting planes, Ambassador Harriman told the Marshal that Colonel Roosevelt was very anxious to obtain permission to land in the Soviet Union, thus flying straight through from Italy, photographing the Danube Basin, and landing in Russia.

Marshal Stalin agreed to give this permission, and said that the exact airfields and other details could be discussed with the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

He also agreed to make available for similar purposes fields in the Northern part of Russia, to permit through flying from England over enemy territory to the Soviet Union.