Symbols worry Nazis (3-24-43)

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The Pittsburgh Press (March 24, 1943)

Background of news –
Symbols worry Nazis

By Oliver Cromwell, New York World-Telegram staff writer

Through all Nazi-occupied countries of Europe early this year unseen hands chalked “1918” on walls and fences. It was a most unpleasant reminder to the German conquerors and a symbol of hope for long-suffering peoples.

The significance of 1918 for the Germans is that it dates the collapse of the first German march to world conquest. For the Allies, it recalls victory so decisive that it was thought the dream of Teuton domination was destroyed forever.

Why that thought was illusive is another and longer story. But the spring of 1943 suggests a comparison with the spring of 1918 – only 25 years ago.

Nazi propagandists have stressed the lie that Germany was not militarily defeated in 1918; that it was the failure of the home front which brought disaster. Many of our own writers have fallen in with that falsehood. The fact is that the German Army was disastrously beaten in 1918, and when it asked for an armistice in November, it faced annihilation.

The power of America was the decisive factor then, as it is now. In the spring of 1918, the military situation was strongly favorable to the Germans. Of the original Quadruple Alliance, only England and France seemed to remain effective, and both were nearing exhaustion. Russia had been eliminated by defeat and revolution. Italy was apparently crushed by the disaster of Caporetto. American aid was slow.

On March 21, Ludendorff struck. In a few weeks, the British 5th Army had been overwhelmed and Haig stood with his “back to the wall” at Amiens. He held there.

In May, after desperate and exhaustive fighting in the direction of the Channel ports, Ludendorff suddenly attacked across the Chemin des Dames toward the Marne and Paris. The attack was successful, and by May 30, the Germans reached the Marne at Château-Thierry.

Then the miracle happened. A machine-gun unit of the U.S. 3rd Division got into action and checked the crossing at Château-Thierry bridge.

A few days later, the U.S. 2nd Division met the German advance at Belleau Wood and stopped it. The French Army rallied, and in the middle of July, with the aid of several U.S. divisions, crushed the German assault eastward of Château-Thierry.

On July 18, Foch launched an offensive with the U.S. 1st and 2nd Divisions and a Moroccan division on the west flank of the Marne salient.

American power had come in time. By November, Pershing had cleared the Saint-Mihiel salient, swept through the Argonne and reached the Meuse at Sedan. Beaten back in France and Belgium by the French and British, flanked by the Americans, the Germans cracked. The armistice was a surrender.

But there is a tremendous difference in 1943. In 1918, America could provide the manpower, but U.S. troops were equipped mainly by Great Britain and France.

In 1943, America is the “arsenal of democracy.” She is providing a large part of the huge equipment for the armies of her Allies as well as her own. In 1918, there was practically no American airpower. This spring, U.S. airplanes are operating on every front around the world. U.S. ships are carrying supplies to every sector, in a volume almost beyond belief.

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That’s not true, is it? I don’t think the Germans had a plan for world conquest. And even in ww2 they did not… well 1940 wise.

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This is a war time US newspaper story. By a Oliver Cromwell.

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It’s American propaganda. It’s not meant to be historically accurate just to remind Americans of our 1918 glory and now we have that plus the arsenal of democracy.

I think Germany in 1918 wanted to be a dominant world player but that was nothing to do with world conquest.

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In 1918 there was regime chance by revolution in Germany. The new German Republik wanted and asked for an armistice and peace. The Germans got Versailles. Amercan ideas about peace ignored.

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That was after the failed German offensive. If the Germans had knocked France out in their big push all you have to do is look at the peace terms they were looking at. They would have been just as harsh as Versailles. It would also have set Germany up as one of the three major powers in the world along with England and the US by seizing French Colonial possessions. They didn’t have to conquer the world just end the war on their terms.

Fantasy maybe but they came close then they fell apart.

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Germany was starving, the legend of a possible victory was a right wing fantasy in Germany.

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Germany was starving but fantasy or not The Germans launched large scale attacks in 1918 by bringing over all the troops they no longer needed in Russia. It was a real offensive and had wildly optimistic goals. But it was also the biggest gains they had made since 1914.

I guess the problem is when your right wing also controlled the army. Ludendorff was German policy at that point. I don’t think that is an inaccurate statement.

Do I think it could have worked? Not a chance. French leaders were made of sterner stuff than they were in 1940. And even if they took Paris, I still think but the end of 1918 they would have had the regime change that happened. Germany really was done for but they sure tried to throw one last huge punch.

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That was my point. So no knockout of France. So

For more details:

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Any small chance Germany might have had to salvage something in 1918 was basically ruined by Ludendorff’s strategy of lets-just-attack-all-over-the-place-and-if-we-break-through-anywhere-we-take-it-from-there.

And they did actually achieve a breakthrough, not the massive one Ludendorff was looking for but still. However, that happened in the worst possible sector for the Germans, where No Man’s Land was at its greatest extent and there was almost nothing to be had in terms of resources.
Ludendorff then fell into the same trap Falkenhayn fell into earlier into trying desperately to hold on to gains that German logistics, already strained beyond breaking point, simply could not sustain.

Germany’s brief numerical superiority on the Western Front in 1918 was also illusory. Sure, there was an influx of battle hardened veterans but Germany’s logistics and food situation were already reaching the point of catastrophic and as soon as German troop advancing captured a few supply depots the French and British left behind, they stopped and were amazed at what their enemies could apparently simply afford to leave behind when they (the Germans) were slowly starving and had been since early 1917.

The 1918 offensives actually ended up doing the reverse of what they had been meant to do, they speeded up Germany’s eventual defeat. Had they used the influx of Eastern troops to maybe withdraw to a defensible line and dare the Entente to ‘come at them’ maybe they could have stretched the war further, but still, even then there would be signicant problems:

The Americans were now coming in with more than 100k fresh troops a month which Germany had no hope of matching.
The Austro-Hungarian collapse would have enabled an Italo-Franco-British army to march through Austria into Bavaria unopposed (which would have happened in our timeline had Germany not thrown in the towel).
Ludendorff’s request for an armistice caused the collapse of Bulgaria because it immediately did the same and was about to be invaded by the Salonika armies anyway. Those armies were now on their way to Belgrade and after that Vienna and Budapest.
Romania re-entered the war and would have aided the armies coming in from the South and invaded Hungary to claim lands Romania considered her own.

Ludendorff can be said to be a main contributor to Germany’s collapse. His lack of a coherent strategy in the spring of 1918, his stubborn attempts to hold lands that Germany’s logistics could not supply and his ignorance in thinking the armistice he asked for would be a Napoleonic armistice (ie cease fighting for a bit, lick your wounds, regain your strength and then try again) were key reasons for Germany’s ultimate collapse late 1918.

Ludendorff had also been the main driver behind the idea that Germany must gain something in the ‘West’ and had held on to this belief longer than anyone else in Germany). Had Germany been willing to give up its gains in the West and even Elsass-Lotharingen (Alsace-Lorraine) they might have been able to salvage something, but Ludendorff’s stubborn insistence prevented it.

Most ironically then that it was he who perpetuated the stab-in-the-back-myth when he more than anyone else knew that after September 1918 Germany’s defeat was assured.

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Fantastic information. It seems like nothing would have staved off a complete collapse given the political situation in the east. My ideas of German war aims largely came from Ludendorff and they really were a fantasy. In his own way, Ludendorff was as destructive to the German military situation as Hitler would be later.

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