The Pittsburgh Press (June 23, 1946)
Secret papers show –
Stimson in 1931 opposed war with Japanese
Pursued policy of peace at any price
By R. H. Shackford, United Press staff writer
WASHINGTON, June 22 – Hitherto secret State Department documents on the Manchurian crisis of 1931 revealed tonight that then Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson pursued a policy of peace with Japan at any price.
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria touched off fighting with China and sowed the seeds for World War II.
The documents showed that Mr. Stimson, who was secretary of war when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, felt Japan had gone beyond “any proper intervention” in Manchuria. But he felt that China’s great “aggravation” of Japan was partly to blame for the Manchurian incident.
He also accused China, in effect, of wanting “very much to get all of the nations of the world in war with Japan.”
“We have no sympathy with that and we do not intend to get into war with Japan,” the documents quoted Mr. Stimson.
Invaded in 1931
The documents cover only the first three months of the Manchurian crisis. which led to Pearl Harbor 10 years later. Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931. Two months later, the old League of Nations Council met for a second time in Paris to consider the crisis.
For the first time, the documents reveal in detail the powerful behind-the-scenes role Mr. Stimson played in activities of the League, even though the United States was not a member. They show that he virtually “engineered,” but took no responsibility for, much of the League’s activities in connection with the Manchurian crisis.
Mr. Stimson was revealed to have ordered Gen. Charles G. Dawes, unofficial U.S. observer at the League, to “keep your hand on the shoulder or coat collar” of Council President Aristide Briand of France to prevent the League from moving “too rapidly” against Japan.
Opposed strong action
He feared that strong League action would “inflame” Japan. He opposed economic sanctions as a “step to war” with Japan. And he claimed “credit” for preventing the League from sending a military investigating commission to Manchuria.
“Our only interest in Manchuria is to prevent war,” he advised Gen. Dawes. “We do not care what solution is reached between China and Japan so long as it is done by pacific means…”
The documents showed that Mr. Stimson’s advice and counsel were sought and encouraged by League Council members. But, by the end of 1931, Chinese officials were blaming the United States for “tempering” what they thought otherwise might have been “unsparing condemnation” of Japan by the League.
Instead of strong League action against Japan, Mr. Stimson favored direct Chinese-Japanese negotiations. Japan later vetoed a League resolution calling on her to negotiate and to withdraw her troops from Manchuria immediately.