Québec Conference 1943 (QUADRANT)

111 
740.0011 EW/8–2243

Department of State Minutes 

August 22, 1943, 5:30 p.m.

Strictly confidential

The Meeting followed an agenda previously prepared by the British.

Polish Statement

The first subject discussed was the text of the statement to be issued by the two Governments with respect to the atrocities against Polish citizens in the Lublin area where the population was outstandingly Polish. The discussion hinged on a text prepared by the British and which was generally agreed to as appropriate for issuance on the subject at this time even though it was not expected to have any real effect on the situation.

Liberated Areas

There was discussion of the text of a statement which had been prepared by the United States with a view to clearing up misrepresentation and apprehension as to putting military government into effect in the friendly and Allied countries which will be liberated by the military operations undertaken on the Continent against Germany.

With very minor amendments the draft text was adopted with the decision that it would first be conveyed to the Soviet Government and China and the refugee governments directly concerned, with eventual view to publication.

The Prime Minister suggested that the timing of publication would be on or about September 15, which corresponded roughly with the date fixed for the opening of Parliament. This was generally agreed to.

Convoys to Russia

This discussion turned on the text of a communication to the Soviet Government with respect to the temporary suspension of convoys to Russia in view of other military operations, the convoys to be resumed at the end of September or early in October.

Statement on Palestine Situation

The question of a statement with respect to the Palestine situation during the period of the war was discussed and views were exchanged as to the advisability of making any statement at this time and, if so, as to its form.

Both the President and Prime Minister agreed that this question should be held in abeyance and should be discussed further between the two Governments from month to month as the war situation developed, and any decision on the matter was left to the light of these further exchanges of views on the matter.

Fraternization Between U.S. and British Soldiers in the British Isles

It was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that all possible steps should be taken to promote fraternization between the U.S. and British forces in the British Isles and, with a view to accomplishing this end, Mr. Eden should speak to General Marshall, to General Devers and to Norman Davis as to methods for its accomplishment.

The King of Greece

This discussion turned on the subject of the message from the King of Greece recently received by the President and the Prime Minister, in which the King of Greece asked advice from the President and Prime Minister as to the action the King should take, in view of the request of certain Greek elements that His Majesty should not return to Greece until after a plebiscite on the subject of the Monarchy had been held.

At the request of the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden read a report on the present political situation of Greece prepared by the British Foreign Office.

At the further request of the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander Cadogan read a communication on the subject from General Smuts, who advocated, as a matter of fair play, that the King of Greece not be precluded from entering his own country and resuming his former position, subject, perhaps, to later decision by the people of Greece as to the future form of the Greek régime.

There was some discussion then on the general subject of the attitude of the British and U.S. Governments toward the constituted governments of the refugee countries. It was decided, in general, that the two Governments should continue to support the governments and régimes as now recognized by them generally through the period up to the defeat of the enemy.

Mr. Hull pointed out that this attitude was in line with the attitude adopted in the statement with respect to administration of liberated areas, decided upon under Subject 2 of the agenda above.

With specific reference to the situation of the Greek King it was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that the British Foreign Office should reply to the King’s telegram, supporting his contention that he was prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible and submit the question of the Royal House to plebiscite.

The President said the United States Government would not take any different position.

The Prime Minister further stated, on his own initiative, that the British Government would instruct the British agents who were working with the guerrilla elements in Greece to refrain from encouraging those elements to put forward political claims as to the future form of government of Greece at this time.

The French Committee of National Liberation

After some discussion The Prime Minister stated that all the liberal elements in the world, including the governments in exile and the Soviet Government, were demanding an immediate decision granting full recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation.

The President took the view that we had to think of the future of France itself, which he felt would be in no way advanced by turning over the whole control of the French people to the present group comprising the French Committee.

After a further rather lengthy discussion, the suggestion of the President was accepted that the President himself draft the form of statement which he thought should be made.

As it was getting late and it was not possible to make further advance on this subject until the two views were further reconciled it was decided to await the President’s draft to which he said he would apply himself that evening.

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112 
800.0146/8–2243

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation 

Québec Conference, 22 August 1943.

Statement on Liberated Areas

The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory, must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories conquered by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of each government and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with its function of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

Conversations and arrangements with the governments of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved.

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113

Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Québec, 22 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 222/3

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic

a. CCS 222/2 indicates that convoy UGS 16, sailing 26 August, has 91 firm presenters as against a convoy limit of 80 ships.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been requested by the Combined Military Transportation Committee to give a decision on one of two alternatives:
(i) To raise the limit of UGS convoys.
(ii) To indicate the priority which should be assigned the presenters involved so that 80 ships can be selected.

a. With regard to alternative (1), the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, has established the limit on the number of ships in UGS convoys at 80 for security reasons.

b. The immediate problem in priorities has been solved in large part by the withdrawal of 6 U.S. Army vessels and 2 BMWT vessels from the list of presenters. The convoy limitation of 80 ships now is exceeded by 3.

c. It is quite possible that, of the remaining 83 vessels, at least 3 may fail to meet the convoy sailing date.

Recommendations

  1. It is recommended that:

a. Three vessels be nominated for withdrawal from the convoy, if necessary, in the following priority:

  • First withdrawal – 1 BMWT vessel
  • Second withdrawal – 1 WSA vessel
  • Third withdrawal – 1 BMWT vessel
  • Vessel or vessels to be selected by the agency concerned.

b. All vessels should be prepared to sail.

  1. In view of the fact that indications point to a recurrence of this problem in subsequent months, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy fix the earliest practical date when a program of four UGS convoys per month will be established.

  2. It is further recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff delegate to the Combined Military Transportation Committee the executive authority to act on similar problems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority:
    a. U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Mediterranean.
    b. U.S. and British ships destined for India.
    c. U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.
    d. U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.
    e. Ships destined for Persian Gulf.
    f. Lend lease to Turkey.
    g. Miscellaneous.

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114

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Québec, 22 August 1943.

Secret
CCS 317/2

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals

Action on CCS 317 has been deferred pending further study of the subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, recommend that immediate decision be rendered on the recommendations contained in paragraph 10a and b of that paper. These paragraphs pertain to the equipment of French forces in North Africa. A decision at this time is necessary because of certain administrative arrangements which should be carried out at once in the event that the recommendations are to be approved.

H. REDMAN
J. K. DEANE
Combined Secretariat

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115 
740.0011 EW/8–2243

Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Adviser on Political Relations 

Washington, August 22, 1943.

Secret

PA/D – Mr. Dunn The attached message was left with me yesterday by an officer of the OSS. It is of interest as another “feeler” and channel from the Badoglio Govt.… the author of the message is Dulles. I told the OSS to make no reply to the question raised by the latter.

J WESLEY JONES

[Attachment]

Bern, August 20, 1943.

A reliable cutout has transmitted to me a report from … which states that Italy, according to Foreign Minister Guariglia, remains prepared to cease resistance on condition that we can guarantee plane protection against the Nazis, and they are willing to open the airports, and so forth. It would seem that … is anxious to be in touch with me directly. It is very possible that Guariglia and Rosso are making use of him here. Until I receive instructions, I am continuing to handle … with care, as an intelligence source only, and by means of cutouts.

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116

Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the U.S. Government 

Québec, August 22, 1943.

Secret

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen, looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The Government of the United States, accordingly, welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is the understanding of the Government of the United States our expectation that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war. It will be for the French people themselves to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. It does constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations until during the war. Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own form of government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States takes note, with sympathy, of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the allies until the French and Allied authorities are completely liberated soil is freed from its invaders and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the U.S. Government 

Québec, August 22(?), 1943.

Secret

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of French people and French territories from the oppression of the enemy.

The Government of the United States accordingly welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is the understanding of the United States that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the Government of the United States with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. It constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, proceed to select their own form of government and their own officials to administer it.

On these understandings, the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge the authority of the Committee.

The Government of the United States notes the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration [in] each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle, in cooperation with all the Allies, until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

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117

Prime Minister Mackenzie King to the Secretary of State 

Québec City, August 22, 1943.

Most secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am sending you, herewith, a copy of our draft letter to the Delegate in Canada of the French Committee of National Liberation, about which I think I spoke to you yesterday. I have given a copy to Mr. Churchill and am sending one to the President.

Yours very sincerely,
W. L. MACKENZIE KING

[Enclosure]

Draft Note

Ottawa, August 6, 1943.

Most secret

Draft Note to the French Delegate in Ottawa

Sir, I have the honour to refer to your note of June 11 with which you transmitted the text of the Declaration adopted at Algiers on June 3 by which the French Committee of National Liberation was established.

[Here follows, with minor editorial differences and one difference in phrasing, the text of the Canadian statement on this subject released on August 26, 1943.]

Accept [etc.]

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118

Harriman-Bracken meeting, early evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Harriman Minister of Information Bracken

From an informal memorandum by Harriman:

Before dinner sold Bracken a bill of goods for Steve Early – that the President and Prime Minister should have a joint Press conference, which Bracken had evidently been opposing with a view to substituting a cocktail party in which newspaper men could mingle with all the Chiefs of Staff.

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119

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Subaltern Mary Churchill

Roosevelt dined with the Churchill family from 8 to 10 p.m.

120 
740.00116 European War 1939/1136

The Dutch Ambassador to President Roosevelt 

Washington, August 22, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President, In the course of Her latest visit to Hyde Park the Queen discussed with you the opportunity of issuing a declaration with a view to preventing as much as possible destruction by the Germans upon their leaving the occupied countries. The Queen discussed this idea also with the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary, who were in favour of it and asked for a draft declaration. Such a draft has now been prepared and approved by Her Majesty.

Acting upon instructions I have just received, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft which has also been handed to the British Foreign Office.

Dr. van Kleffens instructs me moreover to submit to you the request that this draft be discussed with the British Prime Minister, if this would be agreeable to you.

I beg to add that the Queen would have no objection against a shorter and more strongly worded text.

Dr. van Kleffens would highly appreciate if further consultations could take place for the final drafting of this declaration and its subsequent handling, especially with regard to the opportune moment of its publication. In this connection Dr. van Kleffens ventures the suggestion whether it would be desirable to ask the Soviet Union to participate.

With my highest esteem [etc.]
A. LOUDON

[Enclosure]

Draft Declaration

In the regions of Europe which Germany has occupied, the German authorities and their subordinates have shown a measure of harshness and cruelty which not only violates clear and binding rules of international law but runs counter to the most elementary feelings of common decency. Confinement in concentration camps of evil and sinister repute, seizure of hostages (a practice expressly forbidden in a solemn treaty of 1907, to which Germany has expressly adhered) and large-scale deportation of men and even of women, are common German practice and these are far from being the worst offences committed in the name of Germany. In many cases, especially in Eastern Europe and with regard to the Jews, German action assumed proportions of bestiality. Wholesale slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people will be forever a blot on the German name. In the economic field the Germans have taken measures indicating that far from their showing any regard for the occupied countries and their population, they are bent upon crippling the resources of those territories. The German nation as a whole may not as yet have a full knowledge of all the savagery and brutality committed in its name. But that nation cannot be presumed to be ignorant of what has been and still is being done. Remembering further what the German authorities did towards the end of the last war in territory then under their occupation, the Governments of . . . . . . . issue the following warning to the German Government, civil and military authorities and people:

When the hour of liberation strikes for the occupied regions, those Germans who are stationed there may receive orders, or feel inclined to do their utmost not to leave the territory they hold before having wrought havoc, not only by an attempt to destroy objects of value to the wellbeing of the country concerned but also by murdering or deporting a still larger part of the population. All Germans should bear in mind that those guilty of such acts will be held responsible for their misdeeds, not only the leaders and authorities who plan crimes of this kind or give orders to commit them, but also the actual perpetrators. Moreover, from now on any further action against the population of the occupied regions including that part of the population that has been deported to Germany – In complete disregard of international law – either as prisoners or as hostages, as workers in war-industries or otherwise, any act of destruction calculated to obstruct the resumption of the economic or social life of the occupied countries to impoverish them or to impede their recovery, exposes Germany and the Germans to retaliation of the severest kind.

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121

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill 

Moscow, August 22, 1943.

[Translation]
Secret

Personal and secret message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to Premier Minister Winston Churchill.

  1. I have received your message[s] concerning the negotiations with the Italians and the new terms of armistice with Italy. Thank you for the information.

Mr. Eden told Mr. Sobolev that Moscow was fully informed about the negotiations with Italy. I have, however, to say that Mr. Eden’s statement does not correspond with reality, as I have received your message in which long passages are omitted and which has no concluding paragraphs. In view of this, it is necessary to state that the Soviet Government is not informed about the negotiations of the British and the Americans with the Italians. Mr. Kerr gives assurance that within a short time he will receive the complete text of your message; although the three days have passed, and Ambassador Kerr has not yet given me the complete text of the message. I cannot understand how such delay could have occurred during the transmission of the information on such important matter.

  1. I believe that the time is ripe to organize the military-political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: The United States, Great Britain and the USSR with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different Governments dissociating themselves from Germany. Until now the matter stood as follows: The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such situation any longer. I propose to establish this Commission and to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commission.

  2. I am waiting for the complete text of your message concerning the negotiations with Italy.

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122

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill conferred from 11 p.m. until midnight.

123

U.S. State Department (August 23, 1943)

Roosevelt-Robertson meeting, forenoon

Present
United States Canada
President Roosevelt Mr. Robertson

During the morning Roosevelt received Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs.

124

The Pittsburgh Press (August 23, 1943)

Québec puzzle –
Russia only major ally now absent

Australia and China join in war conferences now nearing an end
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Québec, Canada –
Announcement that Australian representation was being added to the Québec Conference today focused new attention on the absence of Russia, now the only one of the big Allied fighting powers without some representative in the war talks led by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Sir William Glasgow, High Commissioner for Australia in Canada, was due from Ottawa. U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox arrived by plane from Washington. And there was some indication that Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, absent from Washington, might have been called into the conference.

Deny connection

Represented now by top men in the Québec war conferences approaching a conclusion were the United States, Great Britain, Canada, China and Australia.

Official sources still denied any connection between the Québec Conference and the Russian withdrawal of Ambassador Maxim Litvinov from Washington. But they admitted that the timing of the announcement raised a multitude of questions as to the impression the Soviet was trying to convey to the world.

Virtually every important war figure in the higher echelons of the British, American and Canadian governments was on hand. Mr. Roosevelt scheduled a series of continuous conferences during the day and it was definitely known that the meetings are at a point of final approval of a master plan for destructive operations against the Axis the remainder of this year.

Mystery continues

As the arrivals of new officials here continued so did the air of mystery over the conference of the past seven days. Last night, some officials tacitly advised some of their contacts that today would bring a big announcement. A morning press conference produced the news that Mr. Churchill and Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King were to make an automobile tour of the city.

Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, lunched with President Roosevelt and was expected to remain for additional talks in the afternoon. Mr. Roosevelt was devoting some time in preparing his Ottawa speech.

May blitz cities

While official sources cautioned against excluding any war theater from speculation, there were increasing indications that an intensification of the aerial offensive against Italy was near. The plans, it was believed, called for such cities as Naples, Brindisi and Taranto to be “Hamburged” from the air, and then, if the Italian government still refused to capitulate, an invasion.

Dr. Soong’s arrival yesterday was followed by a statement from White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early:

The President expected to confer as soon as possible with Dr. Soong. Mr. Churchill will participate in these discussions which have to do with the plans for the war on Japan, the emphasis being given to that and all points pertaining to the war on Japan.

Welcomes Stimson

Yesterday, the conference at the Citadel began right after breakfast. Mr. Roosevelt welcomed Mr. Stimson, then lunched with the Prime Minister and the War Secretary and a number of others.

After lunch, the President drove to the Isle d’Orleans with Mrs. Churchill and inspected several old churches. Lewis O. Douglas, American deputy war shipping administrator, who was once principal of McGill University and who has an intimate knowledge of Québec Province, acted as “guide.”

Hold long parley

After the drive, Mr. Roosevelt joined Mr. Churchill, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary for External Affairs in the British government, and James C. Dunn, State Department political advisor.

The conference began about 5:30 p.m. and lasted far into the night. It obviously involved bigtime foreign policy from the political standpoint.

While the intensive conferences were going on in the Citadel, the armed staff chiefs and many of their aides, including some secretarial help and technical experts, cruised on the St. Lawrence and the Saguenay Rivers. Leaving Saturday night, they returned late yesterday.

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125

Québec sure Reds won’t make peace

Allied strategy based on belief that Russia will stay in war
By Henry J. Taylor

Québec, Canada –
The overwhelming fact which emerged from this conference cannot be told officially. The absolute conviction among the conferees in the Québec discussions is that Germany and Russia will not make an armistice or in any way arrive at a separate peace.

The reason this cannot be told officially is, of course, because this source of widespread anxiety and speculation throughout the United States and Great Britain cannot be recognized officially. But this correspondent has established the fact through direct contact and individual inquiry.

The directives emanating from this conference and every plan decided here are based on the conviction that there will be no diminution of fighting on Germany’s Eastern Front.

This possibility effects every fundamental in Allied strategy. In a military problem so large as this you cannot make alternate plans which include such an eventuality as this. It bears directly on the size of our forces needed for victory., the time and place of opening the so-called second front, the disposition of the British Navy from European waters to help us in the Pacific, the design of our Air Force equipment and organization, the type of it we are willing to supply Russian under Lend-Lease and, most of all, the length of the war and its cost in blood, sweat and tears.

The time comes when you have to make up your mind. The time has come. The minds are made up. Plans which would be disastrous if the Germans were in any way released from fighting on their Eastern Front have been agreed to here and the die is cast.

The news value of this dispatch – and it is vastly important news – is that anyone in our country or abroad who believes that there may be a reproachment between Russia and Germany differs with the final judgment of the conference of Québec.

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126

U.S. State Department (August 23, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill-Soong luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom China
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Minister Soong
Mr. Hopkins

Roosevelt lunched with Churchill, Soong, and Hopkins. Soong thanked Hull for mentioning to Roosevelt at Québec the problem of “the 40,000 tons of munitions promised China by Canada and later revoked by Canada at the request of Mr. Currie” and “said that he [Soong] followed this up with a talk with the President which was satisfactory.” The occasion on which Soong discussed this question with Roosevelt has not been definitely identified, but the luncheon meeting of August 23, 1943, appears to have been the most likely opportunity for such a discussion.

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127

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Vice Admiral Willson Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Badger Admiral Noble
Major General Handy Lieutenant General Macready
Major General Fairchild Air Marshal Welsh
Brigadier General Kuter Captain Lambe
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Brigadier Porter
Commander Freseman Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Long Captain Tollemache
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes 

August 23, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

Secret

Conclusions of the Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to the understanding that, with regard to Item 2 of these conclusions, certain amendments made to CCS 319/3 would necessitate consequential amendments in CCS 319/2.

Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 319/3)

Certain amendments were agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister contained in CCS 319/3.

Later in the meeting, certain additional amendments were put forward consequent to decisions taken on Items 4 and 5 below.

In the course of discussion, General Marshall suggested that there might be some method whereby the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command should have at least some control over the lines of communication through Assam.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that it had originally been thought that it might be possible to put the Commander-in-Chief India, under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area, since India formed the base for the latter’s operations. There were, however, constitutional difficulties which had prevented this plan being implemented.

General Marshall said that he fully appreciated these constitutional difficulties, but had hoped that some system similar to the French “zones des armées” might be instituted.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that this point had also been considered and an Eastern Command, India, had been formed comprising the whole area covering the lines of communication through Assam. This command had been placed under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area.

General Arnold suggested that with regard to the examination of future operations in the India-Burma-China Theater, it might be well to insert a reference to a study and report on operations against the Andaman Islands, since the possession of these islands would be of great value to operations in this Theater.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the Planning Staff would certainly consider the Andaman Islands in connection with certain of the operations which they had been instructed to examine.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft final report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (subsequently circulated as CCS 319/4), and agreed to present it at the meeting to be held that evening at the Citadel.

Japanese Treatment of Prisoners

General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum on the treatment of U.S. and Filipino prisoners by the Japanese. This memorandum was a report from a Major in the Air Corps of the U.S. Army who had recently escaped after one year in captivity. The Japanese treatment of the prisoners had been inhuman and barbaric in the extreme.

Pipeline From India to China (CCS 312; 312/1)

It was pointed out that an unqualified approval of the proposals contained in CCS 312 might result in a further decrease in the scale of our military operations in Northern Burma.

General Somervell said that the U.S. craft sent to India for the pipeline could be used for other more urgent purposes if the Supreme Commander so desired.

After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved, subject to prior requirements of military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam to facilitate air operations in China and to ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

Operations From India (CCS 327)

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that there were three possible courses open to us in North Burma in the dry season of 1943-44, and that it seemed clear that the existing capacity of the lines of communication would not allow of the full accomplishment of more than one of these.

General Somervell pointed out that operations in North Burma would not start until mid-February. He said that he believed the movement of supplies into the area should be based on the most optimistic forecast of the capacity of the lines of communication.

After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the main effort should be put into offensive operations, with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route.

b. That priorities cannot be rigid and that therefore the Supreme Commander should be instructed that in formulating his proposals he should regard the decision in a above as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the lines of communication.

Movement of the QUEENS (CCS 246/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the QUEENS should revert to running on a 21-day cycle.

Amphibians for OVERLORD (CCS 326)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 326 until after the QUADRANT conference.

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals (CCS 317/1-317/2-317/3)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (Cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 August 1943 be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September–31 December 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.

b. That the rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio (W7177) of 13 August 1943.

Operation RANKIN (CCS 320)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the Allied forces employed were too large and that it was hoped that fewer forces could be used for occupation purposes. An insufficient emphasis had been laid on the value of air power to quell the population.

Admiral Leahy said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view. They suggested that the plan should be approved in principle and kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the recommendation, contained in Paragraph 20b, that the provision in the United Kingdom of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group was of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle the digest of the plan for Operation RANKIN contained in CCS 320, but directed that this plan be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.

b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would give early consideration to the appointment of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group in the United Kingdom.

Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories (CCS 324/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of CCS 324/1.

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic (CCS 222/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this paper.

Meeting With Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to discuss operations in the Mediterranean with Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley at their meeting the following day.

Future Meetings

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1030 on Tuesday, 24 August.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

Québec, 23 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 327

Operations From India

  1. We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in Northern Burma, in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

  2. These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which we would like to take advantage of their assistance.

  3. Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these telegrams a brief summary of the Commander in Chief’s views, and we think they should be brought to the notice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the Conference breaks up. Briefly, on the assumption that first priority must be accorded to raising the capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief estimates that:

a. Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 1944, by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at TRIDENT for Northern Burma.

b. The deficiency must either fall on the Ledo operation or must be shared between the Ledo and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphal advance as the capacity then available would not enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion.

c. If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Ledo operations could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and Tiddim which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear whether General Stilwell can accept this reduction however without causing the Ledo operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinleck’s opinion the extensive use of LRPGs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate will not alleviate the position since the LRPGs must be followed up by our main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will not be sufficient for the purpose.

d. Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to contemplate the longer-term increase of supplies to China by land or by air.

  1. We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite decisions can be taken as to what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  2. Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us in Northern Burma in the dry season 1943-44; and it seems clear that the existing capacity of the L. of C. will not allow us to do more than one of these fully:

  • First Course. To put our main effort into the land and air operations which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done at the expense of the airlift to China.
  • Second Course. To give first priority of resources to increasing air supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption.
  • Third Course. To adopt a longer-term policy and put our main effort into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944-45 season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime.
  1. We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining hands with the Chinese, should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air. Priorities between the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the L. of C.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

Québec, 23 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 317/3

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals

We agree with the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve at once subparagraphs 10a and b of CCS 317, provided that the following is inserted at the end of subparagraph a, “insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.”

If you agree, we suggest that the necessary action should now be taken without this matter again coming before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT.

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128

Roosevelt-Mountbatten meeting, 5 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Vice Admiral Mountbatten

Roosevelt conferred with Mountbatten for half an hour beginning at 5 p.m.

129

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins General Brooke
Admiral Leahy Admiral of the Fleet Pound
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Field Marshal Dill
General Arnold Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Rear Admiral Brown Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

August 23, 1943, 5:30 p.m.

Secret

At the request of the Prime Minister, Brigadier Jacob read CCS 819/3[319/4], a draft of the Final Report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister containing the conclusions of the Quadrant Conferences.

There was no comment on Sections I, II, and III.

Facilities in the Azores Islands

With reference to Section IV, paragraph 1b, the Prime Minister asked if any measures had been taken as yet to prepare a combined British-U.S. convoy including escorts and air support to move to the Azores about two weeks after the original British occupation on 8 October.

Admiral King said that arrangements would be made for such a convoy to leave the United States on or about 20 October.

Emergency Operation to Enter the Continent

The President asked if a study was being made regarding an emergency entrance of the Continent and indicated that he desired United Nations troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians.

General Brooke replied that General Morgan’s staff had prepared plans for such an entry and that they were based on several contingencies. These include ‘a weakening of German resistance, a withdrawal of the German forces from France, or a complete German collapse.

Operation OVERLORD

The Prime Minister stated that he wished it definitely understood that British acceptance of the planning for Operation OVERLORD included the proviso that the operation could only be carried out in the event that certain conditions regarding German strength were met. These included the number of German divisions to be in France and a definite superiority over the German fighter force at the time of the initial assault. Further, that if it developed that the German ground or air fighter strength proved to be greater than that upon which success of the plan was premised, the question as to whether or not the operations should be launched would be subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In this connection he suggested that the United Nations have a “second string to their bow” in the form of a prepared plan to undertake Operation JUPITER. He did not in any way wish to imply that he was not wholeheartedly in favor of OVERLORD, but, at the same time, he wished to emphasize that its launching was dependent upon certain conditions which would give it a reasonable chance for success.

It was decided that the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister should include a paragraph which would provide for continued planning for the launching of Operation JUPITER in the event that OVERLORD should have to be abandoned.

The Prime Minister also discussed the question of moving seven trained divisions from the Mediterranean to England. He agreed that at this time the decision to return the seven divisions to England was firm but that it was subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff if the strategic situation seemed to make such review advisable. He asked General Brooke if that was definitely understood.

General Brooke said that at the present time it was planned that the seven trained divisions would return from the Mediterranean to England to participate in OVERLORD unless the situation forced the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reconsider this decision. This decision of course would be dependent upon the enemy situation at the time. It might be necessary to keep one or two of these trained divisions in the Mediterranean in order to create a more favorable situation for the success of OVERLORD or to avoid a setback in Italy.

The Prime Minister said that if it becomes necessary to make an interchange of divisions between England and the Mediterranean, it might be clone without prejudice to the move of the seven divisions by exchanging others. For example, it might be necessary to send out a second Canadian division to complete a Canadian Corps and bring home a British division in its place. Meanwhile, he stated he had heard Brigadier MacLean give a presentation of the OVERLORD plan and that it seemed sound, but should be strengthened.

General Marshall agreed to this and pointed out that actually there would be four and one-half divisions in the initial assault rather than a force of three divisions which had been suggested at the last conference with the President and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister asked if this would include an attack on the inside of the Cotentin Peninsula.

General Marshall said the present plans would not provide for such an operation but that if more landing craft could be made available there was a possibility that this landing would be included in the initial assault.

The Prime Minister expressed some surprise that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, had been designated as Naval Commander and he indicated that he had always thought of this officer as having administrative rather than outstanding tactical ability. He agreed with the choice of Air Commander-in-Chief.

Sir Dudley Pound said that he felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth was the logical person to be given this command, particularly at this time. During the preliminary phases much of the naval planning and operations had to be accomplished between adjoining naval commands in Great Britain and he was the logical person to coordinate it. He said that if later events indicated the desirability, there would be no difficulty in designating a new commander.

The Prime Minister said that he had thought of giving this position to Admiral Ramsay who had been in command of the British naval operations in the attack on Sicily under the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean. He would accept the present arrangement only if it were subject to review on the appointment of the Supreme Commander.

In discussing the transport of troops across the channel, the President recalled that in 1917 two light American passenger vessels, the HARVARD and the YALE, had been sent to England and had been utilized very successfully in transporting troops across the channel. He suggested that the world should be combed to see if vessels of this type could not be made available and thus increase the troop lift from England to France.

Admiral King said that the United States had been pretty well explored in this connection but he would see what else could be done.

The Prime Minister indicated the possibility of asking Canada to help out in this respect.

Operations in Italy and Southern France

The Prime Minister said that there had recently been rumors that the Germans were planning to defend the Ravenna-Genoa Line in Italy, which is about 50 or 60 miles north of the Ancona-Pisa Line. He thought that our forces should proceed as far beyond their objective as possible with the troops allocated for the purpose.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt the Germans must defend on the forward or southern slope of the Apennines, in which case they would be somewhat south of the Ravenna-Genoa Line.

Admiral King agreed with this and thought that the terrain dictated a German defense on the Leghorn-Ancona position.

The Prime Minister felt that the further north in Italy the United Nations were able to progress, the easier would become the supply of guerrillas who might be assembled in the Maritime Alps. In this connection he said he was glad to see that steps had already been taken to investigate the possibility of intensifying fifth column activities in Sardinia. He thought that organizations such as the OSS and the British SOE should certainly enter Sardinia at this time. However, he suggested that if Italy capitulates, Sardinia would probably come into our hands without a struggle.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there were conflicting reports in this regard. One was that the Germans would attempt to hold Sardinia and another was that they were assembling landing craft between Sardinia and Corsica for the purpose of effecting an evacuation.

The Prime Minister said that if an advance into Southern France appeared to be likely he thought that General Giraud and General de Gaulle should be brought into consultation by General Eisenhower and that French forces should be fully utilized.

The President indicated that he felt guerrilla operations could be initiated in south central France as well as in the Maritime Alps.

The War Against Japan

The Prime Minister said that he was glad to see that the Chiefs of Staff included provision that plans should be made for the defeat of Japan within 12 months after the collapse of Germany; this at least would be a target towards which we should work and it discouraged planning on the basis of a prolonged war of attrition.

The paragraphs concerning operations in the Central Pacific were read and the Prime Minister suggested that these should result in bringing on a naval battle with the Japanese Fleet.

Admiral King said that was one of their main purposes but he did not feel that a large battle would develop until our forces had reached the Marianas.

Operations in the India-Burma0China Theater

The Prime Minister then asked for an explanation of what was meant by the directive to the Commanding General of the Southeast Asia Command that he should give priority to operations in Northern Burma but at the same time keep in mind the long-term necessities for improving the lines of communication.

Sir Alan Brooke said that priority must be set between operations and the maintenance of the lines of communications. This directive to the Commanding General, Southeast Asia Command, had been put forward to emphasize the importance of the Burma operations and, at the same time, to caution him to take a long-range view of the necessity for building up his lines of communication, without which no communications would be possible.

General Arnold pointed out to the President that in giving priority to the operations in Northern Burma, the delivery of supplies into China might be reduced. He said he did not disagree with the decision but he had been charged with the responsibility for the delivery of supplies to China and he wished to point out that giving first priority to the reconquest of Northern Burma might make it impossible for him completely to fulfill his responsibility.

The Prime Minister said that this would be largely a matter of judgment for the commander on the ground. He cited the necessity of sending some 2,000 men to Yunnan as part of General Wingate’s force to cover the Chinese advance from Yunnan. This would be an instance in which the delivery of supplies to China would be temporarily but justifiably interfered with.

The President said that he wished to establish some proviso which would prevent commanders on the supply lines in China confiscating supplies intended for China for use in their own theaters.

General Marshall replied that he thought that situation had been pretty well taken care of However, he said that it was necessary for someone on the ground to have authority to make decisions regarding priorities. He said that if, for example, it was arbitrarily decided to use the entire capacity of the air transport route to supply General Chennault with gasoline, this very decision might jeopardize the success of the Burma operations which in themselves were essential to keeping China in the war.

The Prime Minister then referred to studies that were directed in the report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said that as far as he was concerned he had no objection to a study being made regarding the capture of Singapore but he was very much opposed to such an operation being adopted for 1945 if action in 1944 was thereby curtailed.

He would personally be quite unable to agree to an operation for the capture of Akyab and Ramree as the main amphibious operation for the Indian Ocean in 1944. At the TRIDENT Conference, the capture of Akyab had been spoken of as a preliminary to operations in Southern Burma for the capture of Rangoon. Rangoon had then been dropped out for 1943-44, but Akyab had been retained, mainly to please Chiang Kai-shek. Later developments showed that the capture of Akyab would be a dangerous, sterile and costly operation directed against a point where the Japanese would be expecting attack. If we undertook it, we would hamstring operations in the Indian Ocean area to little purpose. He was quite prepared for a study of the operation to be made, and it might well prove right to carry it out as a sequel to some more profitable operation elsewhere; but he would not himself be able to subscribe to it as our main amphibious operation in the coming year.

The President said General Wingate had informed him that the capture of Rangoon would not cut the Japanese line of communications since they were now largely supplied overland from French Indo China and Thailand.

Southeast Asia Command

The President asked if Thailand was included in the Chinese Theater.

Admiral Leahy replied that both French Indo China and Thailand had been included in the Chinese Theater. At the beginning of the discussion on the Southeast Asia Command, it had been intended that French Indo China should be included in it. However, any operations in this area were so far in the future that it was not necessary to include French Indo China in the new command at this time. The situation with regard to Thailand, however, was quite different. Operations to be undertaken by the Southeast Asia Command might well envisage a conquest of Thailand. Forces of the Southeast Asia Command were in a position to carry out such an operation if it appeared to be desirable, whereas, Chinese forces could do nothing as far as this area is concerned. He therefore felt that regardless of what the commitments to the Generalissimo might have been, Thailand should definitely be included in the area of the Southeast Asia Command.

Admiral King indicated that a check was to be made to see if French Indo China and Thailand had not been removed from the Chinese Theater in a more recent definition of bounds.

The Prime Minister said that he was anxious to make a public announcement regarding the formation of the Southeast Asia Command and also to indicate who the commander was to be. He thought that such a public announcement would indicate that much of the discussions at the QUADRANT Conferences had been concerned with the war against Japan which would set forth a sufficient reason as to why Russia had not been included in the deliberations. He asked General Ismay to make up a short statement for release to the press.

The President said that the statement should make it clear that the Generalissimo still retains command of the Chinese Theater.

General Marshall said that the announcement should be written in such a way as not to mention the use of Chinese troops in the Southeast Asia Command or give any indication of General Stilwell’s place in the command setup. He said that General Stilwell is still the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff and that it would be offensive to the Generalissimo if he were not to be consulted before Stilwell was assigned his additional position. Moreover, he might expect that a Chinese deputy would be appointed. Actually, General Stilwell is being made Deputy Supreme Commander for the purpose of protecting Chinese interests and also to try and insure that Chinese forces would carry out their share of the plans devised by the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

Admiral King pointed out that the mere announcement of the formation of the Southeast Asia Command would indicate General Stilwell’s status at once. He thought that any announcement should be delayed until after the Generalissimo had been informed of the decisions.

Mr. Hopkins said that Dr. Soong had said that he had just had a telegram from the Generalissimo saying that the Supreme Allied Commander should be appointed forthwith.

The Prime Minister thought that any difficulty could be overcome by making the announcement to the press extremely brief. He suggested, for example, that it might be as follows:

It has been decided to establish a combined separate Southeast Asia Command. The Supreme Commander will be (here give the officer designated by name).

He felt that the shorter the announcement the better it would be. General agreement was expressed with this proposal.

The Prime Minister then asked General Marshall if it would not be wise to place a paragraph in the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister providing for the designation of a British liaison officer as a member of General MacArthur’s staff.

General Marshall replied that he did not feel it would be necessary to include such a statement in the paper, but that he would see that the suggestion was carried out immediately.

Spain

The Prime Minister asked if the Chiefs of Staff’s recommendations regarding Spain had been submitted to the Foreign Office.

General Ismay informed him that the suggestions had been sent to the Foreign Office but no comments had as yet been received.

The Prime Minister indicated then that before committing himself on these recommendations he would like to have the advice of his government. He said that personally he did not favor putting “economic screws” on Spain at this time. The situation was still too critical. For instance, there were the negotiations with Portugal which should be settled before a new attitude regarding Spain is adopted. He said, however, that in any event even though the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were approved, the timing as to their execution would have to be determined by the governments.

Turkey

The Prime Minister expressed disagreement with the proposal to have the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East empowered to determine what amount of supplies Turkey could absorb. He felt that this decision should be retained by the British Government. He said that the time has now come to ask Turkey for something in return for the aid which the United Nations have been giving her. He thought the Turks would be considerably relieved if they were only asked to carry out the recommendations submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than being asked to give up their neutrality and enter the war.

It was decided to delete any reference to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East’s being allowed to determine the amount of supplies to be given Turkey.

Meeting of Dr. Soong with the Combined Chiefs of Staff

After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would ask Dr. Soong to meet with them on Tuesday, 24 August.

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130 
740.00119 European War 1939/1656

Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs

Washington, August 23, 1943.

Memorandum

Mr. Matthews: I attended a drafting session at the War Department this morning in connection with the terms, other than military, to be imposed upon Italy in the event of a surrender. The military terms are already in General Eisenhower’s possession. Representatives of the British Embassy military and naval missions were present. These further terms were drawn up and agreed to by both the British and American representatives for transmission to Quebec today with the exception of four articles nos. 3, 4, 5a and 29. The British representatives were unable to accept these articles and we agreed to send them to Quebec pointing out our differences. Among the articles to which the British could not give their concurrence were:

No. 3, the exercise of the prerogatives of the crown will be suspended in all Italian territories. The powers of the central Italian Government will be suspended in all occupied areas as are designated by the allied commander-in-chief as Military Districts.

No. 4 …

No. 5a. Subject to the supreme authority of the allied commander-in-chief, the Italian Government will exercise legislative, judicial and executive powers in all unoccupied areas, these functions to continue only until, the general military situation permitting, the people of Italy shall have an opportunity freely to determine the form of permanent government, based on democratic principles, to be established in their country.

The other points on which we agreed to disagree were of a military character and of no particular concern to the Department.

Already approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, under General Hilldring, was the draft instrument of surrender of Italy called the “comprehensive” document because it includes military as well as other terms. This document is designed to supersede the military terms already in General Eisenhower’s hands and give him one complete instrument of surrender. This plan and procedure are generally preferred by the British representatives. It has been agreed to, as stated above, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and in our opinion is all right as far as it goes. We do not feel, however, in spite of its designation as “comprehensive” that it is sufficiently complete.

The American representatives generally favor the alternate plan and procedure which are to supplement the military terms already in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief with the additional terms necessary to define our relationship to the defeated Italian Government. These further terms, we believe, are more complete than the “comprehensive” document and do in fact contain certain political provisions not included in the “comprehensive” document.

When I left the Pentagon Building this noon, it was agreed that both plans would be sent to Quebec by plane today with the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff select the plan and procedure they prefer.

About 2:30 p.m. Colonel Laux of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department called to say that General Hilldring felt that the British reservations on the “American document” prejudiced the entire acceptance of the American plan; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be inclined to take the document on which agreement had been reached and wondered if the Department would not be willing to withdraw the two articles quoted above which caused our British colleagues to withhold their approval. He said that the War Department was prepared to withdraw the two articles of military character to which the British objected. I told the Colonel that the Department felt very strongly about retaining the two political articles referred to; that it was true that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff chose the “British plan” these political provisions would not appear, but that we felt they should be submitted to Quebec for consideration. I said that while I regretted to have to insist on inclusion of certain terms which might jeopardize the acceptance of the whole “American plan,” I felt that we could not omit them and thus leave ourselves open to possible future charges from the military that we had failed to give them proper advice on certain political phases of the highest importance with respect to the Italian situation. He asked if the Department’s position was, then, that we could not agree to have the controversial political provisions withdrawn and I answered in the affirmative.

J WESLEY JONES

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