Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

77

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 17, 1945]
Top secret

Policy Toward Italy

The objectives of the three governments with regard to Italy are directed towards her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

Italy’s present status as co-belligerent and unconditionally surrendered enemy is anomalous, and hampers every effort both by the Allies and by Italy herself, to improve Italy’s economic and political situation. This anomaly can be finally solved only through the negotiation of a definitive peace treaty which would at best require some months. The preparation of such a treaty should be one of the first tasks of the suggested council of foreign ministers.

Meanwhile, however, improvement in the Italian internal situation would be greatly facilitated by some immediate interim arrangement whereby the Italian Government would have some tangible recognition of Italy’s contribution toward the defeat of Germany.

It is therefore recommended that the short terms of surrender and the numerous obsolete clauses of the long terms of surrender be terminated, and replaced by certain undertakings on the part of the Italian Government to meet the requirements of the existing situation.

These undertakings should provide:

  1. That the Italian Government will refrain from any hostile action against any of the United Nations pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace.

  2. That the Italian Government will maintain no military, naval or air forces or equipment, except as authorized by the Allies, and will comply with all instructions on the subject of such forces and equipment.

Under this interim arrangement, control of Italy should be retained only so far as is necessary:

  • a. To cover Allied military requirements, so long as Allied forces remain in Italy or operate therefrom.
  • b. To safeguard the equitable settlement of territorial disputes.

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 17, 1945]

German Reparations

Agreed Principles
The Allied Commission on Reparations has agreed on seven basic principles (text attached).

Principle for Decision
The Commission has failed to reach agreement on the underscored last clause of an eighth principle:

After payment of reparations, enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the governments concerned before reparation deliveries are made from current production or from stocks of goods.”

The United States Government fully concurs in these principles and must insist that such necessary imports as are approved by our governments shall constitute a first charge against exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods. To do otherwise, will lead either to a repetition of our mistakes at the end of the last war, or leave us unable to bring about the desired industrial disarmament of Germany.

Definitions and Allocation of Reparations
The United States proposes immediate agreement on definitions of restitution, war booty, and reparations (text attached). The Commission has agreed on a formula for allocation of reparations between the USSR, U.K. and U.S. and a procedure for settling the division of reparations among other countries (texts attached).

The United States Government feels that the definitions of restitution, war booty, and reparations are so interrelated with the formulae for allocation of reparations that agreement must be reached on all of these matters simultaneously.

[Attachment 1]

Agreed Principles of Reparations

I. Removals of property for reparations shall be primarily such as to assist in bringing to an end the war-making power of Germany by eliminating that part of Germany’s industrial capacity which constitutes war potential.

II. Reparations shall be such as will speed recovery and reconstruction in countries devastated at German hands.

III. For the purposes of making a reparations plan, Germany will be treated as a single economic unit.

IV. Any plan of reparations shall be avoided which necessitates external financial assistance either to enable reparations deliveries to be made or to facilitate economic reconstruction required for reparation purposes, or which might, in the opinion of the Governments concerned, prejudice the successful execution of the task entrusted to the Armies of Occupation.

V. To a maximum extent reparations shall be taken from existing national wealth of Germany. While for convenience claims may be stated in money, it is necessary to bear in mind that in contrast to reparations after World War I which were assessed and exacted in money, this time reparations will be assessed and exacted in kind in the form of things, such as plants, machines, equipment, stocks, foreign investments, etc.

VI. In order to avoid building up German industrial capacity and disturbing the long term stability of the economies of the United Nations, long run payment of reparations in the form of manufactured products shall be restricted to a minimum.

VII. In justice to those countries occupied by the enemy, reparations shall be calculated upon the basis that the average living standards in Germany during the reparation period shall not exceed the average of the standards of living of European countries. European countries means all European countries excluding U.K. and USSR.

[Attachment 2]

Proposed Definitions

The United States proposes that:
1.) Restitution shall be confined to identifiable artistic, religious and cultural objects existing at the date of the invasion of the territories from which such objects have been removed, insofar as such objects can be recovered and irrespective of the form of dispossession by which they came into enemy hands. While any nation entitled to reparation may be allowed a prior claim for the return of certain other particular types of identifiable property removed by the enemy, the value of such property, if returned, shall be entered on the reparation account of such nation.

2.) War booty shall be limited to finished equipment and supplies produced for and belonging to the German armed forces exclusive of any facilities used to produce such equipment or supplies.

3.) Except for property transferred as restitution, war booty or exports to pay for approved imports, all property in the territory within the boundaries of the German Reich as it existed on December 31, 1937 shall be subject to reparations.

[Attachment 3]

Agreed in the Allied Commission on Reparations

In accordance with the principles established at the Crimean Conference, namely, that the countries entitled to the greatest share of reparations are those which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy, the Allied Commission on Reparations agrees that the total sum of reparations (including both what is received on account of removals from the national wealth of Germany and what is received from annual deliveries after capitulation) will be distributed as follows:

Of the total
USSR 56%
UK 22%
USA 22%
TOTAL 100%

To meet the validated claims for reparations on the part of the other nations, as determined by mutual agreement of the three powers, each of the three powers will give up from their share in the ratio that each share bears to the total.

[Attachment 4]

Agreed in the Allied Commission on Reparations

Procedure for settling the division of reparations between countries other than the U.K., USA, and USSR

  1. The Allied Commission on Reparations will send a communication as soon as possible through the Governments of the U.K., USA, and USSR inviting all the United Nations that have taken a direct part in the war with Germany to submit within one month to the Allied Commission on Reparations through their Diplomatic Representatives in Moscow, or otherwise, statements showing data for establishing their reparations claims against Germany and the value of German pre-war assets in their territory. The nature of the data to be submitted will be determined subsequently.

  2. On receipt of the data the Allied Commission on Reparations will decide as a basis of discussion on a provisional list of countries entitled to receive reparations and also on the percentage to be allotted to each of them.

  3. The Allied Commission on Reparations will in such form as is found to be convenient enter into negotiations with the United Nations whose claims to reparations are considered to be well founded with the object of securing their agreement to the percentage of reparations which has been provisionally suggested by the Allied Commission on Reparations.

  4. If the said negotiations with the United Nations whose claims to reparations have been recognized are successful the Allied Commission on Reparations through the member Governments will send to these nations a further communication inviting them to take part in a special conference for the conclusion of a general agreement on reparations between the interested nations.

If however the preliminary negotiations prove not sufficiently successful to make it possible to call a conference of this kind the Allied Commission on Reparations will consider afresh in the light of the factual material in its possession the question of the further steps required.

  1. A Communication will be sent to the United Nations whose claims to reparations have not been approved informing them of the decision of the Allied Commission on Reparations with an indication of the reasons for that decision.

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 17, 1945]
Top secret

Subject: DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world.

The experience at Versailles following the last war does not encourage the belief that a full formal peace conference without preliminary preparation on the part of the leading powers is the best procedure. Such a conference without such preparation would be slow and unwieldy, its session would be conducted in a heated atmosphere of rival claims and counterclaims and ratification of the resulting documents might be long delayed. I therefore propose as the best formula to meet the situation the establishment of a Council composed of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States, namely, the countries which compose the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations organization. It is my thought that this Council should meet as soon after our meeting as preparations therefor can be completed. I should like to present therefore a draft proposal along these lines which I have drawn up for your consideration.

[Attachment]

Draft Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers

  1. There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.

  2. The Council shall meet at ___________ and its first meeting shall be held on ____________. Each of the Foreign Ministers shall be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy duly authorized and capable of carrying on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister. He will likewise be accompanied by a small staff of technical advisers suited to the problems concerned and to the organization of a joint secretariat.

  3. As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

  4. Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. It is not intended, however, to fix hard and fast rules but rather to permit the Council to adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it might desire to hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases the Council might desire to convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. It is so authorized.

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 17, 1945]
Top secret

Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe

In the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe signed February 11, 1945, the three governments assumed certain obligations in regard to the liberated peoples of Europe and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states. Since the Yalta Conference, the obligations assumed under this declaration have not been carried out. In the opinion of the United States Government the continued failure to implement these obligations would be regarded throughout the world as evidence of lack of unity between the three great powers, and would undermine confidence in the sincerity of their declared aims.

The United States Government proposes, therefore, that the following steps to carry out the obligations of this Declaration be agreed upon at this meeting:

  1. The three Allied Governments should agree on necessity of the immediate reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, in conformity with Clause (c) of the third paragraph of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe.

  2. That there be immediate consultation to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganization of these governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements. Diplomatic recognition shall be accorded and peace treaties concluded with those countries as soon as such reorganization has taken place.

  3. That in conformity with the obligations contained in Clause (d) of the third paragraph of the Declaration on liberated Europe, the three governments consider how best to assist any interim governments in the holding of free and unfettered elections. Such assistance is immediately required in the case of Greece, and will in due course undoubtedly be required in Rumania and Bulgaria, and possibly other countries.

78 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1745

The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Assistant Secretaries of State

[Babelsberg,] July 17, 1945
Secret

Memorandum for Mr. Dunn and Mr. Clayton

Subject: CREATION OF A RHINELAND-RUHR STATE

A. The Proposal
While there are several proposals under consideration for separating the Rhineland-Ruhr area from the remainder of Germany, most of the proposals provide for this area to be set up as a permanently separate unit, economically and politically independent of the rest of Germany. One of the proposals provides that it shall be controlled by France, Belgium and the Netherlands under the supervision of the Security Council. Obviously, a merely temporary separation would, by the very assumption that the area would at some foreseeable time be returned to Germany, have political and psychological effects different from those of a separation designed to be lasting. Similarly, the economic effects of separation would be very different if this area were to be left in customs union with the rest of Germany.

B. Advantages of Separation

  1. The advantage of separation most often cited would be that even when political self-rule was returned to the Germans in the rest of Germany the basic resources of the Rhineland-Ruhr area would not return to the control of the German state or the German economy, thus eliminating Germany’s ability to use these resources to rearm. This argument assumes that when direct Allied occupation of Germany comes to an end, the four Powers might be unable or unwilling to prevent the rest of Germany from rearming and that the separation of the Rhineland-Ruhr is therefore a necessary safeguard against the revival of Germany as a military power.

  2. A second advantage is that the separation of this area would make the rest of Germany much weaker as a power factor and hence much less attractive to any outside power which might be tempted to court it as an ally, and that Germany would thus be more likely to remain a political vacuum. If political forces could be shaped or confined by drawing lines on a map, this argument would carry decisive weight. There are other political factors, such as numbers, technical and organizing skills and political drives of a people, which can be deflected but not destroyed by lines drawn on a map.

  3. It is also argued that existence in partite states could be made so attractive to Germans over the long run that it would be accepted by them and would thus form a lasting contribution to a more peaceful Europe. In the history of Europe in the last 200 years nothing suggests that the bulk of Germans either in the Rhineland-Ruhr or in the rest of Germany will eventually accept such a solution sincerely and work to maintain it. Failing such acceptance, this solution, to endure, would require permanent unity of will among the four great powers. An imposed partition of Germany is, over any considerable period, more likely to divide the four major powers than it is to contribute to their continued unity of purpose and action.

C. Disadvantages

  1. Would the economic potential of Germany be reduced by drawing a boundary line around the Rhineland-Ruhr? As a byproduct of separation, the exploitation of the Rhineland-Ruhr would probably have to be maintained on a fairly high level in order, through developing its capacity to export in highly competitive markets, to support its present population. Numerous industries now carried on in the rest of Germany would, as a normal consequence of separation, be developed in the Rhineland–Ruhr area, and thus, if at some later date the boundary between the Rhineland-Ruhr and the rest of Germany were removed, Germany’s total economic potential might well be no smaller than it had been before partition.

  2. The separation of the Rhineland-Ruhr would contribute to the stability of Europe if it were accepted sincerely by the bulk of Germans in both parts of Germany and if the four major powers were equally determined to maintain partition. However, the issue of partition could easily become the focus for all the discontents among Germans in both areas. The grievance of partition would unify all Germans in a way difficult to combat and dangerous to the longer-range aims of the Allies. Any great power which wished to disturb the peace of Europe would have at hand an issue which would win the support of the entire German people and would trouble the conscience and divide the political will of the Allied nations. The inability of the great powers to unite between 1918 and 1938 in maintaining the independence of Austria, which had never been politically a part of the modern German state, gives some inkling of the political risk involved in basing a long-range policy on the assumption that all major powers will share an equal interest in maintaining the partition of Germany.

  3. While control of the Rhineland-Ruhr by France, Belgium and Holland would give a western-European bloc the power to cut off the flow of coal, iron and steel from the Rhineland-Ruhr to the rest of Germany, other potential power-factors would not be under their control. It is doubtful that they could eradicate the will of the Germans to reunite. This factor, even though Germany by itself were incapable of an active political role, would have its influence on all calculations and decisions as long as the separation lasted, since the German people, even disarmed, could be counted on to throw the weight of their manpower and economic potential to the side of any power which seemed likely to support their efforts at reunion.

  4. Any decision as to what powers will dominate a separate Rhineland-Ruhr state or protectorate will give rise to both immediate and continuing rivalries. Neither Great Britain nor Russia can afford to have an area of sixteen million Germans, possessing a great industrial potential, drawn into a combination which would be outside its own control. If the four major powers agree to separate the Rhineland-Ruhr, that will be on a basis of equal participation in its control. As long as the four powers are willing to maintain their joint control over all of Germany, it is hard to see what advantages would be gained by setting up a separate four-power regime for the Rhineland-Ruhr apart from the four-power control over Germany as a whole, and it is easy to foresee the great administrative, economic and political complications to which it would give rise.

  5. If the Rhineland-Ruhr is placed under the control of France, Belgium and Holland, these three countries will have to combine to form a cohesive Western European bloc, in order to control effectively a West German state of sixteen millions. The formation of such a bloc would be regarded with suspicion by Russia and has not previously been encouraged by the United States, which has so far opposed the division of Europe into watertight regional power-blocs. Weak in itself, a West European bloc would need generous and sustained support by both Britain and the United States.

  6. For Britain and the United States to underwrite permanently a spearhead bloc in Western Europe implies a major decision on their part. It assumes that they cannot work out satisfactory joint solutions with Russia and that they must now form a strong and cohesive bloc of their own. If that assumption is the only one on which Britain and the United States can safely act, they should not limit their power-bloc to Western Europe but should strive to make the area of their leadership as broad, inclusive and cohesive as possible. They cannot feel adequately reinforced by having on their side a disparate bloc consisting of France, Belgium, Holland and a reluctant Rhineland.

  7. A principal argument for creating a separate Rhineland-Ruhr state is that this will furnish a reliable safeguard against Germany’s rearming after American and British forces have withdrawn from the Continent. However, a separate Rhineland-Ruhr state could be maintained only by military forces, available in substantial numbers on the ground and always available in unstinted numbers on immediate call at a distance. It is conceivable that the forces needed to maintain a separate Rhineland against the will of the German people and the potential opposition of other major powers would be as great or greater than those needed to garrison all of Germany after Germany has been disarmed and reorganized internally.

    Even if American and British forces are withdrawn from Germany at an early date, Germany could still be garrisoned indefinitely by contingents furnished by the Continental European allies. These allies, which have obligatory military service and are in close proximity to Germany, could easily provide, on a rotating basis, a garrison of 200,000.

    The creation of a separate Rhineland state would not obviate the necessity for maintaining a long-term system of inspection as a safeguard against German efforts to rearm. Through licensing industrial establishments, through direct and frequent inspection by a corps of Allied personnel, through licensing and regulating the use of critical alloys, through eliminating the production of aircraft and synthetic oil and rubber, and through preventing all forms of military training and warlike indoctrination, the victorious powers can, if they so will, prevent Germany from restoring her military strength or potential. Continuity in enforcing such controls under the authority of the Security Council will be attained more easily than continuity of joint and unremitting action to enforce the separation of the Rhineland-Ruhr from the rest of Germany.

  8. It should be the aim of the victorious powers to keep Germany weak and disunited politically. An imposed partition will lead nearly all Germans to subordinate their natural internal differences to the one burning desire, namely, to overcome a division of their country and people which runs counter to their deep national feeling, and to their economic interests. Finally, it will be easier to maintain unity of policy between the four major powers if they agree to keep Germany politically weak and economically open to the influence of all the major powers instead of breaking Germany up into exclusive spheres of influence.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

79 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745

The Assistant Secretary of War to the Assistant Secretary of State

Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945
Confidential

Memorandum for Mr. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State

General Clay advises me today that he has tentatively worked out with General Weeks, Deputy Military Governor of the British Zone, an agreement that a French Area of Occupation in the City of Berlin will be formed from the existing areas allocated to the United Kingdom and the United States Forces of Occupation. It would seem appropriate now to inform Ambassador Winant that agreement with the British and French on this point seems likely and to request that he agree in the European Advisory Commission with the British, the Russians and the French that the matter may be referred to the Control Council for Germany for settlement, with the understanding that the French Zone will be created out of the areas presently assigned to the United States and United Kingdom Forces.

General Clay expects to confer with General Weeks and General Koeltz on this matter on Thursday and to work out a definitive scheme, subject to final ratification by the Joint Chiefs of Staff if that turns out to be necessary.

JOHN J MCCLOY

80 
868.00/7-1745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 17 [1945]
Secret
us urgent

38

Brit FonOff telegram July 14 suggests draft “invitation to be issued simultaneously to Soviet Govt at TERMINAL and to French Govt in Paris re joint supervision Greek elections. We are in essential agreement but prefer not use words “invite” or “invitation.” Consider phraseology excellent in notes presented to Greek Govt quoted in telegram no. 22 to SecState July 14. Suggest draft proposal along following lines:

In view of Allied obligations to Greece and the undertakings at Yalta, the US Govt feels that Allied responsibility to the Greek people makes advisable joint Allied assistance in supervising approaching Greek national elections. It is therefore proposed that the responsibilities in the supervision of the Greek elections be shared by the Brit, the Soviet, the French, and the US Govts. The Greek Govt, which it may be recalled is a signatory to the Varkiza Agreement, Article 9 of which provides for Allied supervision of elections, has expressed its agreement that the approaching national elections be held under the supervision of the four Allies named. The US Govt earnestly hopes that the Soviet Govt (Govt of France) will agree to participate in the joint supervision of Greek national elections.

Sent to SeeState as no. 38 July 17. Repeated to Paris and Athens.

You may wish to concert with Brit at TERMINAL on this question and instruct Caffery direct regarding timing and phraseology of approach to French FonOff in collaboration with Brit colleague in Paris.

[GREW]

81 
868.00/7-1745

The Ambassador in Greece to the Secretary of State

Athens, July 17, 1945
Secret
No. 1331

Subject: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN GREECE

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1213 of June 23, 1945, and to transmit herewith a survey of politico-economic conditions in Northern Greece prepared by Third Secretary Leonard J. Cromie, together with a copy of a report on the British Army in Greece and its relationship to Greek armed forces prepared by Captain William H. McNeill, Assistant Military Attaché, who accompanied Mr. Cromie on his recent tour (June 12-24) of Macedonia and Western Thrace. These reports may perhaps be usefully read in conjunction with my despatch No. 1282 of July 4 on Developments in the North of Greece: Frontier Incidents and Anglo-Russian Relations and my telegrams No. 695 of July 10 and No. 708 of July 14, referring to Marshal Tito’s speech of July 8.

Mr. Cromie’s report, based on first-hand observation and numerous, on-the-spot conversations with representative persons of all factions and classes as well as other reliable intelligence data available to the Embassy, fails to support in any substantial degree the allegations of Marshal Tito and the Moscow and Balkan Soviet press regarding anarchy and wholesale terror in Northern Greece. The overall picture of conditions in that area resembles that of the rest of the country, with the possible difference, characteristic of the “New Greece” acquired after the Balkan and first World Wars, of more pronounced republicanism in the cities and a more kaleidoscopic pattern of political sentiment in the countryside owing to the presence of some minority groups and of large numbers of Greek refugees from Asia Minor.

Figures cited by Mr. Cromie on the prison population of various small towns in Northern Greece and the high ratio of arrests to convictions do bear witness to the deficiencies of present Greek regional administrative and judicial procedure and the disregard of local officials of royalist persuasion for the civil liberties of leftists and Slavophones. Certain of the latter who have identified themselves with the “Free Macedonian” movement or who have relatives among the ELASites now in Yugoslavia have doubtless found it expedient, as Marshal Tito stated, to seek a more congenial political clime across the border. A New York Times Correspondent, Mr. Sam Brewer, told me today that he interviewed last week in Monastir a score of such persons who had recently come from Greece. They gave such reasons for their move as “because we were suspected of being Tito’s spies” or “because we love Stalin”. Brewer was told by Yugoslav authorities, who invited him to inspect frontier registers, that about 1,000 refugees of this type have already crossed the border at the Monastir Gap and 3,000 in the Lake Dojran region. Granted the existence of some injustice, the bitter legacy of Slavophone collaborationism during the war and of post-liberation civil strife, it must also be borne in mind, as pointed out in the attached reports, that a determined effort is being made by the British to restore order and safeguard civil liberties with the sincere support of many enlightened Greek officials acting in accordance with the directives of their well-intentioned if still weak central Government.

An objective understanding of the true situation in Northern Greece is essential if the threat to this strategic and rich territory implied in the current war of nerves directed against Greece is to be averted. Captain McNeill’s report shows that local British and Greek forces could scarcely block a Soviet-sponsored military promenade to the Aegean disguised as a “Free Macedonian” uprising. Firm diplomacy, therefore, backed by informed public opinion in the Western Democracies, will be needed to make it clear that, while the legitimate desire of the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians for port and transit facilities may be satisfied, the perpetration of a major crime against a loyal member of the United Nations on the pretext of correcting transient and relatively insignificant abuses cannot be tolerated.

Respectfully yours,
LINCOLN MACVEAGH

[Enclosure 1—Extracts]

Northern Greece
Secret
[Undated]

A Regional Survey of Present Conditions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary
The spotlight of world attention is once again swinging back to Macedonia and Western Thrace, granary of Greece and outpost of British influence in the Balkans, in which the struggle for rehabilitation is being carried on in an atmosphere dangerously troubled by ideologic and ethnic conflict and the clash of rival territorial ambitions, the Greek claim to a more strategic northern boundary and the quest of the Slavs and Bulgars for footholds on the Aegean.

UNRRA food shipments and the indestructible fertility of the soil have laid the specter of actual starvation in Northern Greece despite a fifty percent failure of this year’s grain crop. But a serious lack of transport is impeding the distribution of foodstuffs and the launching of the rehabilitation program that is needed to dissipate internal discontent which breeds disorder and on which international rivalries batten.

Internal conflicts in Northern Greece find their origin not only in economic distress but also in the different backgrounds of the various Greek and non-Hellenic population groups. Rightist leanings prevail among native Greeks in both rural and urban districts, while Greek refugees from the Turkish cities and Transcaucasia and the Slavo-Macedonian minority have mainly gravitated toward the left. The result is a kaleidoscopic pattern of political sentiment throughout the area.

Political passions and ethnic differences, exacerbated by the war and civil strife, inevitably breed a certain amount of injustice and violence. Scant respect is shown for the civil liberties of leftists, and members of the Slavophone minority, as a consequence of their alleged pro-Bulgar attitude, are deprived of cultural rights and subjected to petty persecution by their Greek neighbors and local police authorities. The British, with one division and some armored units in the area, stand as arbiters in the midst of turmoil under a group of able and impartial officers, but their task is complicated by the disorganized state of Greek judicial and administrative machinery and the complacency of royalist officials.

It should not be assumed, however, that a state of anarchy exists in Northern Greece, where the average citizen, thanks to the presence of the British and the moderate policy of the Athens Government, probably enjoys a greater measure of personal security and freedom than in any other country of the Balkans. Tito’s flight of “thousands and thousands of refugees from the terror of Greek reactionaries” is largely a flight of fancy.

Difficulties which do exist would solve themselves in the absence of outside pressure. In particular, it is most likely that the few Slavic remnants left in Northern Greece would become painlessly Hellenized within one or two generations were it not for the possibility of the Soviet Balkan bloc’s using the “Free Macedonia” movement as a key to conquest. In this connection, the exact import of the present war of nerves and of the armies now poised at the strategic gateways to Greece, to which no effective, immediate resistance could be offered, warrants most careful consideration by the Western Powers. For loss of her Northern Provinces would not only be a mortal blow to Greece and a shocking violation of the principles of the United Nations, but an event of major geopolitical importance in the Mediterranean.

I – Introduction
Northern Greece is the breadbasket and the powder keg of the Hellenic Nation. Before the war, the Provinces of Macedonia and Western Thrace, with about one quarter of the population of Greece, accounted for forty to fifty percent of Greek agricultural production. In Greece’s present straitened circumstances, the economic resources of the area should be invaluable. They would also be useful to covetous neighbors. The traditional political importance of the region, deriving from its wealth, its strategic location and the mottled ethnic composition of its population, is enhanced today by its position on a key frontier between the zones of Russian and British influence in Europe, a frontier which the Greeks would like to push northward and which the Soviet Balkan bloc, according to many indications, would like to push into the sea.

The picture of Northern Greece today is a study in contrasts. On the one hand, the litter of war: twisted rails and hundreds upon hundreds of wrecked cars and locomotives in the railroad yards of Salonika; the Port of Salonika a shambles of sunken ships and broken cranes; the burned village of Lekhovon, one among many, stark but still picturesque on the mountainside; destroyed bridges and railroad spans, testimonials to the ruthless efficiency of German sappers. On the other hand, scenes of normality and peace: the Germans spread destruction no farther east than the Strymon River. Beyond, the Bulgars were careful to leave undamaged “their” Provinces of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace to which they hope to return. Bridges are intact, highways have actually been improved, reforestation projects dot the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains, and the housing problem is relieved in some areas by hundreds of neat, concrete village bungalows erected for Bulgarian settlers. The railroads from Serres to Alexandroupolis and from the latter Port to Adrianople are running, although on a reduced schedule owing to lack of rolling stock. In the whole of Northern Greece, the peasants are busy at their usual seasonal pursuits, but their attitude is by no means uniform. Whereas broad smiles and the brave thumbs-up gesture universally greet the jeep traveller in the Greek villages and districts, the Slavophone peasants, particularly in the northwest frontier regions, are morose and sullen. In Salonika and the large towns, life appears quite normal on the surface with no suggestion of a “reign of terror”, but the building next to the Prefecture in Fiorina has been converted into a detention barracks and the barred windows are crowded with political prisoners.

Such are the highlights of the general picture of Northern Greece in June 1945. Because the spotlight of world attention may shortly be focused on this area, it may be of interest to fill in some of the details.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

III – The political imbroglio

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rival Territorial Ambitions
The economic and political problems of the 1,700,000 inhabitants of Northern Greece would be of scant interest to the outside world were it not for international factors which not only complicate the solution of local problems but threaten to compromise the political future of the region as an integral part of Greece and consequently the present balance of power in the Mediterranean and around the Dardanelles. These factors have already been mentioned and are well known: on the one hand, agitation in Greece for territorial expansion northward; on the other hand, the old Russian drive for a window on the Aegean, currently masquerading as a “Free Macedonia Movement.”

With regard to Greek expansionism, it need only be said that the naturally receptive state of mind of the public is being exploited and stimulated to the utmost by public leaders and editors as a tactic of internal politics. In this, the situation resembles the pattern of the whole country. The particular claim to Turkish Thrace recently featured by the Communists arouses little interest. The usual response to questions on this matter was: “It would be very nice, of course, to have Eastern Thrace, but we do not want to complicate our relations with Turkey.” In view of the present unequal balance of forces in southeastern Europe, Greek expansionism is of immediate interest only insofar as it might conceivably provide a pretext for “precautionary” troop concentrations on the opposite side of the frontier or even for positive “preventive action” by Greece’s neighbors backed by the Soviet Union.

Minorities – Turks, Kutzo-Vlachs and Armenians
It is much more likely, however, that minority grievances would be invoked as justification for Soviet intervention in Northern Greece, and it will therefore be of interest to follow closely the post-war development of Greek policy towards the minorities, the attitudes and problems of the different minorities, and their susceptibility to foreign propaganda and influence.

Of the four principal minorities in Northern Greece, Turks, Kutzo-Vlachs, Armenians and Slavo-Macedonians, now as before the war, the most contented and best treated are certainly the Turks. The Greeks generally credit the Turks in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace with having observed a correctly non-cooperative attitude towards the Bulgarian forces of occupation and have accordingly permitted them to reopen their schools, practise their religion, and enjoy a large measure of cultural freedom. Their lot is not quite perfect, according to the Turkish Consul at Komotiní. Like minorities everywhere, they suffer some persecution from neighbors of the dominant ethnic group, and local officials are not over-zealous in protecting their rights and interests. It is this situation, the Consul said, which led to the emigration of considerable numbers of Turks from Western to Eastern Thrace earlier this year (despatch No. 965 of May 1, 1945, page 17). Some difficulty, too, was caused by recent action of the Greek authorities in ordering the summary expulsion of some 2,000 Pommacks (Bulgarian subjects of Turkish descent) from Western Thrace. Upon the refusal of the Bulgars and Turks to permit these people to cross the border, the British intervened to have the order suspended and there the matter now rests. Apart from these observations, the Consul formulated no general grievances against Greek Government policy.

The Kutzo-Vlachs are a lesser minority, partially Hellenized, mostly scattered in small villages in Western Macedonia. Moreover, the Rumanian motherland is conveniently remote. Though occasionally troublesome, this minority does not appear to arouse serious Greek animosity or apprehensions. The Inspector General of Rumanian Schools at Salonika (an official of the former Rumanian Government whose present status is dubious) stated that some of the Rumanian elementary schools have already been reopened. The secondary schools have not.

As for the Armenians, their trading instinct apparently got the better of their neo-Hellenism during the Bulgarian occupation, with the result that they find themselves in a very difficult situation today. Andreas Kondoianopoulos, Prefect of the Nome of Rhodope, spoke very bitterly of their collaborationist activities during the war, and a family of five Armenians was brutally murdered at Xánthi in early June for their alleged pro-Bulgar attitude.

The Slavo-Macedonians
Most troublesome and largest minority in Northern Greece are, of course, the Slavo-Macedonians. It was they, for example, who undoubtedly inspired the Yugoslav Minister of State’s ominous reference in Politika (Belgrade) of June 21 to “current outrages in Aegean Macedonia,” which “is Yugoslav just like all the other Yugoslav federal units.” (According to this same statement, the minority numbers 260,000 persons, which would be about fifteen percent of the total population of Northern Greece. Greek sources usually give a total of 80,000 Macedonians, 70,000 in Western Macedonia and 10,000 in Western Thrace. They also tend to play down the distinct ethnic character of the minority, pointing out that virtually all the Slavophones know how to speak Greek and asserting that fifty percent are Greek in sentiment anyhow.

The present situation of the Slavophones is the outgrowth of Greek policy towards them in the past and their own behavior during the recent years of Bulgarian and German occupation. It may be recalled that Venizelos attempted to woo with kindness and preferential treatment the Slav remnants left in Greece after the population exchange of 1924. Metaxas abruptly reversed this policy and even forbade the use of the Macedonian language. As a consequence, the Slavophones generally welcomed the Germans and Bulgars as liberators and collaborated with them whole-heartedly. In return, Slavic villages were usually untouched by the conquerors while many Greek villages were razed, and the Slavic peasants were allowed to enrich themselves at the expense of their unhappy Greek neighbors. Later, with the changing tide of war, Macedonian autonomist leaders such as Gotsi began to see the wisdom of collaborating with EAM/ELAS with a view to the realization of their objectives through the medium of Soviet federalism. Their cooperation was welcomed at first by the Greek Andartes, but the Macedonian guerilla chiefs soon demonstrated by their attitude and indiscipline that they were more interested in promoting Macedonian autonomy than in fighting against the Germans or for a socialist Greece.

The opportunism of the Slavophones and their autonomist activities have embarrassed their traditional friends, the Greek left, and aroused the active animosity of Greek nationalists. EAM leaders, whatever their Marxist convictions regarding the insignificance of national frontiers, are good enough political realists to be unwilling to offend the patriotic sentiments of the Greek electorate, including rank-and-file leftists, in order to win the support of a minority or even to please the comrades abroad. Accordingly, present EAM policy would allow the Slavophones their own schools and church services in Macedonian, but would insist that higher studies be pursued in Greek at Greek universities. On the other hand, a typical Greek nationalist such as the Bishop of Fiorina favors the Metaxist policy of forbidding entirely the use of the Macedonian tongue.

In this, as in connection with policy towards Greek leftists, the Greek Government authorities seem to be following a middle-of-the-road course and sinning more by omission than by commission. There is no positive reign of terror directed against the Slavophones as such, and they are secure in their lives and in the essential right of land tenure. Those who have fled to Yugoslavia have apparently done so because they feared arrest as political leftists or autonomist agitators. A promise of improved conditions may be seen in the visit to Fiorina on June 27 and 28 of Governor General Merenditis of Northern Greece, whose fair attitude has already been demonstrated by his refusal to permit discrimination in the distribution of UNRRA foodstuffs as between Greek and Slavophone villages. According to an OSS source, Governor General Merenditis hopes to reenforce security by bringing a National Guard battalion to Fiorina for border patrol duties and 1,200 Gendarmes to Fiorina, Kastoria and Kozani. He has, moreover, ordered that arbitrary arrests must cease, that all cases involving charges of autonomist activities must be cleared up within two months, and that the Slavo-Macedonians are to be assured their full rights as Greek citizens including the right to speak their own language.

The future of the Slavophones of Northern Greece will be determined by the further evolution of relations between the Balkan Soviet bloc and Greece and the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. Left to themselves, they would, in all probability, become painlessly Hellenized within one or two generations – a normal solution for the problem of a minority which is too small and too scattered geographically to warrant indefinite, special protection and perpetuation as a distinct ethnic unit.

Attitude of the Balkan Soviet Bloc
It appears, unfortunately, that the Slavophone minority is too convenient a peg on which to hang Balkan-Soviet territorial ambitions to be allowed to die a natural and peaceful death, for a mounting weight of evidence indicates that this bloc intends to make such capital as it can out of the Macedonian imbroglio.

Acquisition of all or a substantial part of Northern Greece would give the Russians one outlet on the Aegean and result in the strategic investment of the coveted Dardanelles. Moreover, this oblique movement would appear to have the advantage over a frontal attack on Turkey in that it could be carried out by non-Russian forces against a relatively undefended territory under the guise of assisting a “spontaneous uprising of oppressed peoples.” British commanding officers in Northern Greece are inclined to discount, on political grounds, the likelihood of an immediate attack from the north, but they are fully alive to the strategic implications of the potentially hostile forces now massed near each of the gateways to Greece, the Monastir Gap, the Strymon Valley, and the Roupel Pass. Defense of the area in the event of attack being out of the question in view of the relative weakness of the British (one division and units of an armored brigade), these are now engaged in maneuvers and a study of troop dispositions for a covering action to permit orderly withdrawal from Salonika in a few days’ time.

British diplomacy is presumably equally aware of the possible implications behind the present war of nerves directed against Greece, but it can scarcely afford to adopt a similar policy of retreat. Appeasement on the issue of Northern Greece would involve the surrender of an important bastion of security in the Mediterranean, the betrayal of a loyal ally and the overwhelmingly Greek population of the affected area, and abandonment of the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, tantamount to hoisting the white flag over that newly-erected citadel of peace.

[Enclosure 2]

Secret
No. R 121-45
[Undated]

Revised British Plans:

  1. Contingent upon what the Government’s policy will be following the elections in Great Britain, it has been recently decided to keep the two British divisions which now garrison Greece in the Country through the coming winter. At the same time, top priority for supply to the Greek Forces has been assigned to the Gendarmerie, in the hope that the gendarmes will be sufficiently well organized and able (1) to enforce law and order in Greece during the coming year; and (2) to supervise the elections and/or the plebiscite which the British hope to see held in November. (The elections are for members to the Chamber of Deputies; the plebiscite will decide upon the return of the King, or the formation of a Republic.) To achieve this, the National Guard battalions have been seriously weakened by the withdrawal of volunteers for the Gendarmerie; and the effort to rebuild the Greek Army has come to a standstill after the formation of a single division.

Background:

  1. The British troops which were originally despatched to Greece included a small force designed to harass the retreating Germans, and a larger number of service troops who were expected to administer the civilian relief program. After ELAS attempted to carry through a revolution in December 1944, three additional British divisions were sent to Greece. This force succeeded in driving ELAS from Athens, and later superintended the disarmament and disbandment of ELAS, and then occupied all the principal centers of Greece. One division was withdrawn in April, leaving the present garrison behind.

  2. During March and April 1945, the British planned to create a Greek National Army of three divisions by November; and, as soon as these divisions were ready, to withdraw the British force. Meanwhile, as a stop gap, National Guard battalions were organized to perform police work in the areas taken over from the control of ELAS. In fact, however, supplies have not been delivered in sufficient quantity to equip three Greek divisions; and the National Guard has made a rather bad name for itself by sporadic illegality and violence directed against persons known or suspected of being Leftists. It is in view of these conditions that British authorities in London have tentatively decided to retain British troops in Greece over the winter, and to endeavor to establsh a Gendarmerie that may perform its police duties more impartially and with less violence than does the National Guard.

Role of British Troops in Greece:

  1. It is a general policy of the British army to leave as much of the policing of Greece to Greeks as is possible. In Southern Greece, where there are relatively few supporters of EAM/ELAS, British troops are concentrated in battalion or larger units, and very seldom intervene either to support or to restrain the Greek authorities. In Central and Northern Greece, however, where a large percentage of popular sentiment is antagonistic to the present government of Greece and opposes the Gendarmerie and National Guard, British troops are dispersed in company and platoon detachments; and normally, whenever something unusual is in the wind, mixed Greek and British patrols are organized to investigate. In general, British efforts are directed more toward restraining the illegal and violent methods favored by some members of the National Guard, than toward supporting the National Guard against bandits or other opponents.

  2. When winter comes, with its attendant difficulties of transportation (the roads of Western Macedonia are snowbound for about three months), British troops will perforce be concentrated in the principal communications centers of Northern Greece, and policing of the smaller towns and villages will be left exclusively in the hands of Greek forces. General Boucher plans to station his troops in battalion camps for the winter, located in the following towns: Komotiní, Kavalla, Drama; Serres, Salonika, Kilkís; Verroia, Edessa, Kozáni. It is not even sure whether the road to Kozáni can be kept open through the winter, since snow plow equipment will be necessary, and is not yet on hand.

Future of the National Guard:

  1. As soon as the Gendarmerie is up to strength, and no longer needs National Guard assistance to police the country, the British expect to convert the National Guard battalions into a Frontier Force, totalling 9-12 battalions. Surplus personnel will be transferred to the regular army, or else demobilized. According to present hopes and plans, the transfer of all police responsibility from the National Guard will be completed before November.

  2. For the present, the National Guard is being starved of equipment and milked of men for the benefit of the Gendarmerie. Plans for raising new National Guard battalions have been dropped, with the result that some districts of Greece are policed by locally recruited National Guardsmen, while others are under the “Athens battalions” which were originally raised during December to fight against ELAS in Athens and Piraeus. The nominal strength of a National Guard battalion is 530, all ranks; but actually many battalions in Northern Greece can muster no more than 200 men at the present time, owing largely to transfers to the Gendarmerie.

The Gendarmerie:

  1. The Gendarmerie is expected to control Greece with half the number of men used by the National Guard (30,000 as against 60,000). It is a volunteer, career service; and at the present time, its ranks are being recruited largely from among former Gendarmes and present day National Guardsmen. British officers believe that the Gendarmerie will establish a better reputation for itself than has the National Guard; that it will meet with less hostility among the population; and that, consequently, it will be able to establish smaller detachments, and man smaller, more numerous posts. The British apparently rely on an election to clear the political air in Greece, hoping that it will stabilize the government, and thus facilitate the task of the Gendarmerie.

  2. Up to the present, only a more or less skeleton Gendarme organization has been established throughout Greece. Actual day to day policing has been taken over by the Gendarmes in all the principal provincial towns, and in a few of the villages small detachments have been set up. As more men come from Athens, more and more of these village detachments will be sent to their stations, until there will be one Gendarme post for every three or four villages in Greece.

The National Army:

  1. Since it has been decided to keep British troops in Greece for an additional six months or more, the urgency of the need for a Greek National Army has lessened; and, due to an acute shortage of almost every sort of military equipment, plans for the establishment of two more divisions (in Salonika and Thessaly) have been indefinitely postponed.

Comment:

  1. This revision of British plans is made inevitable by their failure to deliver supplies sufficient to equip the proposed Greek army. It is made advisable by the fact that it is quite improbable that any Greek force would be able to maintain peace and order inside the country were it not supported (and restrained) by foreign troops; and a turbulent Greece might easily inflame world relations by entangling Russian with British interests.

  2. At the same time, it appears doubtful whether the Gendarmerie will prove much less partisan than the National Guard in its administration of the law. Its members are all recruited from the Right; and many of them have served as Gendarmes under both Metaxas and the Germans. Furthermore, given the volatile Greek temperament, it is a question whether an early election will not rather exacerbate than calm political passions in this country.

WILLIAM H. MCNEILL
Captain, CAC, Asst. Military Attaché

Approved and forwarded:
STERLING L. LARRABEE
Lt. Colonel, GSC, Military Attaché
82 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745: Telegram

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Acting Secretary of State

Babelsberg, July 17, 1945
Secret
Victory-51

To Kindleberger and Wolf, White House, Washington for [Acting] Secretary of State from Pauley.

Understand that Reinstein has been preparing materials on possible Italian reparations and restitutions. Urgently require outstanding features of this report. Cable summary to me at Tripartite Conference Headquarters Masterwork Berlin with particular emphasis upon what might be available for reparations and possible value of same. Send also estimates made by State and FEA as to value of imports required by Italy in order to maintain her economy over the coming year. (Repeat message for Sproul, c/o American Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations, American Embassy, Moscow, for his information numbering the repeat message as follows Confrep 3.)

83 
864.918/7-1745: Telegram

The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State

Budapest, July 17, 1945 — 4 p.m.
Secret
297

Gregoriev Pushkin’s Assistant has asked Balogh for list Hungarian newspapermen previously correspondents wholly or in part for foreign newspapers and who will presumably engage in reporting subsequent to reestablishment international communications. This is first evidence Russians will raise blackout on foreign correspondents but there are no indications they will permit uncontrolled reporting.

SCHOENFELD

84

First plenary meeting, 5 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pauley Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev
Mr. Davies Sir William Strang Mr. Novikov
Mr. Dunn Major Birse Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Clayton Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

Premier Stalin proposed that President Truman preside over the meetings.

Churchill seconded the proposal.

The President accepted it and inquired if it were proper for him to propose some items for the agenda.

Stalin agreed.

Eden asked if all members would have the power to add to the agenda.

The President replied that they would. The President then took up the proposal for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers and read the document on this subject (Attachment 1).

The President stated his second memorandum related to Germany. (The President did not read the proposed draft agreement in regard to Germany but handed it in for study. Attachment 2.)

Churchill inquired if this meant they were not to give any consideration to these matters now.

The President replied that he was merely proposing items for the agenda.

Churchill proposed that the first item proposed by the President be referred to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

Stalin said he agreed but he was not clear about the inclusion of China in the Council. He said he supposed that it was contemplated that the Council would discuss European problems.

The President said that this could be discussed by the Foreign Ministers and then referred back to the meeting of heads of state.

Churchill said it would be returned with the comments of the Foreign Ministers.

Reverting to the question of the policy with regard to Germany, the President said he proposed that the Control Council should commence to function immediately in accordance with the agreement which had already been entered into. He said he was submitting a document containing the United States proposals on this matter.

Churchill said that he had only just seen this document and that he could not express any opinion.

The President said he did not expect any expressions of opinion now.

Stalin remarked that he also had not studied the document.

Churchill said that this was such a wide subject that it was not appropriate for the Foreign Ministers but that the heads of state should study it and then discuss it.

Stalin said they could take it up the next day but that it might be well to let the Foreign Ministers study it.

Churchill said the Foreign Ministers would be busy enough with the other item that had been referred to them.

Stalin agreed.

The President then read the document on the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe (Attachment 3). Before reading the United States proposal in regard to policy towards Italy, the President said that in view of the recent Italian declaration of war on Japan he hoped that it would be possible for this meeting to agree to support Italian entry into the United Nations Organization in recognition thereof. If this was acceptable he thought that the Foreign Ministers might be instructed to prepare a suitable declaration.

Churchill said that this was an important matter on which their positions were not the same. The British were attacked by Italy in 1940 at the time France was going down which was described by President Roosevelt as “a stab in the back.” The British fought the Italians for some time before the United States came in. At a most critical time we were obliged to send sorely needed troops to Africa and we fought two years on those shores until the arrival of the American forces. We also suffered very heavy Naval losses in the war with Italy in the Mediterranean. We provided 14 out of the 15 vessels which was the equivalent of the Russian share of the Italian fleet.

The President proposed to read the American document on this question.

Stalin intervened to suggest that the discussion be confined to the setting up of the agenda.

The President agreed.

Churchill said he was grateful to the President for opening up this discussion and for the positive contribution he had made in submitting his proposals which would have great advantage. He said, however, that the question must be given very careful consideration. He suggested that the President proceed to give his presentation now.

Stalin agreed.

The President then read the document on Italy (Attachment 4).

The President said he wished to state that he appreciated the honor of having been made Chairman of the meeting. He said he had come gladly to the Conference but that he had come with some trepidation because in the United States he had had to succeed a man who could not be replaced and one who was on the friendliest terms with both the Prime Minister and Premier Stalin. He said that he hoped he would merit the same friendship. The questions he had presented were of the highest importance but he wished it understood that he could add under [sic] other questions and that both of the other representatives could do the same.

Stalin said he agreed.

Churchill said he should like to express on behalf of the British delegation his gratitude to the President for undertaking the Presidency of this momentous Conference and to thank him for presenting so clearly the views of the mighty republic which he heads. The warm and ineffaceable sentiments which they had had for President Roosevelt they would renew with the man who had come forward at this historic moment and he wished to express to him his most cordial respect. He trusted that the bonds not only between their countries but also between them personally would increase. The more they came to grips with the world’s momentous problems the closer their association would become.

Stalin said that on behalf of the Russian delegation he wished to state that they fully shared the sentiments expressed by Mr. Churchill.

Churchill then proposed that they go to the simple question of the agenda and either deal with items or refer them to the Foreign Ministers. The agenda was not complete but they had a program. The British, of course, wished to add the Polish problem to the agenda.

The President said that he wanted the Prime Minister and Premier Stalin to add any questions to the agenda that they wished.

Stalin said it would be well for the three delegations to set forth the questions they wanted discussed. The Soviet delegation wished to add the question of the division of the German merchant fleet and Navy. Some correspondence had been exchanged on this subject and it was agreed that it should be discussed at this meeting. They also wished to add the question of reparations not only from Germany but also from Italy.

Churchill asked what about Bulgaria and Rumania.

Molotov said that was already taken care of.

Stalin then proposed the question of territories to be placed under trusteeship.

Churchill inquired whether Stalin was referring to areas in Europe or in general throughout the world.

Stalin replied that this could be discussed. The Soviets had already mentioned that they would like some territories of the defeated states.

The Soviet delegation also wished to raise the question of relations with satellite states.

Another question which the Soviet delegation wished to discuss was that of Franco Spain. The Spanish regime did not originate in Spain but was imported and forced on the Spanish people by Germany and Italy. It was a danger to the United Nations and he thought it would be well to create conditions which would enable the Spanish people to establish the regime they want.

Churchill said they were only discussing the agenda. He agreed that this item should go on the agenda.

Mr. Attlee said he would be very happy to see this item go on the agenda.

Stalin said that perhaps the question of Tangier should be brought up, as well as that of Syria and Lebanon.

Churchill said that Eden had pointed out to him that in the absence of the French this question could only be discussed provisionally.

Stalin said it would be interesting to clarify the views held by the three powers.

Stalin then added that he wished to propose a discussion of the Polish question. What they had in mind was the question of the present émigré Polish Government.

Churchill said it was most necessary that the Polish question should be discussed. As a result of the discussions since Yalta sensible progress had been made. He agreed that the question should be discussed and that the winding up of the former London Polish provisional government was part of that question. He was sure that Premier Stalin and the President would realize that Britain had been the home of the Polish Government and the base from which the Polish Armies were maintained and paid. He thought their objectives were the same but the British would have a harder task than the other two powers because they would have the details to handle. They did not wish to release large numbers of soldiers in their midst without making proper provision for them. He thought they could handle this problem in a satisfactory manner. It was important to continue to carry out the Yalta agreement and he, of course, attached great importance to the Polish elections in order that the will of the Polish people would be reflected.

Stalin said he had no other questions to add.

Churchill said they had already sent in their agenda. He wished, however, to suggest that the three Foreign Secretaries meet today or tomorrow to pick out the questions which were to be discussed at the next meeting. They knew the questions and knew which were prepared for discussion but it would be well to have a definite program. The Foreign Ministers could prepare the dinner better than they could themselves. The President and Stalin had no objection.

Churchill said that the broad presentation had been made and at the next meeting they would address themselves to the questions that were the most agreeable or perhaps he should say, the least disagreeable.

Stalin observed that in any event they could not escape the disagreeable ones.

He wished to know if they would proceed with their meeting this evening. Were there any matters they could take up before the Foreign Ministers had made their selection?

The President asked if there were any suggestions.

Stalin proposed that they discuss the question of the Council of Foreign Ministers and The President and Prime Minister agreed.

The President said he had submitted his views and a draft proposal.

Stalin said that the principles advanced by the American Delegation met with no objection on the part of the Soviet Delegation but they wished to question the inclusion of China if the Council is to deal with European problems.

The President pointed out that China was one of the permanent members of the Security Council which [it] had been agreed at San Francisco to set up.

Stalin said that at Yalta a decision had been taken for regular meetings of the three Foreign Ministers. He wished to know if that was to be dropped now.

The President said he did not understand that the arrangements relating to the three Foreign Ministers was a permanent one.

Stalin replied that the arrangement was not permanent. It had been arranged that they were to meet several months later. He assumed that this was now dropped and also that the European Advisory Commission would now lapse.

The President pointed out that the Council of Foreign Ministers was being set up for a definite purpose.

Stalin said that they could deal with any other question. The Crimea decision should be regarded as having lapsed and in this case the European Advisory Commission would also lapse. These would be replaced by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The President said that it was satisfactory to him to interpret it in this way.

Churchill said he had supposed that the three Foreign Ministers were to meet about every three months and that they would advise the three Heads of Governments on matters that are going on from day to day. He thought it was a complication, even though it might look like simplification, to bring in China. He was agreeable to China being represented and to the Foreign Ministers’ drawing up conditions of peace but day to day questions were very urgent. He questioned the advisability of bringing in from the other part of the world a country which had contributed little to the defeat of the enemy in Europe. It was easy to set up bodies that look well on paper but which do little in practice. Could not the future of Germany be decided without China?

The President suggested that the question of the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers be passed over for the time being as this was another matter and they were now discussing his specific proposal.

The President then read Annex I to Attachment I.

Stalin said they had the duty to prepare for the peace conference. The war was over in Europe and it would be for this Council to deal with the effect of this fact. The Council could also give them a hint as to the date.

The President said that he agreed that the date might be fixed when we felt that it could be successfully concluded.

Churchill said that there did not seem to him to be any difficulty in reconciling the objects they were pursuing. We ought to set up a peace conference. We ought not to replace the two useful bodies which have been set up, namely, the Three Foreign Ministers and the European Advisory Commission, which brings in France. It was a matter of the selection of the body to be used. He would be sorry to see these existing organisms destroyed. They can co-exist. Until the Japanese were defeated, he saw difficulties in China’s having an important voice in settling the tangled problems of Europe – the volcano from which war springs. He saw no useful purpose in including the Chinese in the European settlement. China was far away and did not see questions the way they did. Perhaps while the Council is sitting, we would receive better news from the Far East. He suggested that the world peace treaty be settled by the Five Powers but that European problems be dealt with by the Four Powers directly concerned and that the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers and the European Advisory Commission be continued. He did not see that China could give us good advice on handling the Rhineland question. It would have only an intellectual interest in the matter.

The President said we might have to settle that problem here too.

Stalin said that perhaps the question of the Council could be referred to the Foreign Ministers.

The President observed that he had no objection to China being excluded from the Council.

Churchill said he saw difficulties in a Power having full representation when its interests were not directly concerned.

The President said the question was referred to the Foreign Ministers.

Stalin observed that they would have nothing to do as all questions would be discussed by the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill suggested that the Foreign Ministers look into the question of there being four or five members of the Council. Stalin interrupted to say “Or three members?”

Churchill also suggested that the Council be confined to questions of peace and that meetings of the three Foreign Ministers and the EAC be continued. The Foreign Ministers would also pick out what questions were to be discussed at the meeting of the Heads of States.

Stalin inquired whether it was a question of a peace treaty or a peace conference.

Churchill said the Council would prepare a plan for the peace which would be submitted to the Three Heads of States.

Stalin inquired as to the time.

Churchill replied that this would depend on the progress which the Council made and upon the course of events.

Stalin suggested that the Foreign Ministers discuss the extent to which it was necessary to preserve the EAC and the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers.

The President said there should be something which they could discuss tomorrow and upon which they could arrive at a decision. He proposed that they meet at four instead of at five o’clock and that they now adjourn.

Stalin agreed that they adjourn but there was one question he could raise now: Why does Churchill refuse to give Russia her share of the German fleet?

Churchill exclaimed “Why?” and went on to say that he thought that the fleet should be destroyed or shared. He observed that weapons of war are horrible things.

Stalin said, let’s divide it. If Mr. Churchill wishes, he can sink his share.

The meeting adjourned.

85

Cohen notes

Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 5 p.m.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN opened the meeting by suggesting that PRESIDENT TRUMAN be asked to serve as the presiding officer. The GENERALISSIMO’S suggestion was seconded by MR. CHURCHILL. PRESIDENT TRUMAN said there was nothing he could do but yield to their wishes and to preside. He thanked them for their courtesy.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN then stated that he had some concrete proposals to lay before the Conference.

He first pointed out the urgency of preparing for the European settlements. He submitted to the meeting a draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers.

MR. CHURCHILL suggested that the paper be referred to the foreign secretaries.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said he agreed with that procedure but only wished to mention that he had some doubt as to the inclusion of China in a Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with the European peace.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN then stated he desired to make a statement with regard to our policy toward Germany.

(1) He thought that the Control Council should commence to function immediately in accordance with the agreement already entered into. For this purpose he was submitting for their consideration a draft containing the principles which should be followed by the Control Council in the administration of Germany.

MR. CHURCHILL indicated that he had not had a chance to read the draft agreement and he would like to do so before the matter was referred to the foreign secretaries.

(2) THE PRESIDENT then read his prepared statement on the need for the implementation of the Yalta Declaration.

MR. CHURCHILL also indicated that he wanted time to read the document which he probably generally concurred in.

(3) THE PRESIDENT then stated that the time had come for revision of our Italian policy. Italy had entered the war against Japan and he thought the time had come to admit Italy into the United Nations. He submitted a prepared proposal looking toward the establishment of peace with Italy.

MR. CHURCHILL stated he thought we were preparing to deal with very important policies somewhat too hastily. He thought that these important matters required very deliberate consideration. Britain had fought for four years against Italy. Italy had entered the war against Britain at a most critical time. President Roosevelt himself had used the phrase regarding the dagger that stabbed the neighbor in the back with reference to Italy’s entrance into the war. Possibly he would not differ from the concrete proposals of THE PRESIDENT but he wished more time to consider.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN pointed out that he had to step into the place of a man who really was irreplaceable. He knew that Mr. Roosevelt had gained their good will and their friendship both for himself and for his country and he hoped that he might be able to succeed in part to that friendship and good will.

MR. CHURCHILL stated that he felt certain that both he and THE MARSHAL wished to renew the great regard and affection that they had for Mr. Roosevelt with MR. TRUMAN. Their common friendship had served to hold their countries together in the most trying period of history. Mr. Truman has come to join them at a most critical time. He extended his cordial regard and respect to MR. TRUMAN. He had every hope and confidence that the ties that bound their nations together would be continued.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN on behalf of the whole Russian delegation, expressed the desire to join in the sentiments expressed by MR. CHURCHILL.

MR. CHURCHILL suggested we go over various points proposed for discussion and try to agree on the agenda.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN: We have offered what we think is most important.

CHURCHILL: I would like to add the Polish question.

STALIN: It would be well for the three delegations to set forth the questions they would like to discuss. Russia would like to discuss (1) the question of the division of the German merchant fleet and navy; (2) the question of reparations; (3) trusteeships for Russia under the San Francisco Charter; (4) relations with the Axis satellite states; (5) Franco regime imposed on Spain by the Axis. This regime should be changed. It harbors great danger to the United Nations.

CHURCHILL: We are only discussing things to go on the agenda. I agree that the matter of Spain should be discussed.

STALIN: (6) the question of Tangier.

CHURCHILL: Mr. Eden has advised me we can reach only provisional agreement on Tangier in the absence of the French.

STALIN: (7) The question of Syria and Lebanon; (8) the Polish question involving the determination of Poland’s western frontiers and the liquidation of the London Government.

CHURCHILL: We agree the Polish question should be discussed including the willing up of the London government. We hope the Marshal and the President will recognize that England was made the home of the Polish government which fought against the Axis. England has the burden of winding up these obligations. Our objectives are similar but probably more difficult for Britain. She cannot force the liquidation of the Polish army before the arrangements have been made for taking care of the soldiers. With regard to Poland, Britain attaches great importance to the election that should give the people an opportunity to realize their wishes.

STALIN: The Russians have no additional points to add to the agenda.

CHURCHILL: The British have submitted in writing their proposed agenda. I suggest the foreign secretaries meet tonight to agree on the agenda for tomorrow. They can prepare a menu for us better than we can at this table.

STALIN and TRUMAN agree.

CHURCHILL: So tomorrow we will have prepared the points most agreeable.

STALIN: All the same, we will not escape the disagreeable.

CHURCHILL: We will feel our way up to them.

STALIN: Shall we proceed with the meeting further today?

TRUMAN: Have you any suggestions?

STALIN: We might take up the Council of Foreign Ministers.

TRUMAN: I have submitted my views.

STALIN: The principles suggested by the American delegation present no difficulty, but I would like an explanation of the reason for China’s participation in European affairs.

TRUMAN: China is one of the five members of the Security Council.

STALIN: The decision taken at Crimea provided for quarterly conferences of the foreign secretaries. Does PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S suggestion supersede the Crimea proposal?

TRUMAN: The Crimea proposal was temporary.

STALIN: Then the quarterly meeting of the secretaries will be dropped. Should not the European Advisory Committee [Commission] also be dropped? I have no objection to the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but I think it should be clear that the quarterly meeting of the foreign secretaries and the European Advisory Committee elapse [will lapse?].

TRUMAN: That interpretation would be satisfactory to me. The foreign secretaries could meet but there probably would be nothing for them to discuss.

CHURCHILL: The quarterly meetings of the foreign secretaries are very helpful in advising us. I think it a needless complication to bring China in. When it comes to drawing up the peace, all countries must come in. The preliminary work cannot be done by telegram. I am content that China should be admitted to drawing up the general provisions for peace but not for the day-to-day work. China is far from Europe and has not contributed to the European war. Do you really wish to discuss the administration of Germany with the Chinese delegation?

TRUMAN: The problems to be considered by the Council are quite different from the ordinary meetings of the foreign secretaries. It is intended for a specific purpose. Let me read the draft proposal.

(The draft proposal is read by MR. TRUMAN)

STALIN: This will be a Conference to prepare for the future Peace Conference.

CHURCHILL: The Peace Conference.

STALIN: The war is over in Europe and this Council will deal with reparations and will give an indication of the day when the Peace Conference should meet.

TRUMAN: The Peace Conference should not be convened until we are adequately prepared.

CHURCHILL: This does not seem to me to present any difficulty in reconciling our different objectives. We ought to have a council to prepare for the peace, but it should not supersede the two practical bodies, to wit: the quarterly meetings of the foreign secretaries, and the European Advisory Committee, which deal with current events. I would regret to see these two bodies to cease to exist. Until the Japanese war is over I see great difficulty in China’s having a voice in the trying problems of Europe. I see no advantage in introducing China with the European settlement. They have not fought in Europe. It is possible that while the Council is sitting, the war with Japan will end. Then China can and should come into the World Peace Conference. I do not see that China could help us in settling the question of the Reich.

STALIN: Perhaps the matter can be referred to the foreign ministers.

TRUMAN: I have no objection to the foreign secretaries eliminating China if they think that that is best.

CHURCHILL: China might be present and come in when Asiatic matters are considered.

STALIN: As all the questions are to be discussed by the foreign ministers, we shall have nothing to do (Laughter).

CHURCHILL: Our first task is making a peace in Europe – ultimately in the world. The quarterly meeting of the foreign secretaries should continue and the European Advisory Committee fitted in. The Council should make plans for the peace for submission to their governments when their governments are ready to come together for that purpose.

STALIN: The time of the Conference.

CHURCHILL: That depends on events and the progress made by the Council.

STALIN: The Foreign secretaries should discuss the necessity of preserving the European Advisory Committee as well as the quarterly meeting of the foreign secretaries.

TRUMAN: There should be some issue to discuss on which we can come to a conclusion tomorrow.

CHURCHILL: The secretaries should give us three or four points – enough to keep us busy.

TRUMAN: I don’t want just to discuss, I want to decide.

CHURCHILL: You want something in the bag each day.

TRUMAN: I should like to meet at 4:00 instead of 5:00.

CHURCHILL: I will obey your orders.

STALIN: If you are in such an obedient mood today, MR. PRIME MINISTER, I should like to know whether you will share with us the German fleet.

CHURCHILL: We will share it with you or sink it.

Tripartite Communiqué

The Berlin conference of the heads of government of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union met this afternoon at 5 o’clock. By invitation of his two colleagues, the President of the United States of America will preside at the meetings of the conference.

A preliminary exchange of views took place on matters requiring decision by the heads of government.

It was decided that the three foreign secretaries should hold regular meetings with a view to preparing the work of the conference.

86 
740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-1745: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State

Rome, July 17, 1945
Plain
2010

Most Rome papers this morning carry United Press item stating that Colonel James Henderson Douglas will arrive in Italy probably on July 24 to assume post of Chief Commissioner of Allied Commission replacing Admiral Stone (see my 1877, July 7th).

KIRK

87

The Pittsburgh Press (July 17, 1945)

BIG THREE OPENS POTSDAM CONFERENCE
Truman talks with Stalin at luncheon

Foreign chiefs also attend

…

88

U.S. drafts terms for Japs when they decide to give up

…

89

Library WAC handles calls for Big Three at Potsdam

Sgt. Royer works on switchboard

…

90

Simms: Truman holds trump cards to play at Potsdam meeting

By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

…

91

Conference gag irks reporters

Censorship rules worse than in war

…

92

Editorial: Potsdam

At Potsdam, shrine of militarism, the preliminary peace conference opens today under hopeful signs. Marshal Stalin’s tardy arrival forced a day’s delay. But it appears to have been in the best cause.

He has been closeted in Moscow with Premier Soong. If a Russian-Chinese agreement is in the making, as reported, it can do much to preserve Pacific peace after Jap militarism is destroyed. The fact that American Ambassador Harriman was the only outsider consulted on the Statin-Soong conversations reflects the vital interest of our country.

The importance of those negotiations to the Potsdam meeting cannot be exaggerated. Though this is a session of the Big Three without China, and though the Far East is not on the official agenda, actually Japan’s defeat and the future of that part of the world are basic to American-British-Russian relations. That is true even though Russia is not now at war with Japan, which restricts the official range of Potsdam.

While the Pacific problem will be at this conference in spirit, and while Middle Eastern and other questions will be discussed, of course the main task is a European settlement. That involves immediate occupation and rule of Germany, which the Big Three and France are to share. Also it includes preparation for the general Allied peace conference, or perhaps series of peace conferences.

Success of the Potsdam meeting is not assured. Indeed, complete success is impossible. For it will deal with scores of complicated and deep-rooted problems – military, economic, territorial and political – not one of which can be solved in any final sense. No statesmen ever have faced such a stupendous job.

If the Big Three can make a genuine start in dealing jointly and constructively with only a few of these issues, and can prevent some others merely from getting worse, theirs will be a great success as it is counted in this war-weary world.

That achievement will depend in part on the intelligence of the Big Three and their technical advisers. But it will rest most on the ability to get along together. They must meet one another halfway. Unless they can compromise selfish interests and resolve mutual differences, Potsdam will fail.

We think it will not fall. With all its ups and downs, it should advance the world nearer the goal for which so many have died and still die.

93

Japs reported in peace move

Stalin may have offer from Tokyo

…

94

Youngstown Vindicator (July 17, 1945)

27 WACs are assigned to Big Three switchboard

WASHINGTON (UP) – Twenty-seven WACs have been assigned to telephone switchboard duty at the Big Three conference at Potsdam, the War Department reported today. The WACs are members of the 3341st Signal Service Battalion.

95

Eliot: Russo-Sino talks of key importance

Points out possibility for another war after this
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

…

96

U.S. State Department (July 17, 1945)

800.515/7-1745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 17, 1945 — 7 p.m.
Secret
U.S. urgent

1629

British have now agreed to proposal outlined Deptstel 1316 June 15. Spanish situation urgent. Reurtel 2570 July 14 inform Soviet we assume their concurrence in view of reports from Ankara and Stockholm that Soviet has so warned Turks and Swedes. Make point 5 of Depstel 1534 July 6 if can conveniently do so. For your information Dept proposes to continue stressing coordinated action and maintenance of trusteeship principle. This would preclude particular occupying power from disposing of German external assets to its own advantage. American expressions to Soviet regarding German Legation property Stockholm and German shares Rumanian oil companies will probably make these points.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to SecState Berlin for Collado and Despres.

GREW
C[OVEY] T. O[LIVER]