Youngstown Vindicator (July 29, 1945)
What we’re up against in Asia
Our task will only have begun with the defeat of Japan – problem of Europe is small in comparison – we’re in the Pacific to stay
By Sen. Elbert Thomas, D-Utah
…
U.S. State Department (July 29, 1945)
Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference
Sunday, July 29:
1000: The President attended Protestant church services at the Coliseum. The services were conducted by Captain Northern.
1130: Mr. Molotov, accompanied by Mr. Galounsky (interpreter) called at the Little White House. The President, Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Galounsky conferred for more than an hour. Generalissimo Stalin was indisposed and could not attend.
The President presented autographed pictures to Colonel General S. N. Kruglov, Lieutenant General N. D. Gorlinski and Colonel M. M. Koretsky of the Red Army. These officers, members of the Soviet Advance party, had charge of arrangements at Babelsberg for the housing and security of the Big Three.…
Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon.
1630: Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Bevin, and Sir Alexander Cadogan called at the Little White House. They conferred for some time with the President and Secretary Byrnes.
There was no meeting of the Big Three today. Generalissimo Stalin was still indisposed.
1930: Captain Ross was a dinner guest at the White House this evening. Dinner music was furnished by an Army band.
The Syonan Shimbun (July 30, 1945)
Invincible country like Nippon will never think of surrender
Army spokesman ridicules foe proclamation
…
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 30, 1945)
Japan lehnt Ultimatum ab
Die japanische Regierung ist gewillt, den Krieg bis zum bitteren Ende auszesechten
NEW YORK, 29. Juli (Reuters) – Der Japanische Rundfunk gab bekannt, dass Ministerpräsident Suzuki das Ultimatum der Alliierten, zu kapitulieren, abgelehnt hat. Radio Tokio fügte hinzu, dass Suzuki in einem Interview die Entschlossenheit der japanischen Regierung den Krieg fortzusetzen zum Ausdruck brachte. Die kaiserlich-japanische Regierung wird die Aufforderung zur Übergabe durch die Alliierten nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen.
Zur Ablehnung des Ultimatums durch Japan schreibt der Reuter-Korrespondent William Hardcastle: „Die nach den letzten Angriffen von Superfestungen entstandenen ungeheuren Brände wüteten noch in drei japanischen Kriegsindustrie-Zentren, als die japanischen Minister von dem 77-jährigen Premier, Admiral Suzuki, in aller Eile in die Residenz berufen wurden, um das Ultimatum der Großmächte, „Übergabe oder Zerstörung“, zu besprechen. Nach einer dreistündigen Kabinettssitzung verkündete die japanische Nachrichtenagentur an die Alliierten eine herausfordernde Antwort, in der es heißt, dass „Japan den Krieg seiner feststehenden Politik entsprechend bis zum bitteren Ende ausfechten werde.“
Die gesamte Propaganda-Maschine der Vereinigten Nationen wird eingesetzt, um das japanische Volk von der Proklamation in Kenntnis zu setzen. Von Superfestungen werden Flugblätter mit der Aufforderung an die Japaner, ihre Regierung zu stürzen, kreuz und quer über das ganze japanische Mutterland abgeworfen. Der Sprecher der US-Regierung, Kapitän zur See, E. M. Zacharias, sprach zum japanischen Volk und sagte, dass Japan nur die Wahl zwischen der Annahme der Bedingungen oder völliger Vernichtung hätte. Die Führer Japans könnten nicht länger ihrem Volk die Wahrheit über die Niederlage Japans vorenthalten. Japan müsse den Weg der Vernunft wählen, da seine ganze Zukunft davon abhängt. Wenn das ‚japanische Volk durch seine selbstherrliche Militärclique gezwungen würde, den Weg des Verderbens zu wählen, dann werden Schweiß und Mühe von Jahrhunderten umsonst gewesen sein.
Die Pressestimmen prangern durchgehend die eigensinnige Haltung des japanischen Kabinetts an. Die New York Times schreibt unter anderem: „Die Bedingungen dieses letzten Friedensangebotes der alliierten Regierungen wurden zurückgewiesen und somit muss und wird der Krieg im Pazifik auf dem Schlachtfeld entschieden werden. Die Bedingungen der Alliierten waren so günstig und großzügig, wie man es angesichts der langen Liste brutaler und verräterischer Angriffe Japans gerade noch verantworten konnte.“ Die New York Herald Tribune äußert sich: „Es besteht kein Anlass, durch die glatte Zurückweisung des in Potsdam erlassenen Ultimatums beunruhigt oder überrascht zu sein. Japan wird immer noch durch seine Militärclique beherrscht. Wie lange sie den Japanern noch ihre Entscheidung aufzwingen kann, ist eine andere Frage. Der Nervenkrieg, nur möglich durch Amerikas Stärke und Japans Schwäche. kann es den japanischen Militaristen bald unmöglich machen, weiteren Widerstand zu verlangen.“
L’Aube (July 30, 1945)
Cédant a une suggestion d’Attlee –
Les « Trois Grands » ajourneront-ils les grandes décisions à l’automne ?
…
U.S. State Department (July 30, 1945)
Conversation between members of the U.S. and Polish Delegations
It is not known definitely who participated in this conversation, although it appears from Despres’ memorandum of his conversation with Minc on July 29 that Major General Echols was one of the participants for the United States.
Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister
[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]
[Translation]
A Polish-American conference was held at the headquarters of the Polish Delegation concerning a transaction with regard to 2,500 tons of coal to be delivered to the American occupation sector in Berlin. The transaction was based on a payment in dollars, but the Polish side retained the right to accept oil or gasoline in payment for the supply of coal. The Americans would provide railroad freight cars for the coal and would send them to the place of loading.
Byrnes-Molotov meeting, 4:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Commissar Molotov | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov |
Bohlen Minutes
Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 4:30 p.m.
Top secret
THE SECRETARY said he wanted to talk to Mr. Molotov on two or three questions of importance still open before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting this afternoon.
He said, first of all, he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that in regard to the Polish western frontier, we were prepared as a concession to meet the Soviet desire and he, therefore, had a revised paper on this subject (copy attached). He pointed out that this would put Polish administration up to the western as against the eastern Neisse.
MR. MOLOTOV expressed his gratification at this proposal.
THE SECRETARY then said the next question was Italy and the entry of Italy into the United Nations. He had again been endeavoring to find a compromise between his British and Soviet friends. He proposed a new sentence at the end of the third paragraph and a new paragraph regarding freedom of the allied press to report on events in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland (copy attached).
MR. MOLOTOV, after hearing a translation of these changes, said while he could not say finally he believed that they would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.
THE SECRETARY then said we come to the most difficult of all the questions, namely, that of reparations. He said that he had a new proposal to make and handed Mr. Molotov the revised United States formula (copy attached). He emphasized that this was a United States proposal and that he had not yet consulted the British, adding that if they could reach agreement here on this question he would go to see the British this afternoon and endeavor to persuade them to agree.
MR. MOLOTOV studied the new proposals and then asked who was to determine what equipment was suitable for reparations.
THE SECRETARY replied that he thought since the Ruhr lay in the British zone that that would be for the British to determine on the basis of what must be left there in order to maintain the minimum required standard of living.
MR. MOLOTOV said he thought that determination of reparation materials should be done on an Allied basis in which the Soviets would participate. He suggested that it either be the Control Council or the Reparations Commission.
THE SECRETARY said that that was a possibility and should be studied. He said the Control Council operating for all Germany could determine the general norms of living standards, but that the final authority would probably remain in the commander-in-chief of the given zone, since he was responsible for that zone.
MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the Secretary’s draft did not mention any possibility of the Control Council or the Reparations Commission determining what equipment was available for reparations. Mr. Molotov then proposed that instead of the 12% [15%?] of reparations to be received without exchange that that figure be raised to 25%, thus making 25% from the Ruhr to be exchanged and 25% without exchange to the Soviet Union.
THE SECRETARY said he doubted if the British would agree to any such figure. He felt that it would be difficult enough to get them to agree to his proposal.
MR. MOLOTOV then reverted to his argument of yesterday and to the necessity of having a fixed figure either in dollars or in pounds. He repeated all his arguments on this point.
THE SECRETARY replied for his part, giving the arguments as to why it was impossible and dangerous for us to attempt to fix a definite figure either for tonnage or for dollar value at this time.
MR. MOLOTOV said he could only give a preliminary opinion and would, of course, have to consult Marshal Stalin. He said he thought the three points of difficulty would be:
- who was to determine reparations equipment,
- the absence of a fixed sum, and
- the question of deliveries from the Soviet zone.
He said that before meeting Mr. Byrnes today they had prepared a counter suggestion and he handed the Secretary a copy in Russian (copy in translation attached). He then said he wished to talk about the Ruhr, that he felt that in confining the removals for the Soviet Union to the Ruhr area it narrowed the base, since there was industrial equipment in the United States zone as well.
THE SECRETARY explained that the United States from its zone would have to help meet claims from other countries, such as France, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and others. He said that under his scheme the Soviet Union would be responsible for reparations to Poland, but that the reparations for other countries would come from the western zones.
MR. MOLOTOV said that despite the difference still existing he felt that some progress had been made in this question of reparations and he would so report to Marshal Stalin. He then said they had a proposal in regard to the question of the Ruhr as a whole. He recalled that there had been much discussion at previous conferences in regard to the internationalization of the Ruhr, but he said that nothing lately had been heard of it.
THE SECRETARY reminded Mr. Molotov that at one time President Roosevelt had been in favor of the dismemberment of Germany but had subsequently changed his mind. He recalled Marshal Stalin’s talks with Mr. Hopkins last spring on this point.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed and said that the paper he was now handing to the Secretary merely dealt with the setup of an Allied Commission composed of the four occupying powers to administer the Ruhr under the general direction of the Control Council (copy attached). Mr. Molotov said he had two other papers to hand the Secretary: one in regard to Italian and Austrian reparations based on the discussions of the Big Three, and the other, concerning war criminals which listed the first ten of such war criminals which were to be brought to trial in the near future. (Copies attached).
THE SECRETARY remarked that he had understood that Marshal Stalin had agreed to drop reparations from Austria.
MR. MOLOTOV replied they might be prepared to withdraw the reference to Austria but that the Yugoslavs would be offended, adding however, that if Yugoslavia received reparations from other sources she might be satisfied.
THE SECRETARY, in conclusion, said he wished to emphasize once again that these proposals were United States proposals and had not yet received British consent.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
Western Frontier of Poland
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.
The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River2 and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
Admission to the United Nations
The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties, so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.
For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.
The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the ratification of peace treaties with these countries.
The three Governments express the desire that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.
As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declared that:
-
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
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the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.
The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
German Reparations
Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus
(a) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we determine is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets.
(b) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet government without payment or exchange of any kind in return.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
[Translation]
On Ruhr Industrial District
Considering the Ruhr Industrial District as a part of Germany and having in view the necessity of all kind curtailment of Germany’s war potential the Conference has deemed expedient:
-
To determine that the Ruhr Industrial District shall be in respect of administration under the joint control of USA, U.K., USSR and France.
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The administration of the Ruhr Industrial District shall be exercised by the Allied Council composed of representatives of U.K., USA, USSR and France.
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The Industry of the Ruhr District will be utilized for reparation purposes in conformity with the common reparation plan.
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To establish immediately, in view of prompt accomplishment of this decision, provisional Allied Council composed of representatives of USA, U.K., USSR and France, which in a months term will carry out necessary preparatory work and will assume the provisional Administration of the Ruhr District.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
[Translation]
Regarding Reparations from Italy and Austria
-
Italy and Austria must pay reparations in compensation of those losses which they caused the United Nations by their participation in the war on the side of Germany.
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Reparations shall be paid in the form of immediate removals of equipment from those branches of their economy which are the most important elements of their military potential. Such removals should be concluded during a period of one year.
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The total sum of reparations from Italy shall be established at three hundred million dollars. The Allied Reparations Commission shall define the amount of reparations from Austria.
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Italy shall pay reparations to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania; and Austria to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]
[Translation]
Trial of Principal War Criminals
-
The Conference has recognized as necessary for the trial of the principal war criminals whose crimes, as is stated in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, were not connected with a definite geographical place, to establish an International Tribunal in the near future.
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The Conference has decided in the first instance that judgment should be passed on the following leaders of the Hitlerite clique: Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Ley, Keitel, Doenitz, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, Streicher, Krupp.
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The leaders of the three Allied governments declare that according to the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943 they will take all measures at their disposal to provide for the surrender into the hands of justice war criminals who have taken refuge in neutral countries. In the case of the refusal of any such country to surrender war criminals who have taken refuge on their territory, the three Allied Governments will consult between each other concerning the measures which should be taken in order to provide for the effecting of their inflexible decision.
Tenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 5 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Clayton | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Vyshansky |
| Mr. Page | Major Theakstone | Mr. Gusev |
Department of State Minutes
Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m.
Top secret
MR. BEVIN in the chair.
MR. BEVIN suggested that the following questions might be disposed of:
- The invitation to the Governments of France and China to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers.
- Notification to the French Government of the decision on political principles with respect to Germany.
- Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy.
- Disposition of the German fleet and merchant navy.
- Political principles in the first stage of the control period in Germany – additional points.
- Yugoslavia.
- War crimes.
MR. BYRNES proposed that they consider the question of German external assets and submitted a paper on this question. He pointed out that there were also several matters referred to sub-committees upon which reports had not yet been received.
MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had circulated a memorandum on German troops in Norway which should be placed on the agenda today. The Soviet Delegation was circulating a memorandum on the question of fascist activities in Austria and Germany and another memorandum on the question of the Ruhr area. He also suggested that they discuss the agenda for the Big Three meeting.
Invitation to the Governments of France and China to Participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers
MR. BEVIN proposed that they today send a telegram to the French and Chinese Governments on this question.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that it was understood that the message would be delivered 48 hours before adjournment. He agreed to its being sent now.
MR. [SIR ALEXANDER] CADOGAN said that the sub-committee had agreed on a text but that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting had not considered it. In the final paragraph referring to the dissolution of the EAC he suggested the words “the three governments” rather than the words “the conference.”
This was agreed to as well as the despatch of the telegram to the Governments of France and China.
Notification to the French Government of the Decision in Respect to Political Principles for Germany
It was agreed without discussion to notify the French Government of the decision taken on this matter.
Reparations From Germany, Austria and Italy
MR. BEVIN said they should have a clear understanding of what they had decided on this matter.
MR. MOLOTOV said he had submitted a draft of the Soviet proposals.
MR. BYRNES said he would like to submit for consideration a proposal involving three matters:
-
On the subject of reparations, he wished to read a proposal which he had made to the British and Soviet Delegations. (Mr. Byrnes then read the American paper on this subject). He wished to add that they had discussed the question of Italian and Austrian reparations on several occasions. The position of the President had been made clear in the meetings of the Big Three and he thought it would not be helpful to discuss it further at the present meeting. The agreement which he now proposed on reparations was conditional upon agreement on two other proposals which he would read now because they must be considered together.
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The approval of the paper on the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the question of relations with the other satellite states. He proposed two amendments to the document on this question in an attempt to compromise the differences between the Soviet and British Delegations.
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Mr. Byrnes said that this concerned the question of the western frontier of Poland on which he had already presented a paper to the British and Soviet Delegations. The proposal would permit the administration by the Poles of the area which they claimed pending the final determination of the disposition of this area. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this proposal represented a sacrifice of the views held and expressed by the United States Delegation on this question. It was made in a spirit of compromise and that if agreement could be reached on these three proposals he would be satisfied. If not, he was willing to report to the Big Three and they could decide whether to continue the discussion or refer the matter to some future conference. He pointed out that on the settlement of these questions rested the settlement of several other matters, such as that concerning the economic principles for Germany.
MR. CADOGAN said he had submitted a paper on the question of reparations to the Soviet and United States Delegations. (A translator read the document in Russian translation).
MR. BEVIN pointed out that this proposal was connected with the next document which he would present.
MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that under the British proposal the Soviets would receive 10% from the western zone. Under the American proposal they would receive 25% against payment and 15% without payment.
MR. BEVIN pointed out that this was from the Ruhr, whereas the British 10% was from the whole western zone. They had not received the American paper when their proposals were made. He inquired which Mr. Molotov liked best.
MR. MOLOTOV observed that the American draft provided for 25% reparations to be taken in exchange for other goods.
MR. BEVIN said the British had in mind the economic principles drawn up for Germany as a whole. They were prepared to treat the supply of goods in Germany separately. He was concerned that the exchange proposed might lead to disputes. It would be difficult to exchange potatoes for chemical machinery. He was hoping that they could get an agreement for supplies over the whole of Germany and treat reparations separately. The question as to how supplies would be paid for by exports was dealt with in a separate paper. The difference between the United States and British approach was one of method. In order that the question could be examined in the full knowledge of their ideas on the subject, he proposed to read his second paper which he pointed out was linked to the first. (The translator then read in Russian translation the British paper on the question of supplies in Germany).
MR. BEVIN pointed out that the paper on economic principles should also be considered in this connection. (The translator read in Russian the paper on this subject).
MR. MOLOTOV said he felt the proposals made by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin contained a number of elements that could be taken to formulate general principles, but they required amendment and some additions. He had only just read Mr. Bevin’s proposal and would have to study it. It seemed to contain a number of points on which agreement could be reached. Mr. Byrnes’ proposals appeared to raise these questions in a more simple manner. The substance of the views of the Soviet Government were the following. The Soviet Union was anxious to receive German equipment to replace destroyed factories. He felt that the proposals of Mr. Byrnes were closer to their wishes on this. The principal question of interest to the Soviet Delegation, however, remained obscure in both proposals. They both spoke of percentages but of an unknown figure. He proposed an amendment to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal to the effect that the 25% mentioned in the Byrnes draft should be not less than 800 million dollars or two million tons of equipment. The Soviet Delegation was anxious to know what minimum was contemplated. They would, of course, prefer to speak not only of the Ruhr but of the western zones. The question could be settled if they would accept the figures given.
MR. BYRNES said as he had stated before he realized the Soviet desire for an estimate in dollars but it was impossible for us to make an estimate as we had no information as to the amount of equipment that would be available for the payment of reparations. The same applied to an estimate in tons. The amount available for reparations was dependent upon the amount necessary to maintain the economy. With respect to the dollar value it was also the question of what the value was today. The United States representatives on the Reparations Commission as well as other experts did not agree on an estimate of what was available either in dollars or in tons. Our Soviet friends must accept our statement that the economy would be maintained in accordance with the decision to maintain German economy on a uniform basis. The statement on percentages was all they should say now, if they were to avoid quarrels in the future. As an example, he asked whether the two million tons referred to the weight of the equipment or the capacity.
MR. MOLOTOV replied weight of equipment.
MR. BYRNES asked if Mr. Molotov did not think that when our experts disagree his proposal would cause all kinds of misunderstandings. They were going to trust each other on matters of much greater importance than this. When we said 40% of the equipment over and above what was necessary to maintain the economy, he must take this on good faith. Our British friends did not agree on the percentage and he spoke only of his own proposal. He was not wedded to any particular plan but thought our proposal more specific and simpler and that it would avoid misunderstandings.
MR. BEVIN pointed out that in the British proposal the 10% referred to the plants that it would be agreed would be available.
MR. BYRNES urged that [the] advantage to an agreement of this kind was that the determination of what was available in the Soviet zone would concern neither the British, French nor United States and they would not, therefore, be interfering in that determination.
MR. MOLOTOV said he felt Mr. Byrnes’ proposal was in the main acceptable but he would like some indication of the minimum amount. He repeated, however, it was better to speak of the western zone and not the Ruhr.
MR. BYRNES added that when agreement was reached on the percentage of the equipment to come from the Ruhr, the United States would have to agree with their British friends on the amount of machinery necessary to come from the American zone so as fairly to compensate the British and to take care of the claims of France, Belgium and Holland. He confined his percentages to the Ruhr because it was simpler and in order to prevent a situation in which there would be competing claimants. We would have to settle this ourselves.
MR. BEVIN said he was not in a position to state a figure because he did not know what it could be. He did not suppose that Great Britain would receive very much.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired who would determine what equipment would be made available in the western zone.
MR. BEVIN said the zone commander.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested adding “and the Control Council.”
MR. BEVIN agreed that the Control Council should be added.
MR. BYRNES said that the thought of the United States Delegation was that the Control Council should determine the matter but subject to the final determination of the zone commander.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that this should be included in the text proposed by Mr. Byrnes.
MR. BEVIN said that the question of the ascertainment of the material to be removed would be subject to investigation by the Control Council but that the zone commander should have the right of veto at the time of the decision.
MR. BYRNES agreed that in case of dispute the commander of the zone would have to make the decision.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the Control Council should have final decision.
MR. BYRNES disagreed, saying the commander in our zones and in the Soviet zone was the one who was charged with the maintaining of the economy and who had to have the final decision.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviet Delegation could not conceive of a decision which did not contain minimum figures and he thought the matter should be referred to the Big Three. On the question of who was to determine the equipment available he suggested the Control Commission or the Reparations Commission so that the Russians could take part in the matter.
MR. BYRNES repeated that he could not agree to take away the right of veto from the commander of the zone.
MR. MOLOTOV repeated who was to formulate the general program.
MR. BEVIN replied that it should be the Reparations Commission with the French added, which would work in association with the Control Council.
MR. MOLOTOV asked that this be placed in the record.
MR. BYRNES replied that so long as the commander had the right of veto he thought he could agree.
MR. MOLOTOV asked if they could accept as a basis for discussion the draft of Mr. Byrnes.
MR. BEVIN said he was sorry he could not, as he would have to defend at home the whole of this equipment being taken out of the British zone.
MR. MOLOTOV proposed that they take both zones as the basis.
MR. BYRNES replied there was no objection if the percentage was changed. In each case the percentage mentioned would have to be halved; in place of 25% it would be 12½% and in place of 15% it would be 7½%.
MR. MOLOTOV said this would mean reducing the figure too much.
MR. BEVIN said he had been working on the British figure of 10% which he thought was very high.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviets were the ones most interested in receiving equipment. A large figure had been discussed at Yalta.
MR. BYRNES said that if they could agree to designate the Ruhr and if we and the British could reach agreement, then the percentages in the American proposal were all right. If the Soviets now wanted to fix a percentage covering the two zones, it would mean simply cutting the figures in half. The Soviets would be getting 20% of the equipment in both zones. If that were done, it would be well to emphasize the Ruhr in the document because he understood that most of the equipment the Soviets wanted was there.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviet proposal was 25% of reparations by way of exchange and 25% without payment. They had in mind chiefly the Ruhr[.]
MR. BYRNES suggested that the United States and the British reach an agreement now to make an adjustment between them and added that this could be put into the protocol.
MR. BEVIN said he would rather say 12½% in exchange for other goods and 7½% without exchange. That would save him from political trouble and he added that he had the French and other claimants to think of.
MR. MOLOTOV said he was prepared to accept 20% with exchange and 25% without exchange from both zones and have it stated that they had in mind chiefly the Ruhr.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that Mr. Bevin’s proposal gave the Soviets the same amount as did his proposal. He referred again to the proposal with regard to the Polish frontier which involved a greater concession on our part than this one from the Soviets. The paper referring to the United Nations involved a concession on the part of our British friends. He knew it was a concession for the Soviets to agree to percentages but if we made concessions, the Soviets should also.
MR. MOLOTOV said it was a concession to Poland and not to them.
MR. BYRNES said he had heard his friend, Mr. Molotov, make a plea on this matter when the Poles were present and he had made a more eloquent plea than the Poles.
MR. MOLOTOV said they had received territory from the Poles and were obliged to hold to their position with respect to the western frontier of Poland.
MR. BEVIN said the British had not agreed to the American proposal on this matter and he thought it was a very good offer that was being made to the Soviets.
MR. MOLOTOV disagreed and said that they would be left with very little equipment as reparations in spite of the fact that the Germans had destroyed Soviet industries. They needed agricultural machinery and [means?] to rehabilitate their railroads. He asked if they could accept a suggestion of 25% from the Ruhr and 15% from the two zones, but added that what was important was the total figure.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that this proposal was equivalent to 55% from the Ruhr instead of 40%. He inquired if Mr. Molotov was in a position to make a final disposition today of the three questions involved in his proposal.
MR. MOLOTOV thought it should be referred to the Big Three and that the main question was that of an absolute figure.
MR. BEVIN said that it should be quite plain that the British could not agree to an absolute figure. They would not know what would remain for their other allies.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that since the Soviets would receive only a percentage the balance would remain.
MR. BEVIN raised the question of imports being a fixed [first?] charge on exports.
MR. MOLOTOV thought that the sentence on this should be supplemented by the words “to the extent to which these exports will be approved by the Control Commission, and as regards the extent of these imports not agreed by the Control Commission, priority will be given to reparations,” or it might be more simple if stated “as regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs.”
MR. MOLOTOV repeated a previous example he had given with respect to coal. If the Control Commission decided that 500,000 tons of coal should be exported, but one member proposed an additional 200,000, the 500,000 would have priority over reparations. With respect to the remaining 200,000 priority would be given to reparations.
MR. BEVIN inquired what would happen if his own Commander bought wheat and had to export coal to pay for it. Suppose in this case approval for the export of this coal was not given and he was faced with almost starvation in the zone. Would reparations take precedence in the face of a breakdown in the whole administration.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that it must be assumed that all parties were interested in a certain volume of exports. He wished to give another example. Suppose it were planned to arrange for the production of two million tons but only one and one-half million tons were produced. There was no certainty that production could be carried out and it was not possible definitely to fix a figure but 90 percent or 80 percent agreement could be reached. He had made another proposal which would cover such a case. If there were a shortage of certain resources, exports and imports should be equally curtailed as well as internal consumption. If they produced 10 percent less coal, then they should plan to reduce by the same percentage imports, reparations, and internal consumption.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that in the early days of the Conference it became evident that it would be difficult for the Soviet delegation to reach agreement with the British and ourselves. One of the reasons he had proposed the plan discussed this afternoon was to avoid such situations and disputes arising. If the Soviets agreed to his plan they would have no interest in exports and imports from our zone. Any difficulty in regard to imports and exports would have to be settled between the British and ourselves. The Soviets would have no interest and they would get their percentage regardless of what happened to us.
MR. MOLOTOV said that if they could fix a definite figure for reparations this could be arranged.
MR. BEVIN said that so far as reparations were concerned the percentage they proposed would be delivered in any case and would not be affected by this proposal which related to the normal flow of goods. He suggested it was better to leave the question and to deal with Mr. Byrnes’ proposal on the Western frontier of Poland.
MR. BYRNES replied that his proposal was a compromise proposal on three questions. He could not agree to the [separate] settlement of any one of them and suggested that they all be passed over. He could not agree to the other two if there were no agreement on reparations.
MR. MOLOTOV said it seemed that they could reach agreement on reparations but that they had left to the Big Three the one question of an overall figure. On the rest they could reach agreement.
MR. BYRNES said that they might as well send the other two questions along to the Big Three for he could not agree to them unless there was an agreement on reparations.
Disposition of the German Merchant Fleet and Navy
MR. BEVIN said the British were submitting a paper making proposals to settle the differences that had arisen. He proposed that it be submitted to a technical committee.
MR. MOLOTOV also wished to submit a Soviet draft on this matter.
A technical committee was appointed consisting of Admiral McCarthy and Mr. Weston for the British, Admiral Cooke and Mr. Russell for the United States, and Admiral Kuznetsov and Mr. Sobolev for the Soviets.
German External Assets
MR. BYRNES proposed that his paper on this question be referred to the economic sub-committee.
This was agreed to.
Political Principles for Germany
MR. BEVIN said he had submitted a paper on this.
MR. MOLOTOV proposed that the sentence in paragraph 1 regarding treatment of the population should read, “in so far as it is practicable the treatment of the German population should be the same throughout Germany.” He thought that the last sentence of the British draft which referred to the principle of free communications between zones was not in their competence, that they were not familiar with the details. He suggested that the British could raise this on the Control Council.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that while the Control Council would have the final determination this was only a declaration of principles to guide them.
MR. MOLOTOV thought it should have more study.
MR. BYRNES proposed adding the words “subject to normal regulation by the Control Council.” He agreed that the Control Council must be charged with the regulation of these questions.
MR. BEVIN proposed accepting the paper without the paragraph on this question and that this paragraph could be sent to the Control Council for examination and it could then be discussed at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers later in the year.
MR. MOLOTOV thought it would suffice for the British to bring it before the Control Commission; otherwise they would have to set up a special committee to go fully into the matter.
MR. BEVIN inquired if they agreed to the rest of the document and pointed out that the decision in paragraph (a) would have to be included in the message to the French.
MR. MOLOTOV read a proposal for an addition to paragraph 8, sub-paragraph 4, of the document on political principles. This related to the question of a central German administration to deal with economic questions. There were hints regarding this in the document but he thought that it should be stated explicitly and that it was necessary to create such an administration subject to certain limitations.
MR. BYRNES said he saw no objection to accepting Mr. Molotov’s proposal.
MR. BEVIN wondered if this were wise unless the proposal could be shortened and confined to a statement of principles instead of a detailed proposal. He suggested that the Control Commission be asked to advise them in regard to the steps to be taken to establish a central German administration, its constitution and its functions. They were here establishing a central administration without consultation with the Control Commission.
MR. BYRNES said the Big Three had been adopting directives to the Control Commission; if they thought a central administration was necessary he saw no objection to saying so. The British thought the outlining of its functions should be done by the Control Commission. He proposed that they agree to the first paragraph and to the first two lines of the second paragraph stopping with the word “Council.”
MR. BEVIN said he accepted the idea but wanted the British delegation to have a look at it that evening.
Yugoslavia
MR. BEVIN said they had circulated a paper on this question and added that the British were interested in stopping all private wars.
MR. MOLOTOV said he would also want to circulate a document on Yugoslavia.
(The translator read a Russian translation of the British paper.)
MR. MOLOTOV commented that it was difficult for a reader to understand what was implied as different things were combined in one statement. If they should summon representatives of Yugoslavia to the Conference they could ascertain what could be done.
MR. BEVIN pointed out that an understanding had been reached that until peace was established, the status quo should be maintained and that frontiers should not be altered by force.
MR. MOLOTOV said that the paper did not mention any country by name. He would need more time to examine the draft.
MR. BEVIN said he must have more time to study the Soviet draft.
War Criminals
MR. MOLOTOV submitted the Soviet draft proposal which he said had already been handed to the American delegation. He pointed out that many people would expect the Berlin Conference to say a word on this question. The Soviet proposal was that the first ten war criminals who were in the hands of the Allies and who were well known be dealt with.
MR. BYRNES said that the United States representative on the War Crimes Commission, Justice Jackson, had discussed with him the situation in regard to German war criminals. The Commission had not reached agreement but hoped to do so in the immediate future as to the definition of war crimes. So long as they had a Commission of prominent representatives dealing with this matter they might communicate the proposal to them before taking action and see if they had any recommendation with regard to the language. He agreed that it might be well if the Conference made a statement on this matter, but he would like to first telephone Justice Jackson to ascertain the status of the Commission’s negotiations.
MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that they discuss the matter the next day. He had information to the effect that the disagreements in the War Crimes Commission had been disposed of with two exceptions which would be easy to settle. There had been a disagreement as to the place where the tribunal should sit – whether in Berlin or in Nuremberg. He said the Soviets would agree to either place.
MR. BEVIN said he was glad of this because the British delegation preferred Nuremberg. He asked if the British proposal could not be accepted. He pointed out that he did not mention neutrals nor particular names. The British also had a list of names but it was not necessary to state them.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that names were of interest to all.
MR. BYRNES thought it wiser not to mention persons. The men they had selected to prepare these cases had ideas as to which criminals should be tried first. He pointed out that the list which Molotov had given him earlier today differed from the list he was now submitting. The British also had a list of names.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that they take only the names concerning which there was no doubt.
MR. BYRNES said the fact that there were two lists showed that the question was disputable. It would be better to leave the order of the names to those they had chosen to represent them.
(The translator read a Russian translation of the British proposal.)
MR. BYRNES said he thought the British proposal would be a wiser statement than the Soviet proposal and he added that we each had our pet German war criminals.
MR. MOLOTOV thought the British proposal was not enough. What was said in 1943 was not enough in 1945. He asked for time to think about it and said it was not bad but should be improved.
Fascist Activities in Germany and Austria
MR. MOLOTOV said information had reached them to the effect that certain Fascist agents were operating in the American and British zones in Austria and Germany. These were persons who had been in the employ of Hitler. The Soviet delegation felt that they should not be allowed to continue to agitate among the Soviet nationals remaining in the U.S. and British zones. He would be satisfied to receive a short statement from the United States and British to the effect that inquiries would be made in such cases and that an end would be put to these hostile activities.
MR. BYRNES said that he had asked for a report from the Army Commander and hoped to receive it the next day. When he did so he would see what steps could be taken to meet the views of Mr. Molotov.
MR. BEVIN said the British had also asked for information but it was not sure whether they would receive it the next day. If not they would take the matter up with the Soviet Government through official channels.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviets hoped for a statement at the Conference.
MR. BEVIN said that he could not be asked to take action before the facts were received and he was not going to allow any government to make him do so.
MR. MOLOTOV said they would wait.
MR. MOLOTOV said the next question he wished to raise was that concerning the information which the Soviets had received that many Germans [in Norway?] had not been disarmed.
MR. BEVIN replied that the British were sending him a complete reply in writing.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired if they should send the questions of reparations from Italy and Austria to a sub-committee.
MR. BEVIN said he thought Mr. Byrnes had withdrawn this until the main question was settled.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that he had said that this question had already been considered by them and referred to the Big Three. He understood that Marshal Stalin did not insist upon reparations from Austria but did insist upon reparations from Italy.
MR. MOLOTOV said he was only referring to Italy.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Big Three had discussed the question at great length and could not reach agreement. If his colleagues wished they could tell the Big Three that they had not finished their work and put it on their agenda again, but he saw no purpose in doing so.
MR. MOLOTOV said he did not regard the question as finished.
MR. BYRNES said he agreed that they could ask the Big Three to decide it but he wanted the report to state that this was being done on the proposal of Mr. Molotov.
MR. MOLOTOV said he agreed.
Ruhr
MR. MOLOTOV said he had presented Mr. Byrnes a paper on the Ruhr and he was now submitting it to Mr. Bevin. He did not propose that it be discussed now.
MR. BEVIN said it was impossible for them to discuss this without the French.
MR. MOLOTOV observed that they had discussed other important questions without the French.
MR. BEVIN said he was willing to study the paper but he was not willing to decide a matter as serious as this without the French.
MR. MOLOTOV said he wished to submit a paper in regard to certain misunderstandings which the Soviet delegation wished to bring to the attention of the British and American delegations in regard to nationals of the Ukraine, White Russia, etc.
Agenda for the Big Three Meeting
On the proposal of MR. BEVIN, it was agreed that the agenda be arranged by consultation.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]
German External Assets
The United States believes it important that immediate action be taken to exercise control and the power of disposition over German external assets, particularly in neutral countries. This is necessary not only from the standpoint of security but also to preserve such assets for Allied objectives.
It is therefore urged that an appropriate declaration be issued by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and if possible France, assuming jurisdiction over such assets.
There are attached alternative forms of a declaration, one which would be issued by the Big Three, and the other which would be issued by the Big Three and France.
Following the issuance of such a declaration it is recommended that the Control Council issue a decree vesting German external assets.
[Attachment 1]
Text of Proposed Declaration by the Big Three
The Chiefs of State of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union having met at Potsdam, the following Declaration is issued:
The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union declare that German external assets, not already under the control of United Nations which have taken a part in the war with Germany, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Powers occupying Germany and of the Allied Control Council.
All countries in which such assets are located are hereby called upon to place such assets at the disposition of the occupying powers and of the Allied Control Council. The diplomatic representatives of the Powers signatory to this Declaration will act as their representatives in exercising control and the power of disposition over such assets.
[Attachment 2]
Text of Proposed Declaration by the Big Three and France
The Chiefs of State of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union having met at Potsdam and having concerted with the Government of France, the following declaration is issued:
The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France declare that German external assets, not already under the control of United Nations which have taken a part in the war with Germany, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Powers occupying Germany and of the Allied Control Council.
All countries in which such assets are located are hereby called upon to place such assets at the disposition of the occupying powers and of the Allied Control Council. The diplomatic representatives of the Powers signatory to this Declaration will act as their representatives in exercising control and the power of disposition over such assets.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Proposal by the British Delegation
Potsdam, 30th July, 1945
Secret
Disposal of the German Fleet and Merchant Ships
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When this question was discussed at the Third Plenary Meeting on the 19th July, on the basis of the Soviet Delegation’s Memorandum of that date, certain conclusions were reached and it was agreed to leave the matter until the last stage of the Conference.
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The British Delegation have given further consideration to the questions raised in the Soviet Memorandum, in the light of the discussion on the 19th July, and submit the following suggestions as a basis for the decisions of the Conference on the subject. These suggestions relate to the numbered paragraphs of the Soviet Memorandum:
(1) (a) It was agreed on the 19th July that the German surface ships should be shared equally between the Three Powers. The British Delegation suggest that consideration should now be given to allotting a share to France which is an equal party to the terms of surrender for Germany and is a full member of the Control Council for Germany. The allocation of specific vessels is, it is suggested, a matter upon which an expert commission should submit recommendations to the Three Governments, after it had drawn up a list of all available surface ships, including those under construction or already launched, and those under repair which can be quickly completed. Any ships requiring more than three months for completion should be removed from Germany by the country to whom they are allocated. Remaining ships under construction will be destroyed.
(b) At the same time it was agreed in principle that the German U-boats should be dealt with separately, the greater part being destroyed. A token number would be retained for equal division among the Three Powers for purposes of research. The question of a French share of the retained U-boats should also be considered. Here again, it is suggested that the expert commission should be instructed to make concrete proposals after full investigation of the numbers of U-boats – seaworthy, damaged and under construction or repair – which are in the hands of the Allied authorities. Each of the Three Powers would be responsible for arranging the destruction of U-boats in its control, apart from the token number which it may be agreed to retain.
In deciding the allocation of German warships, the British Delegation consider that account should be taken of the Rumanian and Bulgarian warships available to the Soviet Union.
(2) The Soviet request for a proportional share of the German Navy’s reserve of armaments, ammunition and supplies was not discussed at the Plenary Meeting on the 19th July. The Soviet request is acceptable in principle to the British Delegation, who must point out, however, that these stores have been dispersed by the Germans and that the first step must be the preparation of an inventory which should be one of the tasks assigned to the proposed expert commission.
(3) It was agreed in principle that there should be a division of the surrendered German merchant shipping, but no final conclusion was reached as to the proportions to be allotted to the different Allied States. Mr. Churchill expressed the view that account should be taken of merchant shipping which had passed under the control of the Soviet Government as the result of the armistices with Finland and Rumania. President Truman emphasized the need for German shipping in the war against Japan and for bringing supplies for the rehabilitation of Europe.
The meeting agreed in principle that without prejudice to the preparation of a scheme for the division of surrendered German merchant ships, all such ships should be available for use in support of the Allied war effort against Japan.
The British Delegation maintain their point of view that in the division of the surrendered German merchant shipping account should be taken of the shipping taken as reparation by the Soviet Union from the Satellite States. Account should also be taken of the need for providing ships for local German purposes, in accordance with any recommendations which may be made by the Allied Control Council for Germany. Subject to these conditions, the British Delegation renew the suggestion made by Mr. Churchill on the 19th July that a fourth part be made available for division between the other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered substantial losses at the hands of Germany. The share of the Soviet Union would in that case be one quarter of the total available.
The shares of the various Allied States would be counted as reparation receipts.
(4) The British Delegation cannot agree to the timetable proposed by the Soviet Delegation, since, as pointed out above, there is much essential preliminary investigation and listing to be done before the transfer of ships can begin. The British Delegation suggest that the following timetable should be approved in principle by the Conference:
(a) Warships. Transfers will be carried out as soon as possible after Governments have approved the recommendations of the proposed expert commission.
(b) Merchant Ships. Proposals for the allocation of specific German merchant ships, in accordance with such decision on allocation as may be agreed by the Conference, should be agreed as soon as possible between the three Governments, in the light of recommendations made by the experts, and particular ships would then be earmarked. The transfer of these ships would take place as soon as they became available after the end of the Japanese War.
(5) The Plenary Meeting on the 19th July agreed in principle upon the formation of a Three Power Naval Commission, with reciprocal rights for each party to make the investigations required for their work in any territory under the control of the other parties. As mentioned above, the British Delegation propose that there shall be established an expert commission to deal with German warships. Its composition and duties are suggested in paragraphs (1) and (2) above.
As regards merchant ships the British Delegation suggest that detailed recommendations to give effect to the proposals in paragraphs (3) and (4)(b) should be worked out between suitable expert representatives nominated by the Three Governments to deal with merchant ships, in consultation with representatives of other interested Governments.
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There is the possibility that any public announcement that German warships are to be divided amongst the Allies may result in the German crews scuttling ships which might be ordered to sail to Allied ports. It is therefore desirable that no announcement of the division of the German Navy be made, at any rate until the expert commission has completed its investigations, which should include the detailed arrangements for carrying out the transfer of ships. A similar delay is necessary before making any definite announcement about the division of the surrendered German merchant ships.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m.
Top secret
Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 30, 1945
1. German Reparations
The U.S. Delegation presented the proposals attached hereto (Attachments la, 1b, and 1c) in regard to German reparations, to the Polish Western Frontier and to the admission of certain countries to the United Nations. The British Delegation presented two papers in regard to German reparations which are also attached hereto (Attachments 2 and 3). The Soviet Delegation urged that a specific figure of Soviet reparations from Western Germany be named and suggested 8 hundred million dollars and 2 million tons. They also preferred that the proposal specify reparations from the U.S. and British zones rather than from the Ruhr alone. The question of the specification of a definite figure was referred to the Big Three though the British Foreign Minister stated categorically that he could not agree to such specifications. There was also discussion of who should determine what amounts from Western Germany would be available for reparations and the U.S. presented the suggestion which is attached hereto (Attachment 4).
2. Economic Principles to Govern Treatment of Germany
Decision on this question was put off until the question of German reparations was settled.
3. German External Assets
The U.S. presented a paper on this subject which was referred to the Economic Subcommittee for examination. (Attachment 5).
4. Polish Western Frontier
Mr. Byrnes stated that he could not discuss this question unless agreement could be reached on all three of the proposals which he had presented at the opening of the meeting, i.e., the proposal on German Reparations, proposal on the Polish Western Frontier, and the proposal on Admission to the United Nations.
5. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine
Both the British and Soviet papers on this subject, which are attached hereto (Attachments 6 and 7), were referred to the subcommittee which has been set up to deal with this question.
6. Additional Points to Be Included in the Political Principles for Germany
The British paper on this question which is attached hereto (Attachment 8) was considered. The first point was approved. The second point was not approved but was referred for consideration to the Control Council for Germany.
The Soviet Delegation also presented a paper on this question, which is attached hereto (Attachment 9). The British and U.S. Delegations approved the Soviet proposal in principle but took the position that the details should be left to the Control Commission for Germany. The U.S. therefore suggested a modification to the Soviet proposal, which is also attached hereto (Attachment 10). It was agreed that a final decision should be reached on these proposals tomorrow.
7. Southeastern Europe
The British presented a paper on this subject which the Soviets asked for further time to study. The paper is attached hereto (Attachment 11) as well as a Soviet paper presented at the same time on conditions in the Trieste-Istria district (Attachment 12).
8. War Crimes
Both the British and the Soviets presented papers on this subject which are attached hereto (Attachments 13 and 14). There was general agreement that the Conference should make a statement on this subject and the consensus of opinion seemed to be that the statement should not include the names of possible war criminals. It was agreed that Mr. Byrnes would consult Justice Jackson and the Soviets would study the British draft with a view to discussing the question again tomorrow.
9. Fascist Activities in Germany
The Soviets referred to the paper they had circulated in regard to Nazis who are said to be active in the British, French and U.S. zones in Germany and Austria. U.S. and British representatives said that they have asked their commanders for reports on this subject and that they will communicate with the Soviet Government as soon as the reports are received.
10. German Troops in Norway
The Soviets referred to their paper previously circulated on German troops in Norway who are said not to have been disarmed. The British said that they are preparing a reply to this note, which they hope to have tomorrow.
11. Austrian and Italian Reparations
The Soviets presented a new paper on this subject, which is attached hereto (Attachment 15). Mr. Byrnes pointed out that Generalissimo Stalin had already agreed that War reparations would not be asked of Austria. On Mr. Molotov’s motion it was decided once more to refer the question of Italian reparations to the Big Three.
12. The Ruhr Industrial Area
The Soviets presented a paper on this subject, which is attached hereto (Attachment 16). Mr. Bevin stated that he could not discuss this subject without the French but agreed to study the paper.
13. Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, Western Ukraine and White Russia
The Soviets presented a paper on this subject, which is attached hereto (Attachment 17). The British and U.S. Delegations agreed to give the matter consideration.
14. Big Three Agenda
It was agreed that this agenda should be drawn up by informal consultation among the three delegations.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
[Translation]
Soviet Citizens in Allied Territories
According to the information of the Repatriation Soviet Authorities General Thorne, Commander of English troops in Norway, having quoted the British Government’s order refused to deliver to these authorities citizens of the Soviet Baltic Republics, who are at present time in Norway, as well as Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, several thousand persons altogether.
Similar situation exists in Great Britain from which country 287 Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Soviet Baltic Republics and from the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were not permitted to leave for their native country by the British authorities.
Drawing attention of the Government of Great Britain to these facts the Soviet Government expects that the British Military Authorities will immediately issue instructions about delivering to the Repatriation Soviet Military Authorities of all Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Baltic Republics and the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-3045
Rapporteur’s Report
[Babelsberg,] 31st July, 1945
Secret
P (TERMINAL) 69
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Mr. Bevin was in the Chair. The meeting began by conveying to Generalissimo Stalin an expression of the regret with which they had heard of his illness and their hope for a speedy and complete recovery.
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The meeting then agreed to the immediate despatch by each of the Three Governments of telegrams to the Governments of France and China inviting their participation in the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers. The telegram to the French Government would also refer to the dissolution of the European Advisory Commission.
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The meeting also approved the despatch of telegrams to the French Government communicating to them the text of the statement of political principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period.
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Reparations
The Foreign Secretaries considered a proposal by the United States Delegation as follows:Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus:
(a) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we determine is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets.(b) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet Government without payment or exchange of any kind in return.
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The U.S. Delegation made it clear that there were two other questions which must be settled at the same time. The first was the proposal for admission of neutral and ex-enemy states to the United Nations as regards which the U.S. Delegation had circulated a revised note; the second was a proposal concerning the Western frontier of Poland, according to which the U.S. Delegation would agree that the Polish Provisional Government should administer the area claimed by them pending final arrangement of the actual frontier at the Peace Conference. The U.S. Delegation insisted that all three proposals must be the subject of agreement at the same time.
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The Foreign Secretaries also considered proposals about reparations and sources of supply for the zones of occupation put forward by the U.K. Delegation.
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The discussion showed that there was general agreement with the lines of the American proposal, subject to the following two points:
(i) The U.S. and U.K. Delegations considered that the figures in the U.S. proposal should be 12½% from all the western zones in exchange for goods, and 7½% from all the western zones without payment. The Soviet Delegation on the other hand maintained that these figures should be 25% from the Ruhr on the basis of exchanges and 15% from each of the Western zones free.
(ii) The Soviet Delegation wished to see a minimum figure of either weight or value stated in addition to the percentages. The U.S. and U.K. Delegations could not accept this suggestion.
As there was no agreement on this question, the other two proposals by the U.S. Delegation were not discussed.
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Economic Principles
The British Delegation proposed that the following should be included in the Economic Principles: “Payment for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods”.The Soviet Delegation asked for the addition of the following sentence: “As regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations, as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs”.
The U.S. and U.K. Delegations were unable to accept the Soviet suggestion.
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German Fleet and Merchant Navy
The U.K. and Soviet Delegations submitted memoranda on the subject. These memoranda were referred to a Sub-Committee composed as follows:- U.S. Delegation: Admiral Cooke and Mr. Russell
- U.K. Delegation: Admiral McCarthy, Mr. Weston and Mr. Ward
- Soviet Delegation: Admiral Kuznetsov and M. Sobolev
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German External Assets
The U.S. Delegation submitted a memorandum on this subject, which was referred to the Economic Sub-Committee. -
Germany – Political Principles
The U.K. Delegation had proposed two additions to the statement on political principles. The first of these, which was adopted, reads as follows: “So far as is practicable there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population.”The second proposed addition was as follows: “Subject to normal regulations there shall be free circulation of nationals of the Powers represented on the Control Council in all zones by land and air.”
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It was agreed that this should be referred for examination by the Control Council for Germany, who should be asked to submit their recommendations about it to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945.
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The Soviet Delegation then suggested a third addition to the statement on political principles as follows:
Assistance will, however, be rendered to the establishment of a central German administration composed of secretaries for respective branches of administration – in the first instance of central administrative institutions for foreign trade, industry, finance, transport and communications. The central German administration shall act under the direction of the Control Council, and it will be their task to coordinate the activities of the Provincial Governments in order to ensure the fulfilment of the decisions of the Control Council and the exercise of functions connected with the solving of problems of an all-German character.
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It was agreed to defer this until the Delegations had had an opportunity to study it.
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Yugoslavia
Memoranda on this subject were circulated by the U.K. and Soviet Delegations. It was agreed to consider these memoranda at a subsequent meeting. -
War Crimes
Memoranda on this subject were circulated by the U.K. and Soviet Delegations. It was agreed to consider these memoranda at a subsequent meeting. -
Activities of Russian Fascists in Germany and Austria
The Soviet representative referred to the memorandum circulated by the Soviet Delegation on 27th July. The U.S. and U.K. Delegations said that they had asked for reports from the competent military authorities, which had not yet been received. -
German Troops in Norway
The Soviet representative referred to a memorandum on this subject circulated by the Soviet Delegation on 27th [25th?] July. The U.K. representative said that a reply on this topic had been received and would be sent to M. Molotov as soon as possible. -
Administration of the Ruhr Industrial Area
The Soviet Delegation circulated a memorandum on this subject. -
Repatriation of Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, Western Ukraine and White Russia
The Soviet Delegation circulated a memorandum on this subject.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-3045
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m.
Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business, July 30, 1945
I. Problems before the Big Three
| { | |
|---|---|
| 1. German Reparations | |
| 2. Western Frontier of Poland | |
| 3. Admission to the United Nations |
The U.S. has presented proposals on all three of these questions and has insisted that they be considered as a unit. The British also presented yesterday a new proposal on German Reparations. There seemed to be general agreement on the U.S. proposal concerning reparations, made applicable to the entire British and American Zones rather than to the Ruhr alone, with a corresponding reduction in the percentages. The specific question referred to the Big Three was whether or not a definite figure, in dollars or tons, for the Soviet share of reparations from western Germany should be specified.
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Economic Principles for Germany
It was agreed that decision on this question will depend on the decision on German reparations. -
Italian Reparations
Mr. Molotov’s motion on this question was referred back once more to the Big Three.
II. Problems before the Foreign Ministers
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Additional Points for Inclusion in the German Political Principles
The British proposed two additional points the first of which was accepted and the second referred to the Control Commission for Germany. The Soviets also presented a new point which is still before the Foreign Ministers. -
Southeast Europe and Trieste-Istria District
British and Soviet papers on these subjects are still before the foreign ministers. -
War Crimes
The Soviet and British papers on this subject were presented. It was agreed in principle that a statement on the subject should be issued by the Conference. The question of the exact form of this statement is still before the Foreign Ministers. -
Fascist Activities in the U.S., British and French Zones of Germany and Austria
The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note on this subject. -
German Troops in Norway
The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note on this subject. -
Disposition of Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, the Ukraine and White Russia now in Allied Territories
The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note10 on this subject. -
Ruhr Industrial Area
The Soviet paper on this question is before the Foreign Ministers but the British have stated they could not discuss the subject without the French. -
Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania
The Foreign Ministers have not yet acted on the latest British proposal for dealing with this subject.
III. Problems before subcommittees
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German Fleet and Merchant Marine
British and Soviet papers on this subject are before the subcommittee. -
German External Assets
A U.S. proposal on this subject was referred to the Economic Sub-committee. -
Oil for Western Europe
The Economic Sub-committee has not yet reported on the U.S. proposal on this subject. -
Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States
The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported. -
Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways
The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported. -
Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary
The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported. -
Directive to the Military Commanders in Germany
The Sub-committee on this subject is awaiting completion of the work of the Conference in relation to Germany. -
Protocol and Communiqué of the Conference
The Sub-committees are engaged in preparation of these documents.
Lane-Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m.
Polish Delegation HQ, 10 Domgasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Poland | |
| Mr. Lane | President Bierut | |
| Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk | ||
| Mr. Modzelewski |
860c.00/7-3145: Telegram
The Appointed Ambassador to Poland to the Acting Secretary of State
Babelsberg, July 31, 1945
Secret
Victory 444
To Acting Secretary of State from Lane.
Called yesterday on Modzelewski former Polish Ambassador Moscow now Assistant Minister Foreign Affairs, President Bierut and Mikołajczyk also joined group. Following is summary of Modzelewski’s remarks:
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Newspaper correspondents should be able to enter Poland before end August. Only present obstacle poor quality telegraphic communications. (As Modzelewski mentioned censorship this may also be reason for short delay.)
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Consulates can be established Danzig, Poznan, Lodz and Cracow. (Depending on outcome of western frontier we may suggest Breslau also.)
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Rate of exchange for diplomatic corps will have to be arranged. Present rate of eleven zlotys and fraction impossible for us to subsist on.
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Policing entirely adequate. Polish Government will furnish sufficient guards. Unnecessary for us bring military detachment. (Shall report further on arrival Warsaw.)
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Coal deal being arranged with U.S. here. They want goods in return principally fats, meats and oils.
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Requested my personal advice re Oskar Lange as Ambassador to U.S. I replied I thought it might create unfortunate impression because his U.S. Citizenship.
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Soviet troops being withdrawn from Poland except for portion west of 1939 west frontier. (Repeated to Moscow and Paris for Lovell.)
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Soviet, Czech, Yugoslav, French Ambassadors and Swedish and British chargés now in Warsaw.
Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Mr. Brown |
Brown: “… Met with communiqué committee after Foreign Ministers, British and Soviets seemed to like draft. Foote and I had prepared it. All of it had previously been submitted to British. …”