Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2745

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m.

Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business July 27, 1945

I. Problems before the Big Three

  1. Western Boundary of Poland.

  2. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine. (Awaiting completion of U.S. and British papers outlining concrete proposals.)

  3. Admission to the United Nations. (Referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.)

  4. War Crimes. (This British agenda topic was referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.)

  5. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems.
    (The subcommittee report, which states that the Soviets will attend the EITO [ECITO] Conference, but are still studying the question of participation in EEC and ECO, was referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.)

  6. Austrian and Italian Reparations.
    (It will apparently be necessary to report to the Big Three that the Foreign Ministers have been unable to reach any agreement in regard to Austrian and Italian reparations.)

  7. Spain.
    (If the U.S. suggestion is approved that the proposed paper on the Admission to the United Nations be dropped, the Soviet proposal for a tripartite statement on the Franco regime will still be pending before the Conference.)

II. Problems before the Foreign Ministers

  1. German Reparations.
    (To be considered at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers who, if they are unable to reach an agreement at that meeting, will refer the question to the Big Three.)

  2. German Economic Questions.
    (Decision on the outstanding questions, paragraphs 18 and 19 in regard to the source of supply for zones of occupation in Germany and to the payment for essential imports, is dependent on the decision concerning German reparations.)

  3. Rumanian Oil Equipment.
    (The Soviets are circulating a paper, a reply to the British paper on this subject.)

  4. German Political Questions.
    (The British have presented a paper proposing that two additional points be added to the German political document already approved by the conference.)

III. Problems before subcommittees

  1. Oil for Western Europe.
    (The Economic Subcommittee is still considering the U.S. proposal on this subject.)

  2. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States.
    (The subcommittee report on this question has not yet been presented to the Foreign Ministers.)

  3. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways.
    (The subcommittee report on this question has not yet been presented to the Foreign Ministers.)

  4. Transfer of German Populations from Poland and Czechoslovakia.
    (The subcommittee has not yet submitted its report on this topic.)

  5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany on Agreements Reached at the Conference.
    (It is impossible for this subcommittee to complete its work until the German economic questions have been resolved.)

  6. Protocol and Communiqué of the Conference.
    (Subcommittees are engaged in preparation of these documents.)

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 27, 1945 — 4:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

1458

Re my telegram No. 1449

Although it is difficult to predict what the Soviet reply will be to our recent request, it is possible that the repeated request by the Japanese Government is regarded as merely seeking the good offices of the Government of the Soviet Union, since we failed to indicate on what basis such a request was made. Since the request does not even indicate an outline, the Soviet Union may find it impossible to decide its attitude so simply on such an important matter, and it is conceivable that the request may be turned down again. If, by chance, it does result in a Soviet refusal, I am deeply concerned lest this may force us into a very awkward position. It may also implicate the Imperial Household, since we have been ordered by the Emperor to end further bloodshed and are strongly urged to send a special envoy.

In presenting the request, as directed in your telegram No. 931 regarding the mission of Prince Konoye, I have taken the precaution not to give the impression that the mission is to set forth the Japanese Government’s “concrete aim,” and not to present a concrete “proposal.” Lozovsky, however, stated that he understood … is to bring a “concrete proposal” and, as he hinted that he was expecting some form of concrete proposition, I believe we must pay special attention to this point.

In presenting a proposal to end such a tremendous undertaking as the present large-scale war, we do not, in the final analysis, have a definite proposition but are only explaining our intention in an indirect way. It is absolutely impossible to cause the Soviet Government to make a move with such a noncommittal attitude on our part. In this connection I do not have the slightest doubt that the straightforward attitude of the Soviet Union is designed to compel Japan to come out with a concrete proposal.

The definitive joint declaration against Japan made by the leaders of the three nations – the United States, Great Britain, and China – at Potsdam on the 26th appears to be a big scare-bomb directed against us. It became very doubtful whether the Soviet Union would offer its good offices under this offensive started by the three countries. Then there is no doubt that the aforesaid tripartite declaration is a counteroffensive, with our trial venture to terminate the war as its target. According to a broadcast of the BBC on the 26th, Lord [Louis] Mountbatten visited Potsdam on his return trip to England and is said to have reported to and consulted with the Big Three leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union on the progress of the war in the Far East. We must take note of the remark that Stalin has for the first time participated in a discussion of the war in the Far East. For your information I make this reference, since this is also a matter which I fear may have some effect on the attitude of the Soviet Union in relation to our request for the Soviets’ good offices.

Byrnes-Molotov meeting, 6 p.m.

Present
United States Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 6 p.m.
Top secret

THE SECRETARY said first of all he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that his request for a two- or three-day postponement in the issuance of the statement on Japan had only reached him this morning when it was too late.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had sent the word last night as soon as he had received the Secretary’s letter.

THE SECRETARY explained that even then it would have been too late since at 7:00 o’clock the statement had gone to the press for early morning release. He explained that the President for political reasons had considered it important to issue an immediate appeal to the Japanese to surrender. Two days ago, he had discussed it with the Prime Minister and he had received his consent to the issuance of the statement and had cabled Chiang Kai Shek. On his return yesterday from Frankfort the President had found a telegram from Chiang Kai Shek agreeing to the issuance of the statement.

MR. MOLOTOV said that thus they had not been informed until after the release.

THE SECRETARY said that we did not consult the Soviet Government since the latter was not at war with Japan and we did not wish to embarrass them.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was not authorized to discuss this matter further. He left the implication that Marshal Stalin would revert to it at some time.

THE SECRETARY then said that he had also wanted to discuss privately with Mr. Molotov the difficult question of reparations. He said he had closed off the discussion at the Foreign Ministers meeting this afternoon since nothing could be accomplished until the new British delegation had returned to the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

THE SECRETARY asked Mr. Molotov whether he had had an opportunity to think over the suggestion which the Secretary had made, namely, that each country would obtain its reparations from its own zone and would exchange goods between the zones.

MR. MOLOTOV said would not the Secretary’s suggestion mean that each country would have a free hand in their own zones and would act entirely independently of the others?

THE SECRETARY said that was true in substance but he had in mind working out arrangements for the exchange of needed products between the zones, for example, from the Ruhr if the British agreed, machinery and equipment could be removed and exchanged with the Soviet authorities for goods – food and coal – in the Soviet zone. The Secretary said that he felt that without some such arrangement the difficulties would be insurmountable and would be a continued source of disagreement and trouble between our countries.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that whereas removals of capital equipment from the British and American zones could be done in a short period of time, payment for these in the form of products from the Soviet zone must of necessity extend over a longer period of time.

THE SECRETARY agreed and said that was a point of course that would have to be worked out.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired what amount he thought the United States Government could agree to in respect of removals of industrial equipment for transfer to the Soviet zone under Mr. Byrnes’ plan. He said that they had spoken of 2 billion dollars.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Ruhr lay in the British zone and that it would be necessary to consult with them. He said he would talk with Messrs. Clayton and Pauley and when the new British delegation arrived he would discuss possible amounts with them. The Secretary reiterated the advantages of his proposal repeating again that the United States Government would not this time pay out money in order to keep Germans working to produce reparations for others. The Secretary then said that he felt that Mr. Molotov’s question at the meeting in regard to the Yalta decision was based on a misunderstanding. He said in our understanding the words “basis of discussion” merely mean that the subject would be discussed and in no way meant that there had been any agreement as to the sum of German reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed with that and said that he had had in mind the impression that they had received at Yalta, namely, that the United States was in accord with the Soviet view that we should exact as much reparations as possible from Germany whereas at Yalta the British had not shared this view and had fully reserved their position. He said now at this Conference the Soviet delegation had received the impression that the United States no longer held that view and that that was the reason why he had referred to the Yalta Agreement.

THE SECRETARY replied that there had been no change in view on the part of the United States Government and that we were still willing to discuss the Soviet proposal but that he must agree that many conditions had changed since Yalta. There had been first of all the extent of the destruction in Germany and secondly questions as to definitions of war booty and then the de facto alienation to Poland of a large and productive part of former Germany. He said that our aim remained the same and that all he was trying to do was to find a way which would on the one hand be acceptable to all and would on the other take cognizance of existing realities.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that in February the Soviet Government had thought the destruction of the Ruhr was greater than it turned out to be. He said that from their reports only from ten to fifteen percent of the productive capacity of the Ruhr had been destroyed. As a whole, machine tools and the basic equipment remained serviceable. He inquired again what amount of removals from the Ruhr Mr. Byrnes had in mind to exchange for products from the Soviet zone.

THE SECRETARY repeated that he would have to consult with his advisers and the British on this point.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether it was still the intention of the United States Government to reduce the production capacity of the Ruhr as a measure of security.

THE SECRETARY replied that that was still our intention. The only question was how much equipment would be available for transfer to the Soviet zone in return for goods over a longer period of time from that zone.

MR. MOLOTOV in conclusion then said that as he understood it what Mr. Byrnes suggested was in fact an exchange of reparations between the zones.

THE SECRETARY said this was correct.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired on another subject why the Secretary had decided to withdraw our proposal with regard to Italy and the other satellite states.

THE SECRETARY explained that we had wasted a good many days on that and that our original proposal had been amended many times. He agreed, however, that the President had accepted Marshal Stalin’s amendment concerning the consideration of the question of the recognition of the satellite states but that Mr. Churchill had objected to it. He said at one time the British and American delegations had been in agreement but that the Soviets had not and that subsequently the Soviet and American delegations were in agreement but that the British objected. He said he felt that there were more important matters to deal with but if the British and Soviet delegations could reach agreement the Conference could still adopt the proposal.

It was agreed that nothing could be done until Mr. Attlee’s return.

Meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Riddleberger
840.811/7-2545

The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945

Memorandum to the Secretary

Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The Sub-Committee on inland waterways met on July 27 at which time the American and British representatives presented draft proposals, copies of which are attached herewith. While the British and American drafts are cast in somewhat different form, they both incorporate essentially the same ideas and agreement can no doubt be quickly reached on them providing the Soviet member was willing to go along.

The Soviet representative presented no memorandum and stated that his delegation had not expected this question and was not sufficiently informed to present a statement. He said it would be necessary to obtain more information from his Government before the Soviet views could be made known to the Committee. Furthermore he doubted that the Committee could extend its mandate to include the Kiel Canal and the “Straits” without referring the question to the Foreign Ministers. To this objection the United States member pointed out that the Straits had been the subject of a lengthy discussion in the Big Three meeting and that the Kiel Canal was in any case under the jurisdiction of the Control Council for Germany; the Sub-Committee had been established after this discussion and therefore we thought that these subjects could be properly included. The British member agreed. The Soviet representative said that he would take up these points with Mr. Molotov. The remainder of the discussion was devoted to explanatory comment by the American and British representatives on their respective drafts, largely in reply to questions by the Soviet representative. The Sub-Committee adjourned with a promise by the Soviet representative to discuss the question again when his delegation had received the information it required which he hoped would be by July 29.

The Soviet representative has not called back on this question and our efforts to get in touch with him have been fruitless. I have the impression that the Soviets do not desire to discuss this question at this time and I doubt if we shall make any progress unless pressure is applied to the Soviet delegation at a higher level.

The Pittsburgh Press (July 27, 1945)

TOKYO SPURNS ALLIES’ ULTIMATUM
Fight-to-end reply given by cabinet

Enemy to face thousands of troops

Attlee picking new cabinet before return to Potsdam

Churchill probably won’t go back; Bevin slated to be new foreign minister


British policy change expected

Big Three ready to resume its sessions

Churchill not going back

Editorial: Last chance for Japan

Background of news –
Dardanelles and the Turks

By Frank Aston

The Dardanelles is on the program of the Big Three at Potsdam.

The Dardanelles has been on a lot of history-making programs. It is a strait between Southeastern Europe and Asia Minor and also figured in a song. Hardly a party could gather in the early ‘20s without a burst of “Oh, sweet Dardanella…” This American custom had nothing to do with wars and other activities of the region.

Turkey controls the Dardanelles, which is about 42 miles long and from one to five miles wide. Seems people have forever been trying to swim it where it’s narrow. Lord Byron, who wrote poetry, swam it in 1810, getting across in 70 minutes. Ancient Greeks liked to do it, too.

The strait may have taken its name from an old city called Dardanus, or the name may have come from some castles along the water. Experts argue about that. The Greeks had a word for the place: Hellespont.

Russia would like permission for its ships to go back and forth through the strait, so they could move between the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Great Britain has her own ideas about that. Hence the Dardanelles on the Potsdam program.

Turks busy modernizing

While three other fellows talk about their Dardanelles, the Turks continue to busy themselves with their modernization program. A couple of decades ago, male Turks wore fezzes and women wore veils. Along came a dictator who did away with fez and veil. He was so enthusiastic over westernizing his people’s clothes that the law now requires members of the National Assembly to wear frock coats and the President to wear white tie and tails practically every minute of their waking hours.

The President was the dictator, or vice versa. In 1934, a law was passed giving him the family name of Ataturk, or “Chief Turk.” Every Turk was obliged to adopt a family name. at that time titles like Pasha, Bey and Effendi were abandoned. Western forms of dancing were encouraged and men were told to take only one wife at a time.

Ataturk died in 1938.

Turks don’t mention death in polite society unless they can cloak it with fancy words like “cup bearer of the sphere.” It is considered pious to help carry a corpse and pallbearers change constantly while a body is being borne to the grave. Since the Turks believe the soul stays with the body for some time after burial, a wise teacher called a Mullah remains for a period at the graveside, presumably to answer spiritual questioners dropping in to talk to the lingering soul.

Turks are kind to animals but allow no dogs in the house. The average Turk is healthy, a condition he attributes to personal cleanliness, teetotalism and outdoor activity. The face and the hands and arms to the elbows must be washed before each of the five daily prayers.

Turkish dishes are spicy

Checkers, dominoes and backgammon are favorite indoor sports, but card games are out, for religious reasons. Bets are minor, seldom going beyond a glass of raki, a distillation from grape juice and grain. Turks like to wrestle.

Knives and forks are almost unknown, but spoons are used. Lots of spice goes into the typical Turkish dish, with the menu running largely to tomatoes, rice, onions, garlic, peppers, lemons, sugar and honey. Mutton and fowl are popular roasts. Beef and veal seldom are eaten. Give a Turk some curdled milk and he’s happy.

The main dish is often served in a bowl and each guest reaches in with his right hand. It is considered bad manners to reach in with the left hand. It is not unusual to serve 10 or 12 courses of a Turkish meal in 30 minutes. Turks seldom converse at the table; they eat. One drinks only after a meal and it’s almost always water.

Ataturk put Turkish women into community life. They are no longer kept behind veil and lattice.

Turkey gave us the Turkish bath and Turkish towel. It did not provide the Thanksgiving bird. That came from North America.

U.S. State Department (July 27, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Friday, July 27:

There was no meeting of the conference today as the British Delegation had not returned to Babelsberg.

The President worked on his mail during the forenoon.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for Admiral Leahy, departed Babelsberg this morning for the return trip to Washington. They traveled by air.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1200: The President conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. A definition of lend-lease and the prospects of bringing the conference to an early close were among the subjects they discussed.

Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon.

1830: Mr. Davies called on the President.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2030: Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Assistant to the President, arrived Babelsberg this evening and joined the President’s party.

Sergeant List played selected piano solos during dinner hour.

The President today presented an autographed photograph of himself to Colonel Ernest R. Lee, USA.

The Syonan Shimbun (July 28, 1945)

Nippon will not be affected in least by change in British govt.

Will fight on determinedly till war won

Attlee, Bevin going to Potsdam for talks with Stalin, Truman


Problem for Potsdam: Germany’s future

Editorial: Attlee’s change

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 28, 1945)

Das Ultimatum an Japan

Churchill zum Wahlergebnis

L’Aube (July 28, 1945)

Après l’ultimatum –
Le japon ne semble pas devoir accepter de capituler

A nouvelle Angleterre Europe nouvelle !

par Maurice Schumann

U.S. State Department (July 28, 1945)

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union

[Tokyo,] July 28, 1945 — 10:45 a.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

952

Re my telegram No. 944

  1. The position taken by the Soviet Union in connection with the Potsdam joint declaration made by Great Britain, the United States, and Chungking will henceforth have a bearing on our planning and will be a very important problem. When we consider that details of every conference (Quebec, Cairo, etc.) held by the above three countries have been supplied to the Soviet Union, it is not difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union will have detailed knowledge of the recent joint declaration.

  2. However, we have been awaiting the Soviet reply regarding the dispatch of the special envoy and we cannot help but have doubts that there may be some connection between the new joint declaration and our request. Is there no connection at all between the new joint declaration and the above-mentioned request? Also, did or did not the Soviet Government inform England and the United States of our above-mentioned request? And what steps will the Soviet side take against the Japanese Empire from now on? These questions will all remain of interest to our side.

  3. For the time being, countermeasures against the joint declaration will be decided after we receive and study the Soviet reply to our request. Thus, Mr. Ambassador, keeping this in mind, meet with Molotov without delay, and at the beginning make our aims clearly understood as described in our outgoing telegrams. Also, on that occasion, endeavor to find out the Soviet Union’s attitude regarding the joint declaration.

Press Conference Statement by Prime Minister Suzuki

[Tokyo, July 28, 1945]
[Translation — Extracts]

Premier Suzuki, at his press conference held at his Official Residence at 3 p.m. July 28, which lasted about an hour, answered questions on various government policies taken at this decisive stage of the war and expressed strong conviction of sure Japanese victory.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(Question): “What is the Premier’s view regarding the Joint Proclamation by the three countries?”

(Answer): “I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely2 and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of this war.”

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Clayton-Mikolajczyk conversation, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States Poland
Mr. Clayton Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk
Mr. Harriman Mr. Modzelewski
Mr. Collado Mr. Minc
Mr. Despres Mr. Rajchman
Mr. Bergson Mr. Zebrowski

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

July 28, 1945
[Translation]

Economic Conference with the American Delegation Held on July 28, 1945

(Present on our side: Messrs. Mikołajczyk, Mine, Modzelewski, Rajchman; on the American side: Clayton, Harriman, Bergson, and two experts.)

Minister Minc proposes to present a brief exposition for orientation purposes about our economy.

Agriculture: With regard to grain, we shall manage to make ends meet this year, however difficult it may be. On the other hand, the question of livestock presents very serious difficulties. The number of cattle was reduced to 25% as compared with the prewar period; the number of horses is even below 20% of the prewar figures. As to food, we should expect a certain unsteady balance in the supply of grain. We have a catastrophic deficit in the supply of meat and fats. We shall have a certain small surplus of potatoes and sugar. That is the situation in the entire area which is actually under Polish administrative control.

With regard to forests, we have suffered serious losses. It was principally the Germans, and partly also armies in transit, who depleted the forests to such an extent that for 16 years we shall not be able to do any substantial lumbering.

Mr. Harriman points out that the armies had to build bridges. Then he asks about the situation in Poland before the war with regard to lumber.

Minister Minc explains that Poland exported lumber, and now it will have to import it to cover the requirements of the reconstruction of the country. We shall have considerable difficulties in rural reconstruction; there is a shortage of industrial wood, beams for mining, and cellulose for the manufacture of paper and artificial fibers.

This picture represents the prospects for one year. It is to be assumed that there will be a balance in the supply of grains in the following year, but the problem of meat and fats is going to be a protracted affair.

Industry: We are reaching 50% of the prewar production within old boundaries. As far as coal is concerned, the daily production amounts to 81,000 tons according to data received in the past two days. That is the production in the entire area, including the western territories, with the exception of the Waldenburg coal basin, where the production amounts to from 7,000 to 8,000 tons daily. The production figures for German Silesia are: February – 40,500 tons; March – 92,000; April – 123,000; May – 258,000; June – 473,000. The number of workers in that territory was: February – 3,900; March – 6,900; April – 20,000; May – 21,000; June – 25,500. I point out that all workers employed there are Poles. In December we expect a monthly production of 3,750,000 tons, so that the monthly average for the five-month period up to December will be around 3 million. During those five months we expect a total production of 15 million tons.

Mr. Clayton asks whether it will be possible to export any of that amount.

Mr. Minc explains: During those five months Poland will need 6,250,000 tons. To cover export contracts to all countries, i.e., to Russia, Sweden, and those countries with which we are negotiating (Denmark, Finland, Rumania, and Norway), we shall need 5,500,000 tons. If we add the domestic requirements to the export obligations, we get the figure of 11,750,000 tons. That figure is incomplete, because it does not include reserves, which amount to 1,500,000 tons. The total coal balance sheet is therefore 16,500,000 less the requirements of 11,750,000. Our coal production is limited by (1) insufficient food supply for the miners and the resulting difficulties in hiring labor; (2) shortage of young people in the coal-mining industry (the average age of coal miners is over 45 years); and (3) transportation, shortage of freight cars and locomotives, shortage of motor vehicles, which is felt even more acutely because of the shortage of horses that were used before the war.

Mr. Clayton, in connection with the age of coal miners, asks about the decrease in productivity.

Mr. Minc says that, in spite of all, productivity is increasing. In previous months it was 0.4, and in the first ten days of June it was 0.84. These figures do not represent the actual productivity, because the productivity below surface is not very different from the prewar productivity. It is due to the disproportion in individual qualifications between miners working on the surface and those working in the mines.

The 4 to 5 million tons which we have available for export can be used only if we get additional transportation. At present the supply must be considered available only at the mines.

Mr. Clayton asks what the price of coal would be f.o.b. Gdynia or Danzig in dollars.

Mr. Minc: On the basis of Swedish contracts, $8.42 per ton.

Mr. Clayton asks whether the decrease in the productivity of the miners affects the quality of the coal.

Mr. Minc replies to this that the grading of the coal is very accurate.

Mr. Harriman asks whether the widening of railroad tracks makes transportation more difficult.

Mr. Minc says that, on the contrary, it makes it easier. The broad-gauge Breslau-Katowice-Kraków railroad line can transport coal to Russia on wide Russian freight cars. On the other hand, railroad lines running to the seashore have normal gauge. The broad-gauge line which was revamped by the Russians has lines of both gauges, and it can be easily shifted to normal gauge. Since we have only a few freight cars of our own, and the wide freight cars can carry more, we find ourselves in the paradoxical situation where we are in no hurry to rebuild the tracks and return to the normal gauge.

Mr. Clayton asks whether the present condition of the Polish transportation system warrants a discussion about exporting the surplus of coal.

Mr. Minc explains that the railroad lines do warrant it, but that the railroad rolling stock does not.

Mr. Clayton expresses his doubts as to whether the situation will permit an increase in coal production.

Mr. Minc points out that if we cannot export the surplus coal because of the lack of transportation, then we can use it in Poland in view of the fact that the internal consumption figures were determined rather modestly, and that we can use it especially for industrial purposes. Transportation for internal purposes should be sufficient, since the distances are short and industrial establishments are located within a radius of 150 to 200 kilometers.

Mr. Harriman: Are the port installations for loading coal in Gdynia and in Danzig in good condition?

Mr. Minc: The loading capacity before the war was 40,000 tons daily. Today it has decreased to 4,000 tons in both ports. We expect, however, that it will increase to from 16,000 to 17,000 tons by the middle of August. At present our cranes are destroyed, and not all power plants are working. The situation would improve considerably if the number of our ports were increased. Stettin is important, especially since the ports of Gleiwitz and Cosel are now active. We have more barges than before the war. There is also the port of Elbing, which can load from 10,000 to 15,000 tons daily provided we make minor investments. But Elbing can be used only for cabotage to Riga, Tallin, possibly to Denmark, to the Soviet Union, and to ports in southern Sweden during certain seasons of the year. The port of Elbing is rather shallow.

Mr. Harriman: How many freight cars would Poland need to export the 5 million surplus [tons]? Is it true that Poland is to receive freight cars from Sweden?

Mr. Minc: We are to receive 1,600 freight cars of 20-ton capacity. Whether we need freight cars for transportation depends on the destination.

Mr. Clayton: To the nearest port.

Mr. Minc: Have you considered transporting coal by railroad through western Europe?

Mr. Clayton: Unfortunately, nobody in Europe has a sufficient number of freight cars today.

Mr. Minc: Given the present condition of the railroads, we would have to figure 7 days to Danzig one way, which means 14 days both ways – in other words, 14,000 to 16,000 freight cars. If we calculated the figures through the whole year, we could reduce them by some 20%, because then we could organize the railroad transportation appropriately. I also point out that with regard to transportation to the west by railroad we are limited only by the number of freight cars, while with regard to ports we have to take into consideration the loading capacity of the ports, not counting the tonnage of the ships.

Mr. Harriman: Do you have enough locomotives? Could you get more locomotives and freight cars from Sweden?

Mr. Minc: Sweden says that we cannot.

Mr. Bergson: Are there freight cars from Germany in the rolling stock used in Poland?

Mr. Minc: Only in transit to Russia. We do not have any such freight cars.

Mr. Harriman: How many of your freight cars are damaged?

Mr. Minc: We have a certain percentage of incapacitated freight cars. The proportion is not much higher than before the war. The trouble is that we do not have the means to make repairs.

Mr. Clayton: How much coal could Poland produce in 1946 if it had means of transportation at its disposal?

Mr. Minc: The total production would be around 5 million tons a month. Of that total we could export from 2½ to 3 million.

Mr. Clayton: That would be 30,000 [30 million] yearly.

Mr. Minc: At least.

Mr. Clayton: Quite a considerable amount for export.

Mr. Minc: We say in Poland that coal is our foreign exchange.

Mr. Clayton: Is coal perhaps the most important item of Polish export?

Mr. Minc: It is the first item, but not the only one. Other important items are zinc and cement. In June we produced 21,000 tons of zinc ore, 3,501 tons of zinc concentrate, and 4,300 tons of zinc. These figures represent 35% of our capacity, and they apply to the Polish territory as of 1939. With regard to the new territories, zinc is found only on the very border, and the quantity is small. From August 1945 through December 1946, we shall have 40,000 tons of refined zinc according to estimates of our export capacity. In addition, we have a rare metal – cadmium. In the same period, between August 1945 and December 1946, we shall have at our disposal for export purposes 200 to 300 tons of cadmium, 7 million tons of coke, 350,000 tons of cement, 160,000 tons of steel and iron (the total production of steel and iron within the boundaries of the old Poland amounts to 40,000 tons a month). The production capacity of Upper Silesia before the war was 100,000 tons a month.

Mr. Harriman: Is the synthetic rubber industry greatly damaged?

Mr. Minc: It is destroyed in Silesia. In Poland it did not exist at all.

Mr. Bergson: Has Poland yet sold any steel and iron?

Mr. Minc: I am not informed as to how much has been sold.

Other export items are: glass panes for windows, ½ million meters; soda, 50,000 tons. Then there are various small items, which together can bring in a large amount of money, but it would take a long time to discuss them.

Mr. Harriman: How is your textile industry?

Mr. Minc: In December the industry worked at full capacity of the looms.

Mr. Clayton: What about the raw material?

Mr. Minc: Our supply is secure. The Soviet Union has a large quantity of cotton. On the other hand, we are very short of wool. The output of the looms represents about 60% of the prewar production. The Germans destroyed the textile industry to a great extent.

Mr. Clayton: I am amazed that you can import cotton from Russia, because Russia itself had to import cotton before the war.

Mr. Minc: The Soviet Union imported a certain amount of cotton before the war, but they did not use up the cotton during the war.

Mr. Harriman: They received a large amount of ready-made clothing through lend-lease. And how is the problem of footwear in Poland?

Mr. Minc: That is the darkest spot in the picture of our industry. We do not have leather and we do not have tannin. Our tanneries are undamaged and we have a labor force, but because of the shortage of raw material we have the largest deficit in this respect. I can see clearly today how to provide clothing for the people in Poland, but I do not know how to get footwear for them. We do not have rubber to use as a substitute. In some cases it affects us very painfully. In industry, where shoes wear out fast – for example, in coal mining and in those industries where acids are used in production – workers go around half barefooted.

Mr. Clayton refers to our requirements as regards farm machinery, factory equipment, trucks, etc., as well as raw material.

Mr. Minc reads an import program for the period from August 1945 to December 1946, not including UNRRA or long-term investments, and not specifying from which country the material is to be imported:

The approximate value of imports will be 380 million dollars (not including long-term investments on credit). The problem is to maintain current production and to satisfy the elementary needs of the economy and reconstruction.

Rubber 8,000 tons Transmission belts 60 tons
Automobile tires and other tires 5,500 tons Wool 20,000 tons
Woolen rags 15,000 tons Cotton 60,000 to 70,000 tons
Scrap iron 300,000 tons Copper 30,000 tons
Aluminum 2,500 tons Nickel 1,000 tons
Gasoline 100,000 tons

Foodstuffs: Meat – 100,000 tons; fish – 50,000 tons; butter – 20,000 tons; lard – [blank]; fat back – 20,000 tons

As for machinery, we must import steam boilers and parts, combustion motors, motorcycle and automobile engines, traction engines, water and steam turbines, pumps and springs, hydraulic presses, ventilators, wood lathes and metal lathes, moulding machines for foundries, textile machinery, sewing machines, road steam-rollers, excavators, and crushing machines, in a total amount of from 30 to 35 million dollars. River boats, dredges, and barges, and tugboats (not including seagoing vessels) in the sum of 10 to 15 million dollars. Potassium salts, 750,000 tons. Agricultural implements in the sum of from 10 to 15 million dollars, including tractors, of which we shall need about 5,000.

The imports indicated above represent the most indispensable needs, which should be covered by normal foreign trade, through our exports and credit in goods.

Mr. Minc, in answer to Mr. Harriman, explains that we shall have difficulties with regard to lumber for only eight or nine months and that in spite of these difficulties we intend to cover our needs through local production. We have made important experiments in that respect by replacing wood with cement, for example, in the production of railroad ties.

Mr. Clayton: Has not a large part of Polish exports been earmarked for the Soviet Union?

Mr. Minc: Our agreement with the Soviet Union is effective until January 1, 1946. As to the coal for export, the figure which I gave is free of any obligations.

Mr. Clayton: I do not see here capital investments for the construction of plants, railroads, ports, water-supply systems, sewage systems, etc.

Mr. Minc: Our foreign relations in the field of economics are divided into three parts: (1) trade; (2) assistance; (3) credit. I speak only about trade and credit.

Mr. Bergson: How much of the figure of 380 million dollars is to be covered by exports?

Mr. Minc: About 50%, and the rest by credits for about five years.

Mr. Clayton: And should the long-term credit cover only investments?

Mr. Minc: With regard to the normal trade turnover, we expect that the exports will increase, mainly with regard to coal and textiles. On the other hand, we figure that credit for reconstruction will be considerably higher. Furthermore, we have every reason to expect reparations.

Mr. Harriman: I suppose that after these 18 months the imports will decrease and the exports will increase.

Mr. Minc: Our imports will not decrease, but they will be covered by our exports in a higher proportion.