Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

399

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] July 27, 1945

Dear Mr. Secretary: Yesterday I visited five plants in the American area of Berlin located in Zehlendorf and Tempelhof. These plants manufactured artificial wool and artificial silk from wood fibre, electrical instruments, radios, telephones, etc. Will Clayton accompanied me in looking over two of the plants.

These plants are strictly peace-time concerns. We made the following observations:

  1. Very little damage was done to the plants as a result of bombing and shellfire.

  2. Subsequent to the armistice, virtually all machinery was removed by the Russians. The machinery was numbered and removed out of our zone some of it just across the line. The work was tremendously rushed toward the end. A few pieces of machinery were left behind.

    The technical information in the plants, process records and specifications were also taken.

  3. In every case, a few foremen and supervisors were “persuaded” by the Russians to accompany the machinery to Russia.

  4. Two of the plants visited belonged to the International Telephone and Telegraph and were 94% and 100% American owned. They have been completely stripped of machinery down to even small tools.

It would appear that all these removals were in complete violation of all efforts to maintain “non-war potential” industries in Germany. The effect of the removals will be the complete destruction of employment opportunities in the area.

What we saw amounts to organized vandalism directed not alone against Germany, but against the U.S. forces of occupation. Incidentally, under the techniques used, Russia will withdraw two to three times as much from any area as would be withdrawn by the U.S. or U.K. under similar circumstances. In the area which we captured and turned over to the Russians we made no removals except for a few samples of unique equipment.

You may draw your own conclusions.

Respectfully yours,
EDWIN W. PAULEY

[Attachment]

[Babelsberg,] July 27, 1945

Factory Equipment Removals from the American Zone of Berlin

Area Covered
On July 26 the Reparations Mission Staff, headed by Edwin W. Pauley and Isador Lubin, accompanied during part of the trip by Will Clayton and others, visited five industrial plants in the American sector of Berlin under the guidance of Major Gentle of the U.S. Military Government. The plants were in Zehlendorf and Tempelhof, in the U.S. sector of Berlin.

Specific Plant Observations
The three plants most carefully inspected were the artificial fibre plant of the Spinnstofffabrik Zehlendorf AG, the Zeiss Ikon lens and adding machine plant, and the glass works of the Sendlinger Optische Glaswerke. These were selected because they are among the largest plants of the area and are peace-time industries rather than war plants, though their products were used by the military during the war.

The following paragraphs will give a brief view of the facts:

  1. Spinnstofffabrik Zehlendorf AG

Normal products: Artificial wool and silk, from wood pulp.

War products: Same

Plant: About 770,000 sq. feet, mostly one story. About one half built during the war and equipped with new machinery. War damage at end was 20% to buildings and to machinery practically none.

Employees: At end about 2,000 of whom 300 were foreign “slave labor” and were reported by the superintendent to be “just as good as the Germans”.

Removals: 80% of all machinery removed, including all modern equipment; conveyor systems; 2 modern steam turbines, 12,000 KWH; pumping equipment from 7 deep wells (leaving 2); all specifications and process records; 4 technicians.

  1. Zeiss Ikon AG Goertzwerke

Normal products: Cameras, adding-machines

War products: Optical devices

Plant: 270,000 sq. feet, modern 5 story concrete reinforced. War damage, buildings 50%, machinery 5%

Employees: 2,300 including about 300 “slave labor”

Equipment removed: 95% of machine tools, some 1800; all locomotive and rolling stock; all technical reports, drawings and specifications; several technicians went to Russia with the machinery.

  1. Sendlinger Optische Glaswerke GmbH

Normal products: Raw glassware for illumination, Röntgen glass, lenses, magnifying glasses, condensers, raw glass for optics.

War products: Same, with emphasis on raw glass and lenses for optical instruments.

Plant: 117,700 square feet, modern 5 story main plant; war damage to buildings 25%, to machinery none.

Employees: 420, about 25% “slave labor”

Removals: All machinery except 14 old machines removed since Armistice, kilns and furnaces remain. Some plumbing, electrical fixtures are missing. All measuring machines taken.

In addition two International Telephone and Telegraph plants were visited. They manufactured telephones, pneumatic conveyors, radios and other electric equipment.

General Observations

  1. These were not “war potential” plants.

  2. These plants were in full operation up to May 1945. Several of the plants had been damaged during the war mostly by fire, but were repaired and brought to 100% production or more in 30 to 90 days. Some IT&T machinery had been moved out into plants in Czechoslovakia, otherwise there was no evidence of “dispersal.”

  3. Managers or superintendents reported that all plants were operated as parts of various cartels, though they could not give all details.

  4. “Slave labor” made up around 20% of the labor force, somewhat less than we found in heavy industry. Foreign labor was highly regarded by the superintendents we talked with.

  5. Superintendents said that the bulk of their former labor force is still available in the neighborhood, though their living accommodations are very crowded. Present employment is 7% to 10% of normal, and is engaged in repair and clean-up work.

  6. Raw materials and semi-finished materials on hand in the plants are very limited or non-existent, in contrast to the stock-piles in the steel plants. This may be an indication of the breakdown in transport toward the end of the war.

  7. Virtually all useful machinery, including some boilers, turbines, generators and pumps were removed as well as plumbing and electrical fixtures.

  8. Removals were executed by Russian military personnel under some technical supervision. Some 100 men were employed in removals, which may be compared with the 2000 normal employees of the plant. Removals continued up to the time we took over physically. Some machinery, taken from place, was left behind for lack of transport.

  9. The removed machinery was carefully numbered and addressed and apparently sent to places selected in advance, to be set up on the former pattern.

  10. Superintendents reported that the high precision and measuring machinery was not properly protected and was allowed to stand outdoors and along the streets and roads after removal.

  11. German technicians were taken with the machinery to assist in its installation and operation. These technicians went voluntarily, according to the superintendents, though they implied that various “strong inducements” were offered. The Russians wanted many more, but could not persuade them to go.

  12. Two of the plants belonged 94% and 100% to the IT&T Co. They were completely “looted”. They had been more seriously damaged than the other plants we visited, but most of their machinery was in good condition at the end of fighting.

Conclusions

  1. The USSR considers all industrial equipment as war booty, including the equipment of plants engaged in making textiles, cameras, optical instruments, radios, telephones, switchboards and pneumatic tubes and conveyors.

  2. Removals are systematic and in some cases supervised by technical personnel. Machinery is numbered and addressed to places selected in advance. (This conflicts with some evidence seen at the freight marshalling yards. Practices may differ for general purpose machinery). Technical personnel is persuaded but not forced to accompany the machinery.

  3. Special effort was made to strip the Zone turned over to us in Berlin before we came in. The IT&T in our Zone was stripped before July 4, while the AEG (General Electric) plant in the Russian Zone is only now being stripped.

  4. There will be serious industrial unemployment no matter what we do in our Berlin Zone, because the tools of the former peace-time industries are gone.

400 
023.1/9-1454

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg,] 27th July, 1945
[Translation]
P (TERMINAL) 46

Removal of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania

In its memorandum of the 24th July (P (TERMINAL) 40) the British Delegation once more raises the question of the legitimacy of the removal by the Soviet Command from Roumania of oil equipment by way of war booty.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly explained its point of view on this question and referred to definite facts proving that the oil equipment under discussion, consisting mainly of pipes, is German military equipment and war booty for the Red Army.

It should be recalled that beginning as long ago as the summer of 1940, the British Oil Companies and enterprises in Roumania were seized by the Germans and used by them up to the 23rd August, 1944, for supplying the German Army with oil products. In aide-mémoires from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated the 30th November, 1944, and the 4th January, 1945, full details were already quoted to confirm the above statement nor [not] leaving any doubt that the Allied Control Commission in Roumania had in this matter acted in full accord with Article 7 of the Agreement on the Armistice with Roumania and with Article 2 [B] of the Protocol [Annex] to this Agreement. There is, therefore, at the present time, no need to expound the Soviet point of view on this question.

As to the suggestion contained in the British Memorandum of the 24th July to instruct a committee, consisting of three persons who are citizens of Allied countries, to investigate the problem as to whether these pipes were British or German property, the Soviet Delegation considers the reference of this problem to a joint examination by Soviet representatives and British representatives in respect of oil equipment and pipes removed from the territory of the enterprises with the participation of British capital to be more useful. The Soviet representatives, together with the British representatives, could examine the facts and documents which could be presented to the British party.

401 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2745

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Topics Discussed at Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m., July 27, 1945

1. German Reparations
This matter was discussed and passed over for further examination.

2. Admission to the United Nations
Mr. Byrnes stated that as the U.S. proposal in this matter had become complicated by additions and modifications by the other delegations, he preferred to withdraw the paper rather than to delay the Conference by further discussion.

3. German Economic Paper
This matter was deferred until the subject of German reparations was further explored.

4. Italian and Austrian Reparations
This matter was discussed. The American view was that countries which were in need of relief could not be expected to support reparations payments and the subject was deferred to a later time.

5. Oil for Western Europe
The Russian delegation said that they had a paper to present to the Conference on this subject. This paper has not yet been received.

6. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
No report has been received from the subcommittee on this subject.

7. Oil Equipment in Rumania
This matter was not discussed.

8. The Western Boundary of Poland
This matter was not discussed.

9. Cooperation in European Economic Policies
This matter was discussed. The Soviet delegation stated they were ready to enter the European Inland Transport organization and were studying the other economic and coal organizations with a view to arriving at their decision as to whether to join them.

10. German Political Paper
Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that there were two items which had been rejected by the Economic Committee from the economic principles applying to Germany on the basis that they belong properly in the political principles. He suggested that these points be brought before the Big Three. The points were as follows:

(a) Uniform treatment of Germans.
(b) Free circulation of all nationals of the Four Allies in all zones.

11. Inland Waterways
The subcommittee appointed to study this question was not ready to report. Mr. Byrnes asked that the subcommittee expedite this report to the Conference.

12. [German Fleet]
Mr. Molotov asked that the item referring to the German naval and merchant vessels be put on the agenda.

402

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m.
[Translation]

The following questions remain on the agenda of the meeting of Foreign Ministers:

  1. Regarding unsettled questions it was stated that up to the present time the following unsettled questions remain:

    1. regarding the economic principles with relation to Germany;

    2. regarding German reparations;

    3. regarding Italian and Austrian reparations;

    4. regarding European oil supplies;

    5. regarding the acceptance of Italy and other former satellites as members of the United Nations Organization;

    6. regarding the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe;

    7. regarding the lightening of the armistice conditions for Italy and other former satellites;

    8. regarding the export of oil equipment from Rumania;

    9. regarding the western frontiers of Poland;

    10. regarding collaboration in the solving of immediate European economic problems;

    11. regarding military [war] criminals;

    12. regarding the transfer of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary;

    13. regarding the additions [addition?] to the political principles of [for?] the treatment of Germany of two points taken from point 13 concerning the economic principles;

    14. regarding the German fleet;

    15. regarding internal [inland] waterways.

  2. Regarding the admission of Italy and other countries which have concluded an armistice and which have become co-belligerents on the side of the Allies into the United Nations Organization

    The Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. Byrnes, stated that if agreement between the Soviet and British Delegations on the wording of the document on this question is not reached, he, with the approval of the President of the USA, proposed to withdraw completely this question from the agenda of the Conference. Mr. Byrnes added that according to his opinion it was first of all necessary to examine the vitally important questions, namely, the questions concerning reparations, the German fleet and the western frontiers of Poland. Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan proposed to change the wording of the last phrase of the third paragraph, as introduced by the Soviet Delegation, by the following phrase:

    The conclusion of peace treaties with responsible democratic governments in the states will permit the three Governments to renew normal diplomatic relations with them and to support proposals on their side to become members of the United Nations Organization.

    V. M. Molotov stated that this amendment was unacceptable.

    It was agreed that since the meeting of the three Ministers could not attain agreement on this question, it should be referred for settlement to the Chiefs of the three States.

  3. Regarding German Reparations

    V. M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation considered the work of the Reparations Committee unsatisfactory and proposed that the question of reparations from Germany be examined immediately at the meeting of the three Ministers. This proposal did not evoke any objection. V. M. Molotov thereupon read point 4 of the Crimea Protocol on reparations and, referring to Mr. Pauley’s statement in the Reparations Committee to the effect that he withdrew the agreement of the Government of the USA to the decision set forth in this point, inquired of Mr. Byrnes whether the Government of the USA continued to support the Crimea decisions on this question, or whether it had changed its position.

    Mr. Byrnes answered that this was a misunderstanding. The Government of the USA had agreed in the Crimea to accept the figure of $20,000,000,000 as a basis for discussion, but since then the Soviet and Allied Armies had caused great destruction in Germany, several areas had been taken away from Germany, and now it was practically impossible to proceed from that general figure which had been adopted by the American Delegation at Yalta as a possible basis for discussion.

    Mr. Cadogan stated that he would refrain from submitting any proposals.

    On the proposal of Mr. Byrnes it was recognized as advisable to postpone the examination of this question until the next meeting of the three Ministers, after which this question should be reported to the Heads of the three Government[s].

  4. Concerning Austrian and Italian Reparations

    V. M. Molotov proposed to accept as a basis for the further study of this question the proposals on reparations from Austria and reparations from Italy submitted by the Soviet Delegation (see enclosures Nos. 1 and 2). Mr. Byrnes stated that the American Delegation did not consider it possible to exact from Austria and Italy reparations in the guise of current production. In the opinion of the American Delegation it was only possible to remove at one time equipment of the war industries which could not be used for peaceful objectives. Mr. Cadogan stated that the British Delegation supported the opinion of the Delegation of the USA.

    In view of the non-obtaining of agreement, it was decided to report the manifested disagreement to the Heads of the three Governments.

  5. Regarding the Economic Principles with Relation to Germany
    On the proposal of Mr. Byrnes discussion of this question was postponed.

  6. Regarding European Oil Supplies
    The discussion of this question was postponed since the Commission had not concluded its work.

  7. Regarding Economic Collaboration in Europe
    It was decided to approve the report of the commission on this question and to inform the Heads of the three Governments accordingly (see enclosure No. 3).

403 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2745

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m.

Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business July 27, 1945

I. Problems before the Big Three

  1. Western Boundary of Poland.

  2. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine. (Awaiting completion of U.S. and British papers outlining concrete proposals.)

  3. Admission to the United Nations. (Referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.)

  4. War Crimes. (This British agenda topic was referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.)

  5. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems.
    (The subcommittee report, which states that the Soviets will attend the EITO [ECITO] Conference, but are still studying the question of participation in EEC and ECO, was referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.)

  6. Austrian and Italian Reparations.
    (It will apparently be necessary to report to the Big Three that the Foreign Ministers have been unable to reach any agreement in regard to Austrian and Italian reparations.)

  7. Spain.
    (If the U.S. suggestion is approved that the proposed paper on the Admission to the United Nations be dropped, the Soviet proposal for a tripartite statement on the Franco regime will still be pending before the Conference.)

II. Problems before the Foreign Ministers

  1. German Reparations.
    (To be considered at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers who, if they are unable to reach an agreement at that meeting, will refer the question to the Big Three.)

  2. German Economic Questions.
    (Decision on the outstanding questions, paragraphs 18 and 19 in regard to the source of supply for zones of occupation in Germany and to the payment for essential imports, is dependent on the decision concerning German reparations.)

  3. Rumanian Oil Equipment.
    (The Soviets are circulating a paper, a reply to the British paper on this subject.)

  4. German Political Questions.
    (The British have presented a paper proposing that two additional points be added to the German political document already approved by the conference.)

III. Problems before subcommittees

  1. Oil for Western Europe.
    (The Economic Subcommittee is still considering the U.S. proposal on this subject.)

  2. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States.
    (The subcommittee report on this question has not yet been presented to the Foreign Ministers.)

  3. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways.
    (The subcommittee report on this question has not yet been presented to the Foreign Ministers.)

  4. Transfer of German Populations from Poland and Czechoslovakia.
    (The subcommittee has not yet submitted its report on this topic.)

  5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany on Agreements Reached at the Conference.
    (It is impossible for this subcommittee to complete its work until the German economic questions have been resolved.)

  6. Protocol and Communiqué of the Conference.
    (Subcommittees are engaged in preparation of these documents.)

404 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 27, 1945 — 4:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

1458

Re my telegram No. 1449

Although it is difficult to predict what the Soviet reply will be to our recent request, it is possible that the repeated request by the Japanese Government is regarded as merely seeking the good offices of the Government of the Soviet Union, since we failed to indicate on what basis such a request was made. Since the request does not even indicate an outline, the Soviet Union may find it impossible to decide its attitude so simply on such an important matter, and it is conceivable that the request may be turned down again. If, by chance, it does result in a Soviet refusal, I am deeply concerned lest this may force us into a very awkward position. It may also implicate the Imperial Household, since we have been ordered by the Emperor to end further bloodshed and are strongly urged to send a special envoy.

In presenting the request, as directed in your telegram No. 931 regarding the mission of Prince Konoye, I have taken the precaution not to give the impression that the mission is to set forth the Japanese Government’s “concrete aim,” and not to present a concrete “proposal.” Lozovsky, however, stated that he understood … is to bring a “concrete proposal” and, as he hinted that he was expecting some form of concrete proposition, I believe we must pay special attention to this point.

In presenting a proposal to end such a tremendous undertaking as the present large-scale war, we do not, in the final analysis, have a definite proposition but are only explaining our intention in an indirect way. It is absolutely impossible to cause the Soviet Government to make a move with such a noncommittal attitude on our part. In this connection I do not have the slightest doubt that the straightforward attitude of the Soviet Union is designed to compel Japan to come out with a concrete proposal.

The definitive joint declaration against Japan made by the leaders of the three nations – the United States, Great Britain, and China – at Potsdam on the 26th appears to be a big scare-bomb directed against us. It became very doubtful whether the Soviet Union would offer its good offices under this offensive started by the three countries. Then there is no doubt that the aforesaid tripartite declaration is a counteroffensive, with our trial venture to terminate the war as its target. According to a broadcast of the BBC on the 26th, Lord [Louis] Mountbatten visited Potsdam on his return trip to England and is said to have reported to and consulted with the Big Three leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union on the progress of the war in the Far East. We must take note of the remark that Stalin has for the first time participated in a discussion of the war in the Far East. For your information I make this reference, since this is also a matter which I fear may have some effect on the attitude of the Soviet Union in relation to our request for the Soviets’ good offices.

405

Byrnes-Molotov meeting, 6 p.m.

Present
United States Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 6 p.m.
Top secret

THE SECRETARY said first of all he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that his request for a two- or three-day postponement in the issuance of the statement on Japan had only reached him this morning when it was too late.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had sent the word last night as soon as he had received the Secretary’s letter.

THE SECRETARY explained that even then it would have been too late since at 7:00 o’clock the statement had gone to the press for early morning release. He explained that the President for political reasons had considered it important to issue an immediate appeal to the Japanese to surrender. Two days ago, he had discussed it with the Prime Minister and he had received his consent to the issuance of the statement and had cabled Chiang Kai Shek. On his return yesterday from Frankfort the President had found a telegram from Chiang Kai Shek agreeing to the issuance of the statement.

MR. MOLOTOV said that thus they had not been informed until after the release.

THE SECRETARY said that we did not consult the Soviet Government since the latter was not at war with Japan and we did not wish to embarrass them.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was not authorized to discuss this matter further. He left the implication that Marshal Stalin would revert to it at some time.

THE SECRETARY then said that he had also wanted to discuss privately with Mr. Molotov the difficult question of reparations. He said he had closed off the discussion at the Foreign Ministers meeting this afternoon since nothing could be accomplished until the new British delegation had returned to the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

THE SECRETARY asked Mr. Molotov whether he had had an opportunity to think over the suggestion which the Secretary had made, namely, that each country would obtain its reparations from its own zone and would exchange goods between the zones.

MR. MOLOTOV said would not the Secretary’s suggestion mean that each country would have a free hand in their own zones and would act entirely independently of the others?

THE SECRETARY said that was true in substance but he had in mind working out arrangements for the exchange of needed products between the zones, for example, from the Ruhr if the British agreed, machinery and equipment could be removed and exchanged with the Soviet authorities for goods – food and coal – in the Soviet zone. The Secretary said that he felt that without some such arrangement the difficulties would be insurmountable and would be a continued source of disagreement and trouble between our countries.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that whereas removals of capital equipment from the British and American zones could be done in a short period of time, payment for these in the form of products from the Soviet zone must of necessity extend over a longer period of time.

THE SECRETARY agreed and said that was a point of course that would have to be worked out.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired what amount he thought the United States Government could agree to in respect of removals of industrial equipment for transfer to the Soviet zone under Mr. Byrnes’ plan. He said that they had spoken of 2 billion dollars.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Ruhr lay in the British zone and that it would be necessary to consult with them. He said he would talk with Messrs. Clayton and Pauley and when the new British delegation arrived he would discuss possible amounts with them. The Secretary reiterated the advantages of his proposal repeating again that the United States Government would not this time pay out money in order to keep Germans working to produce reparations for others. The Secretary then said that he felt that Mr. Molotov’s question at the meeting in regard to the Yalta decision was based on a misunderstanding. He said in our understanding the words “basis of discussion” merely mean that the subject would be discussed and in no way meant that there had been any agreement as to the sum of German reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed with that and said that he had had in mind the impression that they had received at Yalta, namely, that the United States was in accord with the Soviet view that we should exact as much reparations as possible from Germany whereas at Yalta the British had not shared this view and had fully reserved their position. He said now at this Conference the Soviet delegation had received the impression that the United States no longer held that view and that that was the reason why he had referred to the Yalta Agreement.

THE SECRETARY replied that there had been no change in view on the part of the United States Government and that we were still willing to discuss the Soviet proposal but that he must agree that many conditions had changed since Yalta. There had been first of all the extent of the destruction in Germany and secondly questions as to definitions of war booty and then the de facto alienation to Poland of a large and productive part of former Germany. He said that our aim remained the same and that all he was trying to do was to find a way which would on the one hand be acceptable to all and would on the other take cognizance of existing realities.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that in February the Soviet Government had thought the destruction of the Ruhr was greater than it turned out to be. He said that from their reports only from ten to fifteen percent of the productive capacity of the Ruhr had been destroyed. As a whole, machine tools and the basic equipment remained serviceable. He inquired again what amount of removals from the Ruhr Mr. Byrnes had in mind to exchange for products from the Soviet zone.

THE SECRETARY repeated that he would have to consult with his advisers and the British on this point.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether it was still the intention of the United States Government to reduce the production capacity of the Ruhr as a measure of security.

THE SECRETARY replied that that was still our intention. The only question was how much equipment would be available for transfer to the Soviet zone in return for goods over a longer period of time from that zone.

MR. MOLOTOV in conclusion then said that as he understood it what Mr. Byrnes suggested was in fact an exchange of reparations between the zones.

THE SECRETARY said this was correct.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired on another subject why the Secretary had decided to withdraw our proposal with regard to Italy and the other satellite states.

THE SECRETARY explained that we had wasted a good many days on that and that our original proposal had been amended many times. He agreed, however, that the President had accepted Marshal Stalin’s amendment concerning the consideration of the question of the recognition of the satellite states but that Mr. Churchill had objected to it. He said at one time the British and American delegations had been in agreement but that the Soviets had not and that subsequently the Soviet and American delegations were in agreement but that the British objected. He said he felt that there were more important matters to deal with but if the British and Soviet delegations could reach agreement the Conference could still adopt the proposal.

It was agreed that nothing could be done until Mr. Attlee’s return.

406

Meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Riddleberger 
840.811/7-2545

The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945

Memorandum to the Secretary

Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The Sub-Committee on inland waterways met on July 27 at which time the American and British representatives presented draft proposals, copies of which are attached herewith. While the British and American drafts are cast in somewhat different form, they both incorporate essentially the same ideas and agreement can no doubt be quickly reached on them providing the Soviet member was willing to go along.

The Soviet representative presented no memorandum and stated that his delegation had not expected this question and was not sufficiently informed to present a statement. He said it would be necessary to obtain more information from his Government before the Soviet views could be made known to the Committee. Furthermore he doubted that the Committee could extend its mandate to include the Kiel Canal and the “Straits” without referring the question to the Foreign Ministers. To this objection the United States member pointed out that the Straits had been the subject of a lengthy discussion in the Big Three meeting and that the Kiel Canal was in any case under the jurisdiction of the Control Council for Germany; the Sub-Committee had been established after this discussion and therefore we thought that these subjects could be properly included. The British member agreed. The Soviet representative said that he would take up these points with Mr. Molotov. The remainder of the discussion was devoted to explanatory comment by the American and British representatives on their respective drafts, largely in reply to questions by the Soviet representative. The Sub-Committee adjourned with a promise by the Soviet representative to discuss the question again when his delegation had received the information it required which he hoped would be by July 29.

The Soviet representative has not called back on this question and our efforts to get in touch with him have been fruitless. I have the impression that the Soviets do not desire to discuss this question at this time and I doubt if we shall make any progress unless pressure is applied to the Soviet delegation at a higher level.

407

The Pittsburgh Press (July 27, 1945)

TOKYO SPURNS ALLIES’ ULTIMATUM
Fight-to-end reply given by cabinet

Enemy to face thousands of troops

…

408

Attlee picking new cabinet before return to Potsdam

Churchill probably won’t go back; Bevin slated to be new foreign minister

…

British policy change expected

…

409

Big Three ready to resume its sessions

Churchill not going back

…

410

Editorial: Last chance for Japan

…

411

Background of news –
Dardanelles and the Turks

By Frank Aston

The Dardanelles is on the program of the Big Three at Potsdam.

The Dardanelles has been on a lot of history-making programs. It is a strait between Southeastern Europe and Asia Minor and also figured in a song. Hardly a party could gather in the early ‘20s without a burst of “Oh, sweet Dardanella…” This American custom had nothing to do with wars and other activities of the region.

Turkey controls the Dardanelles, which is about 42 miles long and from one to five miles wide. Seems people have forever been trying to swim it where it’s narrow. Lord Byron, who wrote poetry, swam it in 1810, getting across in 70 minutes. Ancient Greeks liked to do it, too.

The strait may have taken its name from an old city called Dardanus, or the name may have come from some castles along the water. Experts argue about that. The Greeks had a word for the place: Hellespont.

Russia would like permission for its ships to go back and forth through the strait, so they could move between the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Great Britain has her own ideas about that. Hence the Dardanelles on the Potsdam program.

Turks busy modernizing

While three other fellows talk about their Dardanelles, the Turks continue to busy themselves with their modernization program. A couple of decades ago, male Turks wore fezzes and women wore veils. Along came a dictator who did away with fez and veil. He was so enthusiastic over westernizing his people’s clothes that the law now requires members of the National Assembly to wear frock coats and the President to wear white tie and tails practically every minute of their waking hours.

The President was the dictator, or vice versa. In 1934, a law was passed giving him the family name of Ataturk, or “Chief Turk.” Every Turk was obliged to adopt a family name. at that time titles like Pasha, Bey and Effendi were abandoned. Western forms of dancing were encouraged and men were told to take only one wife at a time.

Ataturk died in 1938.

Turks don’t mention death in polite society unless they can cloak it with fancy words like “cup bearer of the sphere.” It is considered pious to help carry a corpse and pallbearers change constantly while a body is being borne to the grave. Since the Turks believe the soul stays with the body for some time after burial, a wise teacher called a Mullah remains for a period at the graveside, presumably to answer spiritual questioners dropping in to talk to the lingering soul.

Turks are kind to animals but allow no dogs in the house. The average Turk is healthy, a condition he attributes to personal cleanliness, teetotalism and outdoor activity. The face and the hands and arms to the elbows must be washed before each of the five daily prayers.

Turkish dishes are spicy

Checkers, dominoes and backgammon are favorite indoor sports, but card games are out, for religious reasons. Bets are minor, seldom going beyond a glass of raki, a distillation from grape juice and grain. Turks like to wrestle.

Knives and forks are almost unknown, but spoons are used. Lots of spice goes into the typical Turkish dish, with the menu running largely to tomatoes, rice, onions, garlic, peppers, lemons, sugar and honey. Mutton and fowl are popular roasts. Beef and veal seldom are eaten. Give a Turk some curdled milk and he’s happy.

The main dish is often served in a bowl and each guest reaches in with his right hand. It is considered bad manners to reach in with the left hand. It is not unusual to serve 10 or 12 courses of a Turkish meal in 30 minutes. Turks seldom converse at the table; they eat. One drinks only after a meal and it’s almost always water.

Ataturk put Turkish women into community life. They are no longer kept behind veil and lattice.

Turkey gave us the Turkish bath and Turkish towel. It did not provide the Thanksgiving bird. That came from North America.

412

U.S. State Department (July 27, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Friday, July 27:

There was no meeting of the conference today as the British Delegation had not returned to Babelsberg.

The President worked on his mail during the forenoon.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for Admiral Leahy, departed Babelsberg this morning for the return trip to Washington. They traveled by air.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1200: The President conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. A definition of lend-lease and the prospects of bringing the conference to an early close were among the subjects they discussed.

Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon.

1830: Mr. Davies called on the President.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2030: Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Assistant to the President, arrived Babelsberg this evening and joined the President’s party.

Sergeant List played selected piano solos during dinner hour.

The President today presented an autographed photograph of himself to Colonel Ernest R. Lee, USA.

413

The Syonan Shimbun (July 28, 1945)

Nippon will not be affected in least by change in British govt.

Will fight on determinedly till war won

…

414

Attlee, Bevin going to Potsdam for talks with Stalin, Truman

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Problem for Potsdam: Germany’s future

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415

Editorial: Attlee’s change

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416

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 28, 1945)

Das Ultimatum an Japan

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417

Churchill zum Wahlergebnis

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418

L’Aube (July 28, 1945)

Après l’ultimatum –
Le japon ne semble pas devoir accepter de capituler

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