Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

325

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 5:30 p.m.

CCS 200th Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Somervell Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Hull Field Marshal Wilson
Vice Admiral Cooke General Ismay
Major General Norstad Lieutenant-General Macready
Captain McDill
Captain Oster
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major-General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Lieutenant-Colonel Mallaby

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5:30 p.m.
Top secret

200th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that this was their 200th Meeting.

Operations in Southeast Asia Command

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to extend a welcome to Admiral Mountbatten and take this opportunity of congratulating him personally on the conclusion of his great campaign in Burma.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff and then proceeded to give an account of past, present, and future operations in his command.

In recounting the broad tale of events in Southeast Asia from the SEXTANT Conference in 1943 to the capture of Rangoon in May, 1945, he emphasized two points of importance:

a. Air transport was the lifeblood of all operations in his command. They had saved the day when things looked black in the spring of 1944 and had enabled him to complete successfully the great overland campaign to recapture Burma which had previously been thought impracticable. The Dakota was far and away the best transport aircraft for his purposes.

b. The tremendous steps in the reduction of casualties made possible by preventive medicine.

In describing the current situation in Burma, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that:
a. He had some 56,000 Japs still to destroy. At the moment seven divisions were employed on the job, three of which would soon be withdrawn to take part in forthcoming operations. Considerable fighting was still going on.

b. He had a big problem in getting supplies through to the native population in the face of one of the worst monsoons in history. He was being forced to use some air transport for this as well as for the maintenance of the troops.

c. His air transport squadrons were some 20 percent under strength.

As regards future operations, the Supreme Commander paid tribute to the immense effort being put forward by the India Command to organize India as a base for these operations which were the largest that had ever been undertaken from the country. He drew a picture of the problem of mounting operation ZIPPER; the vast distances over which the forces would have to converge on the objective; the fact that they would have to rely on carrier-borne air support for the landing; and the degree of opposition they were likely to meet. Risks were involved but these were calculated risks which he was prepared to accept.

Finally, he paid tribute to the morale of the troops and the high degree of inter-Allied cooperation that had been built up in the past two years. This spirit, he felt, would carry the command through forthcoming operations in spite of the disappointments inevitably involved in the acceptance of a second priority in the war as a whole.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then invited the United States Chiefs of Staff to put any questions they would like to Admiral Mountbatten, observing that the British Chiefs of Staff would have the opportunity at subsequent discussions in London.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that it might be possible to use more submarines to prevent the infiltration into Malaya of further Japanese reinforcements.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that no specific demand for further submarines for this purpose had been made from the theater and that within reason there was no limitation on the number that might be employed. There were, however, very few worthwhile targets left in the area.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he felt that the present distribution of submarines, balanced as it was to meet the various tasks to be carried out, was satisfactory.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the Supreme Commander how soon he thought he would be able to take over the new command, explaining that the United States Chiefs of Staff were very anxious to relieve United States commanders in the Pacific of their responsibilities for the area at the earliest possible moment.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he had not expected to be called upon to assume these new responsibilities until Mailfist had been completed. He would like a little further time to consider the idea of taking them on earlier, but assured the United States Chiefs of Staff that he would do his best to meet them. When assured by General Marshall that the forces now in the area would be left there, he said that this certainly made things easier. It appeared that the problem would be merely a matter of assuming the higher direction of operations in the area.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what Admiral Mountbatten thought of the idea of splitting French Indo-China into two and placing the southern half, south of 16° N, in the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he had just heard of the proposition and that his first reactions were favorable. He would have liked some latitude in the actual northern limit of the area in case his operations were to develop either to the north or to the south of the degree of latitude suggested, but did not feel very strongly on the point. He thought the French might find the proposition a little less agreeable.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained the background to the French offer of two French divisions for operations in the war against Japan, and said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were agreed that the best place to employ these divisions would probably be in French Indo-China. One of these two divisions had had battle experience and had done well. Both were composed of white men and the French proposal specifically provided that they would arrive with corps-supporting and service units. He asked Admiral Mountbatten’s opinion as to the acceptance of these two divisions in Southeast Asia Command. They could not be moved out for several months and it would probably be the late spring of 1946 before he could expect to get them.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that, subject to the views of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would certainly welcome these two French divisions provided they came with a proper proportion of service and supporting units. The obvious place to employ them would be in French Indo-China where he would be relieved of the necessity of dealing with a problem which could be satisfactorily handled only by Frenchmen.

GENERAL HULL said that General MacArthur had drawn up a list of the supporting and service units which these two divisions would require if they came out to the Pacific, and this list has been communicated to the French. He undertook to provide Admiral Mountbatten with this list.

326 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 24, 1945 — 5:56 p.m.
[Translation]
Urgent

1441

Re your telegram No. 932

We received this telegram on the 22nd, but your telegram No. 931 did not arrive until today, the 24th. After considering the manner of presenting our proposal, we intend to suggest a meeting with Lozovsky.

327

Truman-Stalin conversation, 7:30 p.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Generalissimo Stalin
Mr. Pavlov

Truman: “On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ‘good use of it against the Japanese.’”

Byrnes: “At the close of the meeting of the Big Three on the afternoon of July 24, the President walked around the large circular table to talk to Stalin. After a brief conversation the President rejoined me and we rode back to the ‘Little White House’ together. He said he had told Stalin that, after long experimentation, we had developed a new bomb far more destructive than any other known bomb, and that we planned to use it very soon unless Japan surrendered. Stalin’s only reply was to say that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it.”

Leahy: “At the plenary session on July 24, Truman walked around to Stalin and told him quietly that we had developed a powerful weapon, more potent than anything yet seen in war. The President said later that Stalin’s reply indicated no especial interest and that the Generalissimo did not seem to have any conception of what Truman was talking about. It was simply another weapon and he hoped we would use it effectively.”

Churchill: “Next day, July 24, after our plenary meeting had ended and we all got up from the round table and stood about in twos and threes before dispersing, I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two conversed alone with only their interpreters. I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do. What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted.… As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. ‘How did it go?’ I asked. ‘He never asked a question,’ he replied.”

328

Byrnes conversation with members of the Polish Delegation

Present
United States Poland
Secretary Byrnes

Morse-Weston conversation, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Morse Mr. Weston

The principal subject of discussion was the distribution of captured German vessels. In the course of the conversation Morse communicated to Weston a draft memorandum from Land to Clayton on this subject.

329

Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Brown Mr. Gromyko

Brown: “There was a conference tonight on freedom of press and movement in liberated areas in Balkans. Gromyko came up with a weasel-worded statement on assuring correspondents the right to report out of these countries. He still insisted on military censorship and admitted this could cover political censorship of certain stories. Would not agree to affirmative declaration against political censorship and freedom of press in these areas. Meeting adjourned with no agreement.”

330

The Pittsburgh Press (July 24, 1945)

Big Three to recess for results of British voting

Churchill to leave Potsdam tomorrow
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

…

331

Youngstown Vindicator (July 24, 1945)

Lawrence: Pacific bases may be leased

Suggests plan to recognize United Nations’ interest
By David Lawrence

…

332

Chinese Reds turn attacks on America

Communists fear closer U.S. relationship with Chiang

…

333

U.S. State Department (July 24, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Tuesday, July 24:

Mail arrived from Washington this forenoon. The President signed this mail shortly after it was delivered to him. It included legislative bills HR 905, HR 3295 and H.J. Res. 228.

1000: The President took time out from his work to pose for pictures with Major Greer’s communications personnel, who included several of the WAC telephone operators who handled the “Amco” board.

1020: Secretary Stimson called on the President.

1035: Secretary Byrnes conferred with the President.

1130: The Combined Chiefs of Staff (U.S. and British) assembled at the Little White House and met in plenary session with the President and Prime Minister Churchill. Their report was approved by the President and the Prime Minister.

1430: The first meeting of the Tripartite military staffs (U.S., British, and USSR) was convened at Cecilienhof.

1500: Mail was dispatched to Washington.

1620: A delegation of Poles (consisting of the President of the National Council of Poland and three members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity), escorted by Ambassador Harriman, called on the President at the Little White House. They departed at 1645.

1650: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof, where they arrived at 1700.

At 1715 the eighth meeting of the conference was called to order. The meeting adjourned at 1930, and the President left Cecilienhof immediately to return to the Little White House.

334

U.S. State Department (July 25, 1945)

740.62114/7-2545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State

Caserta, July 25, 1945 — midnight
Secret
3062

We have read telegram in Broad’s office from British Delegate Potsdam stating that at close July 23 [22] session Big Three meeting, Molotov complained to Eden about British POW camp Italy at Cesenatico near Ravenna where British had informed Russian representatives there were only 150 Soviet citizens held as POWs. Soviet ForMin added that when Russian officials arrived visit camp they discovered there were 10,000 Ukrainian citizens there who were being interviewed by Polish consular officials in Italy while Soviet officers were kept out. These Ukrainians were men who had been organized into division of 12 regiments under officers who had served German Army. 665 of them indicated to Russian officers they wished return Soviet Union. Understood that both Eden and Churchill expressed doubt these were facts of case but promised Molotov they would have report made immediately and inform him soon as complete information received.

General Morgan cabled Potsdam in following sense: Approximately 10,000 personnel in this camp present in process being screened by USSR Mission Rome who have full access to camp. People involved mostly non-Soviet Ukrainians and include numbers Poles who, so far as can be ascertained, were not domiciled east 1939 USSR frontier. He added negotiations already under way return to Russia 665 persons referred to and be ready hand over to Russians any more who will go without use force. Morgan reminded British Delegate Potsdam he has sought urgently required ruling by British War Office as to what to be done with those people for whom use force would be necessary. He also explained that British had retained original regimental troops under their own generals for administrative reasons only.

KIRK

335

The Syonan Shimbun (July 25, 1945)

Potsdam parley

LISBON (Domei, July 24) – The British delegation to the “Three Power” Conference at Potsdam today officially announced that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill will return to London tomorrow for the results of the British general election but said that the Potsdam talks will not end, according to a Reuters dispatch from Potsdam.

Churchill, it said, will be accompanied by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and British Labour Party leader Clement Attlee, who has been attending the Conference at the Prime Minister’s invitation.

Meantime, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, American President Harry Truman and Churchill met again for the eighth consecutive day. No announcement was made, however, on the length of the talks or the topics discussed.

336

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 25, 1945)

Dreierkonferenz in Potsdam

BERLIN, 24. Juli (Reuters/BBC) – Nach einem Montagabend herausgegebenen offiziellen Bericht waren Truman und Stalin „sowie Mitglieder der russischen, amerikanischen und britischen Delegation nach Erledigung der Tagesordnung bei Churchill in dessen Haus, genannt „Potsdam, Downing-Street 10,“ zu Gast.

Der Premierminister empfing Präsident Truman und Generalissimus Stalin an der Tür seines Hauses. Kurz danach erschienen die Großen Drei für einige Augenblicke vor dem Haus. Unter den übrigen Gästen befanden sich die drei Außenminister, der Führer der britischen Arbeiterpartei Attlee, Admiral Leahy, die drei Generalstabschefs, Marschall Schukow, die Feldmarschälle Alexander und Montgomery, Maitland Wilson, Sir Edward Bridges, General Sir Hastings Ismay und Lord McRan.

Die drei alliierten Staatsmänner beschleunigen den Gang ihrer Besprechungen, da Premierminister Churchill voraussichtlich am Donnerstag zur Verkündigung der Wahlergebnisse in London sein wird. Der diplomatische Mitarbeiter der Times schreibt Die Zukunft Deutschlands hat offenbar den breitesten Raum in den bisherigen Besprechungen eingenommen. Das Eintreffen des Vorsitzenden der britischen Delegation bei der alliierten Wiedergutmachungskommission lässt vermuten, dass jetzt die Wiedergutmachungsfrage in Potsdam zur Debatte steht. Premierminister Churchill Wird voraussichtlich am Dienstag, zusammen mit Außenminister Eden und dem Führer der Opposition, Attlee, von Potsdam nach London fliegen.

Die ganze Welt erwartet mit Spannung die Entscheidung der Potsdamer Konferenz, aber nirgends ist das Interesse größer als in Deutschland. Denn viel wird für jeden einzelnen Deutschen von den Entschlüssen abhängen, die von den alliierten Staatsmännern am runden Tisch gefasst werden. Noch ist der Schleier der Nachrichtensperre nicht gelüftet und Gerüchte, die gelegentlich von Mund zu Mund gehen, sollten misstrauisch aufgenommen werden.

337

L’Aube (July 25, 1945)

Accords de principe à Potsdam

Selon le correspondant de l’agence Reuter, on pense qu’au cours de leur huitième rencontre, M. Churchill, le maréchal Staline et le président Truman sont arrivés à des accords de principe. Ceux-ci vont permettre aux experts de mettre au point de nombreuses questions de détail qui les tiendront occupés jusqu’au retour des hommes d’État britanniques.

Churchill et Attlee se rendent à Londres pour la proclamation des résultats électoraux

La délégation britannique a communiqué officiellement que MM. Churchill, Eden et Attlee se rendent au jourd’hui à Londres pour prendre connaissance du résultat des élections britanniques. On prévoit que les personnalités britanniques regagneraient Potsdam probablement vendredi : on fait remarquer, à ce sujet, dans les milieux de la capitale britannique, que même si M. Churchill n’obtenait pas la majorité, sa démission immédiate ne s’ensuivrait pas nécessairement et qu’il retournerait à Berlin avec MM. Eden et Attlee pour assister à la phase finale de la Conférence des Trois.

Celle-ci n’interrompra d’ailleurs pas ses travaux pendant l’absence des ministres britanniques.

338

La participation des soviets a la guerre contre le Japon

économiserait aux Américains un million de vies humaines

…

339

U.S. State Department (July 25, 1945)

Truman-Mountbatten conversation, 9:20 a.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Admiral Mountbatten
340

Truman-Stalin conversation, about 11 a.m.

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Generalissimo Stalin

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
Top secret

  • First Question – Has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish United States weather liaison groups in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk as presented to Generalissimo Stalin by President Truman on 23 July 1945?

  • Second Question – United States naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. United States submarine forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, south and east of a line established by connecting the following points: Coast of Korea at latitude 38° north, thence to latitude 40° north longitude 135° east, thence to latitude 45°45′ north longitude 140° east, thence along the parallel of latitude 45°45′ north. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of naval operations?

  • Third Question – United States air forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: Cape Lopatka, west to point at latitude 51°10′ north longitude 147° east, thence to point at latitude 45°45′ north longitude 144°20′ east, thence to point at latitude 45°4′ north longitude 139°30′ east, thence to point at latitude 41°20′ north longitude 133°20′ east, thence westward to Seishin [Chongjin], Korea, thence north to railroad at Korean border, thence westward along railroad to Yungki and Changchun, thence along the river to Liaoyuan, Kailu and Chihfeng, thence along the railroad through Tolun, Paochang, Wanchuan [Kalgan], Tatung, Fengchen, Tsining [Chining] to Kweisui, thence northwest to the border of Outer Mongolia. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?

  • Fourth Question – Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945?

  • Fifth Question – It is assumed that, after D-day, Soviet or United States air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or United States ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet aircraft.

341

Ninth plenary meeting, 11 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Attlee Mr. Cohen
Mr. Thompson Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.

Agenda for the Meeting of Heads of Governments, July 25, 1945

  1. Polish Western Frontier –Eden opposed to discussing this morning
  2. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine –Br ask to postpone
  3. German Reparations
  4. Transfer of populations from Poland & Czechoslovakia –British will ask to add to agenda
    [5.] Waterways
342

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret

Western Frontier of Poland

CHURCHILL said that he had had a talk with President Bierut and that Mr. Eden had seen the Polish delegation for two hours last evening. The Poles were all in agreement that about one and one-half million Germans were left in the area in the west which was under discussion. Mr. Churchill said he thought that this question was mixed up with the question of reparations and the question of the four-power occupational zones.

THE PRESIDENT observed that this was true. He added that the Secretary of State had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks. He suggested that the question go over to the Friday meeting.

This was agreed to.

Disposition of the German Fleet

THE PRESIDENT said he thought that they had agreed on this matter.

CHURCHILL replied that some concrete proposals would have to be made. A paper was being drawn up for discussion.

THE PRESIDENT said that Admiral Land and Assistant Secretary Clayton were in consultation on this matter. He said he had only just received the papers on the question and had had no time to study them.

It was agreed that consideration of this matter should be postponed.

Transfers of Populations

CHURCHILL said that he thought this question should be discussed at some time or other. There were a large number of Germans to be moved out of Czechoslovakia. It was necessary to consider where they would go.

Stalin said that the Czechs had evacuated these Germans and that they had gone to Leipzig, Dresden, and other cities.

CHURCHILL said he understood that there were two and one-half million of these Germans in the Sudetenland. Moreover there were about 150,000 Reich Germans in Czechoslovakia. The British information was that only a few thousand of these Germans had left Czechoslovakia. He said it was a big question. Churchill asked Stalin if they were all being moved into the Russian zone.

STALIN replied in the affirmative.

CHURCHILL hastened to add that the British did not want them.

STALIN said he did not suggest that the British take them.

CHURCHILL observed that they brought their mouths with them. He said he understood that emigration had not begun on a large scale yet.

STALIN said his information was that the Czechs gave them two hours’ notice and then threw them out. With respect to Poland he said that the Poles had retained one and one-half million to help with the harvest. As soon as the harvest was over the Poles would evacuate them.

CHURCHILL said he did not think that they should.

STALIN replied that the Poles did not ask but did as they liked.

CHURCHILL pointed out that with respect to Czechoslovakia the situation was different from that of Poland. The Poles were evacuating Germans from an occupational zone. This area was part of the Russian zone and Poles were driving the Germans out. He should have thought that this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparations, etc., which matters had not been decided. The position was that the Poles had little food and fuel and that the British had a mass of population thrown on them.

STALIN said that they should appreciate the position in which the Poles found themselves. They were taking revenge on the Germans for the injuries which the Germans had caused them in the course of centuries.

CHURCHILL pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed that this should not be done. He was sympathetic with the Poles and with Marshal Stalin in regard to the difficulties they were up against. He had already made his position very clear. If the Poles were to have a zone this matter should be considered very carefully. The occupying powers of Germany were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States. If the Poles were to have a zone, they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it. He wanted to be as helpful as he could and the position he had taken was that the frontier should be fixed at the peace conference.

THE PRESIDENT at this point said that he wished to make clear to his colleagues what his powers were in respect to the question of the treaty of peace. When they were discussing matters appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties he wanted all to understand that under the Constitution of the United States a treaty could only be concluded with the consent of the United States Senate. Of course they could be sure that when he supported a proposal at the Conference he would use his best efforts to support the matter when it came up for consideration in the Senate. This did not preclude, however, his coming back and saying that he considered that the political sentiment in the United States was such that he could not press the matter without the danger of injuring their mutual relations. He said that he made these remarks not in order to change the basis of any discussion with his colleagues nor to change the basis upon which the discussions with President Roosevelt had been held but to make clear what his Constitutional powers were. He had to consider these matters from the standpoint of the United States people and he wished to be able to be in a position to get the best arrangements approved by the Senate. He concluded by saying that he was convinced that world peace could only be maintained by the three of them present at the table.

STALIN inquired if his remarks referred only to the peace treaties or to the whole discussion.

THE PRESIDENT replied only to those agreements or treaties that under the Constitution had to be sent to the Senate for ratification.

STALIN observed that only certain treaties were in question.

THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative and added that he had wide powers the same as his colleagues but he did not wish to abuse these powers for he was obliged to have the support of the American people for his policies.

STALIN said that he understood.

CHURCHILL proposed to return to the question of the Polish advance so far to the west.

STALIN said he was not prepared for this question which had come up by accident but he was ready to exchange views.

CHURCHILL said he only wanted to say that this matter lay at the root of the success of the Conference. For example, if the Conference ended in ten days’ time; and if there were no agreement regarding the present state of affairs in Poland; and with the Poles practically admitted as a fifth occupational power; and with no arrangement made for the spreading of food equally over the whole population of Germany; this would undoubtedly mark a breakdown of the Conference. In such an event he supposed they might have to fall back on the proposal of Secretary Byrnes and each would hold on to what was in their areas. The definition given by Mr. Maisky of war booty was a very wide one. As given it would certainly cover ships of war. He had hoped to succeed in reaching agreement on this network of problems that lay at the heart of their difficulties. No progress had been made so far on this point.

STALIN said that coal and steel were much more important than food in the question of supplies for Germany. 90 percent of Germany’s metal came from the Ruhr and 80 percent of its coal.

CHURCHILL said that if supplies from the Ruhr were to be given to the Russian and Polish zones, these would have to be paid for by food from the Russian zone. He could not take the position that everything behind the Russian line was to be disposed of by the Russians without British and American agreement while the Russians could demand plants and materials from them.

STALIN said that if the Ruhr was to remain in Germany its supplies would have to be drawn upon for the whole of Germany.

CHURCHILL inquired then why not food.

STALIN said that this could be discussed. There were two points, the Ruhr and food.

CHURCHILL inquired how the miners would get the coal out without food and where the food was to come from.

STALIN said this was a point they were discussing. It was a question of imports and exports. Germany had always imported large amounts of food and had to export to pay for its imports.

CHURCHILL then inquired how they could pay reparations.

STALIN rejoined that they would be able to pay.

CHURCHILL said he would not be responsible for agreeing to anything which would lead to starvation conditions in the British zone this winter while the Poles had the feeding grounds for themselves.

STALIN said the Poles had asked the Russians for bread as they were short of food until the next harvest.

CHURCHILL said he hoped that Stalin would recognize their difficulties as they would recognize his. He pointed out that in England they would have the most fireless winter of the war this year.

STALIN inquired why.

CHURCHILL replied because coal was short.

STALIN replied that England had always exported coal. He suggested that they make their prisoners of war work. The Russians were working the ones they held in the mines and it would be difficult to dispense with them so far as coal was concerned. He said that the British had 400,000 German soldiers in Norway who were not even disarmed. No one knew what they were waiting for.

CHURCHILL said it was their intention to disarm them. He did not know exactly what the situation was but said that the arrangements had been made under SHAEF. However, he said he would inquire. The British were short of coal because they were exporting to Holland, France, and Belgium. They were denying themselves and they found it odd that the Poles sold coal, taken from ground which they did not recognize as Polish, to Sweden and other countries.

STALIN said the Poles were not selling coal from the territory in question but from other sources. He was not accustomed to make complaints but he pointed out that the Russian situation was still worse than that of the British. They had lost over five million men in this war. He was afraid that if he started complaining Churchill would burst into tears so difficult was the situation in Russia.

CHURCHILL said they were eager to barter coal from the Ruhr in exchange for food for the German population.

STALIN said that this question must be discussed.

CHURCHILL replied that he did not expect a decision today but before his departure and the resulting interruption of the Conference he did not think they should consider that they had solved the major problems. Churchill said that the British position would be more difficult after the war than it had been during the war although it might be less deadly.

STALIN observed that as they had tackled the war properly they would be able to tackle the peace.

EDEN reverted to the question of the transfer of population. They had received a message from Dr. Beneš asking that the question be examined here. Could not the Foreign Ministers look at it.

STALIN inquired whether they should not summon the Czechs to the Conference.

CHURCHILL said he would be very glad to see his old friend Dr. Beneš.

STALIN asked if this would not mean serving the mustard after supper. He assured Mr. Churchill that these transfers had already taken place.

EDEN said he thought that all three Governments had received a note from the Czechs asking that the question be discussed here. He thought they ought to do so.

CHURCHILL said he thought there had been an agreement between the Soviets and the Czechs that not more than 1,000 of these Germans would depart at one time and that since there were two and one-half million of them the transfer would take a long time.

STALIN said there had been no such agreement.

CHURCHILL then proposed that the Foreign Ministers at least look into the matter and ascertain the facts.

This was agreed to.

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to call the attention of the Conference to the question of the inland waterways upon which he had circulated a paper. He would like the Foreign Ministers to examine it.

This was agreed to.

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation would circulate a memorandum on the obstacles in the way of the return of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany. He also wished to circulate a memorandum regarding the presence of German troops in Norway.

THE PRESIDENT said that any memorandum could be circulated.

CHURCHILL said he could at once give assurance that these troops would be disarmed immediately. They did not want to keep them up their sleeves. He would have a report made.

The meeting adjourned.

343

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.

TRUMAN: Shall we discuss the Polish western frontier? I think the Prime Minister had something to say.

CHURCHILL: I saw Mr. Bierut this morning. The Foreign Secretary saw the Polish delegation last night. They all agree that there are about one and a half million Germans in this area. The issue is all mixed up with the reparation issue, and the four power zones of occupation.

TRUMAN: Secretary of State Byrnes expects to have further conversations with the Poles also. In view of the British and American conversations with the Poles, it might go over to Friday. The German fleet and merchant marine are also on the agenda. I thought we had agreed on that.

CHURCHILL: Obviously, we must have some concrete proposals.

TRUMAN: Secretary Byrnes tells me that [Assistant] Secretary Clayton and Admiral Land are working on such proposals.

STALIN: Let us postpone it.

CHURCHILL: We must at some time discuss the question of the transfer of populations. There are a large number of Poles [Germans] to be moved from Czechoslovakia. We must consider where they are to go.

STALIN: The Czechs have already evicted them.

CHURCHILL: The two and a half million of them? Then there are the Germans from the new Poland. Will they go to the Russian zones? We don’t want them. There are large numbers still to come from Sudetenland.

STALIN: So far as the Poles are concerned, the Poles have retained one and a half million Germans to help as laborers. As soon as the harvest is over, the Poles will evict them. The Poles do not ask us. They are doing what they like, just as the Czechs are.

CHURCHILL: That is the difficulty. The Poles are driving the Germans out of the Russian zone. That should not be done without considering its effect on the food supply and reparations. We are getting into a position where the Poles have food and coal, and we have the mass of the population thrown on us.

STALIN: We must appreciate the position of the Poles. The Poles are taking revenge for centuries of injuries.

CHURCHILL: That consists in throwing them on us, and the United States?

TRUMAN: We don’t want to pay for Polish revenge. If Poland is to have an occupation zone, that should be clearly defined, but at the present time there are only four zones of occupation. If the Poles have an occupation zone they should be responsible for it. The boundary cannot be fixed before the peace conference. I want to be helpful, but Germany is occupied by four powers, and the boundary cannot be changed [now;] only at the peace conference.

I must make clear at this point my constitutional powers. (Reads formal statement). Peace treaties must be confirmed by our Senate. When I indicate my support of a proposal, I will use my best efforts to secure its acceptance. That does not guarantee its acceptance, nor does it preclude my coming back and informing you that my continuing to press it might endanger our common interests in the peace.

I make this statement, not to change the basis of our discussions, but to make clear beyond misunderstanding my constitutional authority. This is particularly important with reference to the Polish question. I want a treaty of peace which can be ratified by the Senate.

STALIN: May I ask a few questions? Does your statement refer to peace treaties only, or to other questions?

TRUMAN: Only matters which must go to the Senate. I have large war powers, as have the rest of you, but I do not wish to use them to the point that they may endanger the final conclusion of peace.

CHURCHILL: If the conference ends in ten days without agreement on the present state of affairs in Poland, and with the Poles practically admitted as a fifth occupation power, and no arrangement for the spreading of food over the whole of Germany, it will mark the breakdown of the conference. I suppose we will have to fall back on the proposal of the Secretary of State, and each of us fall back on our own zones. Maisky’s definition of booty is a very wise one (???). I do hope that we will reach a broad agreement. We must recognize that we have made no progress so far on this point.

STALIN: Coal and metal from the Ruhr is more important than the food supply.

CHURCHILL: Coal will have to be paid for by food. We could not agree that Russia could dispose of everything in her zone and still claim supplies and reparations from our zone.

STALIN: Supplies will have to be drawn from the whole of Germany.

CHURCHILL: Why not food?

STALIN: That should be discussed. The question is under discussion. Germany has always had to import foodstuff.

CHURCHILL: How will she pay reparations?

STALIN: There is much fat in Germany.

CHURCHILL: I am not going to consent to arrangements which will lead to starvation in the Ruhr, when the Poles have all the feeding grounds.

STALIN: Only recently the Poles requested help by the way of bread from us until their new harvest.

CHURCHILL: We in England are going to have the most fireless winter since the war.

STALIN: How is this? England has always exported her coal. Let the prisoners of war work. They work in the mines in Russia. You have 400 thousand German soldiers in Norway who have not been disarmed.

CHURCHILL: It is our intention to disarm them. I thought that they were disarmed. I will inquire about it.

CHURCHILL: (continuing) We are short of coal because we export coal to France, Holland and Belgium. We find it odd, when we need coal, that the Poles should be selling coal from lands which we do not regard as Polish, to Sweden and other countries.

STALIN: The Poles are selling their own coal, not the coal from the former German territories. I am not accustomed to complaining. We have lost five million men in this war. We are short of coal and many other things. If I described our situation and our needs, I might make the Prime Minister weep.

CHURCHILL: We will sell coal from the Ruhr for food.

STALIN: This question must be discussed, or thought over.

CHURCHILL: We were only exchanging views. I am finished.

STALIN: What a pity.

TRUMAN: We shall adjourn until Friday at five p.m.

CHURCHILL: I hope to be back.

STALIN: Judging from the expression on Mr. Attlee’s face, I do not think he looks forward avidly to taking over your authority.

We have tackled the problems of the war successfully. We should be able to tackle the problems of the peace as well.

EDEN: The Prime Minister referred to the transfer of populations. President Beneš has sent some communication to us. May the Foreign Secretaries look at it?

STALIN: Yes. May we not have to summon the Czechs?

CHURCHILL: I shall be glad to see Beneš. He is an old friend.

STALIN: But is this not serving mustard after supper? The Germans have already been driven out.

CHURCHILL: They have some agreement for gradual transfer.

STALIN: No such agreement exists.

CHURCHILL: There is still the problem how this is to be done. May the Foreign Secretaries look into it?

STALIN: Yes.

TRUMAN: I should like my suggestion on the waterways, the Rhine, the Danube, the Kiel Canal and the Bosporus considered by the Foreign Secretaries.

STALIN: All right.

MOLOTOV: May I circulate a memorandum on the obstacles in the way of return of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany, and also a memorandum on the presence of German troops in Norway.

TRUMAN: Yes.

CHURCHILL: I wish to assure the Marshal that I intend to disarm the troops in Norway. I am not keeping them up my sleeve for use, if any misunderstanding arises in the north. Perhaps the Marshal will let me make a report.

STALIN: I promise in advance, and I shall not criticise.

344

The War Shipping Administrator to the Assistant Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] 25 July 1945
Secret

Assumption:
The Tripartite Conference will agree that USSR (Russia) will be given as reparations one-third (⅓) of the captured and/or surrendered German merchant tonnage. (This will exclude (a) Fishing vessels; (b) Harbor and Inland Water Craft; (c) Coastal shipping required for German use.)

If the above assumption is correct, the Protocol should definitely cover the following points:

(a) In this one-third distribution full consideration should be given to any enemy merchant tonnage captured or surrendered now in possession of USSR.

(b) Ships may be tentatively “earmarked” for delivery to USSR at the end of the war with Japan.

(c) The implementation should not take place until after the fall of Japan, preferably six months after VJ-Day which, by limitation, is the period of the United Maritime Authority.

(d) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships now fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

These ships are now engaged in providing shipping service for military and other tasks necessary for, and arising out of, the completion of the war in Europe and the Far East and for the supplying of all the liberated areas as well as the United Nations generally and the territories under their authority. They are being handled and integrated accordingly. (NOTE: Any change in the present military and civilian approved instructions covering these vessels will interfere with the successful prosecution of the war with Japan.)

E S LAND

[Attachment]

Secret

Notes To Accompany Attached Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Clayton

  1. Russia is not, at present, a signatory to the “Agreement on Principles having reference to the continuance of coordinated control of merchant shipping,” which was done in London on the 5th day of August, 1944 (United Maritime Authority).

  2. To date Russia has evinced no interest in joining the United Maritime Authority.

  3. Our records indicate that Russia endeavored to dissuade both Norway and Sweden from joining the United Maritime Authority but they were not successful. This attitude on the part of Russia indicates either a misunderstanding or a fear, or both, as to the intent and purposes of the United Maritime Authority.

  4. The shipping allocations to Russia by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board have been satisfactorily handled by the United States and the United Kingdom throughout the war and if Russia does not choose to accede to the United Maritime Authority, there is no reason why she should not henceforth apply to it for her shipping requirements. This leads to the conclusion that Russia’s accession to UMA is not vital provided that the Protocol definitely states that the delivery of ships to Russia will not take place until the limit of the UMA period, namely within six months after VJ-Day.

LAND