Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

The fifth meeting of the conference was called to order at 1700. The conference adjourned at 1925, and the President returned to the Little White House at 1935.

At 2015 the President, accompanied by Mr. Davies, Mr. Byrnes and Admiral Leahy, left the Little White House for Generalissimo Stalin’s residence where they attended a dinner given by the Generalissimo. Present were: The President, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Davies, Mr. Bohlen, Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Attlee, Lord Leathers, Major Birse, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vyshinski, Mr. Beria (People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs), Mr. Gousev, Mr. Gromyko, and Mr. Pavlov.

The President returned to the Little White House at 2330.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:06am

Neues Österreich (July 22, 1945)

Die Potsdam Konferenz

…

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:07am

L’Aube (July 22, 1945)

Potsdam va de l’avant !

déclarent les Américains

…

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:08am

U.S. State Department (July 22, 1945)

Stimson-Churchill conversation, 10:40 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Mr. Stimson		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Bundy		Lord Cherwell

Stimson’s diary entry: “At ten-forty Bundy and I again went to the British headquarters and talked to the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell for over an hour. Churchill read Groves’ report in full. He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He said ‘Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn’t understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting’. Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and that he felt the same way. His own attitude confirmed this admission. He now not only was not worried about giving the Russians information on the matter but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations. The sentiment of the four of us was unanimous in thinking that it was advisable to tell the Russians at least that we were working on that subject and intended to use it if and when it was successfully finished.”

According to Bundy in 1957...

Churchill exclaimed after learning the contents of the report of the first atomic test: “Stimson, what was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath.”

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:09am

Fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:10 a.m.

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Clayton	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman	Sir William Strang	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Murphy	Mr. Ward	Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Pauley		Mr. Novikov
Mr. Matthews		Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Russell
Mr. Allen
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m.
Top secret

The Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers took place on Sunday, July 22, 1945, Mr. Eden being in the Chair. The meeting opened at 11:10 a.m.

MR. EDEN stated his belief that mention should be made of all outstanding subjects which appear on the agenda, in order that the meeting could decide which were ready to discuss. He mentioned first the admission of neutral states, except Spain, into world organizations.

MR. MOLOTOV asked about Italy.

MR. EDEN replied that Italy was linked to this subject.

MR. EDEN went on to mention the Council of Foreign Ministers and German economic questions.

MR. BYRNES inquired about the status of the proposal for the Council of Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN asked that he be permitted first to state the questions on the agenda. He mentioned the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe and the removal, as war booty, of Allied equipment from Rumania, and asked about the condition of each of the foregoing subjects.

MR. BYRNES remarked that he had suggested the question of the supply of oil for Western Europe.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there were other questions, including German and Austrian reparations, on which a subcommittee is working. He inquired about Spain.

MR. EDEN stated his assumption that Mr. Molotov meant the general paper on Spain. He remarked that Spain was included in the paper regarding the admission of Italy into international organizations. The question on policy towards Spain was discussed by the Big Three and was still before them.

MR. BYRNES stated that the Big Three had discussed the question of withdrawal of recognition from Spain, but when agreement was not reached the question had been passed over.

MR. EDEN replied that it had not been passed on to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. BYRNES agreed that it had not, but remained on the Big Three agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that there had been a suggestion for special mention of Spain.

MR. BYRNES agreed that the drafting committee had been instructed to state, in connection with the admission of Italy into international organizations, that Spain should not be so admitted. The committee’s report is not yet ready.

MR. EDEN agreed, except that it had been suggested that Spain be linked with the neutrals. The whole question was now in the hands of a subcommittee.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether a committee had been appointed.

MR. BYRNES said Yes and that Maisky had been appointed for the Soviet Union.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of Tangier and the question of the admission of neutral states into the United Nations.

MR. BYRNES remarked that the latter subject was connected with the proposal he had just mentioned. It had been referred to the same committee that was dealing with Spain and Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated his agreement and asked about Tangier.

MR. EDEN replied that the question had not yet been discussed but could be put on the agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that although the question had not been referred to the Foreign Ministers, he had no objection.

MR. BYRNES then stated that he had another item to suggest. This was a paper concerning international cooperation for the solution of European economic problems.

MR. EDEN asked whether the meeting had a paper on this subject.

MR. BYRNES replied that the paper will soon be circulated, but if Mr. Eden wished, he would suggest it for discussion by the Big Three in order that it might be referred back to the Foreign Ministers. This would take another day.

MR. EDEN pointed out that five big items were already on the agenda, but suggested that a start be made on them and, if possible, this extra item may be considered.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the question was not before the meeting and that no document was available.

Implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe

MR. EDEN announced that the first question before the meeting was the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe (Annex l).

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had studied the American suggestion and had two questions on it. The first is the provision for the supervision of elections. The Soviet delegation did not like this provision and had already stated that it did not approve. It believed supervision to be unnecessary. The second question concerned the press. There is no doubt that conditions have now changed and that the end of the war will mean more favorable treatment of the press. He had no doubt that everything possible will be done. He did not understand the need for such a statement. On the question of the control commissions, Mr. Molotov stated that this was not clear. No doubt the American and British members know that in the countries in question the Soviet representatives have submitted suggestions for the improvement of conditions. If his colleagues do not know about the suggestions, he would be glad to furnish information in order that they might be discussed. He was willing to amend them, and any amendments made could be inserted. He had just received a telegram from Voroshilov stating that the American and British representatives on the Control Council in Hungary had been given the text of the Soviet suggestions. Voroshilov believed that they approved of them. Mr. Molotov would like to hear comment regarding these suggestions.

MR. BYRNES in reply referred first to the last question. It is the American position that just as the representatives of the Three Powers gather around the present conference table in order to exchange views and make suggestions, the representatives of the Three Powers in the satellite states should follow the same procedure. Up to now this had not been done, according to reports received from our representatives. Our representatives report not only that suggestions are not made by Soviet representatives, but that action is taken without consultation. Mr. Byrnes believed that the Soviet Government should consult prior to taking action, just as the Conferees were doing here. All paragraph 3 does is to assert that as a desirable thing. There could certainly be no objection to this. As to the press, we have heretofore stated that the American press representatives are refused freedom of movement and freedom to report to their papers. Marshal Stalin had agreed that the end of the war meant an improvement in this situation. We are only stating in our document what he suggested. As to paragraph 1, Mr. Byrnes stated that he could only repeat that we do not like the idea of the supervision of elections but that we have become convinced that it is the wise thing to do in order to remove suspicion regarding the conduct of elections. These suspicions may be unjustifiable, but they can only be removed by supervision of elections; that was agreed to at Yalta.

MR. EDEN stated that the British had been asked to put forward a paper on this subject. This had not been done because the document before the Conference is entirely acceptable to the British Government. In regard to Mr. Molotov’s suggestion regarding the modification of the control councils, Mr. Eden believed that it would be useful if we could have the text of these suggestions here. It is difficult to follow the exact nature of the modifications proposed. Perhaps Mr. Molotov could arrange to make the text available, in which case a subcommittee could be appointed to consider them. In regard to the supervision of elections, Mr. Eden agreed with the paper. We do not wish to supervise elections but must do so in order to fulfill the spirit of the Yalta Agreement. In regard to the press, this was not wholly a question of freedom of movement but a question of the right to report free from political censorship. That is why the British like the proposal in this paper and hope that their Soviet Allies will be able to accept it.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that in the paragraph dealing with the supervision of elections five countries were mentioned, including Italy. However, in paragraph 3 of the paper, dealing with control commissions only three countries were mentioned. It is evident that Greece could not be mentioned in paragraph 3 since there is no control council there, but this is not true in Italy. Why was Italy omitted?

MR. BYRNES replied that Italy had been omitted because no complaint had been received regarding the operation of the Council.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether a tripartite basis would be approved in Italy.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Commission is an Allied commission in Italy and that the Soviet Government has representatives.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that the Soviet representatives took no part in the work and were not kept informed.

MR. BYRNES replied that this was the first that the United States had heard about the Soviet representative not being kept informed. He was certain that he must be. The United States sought nothing in Rumania, Bulgaria, or Hungary which it was not willing to make available to the Soviet Union in Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he believed that it would be best to circulate the Soviet suggestions regarding the Control Council as suggested by Mr. Eden. Of course, there were slight differences in conditions in the three countries, but the principles would be the same. Perhaps somebody would suggest an improvement in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Italy.

MR. BYRNES replied that any suggestion would be considered and reiterated that this was the first time he had heard any complaint about operations in Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had mentioned on several occasions, to American and British representatives, that conditions in Italy constituted a model for the control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Russians had read about the reorganization of the Italian Commission in the press but had decided not to do anything about it.

MR. BYRNES agreed that the Soviet representative should have been informed.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether Mr. Byrnes was satisfied that American and British representatives in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary should have the same working conditions as the Soviet representative in Italy.

MR. EDEN pointed out that if conditions in Italy are not satisfactory to the Soviet Union, they would be changed gladly. Mr. Eden had heard nothing about this.

MR. BYRNES agreed, and stated that our representative should take no action without consultation with the Soviet representative. We wanted the same treatment.

MR. EDEN stated that it was agreed that Mr. Molotov would furnish the text of the proposals and any comment he wished regarding conditions in Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that on the question of the supervision of elections the statement was unnecessary and would cause suspicion. He pointed out that up to now elections in ex-enemy countries had been held only in Finland, and asked whether there is any suspicion that this election had not been free.

MR. BYRNES agreed that so far as we knew this election had been all right.

MR. MOLOTOV then said there was no other election and inquired what grounds there were for suspicion.

MR. BYRNES replied that we would, frankly, always be suspicious of elections in countries where our representatives are not free to move about and where the press cannot report freely. Our representatives in every one of these countries had reported such conditions, but they had not done so in Finland. Elections might be conducted as fairly as is possible to conduct them, but so long as our representatives are not permitted to move about and there is no free press, no one will believe that the elections are free. Great harm might result where no reason existed for such harm.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no objection to the discussion of the American proposal if this discussion at the same time included the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

MR. BYRNES stated that the press had reported freely about the Finnish election and that the public was satisfied regarding conditions under which it was held.

MR. EDEN, referring to Mr. Molotov’s last statement, said that he believed that there might be something in this. If elections were held under conditions set forth in this proposal, it would be much easier to bring about some form of recognition of these countries. However, it must be borne in mind that Constitutionally Great Britain was unable to extend full recognition until the conclusion of peace. Full diplomatic relations had not yet been established with Italy for this reason.

MR. BYRNES stated that the President had made plain the other afternoon that there could be no question, so far as the United States is concerned, of recognition under existing conditions and that, therefore, the United States would not recognize these governments.9 He hoped that elections would be held under conditions which would permit prompt recognition of any government set up by the people.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Soviet Union could not agree to the supervision of elections. He could understand that other Allies wanted better facilities for their representatives in these countries. Now that the war was at an end, there is every reason to give greater freedom both to these representatives and to the press. They would have every opportunity fully to be informed regarding the elections. Mr. Molotov suggested that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposal be referred to a subcommittee.

MR. EDEN stated that he would report to the Big Three that paragraphs 2 and 3 had been referred to a subcommittee but that no agreement had been reached regarding the supervision of elections.

MR. BYRNES interjected to inquire whether Mr. Molotov would agree to accept paragraphs 2 and 3 if paragraph 1 was withdrawn.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there were drafting points, since certain parts of the paper were not clear. If the Conference was willing to state that conditions would be the same as in Italy, there would be no objection.

MR. BYRNES remarked that we were going in circles.

MR. EDEN suggested that the matter go forward as suggested by him and that a subcommittee be appointed.

MR. BYRNES appointed Mr. Cannon and Mr. Russell.

MR. EDEN appointed Mr. Hayter.

MR. MOLOTOV appointed Mr. Sobolev.

German Economic Questions

MR. EDEN next raised the report of the economic subcommittee (Annex 2).

MR. BYRNES suggested that this afternoon’s consideration of this report be confined to those matters agreed to by the subcommittee.

MR. MOLOTOV asked for clarification of this point.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that if the Foreign Ministers approved those portions of the report of the subcommittee [already?] approved by it, they could be referred to the Big Three and progress would be made. Among the disagreements is the question of reparations, and Mr. Byrnes did not wish to have this question considered this afternoon.

MR. EDEN stated his understanding of the need to leave out reparations, but asked whether there weren’t other sections which must be considered before a report was made to the Big Three.

MR. BYRNES agreed, except for reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what report was meant.

MR. EDEN replied that they were considering the report of the economic subcommittee. In this report the last half dealt with reparations. Under the American proposal this meeting would deal with all questions but reparations.

MR. BYRNES agreed that questions not dealt with this afternoon should be first on the agenda of the next meeting.

MR. EDEN brought up the report.

MR. BYRNES asked that paragraph 4 be passed.

MR. EDEN failed to see the connection between paragraph 4 and reparations.

MR. BYRNES replied that he did not wish to discuss paragraph 4 and renewed his request that matters in disagreement not be discussed now but be placed first on the next agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it was not quite clear to him what the meeting was discussing.

MR. EDEN replied that he understood that the drafting committee had agreed on this report except where specifically indicated and that it had been agreed that the Foreign Ministers would discuss only portions agreed upon. Eighteen principles had been agreed upon. They would be taken in order.

MR. EDEN mentioned paragraph 10.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that in the last sentence the phrases providing that “production shall be destroyed” and “or shall be removed” be reversed.

MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. EDEN raised paragraphs 11 and 12, and they were agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV submitted an amendment to paragraph 13 which consisted of the addition of the clause “according to detailed instructions to be issued by the Control Council” at the end of the first sentence. He pointed out that Germany cannot be considered a single economic unit in all respects and cited the language of paragraph 11 as proof of his contention. Therefore he believed that more specific instructions were needed.

MR. BYRNES stated that he wished to give more consideration to this matter. In the report, the principle was stated that during the occupation period Germany would be treated as a single economic unit. The language of Mr. Molotov’s proposal would modify this principle and make it subject to directives from the Control Council. If any member of the Control Council objected on a specific issue, Germany would not be treated as a single economic unit on that issue. Mr. Byrnes was in agreement with the language of the committee’s report but not with that of the amendment.

MR. MOLOTOV stated his belief that the amendment was necessary. The language of the present draft was too general.

MR. BYRNES remarked that this would mean that in every single case the Control Council would decide whether Germany was to be treated as an economic unit.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that he had not been understood. He is not denying that it had been decided that Germany would be treated as an economic unit. However, he had another idea. He felt that the Control Council should be instructed to sit and look at the situation in detail. After some months of experience the Control Council might recommend a new basis based on their experience. He believed this to be essential.

MR. BYRNES suggested that this matter be passed over. He stated that he was willing to take Mr. Molotov’s suggested language and see whether agreement could be reached.

MR. EDEN then raised paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 and they were agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the deletion of paragraph 18. The effect of the war is serious and great changes have been made. Stalin yesterday had said that it was impossible to restore pre-war conditions in Germany. It is difficult for us now to say in what respect pre-war Germany can be restored.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the matters dealt with in paragraph 18 are already contained in paragraph 5 on which agreement had not been reached. Therefore, we must reserve on paragraph 18 and note that no agreement had been reached. He inquired whether the meeting was willing to consider paragraph 7 which did not deal with reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV asked about the annex.

MR. EDEN replied that it dealt entirely with reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that article 16 referred to the annex and that note must be made that the annex had not been considered. This was agreed to.

MR. EDEN then suggested consideration of paragraph 7.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not read the report.

MR. EDEN stated that there are only a couple of sentences.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that he had not read it.

MR. EDEN agreed that it should be passed over.

Industrial Equipment in Rumania*

MR. EDEN then raised the matter of the seizure of British and American owned industrial equipment in Rumania. A British company had a lot of equipment bought and paid for. Some had come from Germany; some from other countries. When the Germans invaded Rumania, they had seized these companies and the equipment. The British had assumed that when Rumania fell to the Allies this equipment would be returned. They were naturally much concerned when the equipment had been taken by our Russian Allies.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that the losses of this British corporation be compared with the losses of the Soviet oil companies.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the British had not taken Soviet property because of British losses.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that German property had been taken.

MR. EDEN denied that the property was German.

MR. VYSHINSKI then made a long statement containing statistics concerning the equipment in question. He maintained that after Soviet seizures had been completed enough equipment remained to insure three years’ output. He asserted that the pipe in question had been imported by the Germans from Germany in order to build a pipeline for pumping Soviet oil. He denied that the equipment had been paid for by British companies.

MR. EDEN intervened to state that he had heard this story before and that it had been disproved.

MR. VYSHINSKI continued his statement alleging that the Germans had imported these pipes and transferred them to firms already made German. He also made an extended argument attempting to justify the Soviet action under the armistice terms and purporting to prove that the equipment constituted war booty.

MR. EDEN intervened to state that no Allied property in any country is booty to another Ally.

MR. VYSHINSKI continued his argument based on the surrender terms.

MR. BYRNES interposed to state that the question does not concern the right of the Soviet Government to take German property as war booty, but concerns the Soviet claim to the right to take the property of American citizens as booty. The question is whether the property in question is the property of American citizens. If it was German, the Russians had a right to take it. The case must be solved on facts and the facts must be determined by somebody [some body?] like the Reparations Committee. Mr. Byrnes wished the three powers to agree to the general proposition that the property of American citizens should not be confiscated as war booty by the three powers here represented. Byrnes stated his understanding that all four of the armistice terms [agreements] contained appropriate provisions governing these cases.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to make a point.

MR. VYSHINSKI remarked that he had not finished his statement. He stated that the Control Council in Rumania was satisfied that the pipes were not British or American property.

MR. EDEN pointed out that this was a unilateral action of the Soviet High Command which had never been agreed to. However, we are used to such unilateral acts.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the Soviet armies had covered big distances in their advance and that there had only been this one case on which dispute arose.

MR. VYSHINSKI then continued his argument insisting that the equipment in question had not been paid for before the war and could not have been paid for during the war. He mentioned that the high-octane Astra-Romana plant though legitimately war booty had not been removed by the Soviet Union since its removal would have affected Rumanian production. He reiterated that enough equipment had been left to guarantee three years’ supply and insisted that according to all the facts the equipment removed was German property.

MR. BYRNES inquired whether it was contended that the Germans owned the oil in the ground.

MR. VYSHINSKI replied that they had used the oil against the Allies and had also used the pipes.

MR. BYRNES stated that if the German Army uses your property, such use does not take title away.

MR. VYSHINSKI then argued that the matter would have been different if the pipes had come from the United States and had been seized from [by?] the Germans. However, they had been brought from Germany. He asked how they could be considered Allied property.

MR. BYRNES asked whether the American citizen owned the oil or whether he had lost the title to it because the Germans had seized the well. If the oil were to be taken out of the ground now, would the American citizen be paid?

MR. VYSHINSKI stated that the Soviet Union received oil as reparation from the Rumanian Government. The Soviet Union is taking nothing from American firms. In any event, we were dealing with equipment, not oil.

MR. EDEN remarked that the argument could go on for a long time. He thought this matter should be examined by a committee. It should be remembered that:

Not only the question of the pipes should be considered;
The great majority of the pipes had been bought and paid for before the war; and
Great Britain had not objected to the removal of surplus property but did object to indiscriminate removal. He believed that if the Committee investigated the matter it could be cleared up.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that it would be difficult to determine the owner of specific pipes. The matter should be left to the Reparations Commission or some similar body. We ought to agree here on general principles. He suggested the reference of the case to a committee which could arrive at principles governing such cases.

MR. EDEN stated his belief that there should be a meeting of experts to determine what had happened. The Soviet Government had issued orders in the name of the Control Council without consulting either the British or American representatives.

MR. BYRNES suggested the appointment of a committee to reconcile opposing points of view.

MR. MOLOTOV queried the usefulness of such a committee. He could understand that the firms in question wanted the use of these pipes even though they were enemy.

MR. EDEN remarked that he had said many times that this was not enemy property. If Mr. Molotov did not wish to discuss it, it would be necessary to leave it as it is, and in that event he would have to tell Parliament. Personally he thought it best that he should not have to take this course.

MR. BYRNES stated that it was not wise to leave a subject of such disagreement. It would be much better if each appointed a representative to discuss the situation in order to avoid future difficulty. If American citizens submitted complaints it would be necessary to investigate these complaints and claim restitution. It was better to try to settle the issue here.

MR. EDEN suggested that the question be thought over for later consideration. He continued that since it was now 1:30 p.m. it was necessary to produce an agenda for the afternoon meeting. Questions still before the afternoon meeting included Western Frontiers of Poland, adjourned from yesterday.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of Koenigsberg and the Koenigsberg area in German territory which is to go to the Soviet Union. He asked whether there was any objection to opening the agenda with the question of the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union.

EDEN inquired whether this subject was desired on the agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it should not go first on the agenda but should be considered after the Western Frontiers of Poland.

MR. EDEN said that the second item would be Trusteeship; the third, Turkey; and that the Western Frontiers of the Soviet Union could be added as the fourth item if Mr. Byrnes agreed.

MR. BYRNES agreed and added that other territorial questions might well be added since they were all interrelated.

MR. EDEN then stated that he would circulate a paper on Iran and asked whether there was any objection to its inclusion. This would be the fifth item on the agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired about German economic questions.

MR. EDEN stated that a report would be made on this subject but that consideration had better be postponed because of reparations.

MR. BYRNES stated that there were two matters which he wished added to the agenda. Each would in due course be referred back to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of States. The President would first present a paper on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. He would also propose the issuance of a draft [directive] by the Heads of Governments stating the principles governing the control of Germany.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the second point was not quite clear to him.

MR. BYRNES stated that the directive proposed would be issued by the respective governments to their commanders occupying Germany in order that what was agreed by this Conference might be carried out.

MR. EDEN stated that this could not be discussed now.

MR. BYRNES agreed and added that it would not be discussed this afternoon since it must be referred to a committee.

MR. MOLOTOV asked about the object of this proposal.

MR. BYRNES stated that he had wanted the matter on the agenda this morning but was unable to get it included. The President will now present it in order that it can be referred to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN asked whether it could not be taken up tomorrow morning.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether military questions or economic had been included.

MR. BYRNES stated that if the Conference agreed, the proposal could be read and referred to a committee. Such action would save time in the afternoon meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he wished a short explanation of the subject. Would it include military, economic or political matters?

MR. BYRNES replied that whatever we agreed to here must be sent to our commanders. It will be only a directive to our commanders to carry out our agreements.

MR. EDEN asked whether it could not be agreed that it would be considered tomorrow morning.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that it go to the Big Three for reference back to the Foreign Ministers.

The meeting then adjourned.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:09am

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2245

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 22, 1945
[Translation?]
Top secret

International Zone of Tangier

Having considered the question of the zone of Tangier we have agreed that this zone which includes the city of Tangier and the area adjacent to it shall, owing to its specific strategic importance, remain international.

Representatives of the states chiefly concerned viz. Great Britain, the United States of America, the USSR and France which will be invited to join this declaration will work out an appropriate status of this international zone responding [corresponding?] to the new conditions that resulted from the victory over Hitler Germany.

Spain will be invited to adhere to the new status after the re-establishment of democratic regime in the country.

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg,] 7/22/45
[Translation?]

Soviet Proposal on Koenigsberg

On shaping the decision of the three Heads of Governments regarding the transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area. The Conference approved the proposal of the Soviet Union that pending the final settlement of territorial questions at the Peace Congress, the part of the western border of the USSR adjoining the Baltic Sea should follow the line from the point on the western shore of the Danzig Bay indicated on the map annexed hereto, eastward – north of Braunsberg-Goldap to the junction of the frontiers of the Lithuanian SSR, the Polish Republic and former East Prussia.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:11am

740.00119 Potsdam/8-245

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 22, 1945]
Top secret

Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems

The urgent tasks of European relief and reconstruction can be most effectively carried out only if supported by the combined efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. It is, therefore, recommended that the three governments agree to participate fully in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe (EECE), European Coal Organization (ECO) and the European Central Inland Transport Authority (ECITO). It should be the aim of the three Governments to assist in making these organizations effective agencies for handling the problems of relief and reconstruction by day-to-day cooperation in their activities.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:12am

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2245

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m.
Top secret

Summary of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers Sunday Morning, July 22, 1945

1. Yalta Declaration on Liberated Areas and Satellite States
It was agreed to report to the Heads of Governments that no agreement could be reached on paragraph 1 of the U.S. paper relating to the observation of elections. Paragraphs 2 and 3 relating to freedom of the press and the Control Commissions were referred to a subcommittee which was instructed to examine the improvements recently made in the conduct of the Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary and to examine Soviet complaints in regard to the operation of the Allied Commission in Italy.

2. German Economic Questions
A number of paragraphs in the proposed agreement on economic principles presented yesterday by the Economic Subcommittee were approved. No presentation is made to the Heads of Governments, however, until the Foreign Ministers have discussed the subject further.

3. Rumanian Oil Equipment
There was extended discussion but no agreement on the question of the treatment of British and American oil equipment in Rumania.

4. Agenda for this afternoon’s Meeting of Heads of Governments
It was agreed that the following questions should be recommended to the Heads of Governments for their agenda for this afternoon:

Western Frontier of Poland – carried over from yesterday.
Trusteeship – carried over from yesterday.
Turkey – carried over from yesterday.
Western frontier of the Soviet Union. Mr. Molotov explained that he referred to that portion of East Prussia including Koenigsberg which the Soviet Union desires to annex.
Iran – The British have presented a paper on this subject.
Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. Mr. Byrnes said that he would ask the President to present a paper on this subject with the recommendation that it be referred to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:13am

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m.

The meeting took note that the following subjects were still on the Agenda of the Foreign Secretaries:

The admission of neutral states to the World Organisation, and the exclusion of the present Spanish Government.
The Council of Five Foreign Ministers.
Reparations from Italy and Austria.
European oil supplies.
Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe.
German economic questions.
The removal as booty of Allied industrial equipment especially in Roumania.

The meeting observed that questions 1-4 had been referred to various sub-committees or drafting committees and could not therefore be discussed at the meeting of Foreign Secretaries this morning. They therefore proceeded to a discussion of the three remaining questions.

Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe
The meeting had before it a memorandum submitted by the United States delegation on July 21st. This memorandum dealt with three questions:

The observation of elections in certain European countries.
Facilities for press representatives in liberated and former Axis satellite states.
Procedure of Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The British delegation expressed agreement with the United States memorandum.

The Soviet delegation was unable to agree with the proposal in regard to the observation of elections. As regards the second and third questions it was agreed that these should be referred to a subcommittee for discussion. This committee consisted of:


United States	Mr. Cannon and Mr. Russell
Soviet Union	Mr. Sobolev
United Kingdom	Mr. Hayter

The Soviet delegation undertook to provide a memorandum showing recent improvements in the status of the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Soviet delegation also agreed to prepare a memorandum showing the changes which they felt desirable in regard to the procedure of the Allied Commission in Italy.

German economic questions
The Foreign Secretaries had before them a report by the Economic Sub-Committee. The United States Delegation asked for discussion on reparations to be postponed to a subsequent meeting and the Soviet Delegation asked that discussion should be confined to the economic principles which had been agreed by the Sub-Committee. The Foreign Secretaries therefore decided to discuss the agreed principles and not the principles in dispute or reparations questions. It was agreed that reparations should figure as the first item on the Agenda of the Foreign Secretaries for their meeting on July 23rd.

Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15 and 17 of the principles were agreed, subject to agreement on the points remaining in dispute.

As regards the remainder:
Paragraph 10. It was agreed to amend the last sentence to read as follows:

Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan, recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned, or, if not removed, destroyed.

Paragraph 13. The Soviet Delegation proposed the addition to the first sentence of wording to the following effect: “according to detailed instructions to be issued by the Control Council in accordance with the principles set out in this Agreement.”

The U.S. Delegation asked for time to consider this and the point was therefore reserved.

Paragraph 16.
It was pointed out that this paragraph referred to an annex dealing with reparations and was therefore reserved.

Paragraph 18.
The Soviet Delegation asked for the deletion of this paragraph. As, however, this paragraph was one of those in dispute, it was agreed that it must be reserved.

Removal as booty of Allied industrial equipment especially in Roumania
A general discussion took place on this question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 19th. No agreement was reached and the question was adjourned for further consideration.

Agenda for the Plenary Meeting
The Foreign Secretaries agreed to recommend as the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting the following items:

The western frontier of Poland (resumption of discussion).
Trusteeship (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting).
Turkey (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting).
Partial change of the western frontier of the Soviet Union (proposal of the Soviet Delegation).
Persia (memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 21st).

Certain further topics were proposed for remission to the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting on July 22nd. These were as follows:

Co-operation in solving immediate European economic problems (proposal of U.S. delegation).
Directive from heads of Governments for the control of Germany in accordance with the principles heretofore agreed (proposal of U.S. delegation).
Tangier (proposal of Soviet delegation).
Syria and Lebanon (proposal of Soviet delegation).

It is hoped that it may be agreed to refer these at once to the Committee of Foreign Secretaries without discussion at this stage by the plenary meeting.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:14am

Truman-Churchill meeting, 12:15 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Truman		Prime Minister Churchill
[Fleet Admiral Leahy?]
[General of the Army Marshall?]

Churchill: “The President invited me to confer with him forthwith. He had with him General Marshall and Admiral Leahy.”

Truman: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me.… I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war.”

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 4:19am

Sixth plenary meeting, 5 p.m.

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Truman	Prime Minister Churchill	Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Mr. Attlee	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pauley	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Davies	Sir William Strang	Mr. Novikov
Mr. Dunn	Major Birse	Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Clayton		Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

STALIN announced that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Austria had begun today. He said that they would have to withdraw for a distance of about 100 kilometers and that the movement would be completed by July 24.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he was very gratified that Marshal Stalin had so quickly carried out his agreement.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was also appreciative.

STALIN replied that it had merely been their duty.

THE PRESIDENT called upon Mr. Eden to present his report of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN then read the following report:

The Foreign Ministers this morning had discussed the following subjects:

1. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
The meeting had before it a memorandum submitted by the United States delegation on July 21st. This memorandum dealt with three questions:

The observation of elections in certain European countries.

Facilities for press representatives in liberated and former Axis satellite states.

Procedure of Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The British delegation expressed agreement with the United States memorandum.

The Soviet delegation was unable to agree with the proposal in regard to the observation of elections. As regards the second and third questions it was agreed that these should be referred to a subcommittee for discussion.

The Soviet delegation undertook to provide a memorandum showing recent improvements in the status of the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Soviet delegation also agreed to prepare a memorandum showing the changes which they felt desirable in regard to the procedure of the Allied Commission in Italy.

2. German Economic Questions
The Foreign Secretaries had before them a report by the Economic Sub-Committee. The United States Delegation asked for discussion on reparations to be postponed to a subsequent meeting and the Soviet Delegation asked that discussion should be confined to the economic principles which had been agreed by the Sub-Committee. The Foreign Secretaries therefore decided to discuss the agreed principles and not the principles in dispute or reparations questions. It was agreed that reparations should figure as the first item on the Agenda of the Foreign Secretaries for their meeting on July 23rd.

Paragraph 10 was slightly amended and agreed to. The wording of paragraph 13 is still under discussion.

Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15, and 17 of the principles were agreed subject to agreement on the points remaining in dispute. Paragraphs 16 and 18 were reserved.

MR. MOLOTOV interrupted to state that this was not accurate as paragraphs 13 and 18 remained.

MR. EDEN pointed out that he had said that paragraph 13 was still under discussion.

Continuing the reading of his report MR. EDEN said that the only other questions discussed were:

3. Removal as Booty of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania
A general discussion took place on this question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 19th. No agreement was reached and the question was adjourned for further consideration.

4. Agenda for the Plenary Meeting
The Foreign Secretaries agreed to recommend as the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting the following items:

The Western Frontier of Poland (resumption of discussion).

Trusteeship (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting).

Turkey (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting).

Partial change of the Western Frontier of the Soviet Union (proposal of the Soviet Delegation).

Persia (memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 21st).

Certain further topics were proposed for remission to the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting on July 22nd. These were as follows:

Cooperation in solving immediate European economic problems (proposal of U.S. delegation).

Directive from heads of Governments for the control of Germany in accordance with the principles heretofore agreed (proposal of U.S. delegation).

Tangier (proposal of Soviet delegation).

Syria and Lebanon (proposal of Soviet delegation).

It is hoped that it may be agreed to refer these at once to the Committee of Foreign Secretaries without discussion at this stage by the plenary meeting.

THE PRESIDENT asked if the agenda as proposed was accepted.

STALIN said he had no objection.

CHURCHILL said he did not know what the proposals were with regard to Syria and Lebanon. These matters affected the British very much. Only British troops were involved. They were ready to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon; they did not want anything there. There was difficulty in doing this at the present time as their withdrawal would be followed by the massacre of the French. He would like to know what was proposed before he made up his mind.

MOLOTOV said that what they had in mind was that the Government of Syria had approached the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government had addressed a note on this matter to the United States, British and French Governments.

CHURCHILL inquired if a communication had been sent to China.

MOLOTOV replied that it had not. He went on to say that they would like to have some information in the matter since it affected Soviet interests. He thought that a preliminary discussion could be held in the Foreign Minister’s meeting.

STALIN said that the Soviets had made no proposals with regard to the removal of the troops of any country.

CHURCHILL said he persisted that the discussion be opened up at the present meeting.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the first three of the four topics proposed for remission to the Foreign Ministers be referred to them and that the fourth question relating to Syria and Lebanon be discussed by the Heads of Government at the next meeting.

This was agreed to.

Western Frontier of Poland

THE PRESIDENT said that he had already stated the case so far as the United States was concerned.

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation wished to place another matter on the agenda of the meeting today. They wished to make a statement with regard to the prisoner-of-war camp in Italy in which Soviet prisoners were held.

This was agreed to.

CHURCHILL inquired if the camp were under British or American control.

STALIN replied that it was under British control.

CHURCHILL said that he had nothing to add to his statement on Poland.

STALIN inquired if his colleagues had seen the statement made by the Polish Government.

THE PRESIDENT and CHURCHILL said that they had read the Polish statement.

STALIN then observed that all delegations maintained their views which meant that the question remained unsettled.

THE PRESIDENT proposed to proceed to the next question.

CHURCHILL inquired if this meant that nothing would be done.

THE PRESIDENT said that the question could be brought up again at any time while they were in session.

CHURCHILL said that they must hope that the matter would be ripe for discussion sometime before their departure. It would be very unfortunate if they parted with an important question like this unsettled, leaving the matter to be discussed in the parliaments of the world.

STALIN then suggested that they comply with the request of the Polish Government.

CHURCHILL rejoined that this was totally unacceptable.

STALIN asked why.

CHURCHILL said he had given a number of reasons the day before, the chief of which were:

that it had been agreed that boundaries should be determined at the peace settlement.
that it was not advantageous to Poland to take so much German territory.
that it would rupture the economic position of Germany and throw an undue burden on the occupying powers.
that they would have a grave moral responsibility for the transfer of enormous populations. The British had accepted in principle the transfer of the population from the east of the Curzon line. He was bound to state, however, that he considered that to transfer a population of from 8½ to 9 million people would be wrong.
that the data on this subject was not agreed. The British information was that from 8 to 9 million Germans were in this area. The Soviet delegation said that they had already gone. This should be cleared up. The British did not now have any opportunity to know what the facts were but until they had some evidence to the contrary they would have to use their own estimates.

CHURCHILL said there were other reasons for opposing the proposal but he did not wish to burden the Conference with them now.

STALIN said he was not undertaking to oppose Mr. Churchill’s views on all the points he had raised but there were two that were particularly important. With regard to the question of fuel, he said that Germany would have fuel in the Ruhr and the Rhineland. There was no great difficulty for Germany caused by the loss of Silesia for Germany’s main base for coal was in the west.

The second important point was the question of the transfer of populations. There were neither 8 nor 6 nor 3 million Poles [Germans] in this area. There had been several call ups of troops in this area and many of these people had been killed. Very few Germans had remained there and those who remained had fled before the Red Army. He said that this could be checked. They can arrange for representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to come to the Conference where they could hear what they had to say.

CHURCHILL said he hesitated to support this proposal because of the views expressed by the President the other day with regard to representatives of the Yugoslav Government.

STALIN then proposed that they let the Council of Foreign Ministers which was being set up call in the Polish representatives and hear them.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not object.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that the Council would not meet until September 1.

STALIN said that all three parties would be able to collect information by that time.

CHURCHILL said that this would merely transfer the difficulty from this Conference to the Council of Foreign Ministers. They were in a better position at this meeting to decide the matter.

STALIN said that under the Crimean decisions they were bound to hear the Poles on the question of frontiers.

CHURCHILL inquired if the President agreed to send this whole matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

THE PRESIDENT said that doing this would not prevent further discussion at this meeting. They could not agree now and he proposed that they take up something else.

STALIN said he continued to urge that they adopt the decision that the Council of Foreign Ministers should call representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to hear their point of view on the frontier question.

CHURCHILL inquired how this could be decided in that way when it was a question which had to be decided at the peace conference.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Council of Foreign Ministers would not take a final decision. Their discussions would, however, be helpful.

STALIN said that this was correct.

CHURCHILL said he would regret that this grave matter should be sent to a body of less importance.

STALIN rejoined that they should then invite the Poles to come to this meeting.

CHURCHILL said he would prefer this because the matter was urgent. He added however that the Poles would ask for more than he could accept.

STALIN pointed out that if they invited the Poles, the Poles would not be able to accuse the Big Three of not hearing them.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not see the urgency of the matter. It would be helpful to have a preliminary discussion and the matter would not finally be settled until the peace conference.

CHURCHILL said that with great respect he wished to explain the urgency of the matter. If the settlement of the question were delayed the present local situation would be consolidated. Poles would be digging themselves in and taking effective steps to make themselves the sole masters of this territory. The longer the problem waited the more difficult it would be to settle it. They should at least see where they stood. There was no use of Poles coming to London when the great powers did not even know the broad outline of where they stood. Meanwhile the whole problem of food remained unsettled and the burden of feeding fell upon them. He pointed out that the British zone had the largest concentration of people and the smallest supply of food of any other zone. He suggested that they suppose that the Council of Foreign Ministers having heard the Poles could not agree, which was a possibility, and said that in this case there would be indefinite delay. The matter could not then be settled until there was another meeting of the Heads of Government. He was anxious to meet the practical difficulties which Stalin had put forward yesterday and which had resulted from the movement of troops. He was ready to suggest a compromise solution to cover the provisional period, that is, the period between the present time and the final conclusion of peace. He had in mind a line which might be drawn east of which the territory would be occupied by the Poles as a part of Poland. West of that line they would be working as agents of the Soviet Government which would be dealing with the zone in accordance with the agreement which had been reached with regard to the zones of occupation in Germany. He had had several talks with Marshal Stalin since the Tehran meeting and they were broadly in agreement on the line of the Oder. Of course the matter could not be so simply expressed. The difference between Marshal Stalin and himself was that the British did not want to go so far as the Soviets but they agreed that the Poles should have a large amount of territory. He said that when he referred to the line of the Oder he was using an expression which had been used when they had discussed the matter two years before. This was a very rough description but the British had a line which they were prepared to submit for the consideration of the Conference.

To adjourn until September and then have long discussions with the Poles would leave the matter unsettled by which time winter would be upon them. He thought that they should have some agreement on principle. He would like the Council of Foreign Ministers to meet and consider the matter on something like a general understanding between the three powers. Otherwise they would be left with all of their difficulties unsolved and after several months had elapsed a solution would be virtually impossible. He repeated that the line of the Oder was an approximate line and that it would be necessary to look at a map to see the line which the British had in view. He urged that they persevere in considering this matter. He inquired what would be the situation in Berlin if this matter were referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Berlin had obtained a portion of its coal from the Silesian mines. This was an important matter for the British. What would happen if the Governments were of the same opinion in September?

STALIN interrupted to say that it was Zwickau in Saxony from which Berlin drew its coal. He suggested that they let the Ruhr supply the coal, but he thought that Zwickau would be enough. He said there was good coal there and that they made briquettes out of brown coal.

CHURCHILL pointed out he had only said that a portion of the Berlin coal came from the Silesian mines.

THE PRESIDENT then read the pertinent portion of the Yalta Declaration concerning Poland’s western frontier. He said that this agreement had been reached between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. He was in complete accord with it. His point was that Poland had been assigned a zone of occupation in Germany and that there were now five occupying powers. They could agree to assigning a zone to Poland but he did not like the manner in which Poland had occupied a zone without any discussion of the matter between the three powers concerned. He appreciated the difficulties mentioned by Churchill and Stalin and he also had these difficulties in mind. The main problem was that of their occupation of Germany. That was his position yesterday, that was his position today, and that would be his position tomorrow.

STALIN said that if they were not bored with the question of frontiers, he would like to make a further statement. He also proceeded on the basis of the Crimean Conference decision. The exact character of this decision was that after the Government of National Unity was formed in Poland they were bound to receive the opinion of the Polish Government on the question of Poland’s western frontiers. There were two possibilities. One was to approve the Polish proposal and in this case it would not be necessary to call in the Poles. If they did not approve the Polish proposal, they could hear the Poles and then settle the question. He thought it was expedient to settle the matter now. As they were not in agreement with the Polish Government’s proposals they should hear their representatives. The view had been expressed that it would not be worthwhile to hear the Poles now. Then, they should send the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

He wished to remind Mr. Churchill as well as others who were at the Crimea that the view held by the President and Churchill with regard to the western frontier and with which he did not agree was that the line should begin from the estuary of the Oder and follow the Oder to where the Eastern Neisse joins the Oder. He had insisted on the line of the Western Neisse. The plan proposed by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill left the town of Stettin on the German side as well as Breslau and the region west of Breslau (At this point Stalin walked around the table and showed the President this line on a map). The question to be settled was that of the frontier and not that of a temporary line. They could settle the matter and they could put it off, but they could not ignore it.

CHURCHILL said he agreed that they could not settle the matter without the Poles, unless, of course, they accepted the Polish proposal.

STALIN said that with regard to the President’s observation that a fifth country had been brought in to occupy Germany and that he was displeased by the manner in which Poland had been brought in, he wished to state that if the President thought that anyone was to blame it was not just the Poles – circumstances and the Russians were to blame.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he agreed and said that this was what he had been talking about.

CHURCHILL said he withdrew any objection to the Poles coming here and to their attempting to reach some kind of practical solution which could last until the matter was finally settled at the peace conference.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed that they could come here and be heard by the Foreign Ministers. He did not wish to go into the matter.

STALIN remarked that this was satisfactory.

CHURCHILL said that the Foreign Ministers should then report to the Big Three.

This was agreed to.

CHURCHILL inquired as to who would issue the invitation.

STALIN said that it should be issued by the Chairman.

This was agreed to.

Trusteeship

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet proposals had been submitted in writing. He said that the statement made by the Soviet Delegation arose as a result of the San Francisco Conference. The trusteeship system had been settled in principle by the Charter. There was now the question of specific territories. It would not be possible to give a detailed consideration of the matter at this conference, but they could make some progress. He said that in the first place they could discuss Italy’s colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. They had put forward two alternative proposals. These could be referred to the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Secondly, there was the question of territories under mandate from the League of Nations.

EDEN inquired what ones he had in mind and pointed out that there were only a few left to England and France.

MOLOTOV replied that it was a question worthy of the attention of the three Governments in accordance with the decision that had been taken at the San Francisco Conference. He said he thought they should also exchange views on the question of Korea.

CHURCHILL said he was ready to exchange views on any subject, but if they reached no agreement there would simply have been an interesting discussion. His impression was that the case of the existing mandates had been dealt with at San Francisco.

THE PRESIDENT then read Article 77 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations which deals with the question of trusteeships. He said that he took it that it was under section 2 of this Article that the Soviet Government wished to discuss this matter. He was ready to agree to refer it to the Foreign Ministers.

CHURCHILL said they had agreed to the project brought up at San Francisco and nothing more. He said that if the matter was in the hands of the World Organization he doubted if expressions of opinion around this table would be the best way to deal with it.

THE PRESIDENT said it was just as appropriate to discuss this matter as it was to discuss Poland or anything else.

CHURCHILL observed that Poland was not being dealt with by the International Organization.

THE PRESIDENT rejoined that it would be.

MOLOTOV said that his point was that the matter should be given some preliminary consideration. The final decision should be taken at the peace conference, the same as the case of Poland.

CHURCHILL said that their position had been settled secretly at Yalta and publicly at San Francisco and that it was not capable of being changed.

THE PRESIDENT remarked to Churchill that the British position was amply protected by another Article of the Charter and that he did not see why it could not be discussed.

MOLOTOV said that he had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies once and for all. The question was “who had received them and where had this matter been decided.”

CHURCHILL replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered and the victories which the British army had achieved by conquering alone all of the colonies of Italy except Tunis.

THE PRESIDENT inquired “all?”

MOLOTOV pointed out that Berlin had been conquered by the Red Army.

CHURCHILL replied that when he referred to the Italian colonies he meant those of Libya, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli. They had conquered these at a time when they were under heavy attacks and were without help, at least during the early part.

STALIN replied that no one denied this.

CHURCHILL continued that they were not expecting gain out of this war. They had suffered terrible losses. Their losses had not been so heavy in human life as those of their gallant Soviet allies. They came out of the war, however, a great debtor to the world. There was no possibility of their regaining naval equality with the United States. During the war they had built only one capital ship and had lost ten or twelve. In spite of the heavy losses they had suffered, they had made no territorial claims – no Koenigsberg – no Baltic states – nothing. It was, therefore, having acted with complete rectitude, that they approached the question of the Italian colonies. With regard to these colonies Mr. Eden had said he regarded Italy as having lost these colonies, but that meant that Italy had no claim of right to these colonies. This did not preclude the peace conference from considering that some of these colonies should not be [should be?] restored to Italy. He did not say he favored that proposal but it was entirely open for discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers when they were dealing with the peace with Italy and, of course, in the final peace settlement as well. Having visited Tripoli and Cyrenaica, he had seen reclamation work done by the Italians which was of an admirable character. While they did not declare themselves in favor of restoration, neither did they say that it was precluded from discussion. At present the British held these colonies. Who wanted them. If there were claimants they should put forward their claims.

THE PRESIDENT said that the United States did not want them nor did the United States want a trusteeship over them for ourselves. We had enough poor Italians to feed.

CHURCHILL said that they had wondered if any of these colonies were suitable as a place of settlement for the Jews, but those with whom they had discussed the matter had not been interested. He said, of course, the British had great interests in the Mediterranean and that any marked alteration in the status quo in the Mediterranean would need long and careful examination.

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet proposal[s] had been submitted in writing and that they would like the Conference to consider them.

CHURCHILL said he did not see what their Soviet allies wanted. Did Stalin wish to put forward a claim to one of these Italian colonies.

STALIN replied that they would like to learn whether the meeting would consider whether Italy would lose her colonies and that in such an event they could decide to what states they would be transferred for trusteeship. If it were premature to deal with the matter, they could wait.

CHURCHILL said he had not considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring to acquire a large tract of the African shore. If that were the case it would have to be considered in relation to many other problems.

STALIN said that at San Francisco the Soviet delegation had stated that they were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories, in a communication to Secretary Stettinius.

CHURCHILL said that the British did not seek territory.

STALIN repeated that the question was who would receive the colonies.

CHURCHILL said they would have to decide if they should be taken, as they had a right to do, and then to decide to whom they would be assigned to under trusteeship. This question belonged to the discussion of the peace treaty. The ultimate administration belonged to the United Nations Organization.

STALIN inquired if Mr. Churchill was suggesting that the present conference was not competent to settle this question.

CHURCHILL replied that it was not competent to settle the matter; that was for the peace conference. Of course, if they agreed here, that would facilitate matters.

STALIN said they were proposing not to settle the matter but to consider it.

CHURCHILL rejoined that they were considering the matter now.

STALIN inquired then why he objected to the Soviet proposal to have it discussed.

CHURCHILL said he was not objecting, that if Stalin could say what he wanted, he, Churchill, would address himself to the question.

STALIN said the matter did not lie with him. The question was set forth in the Soviet paper.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Soviet proposal was for the Foreign Ministers to discuss the matter and he had no objection on his part.

CHURCHILL said he also had no objection but pointed out that they were throwing much work on the Foreign Ministers. He said there were many more urgent matters to discuss here. They had decided that the question of the Italian peace terms were [was] to have priority at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He was against burdening the present meeting of the Foreign Ministers but the matter could be put on their agenda for consideration after they had disposed of more urgent business.

STALIN proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers.

CHURCHILL added the reservation “provided it does not delay more urgent business.”

STALIN said that such a reservation was not acceptable.

CHURCHILL said that if they insisted he would give way.

It was agreed that the matter be referred to the meeting of Foreign Ministers.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 6:48am

Turkey

CHURCHILL said this was not the first time he had discussed this matter with Marshal Stalin. It became important because of the admitted need to modify the Montreux Convention. He had agreed with the Marshal in these discussions that insofar as the British Government was concerned they favored revision. Revision could only be made by agreement with the signatories with the exception, of course, of Japan. He had also frequently expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships, naval or merchant, through the Black Sea and back. He, therefore, opened the discussion on the basis of a friendly agreement. At the same time he wished to impress on Marshal Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. Undoubtedly Turkey was very much alarmed by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria; by continuous attacks in the Soviet press and radio; and, of course, by the turn which the conversations between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov had taken in which modifications of Turkey’s eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire and her power to defend Constantinople. He understood, however, that these were not demands on Turkey by the Soviet Government but that the Turks had asked for an alliance and then Molotov had stated the conditions for such an alliance. He quite saw that if Turkey asked for an offensive and defensive alliance, this would be the occasion when the Soviets would say what improvement they wanted in the Turkish situation. However, the Turks were alarmed by the mention of these conditions. He did not know what had happened beyond these conversations. What he should like to know was the present Russian position on the subject.

MOLOTOV said that he would circulate a letter to the President and Churchill giving the point of view of the Soviet Government on this question. He would like to explain the origin of the matter. The Turkish Government had taken the initiative through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and had proposed an alliance. This question had been brought up before their Ambassador in Ankara and again in Moscow at the end of May by the Turkish Ambassador. Early in June he had had two conversations with the Turkish Ambassador. In reply to the Turkish proposals he had stated that the Soviet Government had no objection to a treaty of alliance subject to certain conditions. He pointed out the fact that in doing so they should settle their mutual claims. On the Soviet side there were two. The conclusion of a treaty of alliance meant that they undertook each to defend the frontiers of both states. He had pointed out that there were several sections of their frontiers which they considered unjust. In 1921 a portion of their territory had been torn from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia. He pointed out that he was bound to settle this question before the conclusion of a treaty of alliance.

The second question was that of the Black Sea Straits. The Soviet Union had repeatedly let their allies know that they could not regard the Montreux Convention as a correct arrangement and that they were not satisfied with it. The rights of the Soviet Union under this Convention were equal to those of the Japanese Emperor. It seemed to them that this did not correspond to the present situation. On behalf of the Soviet Government he had presented certain proposals which had been set forth in the Soviet paper which he was now circulating. At the same time, he had pointed out to the Turks that if both of these issues were settled the Russians were ready to conclude an alliance. He had also informed the Turks that the Soviet Union was prepared to settle any questions which the Turks raised on their side. He had added that if the Turkish Government were not prepared to settle these two questions the Soviet Government was prepared to make an agreement on the Straits alone between the Black Sea Powers.

CHURCHILL said that this was an important document which went far beyond the conversations between Eden and himself and Stalin and Molotov.

MOLOTOV said that the treaty of alliance with Turkey had not been under consideration at that time.

CHURCHILL inquired whether the words “proper regular procedure” in paragraph one of the Soviet paper meant that all signatories except Japan would be consulted. He repeated [that] different questions were raised in this paper, when a Russian base in the Straits was asked for; also by the proposal that no one had anything to do with the Bosporus and the Dardanelles except Russia and Turkey. He was certain that Turkey would never agree to this proposal that was being made.

MOLOTOV said that similar treaties had existed in the past between Russia and Turkey.

CHURCHILL asked if he meant the question of a Russian base in the Black Sea Straits.

MOLOTOV replied that he meant treaties which provided for the settlement of the Straits question only by Turkey and Russia. He referred to the treaties of 1805 and 1833.

CHURCHILL said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties and added that he had only pointed out the difference between these proposals and those which had earlier been discussed. He said that the British were not prepared to push Turkey to accept these proposals.

STALIN said that they had not discussed the proposals before but had only had conversations.

MOLOTOV said that they had proposed to submit the matter to the June meeting of the Foreign Ministers which had not taken place.

CHURCHILL said that he stood by his conversations with Stalin in which he, Churchill, expressed the willingness to press for the revision of the Montreux Convention side by side with Stalin. That agreement still stood, but he felt quite free with regard to these new proposals.

STALIN said: “Yes,” he was free.

THE PRESIDENT said he was not ready to express an opinion and suggested that they defer consideration of the question.

This was agreed to.

THE PRESIDENT said that they were sending a telegram to the Polish Government and as the matter was sure to leak out he suggested that they prepare a communiqué.

CHURCHILL inquired whether it would mention the purpose of the visit.

STALIN said it would be better not to mention the purpose of the visit, but it made no difference to him whether they issued a communiqué or not. Stalin thought it better not to release the whole text of the invitation.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Delegation would send in its proposal with regard to Koenigsberg in writing.

Treatment of Soviet Prisoners in a British Camp in Italy

MOLOTOV said that the camp referred to was camp no. 5 which was located near Rimini. He said that this camp, which was under British authorities, contained Ukrainians. The first statement they had received from the British stated that there were about 150 prisoners in this camp. When their representatives came to see the camp they found that there were 10,000.

CHURCHILL inquired from whom they had obtained these figures and on what date.

MOLOTOV said he would give particulars.

CHURCHILL said that the British did not make false statements.

MOLOTOV said that he understood that the British had formed a whole division of twelve regiments of these Ukrainians with officers selected from those who had been in the ranks of the German army. When their representatives had visited this camp they had found that 665 persons stated their willingness to return to their native country.

CHURCHILL said they welcomed inspection by the Russians of all of their camps. Perhaps some of these persons were Poles. In any event, he would have an investigation made and obtain a report.

MOLOTOV replied that there were only Ukrainians in the camp. He added that they had received a telegram from General Golikov, who was in charge of the repatriation of Soviet prisoners, only today.

Meeting adjourned.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 6:49am

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m.

STALIN: The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the north Soviet zones in Vienna has begun, and should be completed in a few days.

CHURCHILL: The British government is pleased to learn of this prompt action.

TRUMAN: So is the American government.

EDEN: (reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries).

The paper of the American delegation on the southeastern European satellite countries was presented to the Foreign Secretaries. The British agreed with the paper, but the Soviets were unable to agree with the provisions for the reorganization of the government and the election.

The matter of the press and the control exercised by the control commissions were referred to the subcommittee for discussions.

The Soviet delegation agreed to submit a memorandum on the improvement of the control commission in Italy.

The Secretaries considered the economic committee’s report on German economic problems. The United States asked postponement of disputed issues for subsequent meeting. Foreign Secretaries agreed to discuss only principles agreed to by the subcommittee. These agreed principles were accepted, except for the wording of paragraph 13.

The discussions on paragraph 18 and annex to paragraph 16 were also reserved.

The Foreign Secretaries also discussed the removal of Allied industrial equipment in Rumania, on the ground that it was booty, but no conclusions were reached.

The agenda for the Big Three Meeting was submitted. It included the western frontier of Poland, trusteeships, the straits, the western frontier of the Soviet Union, and Iran. It was suggested that certain problems be referred by the Big Three to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion, to save the time of the Big Three. These problems included cooperation on European economic problems, Tangier, and the problem of Syria and the Lebanon.

STALIN: I agree that we should submit these problems to the Foreign Secretaries without further discussion here.

CHURCHILL: Syria and Lebanon affect us specially. We want to withdraw from there as soon as possible, but our immediate withdrawal would mean the massacre of the French. I should like to hear more on this here. Possibly we can discuss it here.

STALIN: The government of Syria has asked the Soviet [Government] to intervene. We should like some information on this matter. This might be discussed by the Foreign Secretaries. We do not propose the removal of troops from any country.

TRUMAN: I suggest that this matter be deferred until tomorrow and that the other questions go to the Foreign Secretaries.

(This was agreed).

TRUMAN: We now may discuss the western frontier of Poland. I have already stated my views.

MOLOTOV: (First brought up the question of certain Soviet war prisoners held in Italy. He gave notice that he would like to say a few words on this subject at the close of the meeting.)

STALIN: Have you seen the statement by the Polish government on the frontiers?

CHURCHILL and TRUMAN both indicated that they had.

STALIN: That means all the delegations maintain their existing views, and the question remains in suspense.

TRUMAN: Next subject is trusteeships.

CHURCHILL: We must hope that the Polish question will become ripe for discussion before we leave. It would be unfortunate to have all these problems discussed in Parliament.

STALIN: Let us accept the Polish proposal.

CHURCHILL: I am sorry we cannot. The matter, of course, is for the peace table, but the Polish problem is not advantageous for Poland. It destroys Germany’s economic integrity, and puts an undue burden on the occupying powers. I have grave moral scruples regarding great movements and transfers of populations. Nine million people are involved. True, there is no agreement on the population data. The Soviets say only a few million are left. We should clear up the facts. I could give other reasons, but I won’t burden you now.

STALIN: I have undertaken [shall not undertake?] to oppose Mr. Churchill’s views on all these points, but I will deal here only with two. One, Germany will have resources in the Ruhr and the Rhineland, so there is no great difficulty if Silesian coal basin is taken from Germany. Two, the movement of population does not present the difficulties Mr. Churchill anticipates. There are neither eight nor six nor three million Germans in this area. There have been several call-ups of troops in this area. Few Germans remain. Our data can be checked. Could we not arrange for representatives of the Polish government to come here and be heard?

CHURCHILL: I should hesitate to support that, in view of the strong views of the President regarding hearing the Yugoslavs.

STALIN: Let the Foreign Ministers in London call them and hear them.

TRUMAN: That is satisfactory.

STALIN: The Polish government must be heard in answer to the Crimea decision. I continue to urge the meeting to adopt the decision that the Foreign Ministers in London should hear the Polish government on the western frontier.

CHURCHILL: How can the frontier be discussed that way? I regret that this grave matter should be adjourned to a lesser body.

STALIN: We must not be accused of settling the frontier without hearing the Poles.

TRUMAN: I cannot see the urgency. The question can be settled only by the peace conference.

CHURCHILL: There is urgency, Mr. President. The local situation will be unremedied. The Poles who have been assigned this large area will have digged themselves in. This process will continue and it will be more difficult to settle or to revise as time passes. So I still hope that some arrangement will be made here. The situation will not be improved by hearing the Poles when the great Allies are not agreed on principles.

The burden falls on us, the British in particular. Our zone has the smallest supply of food and the greatest density of population. Suppose the Foreign Ministers, having heard the Poles, cannot agree. Then there will be indefinite delay, at least until another meeting of the heads of government. I am anxious to meet practical problems due to the march of events which the Marshal referred to. We should be prepared to consider a compromise solution to cover the period between now and the peace settlement. We would be ready to suggest a provisional line. The Poles west of that line would be working for the Soviet occupying authority. I think Marshal Stalin and I agree up to this point, that the new Poland should advance to the Oder. But the difficulty between the Marshal and me is that I do not go quite as far as the Marshal. Is there no use for us to look at anything like this suggested compromise, Mr. President? We should not despair of solutions. We should seek a halfway house. Delay now might make it impossible to alter the consolidated position of the Poles later.

Berlin draws its coal from the Silesian mines, which have long been worked by Polish miners. What is to happen to Berlin’s coal during the winter?

STALIN: Berlin draws her coal from Saxony. Let the Ruhr give her coal. There are different opportunities for supplying Berlin with coal.

TRUMAN: May I re-state my view point. The eastern frontier should follow the Curzon line, with slight digression in favor of Poland. The Allies recognize that Poland must receive substantial compensation in the north and west. They believe the new Polish government should be heard, and the final settlement await the peace conference. That was the agreement of Mr. Roosevelt with the Big Three at Crimea. I am in complete accord with it; but Poland has in fact been assigned a zone of occupation contrary to our agreement. We can agree, if we wish to give the Poles an occupying zone, but I don’t like the way the Poles have taken or been given their zone.

STALIN: I also proceed on the decision of the Crimea Conference cited by the President. After the Government of National Unity has been formed, we are bound to seek its opinion. The Polish government have communicated their views. We have two alternatives: one, to approve the Polish proposal; or, two, to hear the Poles and settle the question.

I think it expedient to settle the question now. As we are not in agreement with the Polish government, the Poles should be summoned here. But the view was expressed by the President that the Poles cannot be heard here, so we must remit the question to the Foreign Ministers.

At Crimea, the President and Mr. Churchill suggested the line should be along the Oder until it joined the Neisse. I insisted on the western Neisse. Under Churchill’s plan, Stettin and Breslau would remain German. The question to be settled is the frontier, and not a temporary line. We can either settle the question or ignore it.

CHURCHILL: Or decide it without the Poles.

STALIN: If we disagree with the Poles we cannot decide it without them. It has been said that a fifth country has been brought into occupied Germany, and in a manner contrary to our agreement. If anyone is to blame, circumstances as well as the Russians are to blame.

CHURCHILL: I withdraw my objection to the Poles coming here and trying to work out arrangements pending the peace conference.

TRUMAN: I have no objection to the Poles coming here, and for the Foreign Secretaries to hear them.

STALIN: The Chairman should invite them.

TRUMAN: The matter of trusteeships is now before us. We will hear the Soviet delegation.

STALIN: Mr. Molotov is our expert.

MOLOTOV: The proposals of the Soviets are submitted in writing. The principal question has been settled by the San Francisco Charter. We have before us specific questions regarding the assignments of territorial trusteeships. It is not possible for us to give detailed answers to these questions, but some progress can be made. First, we can discuss Italian possessions in Africa. We can proceed in one of two ways. We suggest that the matter go to the Foreign Secretaries, or we could consider the questions here tomorrow. There is also the question of the mandated territories.

EDEN: Do you want our mandates?

STALIN: There are other mandates. The question deserves the attention of the Big Three. One point more, we could exchange views on Korea.

CHURCHILL: We can exchange views on any subject, but at the end we have had only an interesting discussion. The existing mandates were dealt with at San Francisco.

(TRUMAN reads Articles 77 to 79 of the Charter. He points out that mandated territory cannot be [placed under?] trusteeship without the consent of the mandatory power. He assumes that it is the territory detached from the present enemy powers that the Soviets wish to discuss, and indicates that he is willing to have the matter referred to the Foreign Secretaries.)

CHURCHILL: We have agreed to the San Francisco draft, nothing [Page 265]more. As this matter is in the hands of the world organization, I doubt that this is a matter to be discussed around this table.

TRUMAN: Article 79 gives you complete protection on your mandated territory.

STALIN: Eden said Italy lost her colonies. Who gets them?

CHURCHILL: The British alone conquered the Italian armies.

TRUMAN: Alone?

STALIN: But Berlin was taken by the Red Army.

CHURCHILL: I meant the Italian colonies, Mr. President, were taken by us.

STALIN: No one denies. It is to the honor and glory of Britain.

CHURCHILL: We do not seek territorial aggrandizement. We have suffered grievous losses, though not so great in human life as has Russia. We come out of the war a great debtor. We have no possibility of regaining naval equality with the United States. Yet, in spite of all these losses, we have made no territorial claims. We have no Koenigsberg, nor Baltic States. We claim nothing. Having acted with rectitude and complete disinterestedness, we approach the question of the Italian colonies with good conscience.

Mr. Eden made the statement in Parliament that Italy had lost her colonies. That meant she had no claim to them as a matter of right. That does not preclude the return of certain colonies to her, if the peace conference so decides. I do not say I favor the return of the colonies, but so far as we are concerned, it is a question open for discussion. I have seen the excellent reclamation work done by the Italians in Libya and Cyrenaica. At present we hold these colonies. Who wants them?

TRUMAN: We do not want them. We do not want a trusteeship for them. We have enough “poor Italians” to feed in the United States [in Italy?].

CHURCHILL: We considered them for Jewish settlement, but the Jews are not attracted to them. Of course, we have great interest in the Mediterranean.

STALIN: Our proposals are submitted in writing, and we would like the conference to consider them.

CHURCHILL: Does the Marshal wish to put forward a claim to these colonies, or to a trusteeship for them?

STALIN: Do we consider it necessary for Italy to lose these colonies? If so, to what states do we propose to entrust the trusteeships? If it is premature to deal with this question, we can wait, but we will have to deal with it sooner or later.

CHURCHILL: I am frank to say I have not considered the possibility of Russia claiming territory in the Mediterranean.

STALIN: The Soviet delegation stated at San Francisco that we were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories.

TRUMAN: I have a copy of the statement that Mr. Molotov gave Mr. Stettinius.

CHURCHILL: We have the right to take the colonies from Italy, but to whom shall we give them? That belongs to the discussion of the peace treaty. The administration of trusteeships is for the world organization.

STALIN: Is it your position that the present conference is qualified to settle the question?

CHURCHILL: Of course, if we three agree, it facilitates settlement.

STALIN: Of course the conference is qualified to consider.

CHURCHILL: I make no objection. I am prepared to hear the Marshal’s views.

STALIN: The question has been submitted in writing.

TRUMAN: Let the Foreign Secretaries consider it.

CHURCHILL: I have no objection, but we are over-burdening the Foreign Secretaries. There are more urgent problems. We are agreed that the Italian treaty should have priority when the council of Foreign Ministers meets in September.

STALIN: Let us submit the question to the Ministers.

CHURCHILL: Yes, if they have time after considering more urgent questions.

STALIN: There should be no reservation.

TRUMAN: Let us turn to the British paper regarding Turkey.

CHURCHILL: This comes up because of the need to modify the Montreux Conference [Convention]. At Yalta, I told the Marshal we would favor the revision of the Convention, but that can be done only with the consent of the signatories, except Japan, with whom we are at war. I have also expressed our readiness to welcome the free movement of Russian ships, whether war or merchant ships, in or out of the Black Sea in time of peace or war. So we start on a friendly basis.

Still, I wish to impress on the Marshal the importance of not alarming Turkey. Undoubtedly Turkey is much alarmed, because of the concentration of Russian and Bulgarian troops on her borders, by the attacks on her by the Russian radio, and the course of the conversation between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov, at which a modification of the Turkish eastern frontiers was mentioned. Also, a base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire, and the power to defend Constantinople. I understand that these were not demands made on the Turkish government, but were stated as conditions of alliance proposed by the Turks. I can see that in the consideration of such alliance, the Russians would state what improvements they desired in the Turkish situation. But the Turks were under alarm. What I should like to know is, what is the present Russian position on this subject?

MOLOTOV: I have now circulated the views of the Soviet government as set forth in writing.

I should like to explain the origin of the question. This was brought up by the Turkish government with our Ambassador, and later by the Turkish Ambassador with me. Early in June I had two conversations with the Turkish Ambassador. In reply to the Turkish proposal for an alliance, I stated Russia had no objection, subject to certain conditions. We should first settle mutual claims. I mentioned two questions on our side. The treaty of alliance means we jointly undertake to defend the frontiers of two states. I pointed out that we could not undertake to defend certain sections of the frontier which we considered unjust. In 1921 part of this territory was torn from the Soviet Union – part of Armenia and part of Soviet Georgia. I pointed out that these territories should be restored. We should also have an alteration of our rights in the Straits. And a base.

On behalf of the Soviets, I have put forward our claims in the paper circulated. I pointed out to the Turks that if they were prepared to settle the two questions, we were prepared to make an alliance and settle any questions they wished to have settled. If the Turkish government was not prepared, the Soviets were prepared to make an agreement regarding the Straits only.

CHURCHILL: May we have a moment to read your statement?

MOLOTOV: Yes.

CHURCHILL: This is a very important document. It goes far beyond any of our discussions. I presume “regular procedure” in paragraph one means consultation with all signatories but Japan. Quite a different question is raised when Russia asks for a military base and asks that no powers be permitted to participate in control of the Straits but Russia and Turkey. I am quite certain Turkey will never agree to this.

STALIN: Similar treaties existed between Turkey and Russia at other times.

CHURCHILL: What times do you refer to?

STALIN: In 1805 and 1833.

CHURCHILL: These suggestions are wholly different from our previous talks. I stand by my talk with the Marshal when I promised to support revision of the Montreux Convention, but I feel quite free as to these new proposals.

STALIN: You are quite free.

CHURCHILL: I thank you.

MOLOTOV: May we submit our proposals on Koenigsberg to the President and the Prime Minister?

TRUMAN: Certainly, and the invitation to the Poles to appear before the Foreign Secretaries has gone out.

Should we discuss the communiqué before it leaks out?

STALIN: Yes.

CHURCHILL: It is breaking the principle we have followed.

STALIN: It is agreeable to me one way or the other.

TRUMAN: We will drop it.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 6:50am

767.68119/7-545

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg], 7/22/45
[Translation?]
Top secret

The Black Sea Straits

With regard to the regime of the Black Sea Straits, the Conference found necessary that:

The International Straits Convention signed in Montreux shall be abrogated in the proper regular procedure as it no longer corresponds to the present time conditions.
The determination of the regime of the Straits – the only sea passage from and to the Black Sea – shall fall within the province of Turkey and the Soviet Union as the states chiefly concerned and capable of ensuring the freedom of commercial navigation and the security in the Black Sea Straits.
In addition to other measures the new Straits regime should also provide for the following:

In the interests of their own security and maintenance of peace in the area of [the] Black Sea[,] Turkey and the Soviet Union shall prevent by their common facilities in the Straits the use of the Straits by the other countries for the purposes inimical to the Black Sea powers (in addition to Turkish military bases the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Straits).

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 6:51am

First meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Mr. Cannon		Mr. Gromyko
		Mr. Golunsky

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2245

The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Assistant Secretary of State

Potsdam, July 22, 1945

Memorandum for Mr. Dunn

The subcommittee to consider sections 2 and 3 of the document “Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe” met this evening (July 22). Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Golunko represented the Soviet Government.

They said that they were not prepared to discuss point 3 because, as Mr. Molotov had agreed, a Soviet paper concerning the recent changes in procedure for the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary will be circulated tomorrow morning, but it was not yet ready this evening, and it of course must be taken into account in considering this subject.

It was accordingly agreed that we would work on point 2 but submit no report to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers until we had also considered point 3 in subcommittee. On point 2 the Soviet Delegation presented a revision reading as follows:

The three Governments agree that in view of the cessation of hostilities in Europe measures can now be adopted to facilitate the entry of representatives of the world press and radio into liberated or former Axis satellite states, and their freedom of movement, and the dispatch of their reports without political censorship or other restrictions than those which result from the security requirements of the occupying forces in those countries which are under the regime of occupation.

In the discussion which followed they receded even from this text and when the meeting closed they left as points of difference the use of the word “entry”, and the specification of “political censorship”. In other words, they hoped not to specify in the text that there were difficulties about entry, on the argument that the other facilities would imply admission, and they wished not to “dot the i’s” of political censorship. They agreed that we would report to our several Ministers that these words need to be worked over in our next session.

They also objected to the last four lines on the first page of our text as mimeographed, to which ad referendum I tentatively agreed, as did the British representative, since this part of the text is not of great substance.

Far more important and the matter which will probably need to be discussed around the Foreign Ministers table is the final provision of Article 2 (see top of page 2 in our text), which applies to domestic freedom of the press in the several countries. They advanced various specious arguments about interference with the sovereignty of other states, and about the authority of the Control Commissions in the satellites, proposing that anything along this line should be handled by a directive to the Control Commissions.

I said that this was a provision to which the American Government attaches great importance, and while for administrative reasons it would probably be necessary in any case to send a directive to the ACCs, it would also be necessary to make some reference to freedom of the press in whatever might publicly be said at the conclusion of the Conference, if the matter is taken up at all. I drew their attention particularly to the phrase “the three Governments express their desire to see removed”, as largely answering the arguments which they had presented.

They asseverated that they had not discussed this question with their top people and the best we could get out of them was an agreement that each of us should report on the details of this meeting to our respective Ministers and receive instructions for the next meeting, which will probably be held after the morning session tomorrow.

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 6:53am

The Pittsburgh Press (July 22, 1945)

Big Three nears decision stage at conference

Political, economic problems up first
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

…

NormanStewart · August 7, 2024, 6:54am

Winant snubbed by Big Three parley

By William H. Stoneman

…