Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Churchill | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes | Mr. Attlee | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Harriman | Lord Cherwell | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Pauley | Major Birse | Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Davies | Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
The Pittsburgh Press (July 19, 1945)
Wants aid in Pacific in return for cash
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer
…
Discussion is certain at Big Three session
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
…
U.S. State Department (July 19, 1945)
740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-1745: Telegram
Washington, July 19, 1945 — 4 p.m.
Secret
1205
Dept has not yet received British concurrence (urtel 2010, July 17) in appointment of Douglas as Chief Commissioner of AC.
GREW
S[AMUEL] R[EBER]
740.00119 PW/7-1945 Telegram
[Washington,] July 19, 1945
Top secret
69
Rumors are increasingly current in the press and on the air that we propose to issue a statement elucidating unconditional surrender for Japan. Most prevalent rumor is that formulation of our position was taken by President to Berlin for discussion with Stalin and Churchill and that statement will issue as result of meeting. Another rumor has it that our “terms” to Japan will include agreement not to invade. Question submitted to the Department today by the Associated Press and the International News Services reads as follows: “Is it true that plans for the handling of Japan’s unconditional surrender have been fully formulated and that President Truman has taken them to the Potsdam Conference?” A second question asks whether the United States has “any unilateral definition of unconditional surrender for Japan.”
Seems to us desirable, for reasons affecting domestic situation as well as situation in Japan, to quiet these rumors insofar as possible. Would you approve a reply to the questions in following terms:
The policy of this Government on unconditional surrender by Japan has been repeatedly stated. Elucidations of this policy were issued by the President on May 8 and on June 1. Papers on this subject as well as on a number of other matters of present importance have been supplied to the President, but no plan altering the policy already announced has been formulated by this Government. The implementation of the announced policy will depend, of course, on the situation as it develops. The treatment to be accorded the Japanese under the unconditional surrender terms as defined by the President will depend upon the circumstances under which the surrender occurs. If the Japanese surrender now, before we invade their main islands on our inevitable march to Tokyo, it is logical that the situation thus created should call for treatment which would be different in character and degree from the treatment that would be required if the Japanese delay surrender or if they fail to surrender. The longer the period of the fighting, and the greater the loss of American lives and of the lives of the fighting men of other United Nations, the more severe must be the treatment accorded the Japanese under the announced terms. The reason for this is clear: the longer Japan resists the more certainly shall we know that the military war lords are still in firm control and the more drastic will be the measures required to rout them out and to insure their complete permanent downfall and elimination. We have declared our firm purpose to eliminate the forces in Japan which have made it a threat to the peace of the world, and that purpose we mean to carry out. In order to carry it out, we shall unquestionably be obliged to occupy Japan and to occupy it by an effective, not by mere token force. In the light of the sacrifices already made by the United Nations, it is unthinkable that we should pause or be deflected from the full attainment of our objectives.
In reply to the second question whether the United States has any unilateral definitions of unconditional surrender for Japan, I would say this.
The United States has never considered the possibility of unilateral action against Japan in fighting the war. Neither has it considered, nor will it consider, unilateral action in deciding upon the future of Japan following the war. It will continue in the future, as in the past, to act jointly with other nations concerned.
It will be necessary to reply in the near future to these questions posed by the Associated Press and the International News Services. Failing satisfactory answers I fear that the steadily mounting public clamor for a statement of our proposed terms for Japan will be harmful to the Administration and will create in Japan the impression that we are weakening in our determination to see the war through to unconditional surrender and final victory. This can only retard any movement in Japan to force the leaders to accept unconditional surrender before our invasion. Hope for your instructions as soon as possible.
[GREW]
Thursday, July 19:
1000: [Assistant] Secretary McCloy and Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay (Staff of General Eisenhower) called at the Little White House and conferred with the President.
1300: Lunch at the Little White House. First Lieutenant James M. Vardaman, AUS (Captain Vardaman’s nephew), Colonel Howard A. Rusk, Medical Corps, AUS, and Sergeant Truman were guests.
The President and party left the Little White House at 1545 for Cecilienhof. The third session of the conference was called to order by the President at 1605. The meeting adjourned at 1655 when the President and party left for the Little White House. Mr. Stalin invited the President to stay for a buffet lunch, but the President declined. We reached the Little White House at 1710.
At 2030 the President entertained at a State Dinner at the Little White House in honor of Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill. Present were: The President, Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Attlee, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Vyshinski, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Gromyko, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Pauley, Mr. Davies, Mr. Sobolev, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Pavlov, and Major Birse.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| Mr. Mosely | Mr. Vyshinsky |
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2045: Telegram
Babelsberg, July 20, 1945
[Extract]
Secret
Victory 115
From Mosely at Babelsberg to London for Winant and State Department at Washington for Grew.
Vyshinsky informed Mosely today Soviet Government has approved agreement on additional requirements except new title and new first paragraph; he expects latter will be cleared shortly.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Syonan Shimbun (July 20, 1945)
LISBON (Domei, July 19) – American President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin have now entered the second phase of their momentous talks at Potsdam, Denis Martin, Reuters correspondent, reported in a dispatch today from Potsdam.
He said it appears now that important preliminary objectives of the “three power” conference have been achieved.
The correspondent reported that main attention in Berlin is still focused on German problems, which cannot be lightly shelved as they affected Europe as a whole.
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 20, 1945)
Japanische Presse diskutiert Potsdamer Konferenz
WASHINGTON, 19. Juli (OWI) – Trägerflugzeuge des britisch-amerikanischen Pazifikgeschwaders haben größere Teile der japanischen Flotte, die sich in der Bucht von Tokio versteckt hielt, erkundet und angegriffen. Es ist dies die erste Begegnung der beiden Flotten seit der Niederlage Japans in der Seeschlacht bei den Philippinen im Oktober 1944. Am fünften Tag richteten sich die amerikanischen Großangriffe der Flotten- und Luftstreitkräfte gegen Industrieziele südlich von Tokio. An diesen Angriffen nahmen zum ersten Male aus Europa nach Ostasien verlegte Bomberstaffeln teil.
Bei den zurzeit in den burmesischen Dschungeln tobenden Kämpfen haben die sogenannten patriotischen Streitkräfte Burmas einen bedeutenden Anteil an den Erfolgen errungen. Diese Guerillakrieger sind ursprünglich aus einer antifaschistischen Organisation, die sich während der japanischen Besetzung illegal gebildet hatte, hervorgegangen. Erfahrene britische Offiziere hatten sie unterstützt und ihnen Anweisungen gegeben. Die eingeschlossenen japanischen Einheiten in Burma wehren sich verzweifelt und wüten in den von ihnen noch besetzten Dörfern. Es wurden Fälle von Massen-Exekutionen bekannt. Auf Borneo ließ die Kampftätigkeit nach. Die siebente australische Division konnte trotz heftigsten feindlichen Widerstandes auf der Hauptstraße nach Samarinda vorstoßen.
Auf Neu-Guinea kämpften sich die australischen Truppen über die Hänge des Prinz-Alexander-Gebirges abwärts und nähern sich den äußeren Verteidigungslinien der japanischen Hauptbefestigungen. Hunderte von Granaten wurden auf die japanischen Stellungen im Südteil der Insel Bougainville abgefeuert. Heftige Regengüsse erschweren hier die Operationen.
Nicht zuletzt wird die Stimmung im japanischen Mutter1and durch die Potsdamer Konferenz bestimmt, die japanischen Zeitungsmeldungen zufolge auf die Ereignisse um Japan eine stärkere Wirkung als je zuvor haben Wird. Man erwartet nach Abschluss der Konferenz ein gemeinsames Kommuniqué zum Problem des Japankrieges und nimmt an, dass die, Vereinigten Staaten alle außenpolitischen Instrumente zur Vorbereitung einer Invasion der Mutterinseln spielen lassen werden. Die japanische Presse diskutiert auch lebhaft die im Zusammenhang mit dem Besuch des chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten bei Stalin eingetretene Lage. Da Stalin ein sehr realistischer Staatsmann ist, erhebt sich selbstverständlich die Frage, welche Konzessionen Tschungking in Erwiderung einer Verständigung mit Moskau eingegangen ist.
BERLIN, 19. Juli (MCC) – Unter Vorsitz von Präsident Truman fand am Mittwochnachmittag die zweite Sitzung der Potsdamer, Dreimächte-Konferenz statt. Alliierte Korrespondenten melden in ihren Berichten, dass die Ergebnisse der Besprechungen bis zum Schlusskommuniqué der Konferenz Wahrscheinlich geheim gehalten werden. Wichtige politische Entscheidungen werden von den führenden Staatsmännern persönlich getroffen. Die Ausarbeitung der Einzelheiten wird den alliierten Fachausschüssen überlassen.
Offiziell wird heute bekanntgegeben, dass sich die „großen Drei“ regelmäßig treffen. Auch die drei Außenminister – Byrnes, Eden, und Molotow – halten regelmäßige Zusammenkünfte ab und arbeiten nun Tagesordnungen für neue Besprechungen aus.
Präsident Truman gibt heute Abend im „Weißen Haus“ ein offizielles Festessen für Stalin und Churchill. Die einzelnen Regierungen werden von je fünf Personen vertreten sein.
Präsident Truman hat General Omar Bradley nach Potsdam berufen, um dessen Ernennung zum Chef der Verwaltung für Veteranenangelegenheiten zu besprechen.
Die Alliierte Kommandantur in Berlin hielt heute erneut eine Sitzung ab. Der russische Vertreter führte den Vorsitz. Zur Beratung dürfte die endgültige Ausarbeitung von Plänen über die ersten interalliierten Treibstoff- und Lebensmittellieferungen nach Berlin gestanden haben Gegenstand der Beratungen war vermutlich auch die Einsetzung von Unterausschüssen zur Behandlung weiterer Verwaltungsfragen.
L’Aube (July 20, 1945)
…
U.S. State Department (July 20, 1945)
JCS 199th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Jamison | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Lincoln | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Esposito | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Captain McDill | |
| General Somervell | Captain Stroop | |
| Lieutenant General Hull. | Captain Oster | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | Colonel Dean | |
| Rear Admiral Gardner | Colonel Donnelly | |
| Major General Gross | Colonel Stone | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Riggs | |
| Major General Norstad | Colonel Cary | |
| Brigadier General Cabell | Lieutenant Colonel Woodward | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Moore |
Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GENERAL MARSHALL presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff certain proposals by Lord Leathers for amending CCS 877, the United States Chiefs of Staff paper on this subject.
ADMIRAL LEAHY read out the proposed changes and these were compared with CCS 877.
ADMIRAL LEAHY read a paragraph in regard to shipping which General Somervell proposed for inclusion in CCS 877.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that Lord Leathers would probably accept as a part of the basic objectives the proposal made by General Somervell but he thought that it might better appear as a commentary on the basic objectives rather than as an integral part thereof.
ADMIRAL KING pointed out that Lord Leathers’ paper in fact involved a change in national policy, and therefore, in his opinion the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not consider it.
GENERAL SOMERVELL asked if his paragraph would be accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister.
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not approve the paragraph outright at the present time but he was sure they viewed it in a favorable light. The other Chiefs of Staff concurred.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Authorized General Somervell to inform the British Minister of War Transport that the proposed amendments to the basic objectives were not acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.
b. Informed General Somervell that they viewed in a favorable light his memorandum of comment on the basic objectives.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GENERAL ARNOLD recalled that it had taken one year to get air transport operations established with Russia via Teheran. Attempts had been made to shorten the route via Turkey, and although Turkish acquiescence had been obtained, the Russians had not agreed to the adoption of this shorter route to Moscow.
Mr. Harriman had informed General Arnold that since the capture of Berlin he had endeavored to arrange with Mr. Molotov for an air route to Moscow through Berlin but he had found it impossible to complete such arrangements. Mr. Harriman had asked General Arnold to submit two memoranda for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this connection.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum to the President enclosing the message to Generalissimo Stalin as presented by General Arnold.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Potsdam, 20 July 1945
Secret
Dear Fred: In accord with your request, the U.S. Chiefs were shown a copy of the amendments to basic undertakings informally submitted by you and the substitute dictated during our conversation.
They state they cannot accept your proposal. Though also unwilling to accept the substitute as a part of basic undertakings, their reaction now is to view in a favorable light, its inclusion in the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister with the words “Isles” for “Commonwealth of Nations,” and “civil requirements” in lieu of British “rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.”
Cordially,
BREHON SOMERVELL
[Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 877/4
Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies
We have considered the latest proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 877/2. In the attached schedule we have set out in one column the document as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with the amendments which we should like to see introduced. In the right-hand column we set out our comments.
The document, as far as paragraph 6, covers presently known military requirements. Against the possibility that additional military requirements may emerge which might conflict with presently accepted civil shipping programmes, it is considered desirable to add a further paragraph in the terms set out in paragraph 7.
We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff adopt the basic objectives, strategy, and policies as amended in the attached, and incorporate them in the final report of the TERMINAL Conference.
[Enclosure]
Top secret
| Memorandum by U.S. Chiefs of Staff with Proposed Amendments by British Chiefs of Staff | Comments by British Chiefs of Staff |
|---|---|
| I. Over-all objective | |
| 1. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. | |
| II. Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war | |
| 2. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria. | We fully agree that the first priority should be given to the main operations against the Japanese Islands. We trust, however, that other operations in the Outer Zone, which will achieve the secondary object of evicting the Japanese from all occupied territories, will receive the fullest possible consideration. |
| 3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese occupied territory if required. | |
| III. Basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war | |
| 4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war: | The wording of paragraph 4b. as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff does not allow for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of such countries as Canada, India or Australia, all of which are making an important contribution towards the prosecution of the war. War-making capacity cannot be confined solely to that required for the defeat of Japan since it is also necessary to meet the requirements for military control of Germany and Austria as stated in the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war. If first priority is given only to the support of the war-making capacity of forces in the combat areas, this might lead to the withholding of priority from the forces destined to relieve or support them. For example, the forces in India are required for maintaining the forces in active operations and providing reinforcements. As is known many installations supporting the operations in Southeast Asia Command are outside those areas which can strictly be termed combat areas. Unless these requirements are recognized, the war-making capacity of forces in combat areas will be jeopardised. |
| a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth. | |
| b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Isles insofar as it is connected with the prosecution of this war. | The present wording would appear to limit this assistance strictly to those forces which can take part in the war against Japan. We feel, however, that the necessity for the maintenance of world order, particularly in Europe, must be recognised. Having brought about the liberation of Europe, it would be illogical to allow unrest to occur owing to lack of forces in the liberated areas to keep order. The last sentence of paragraph 6c. is unnecessary as it is now dealt with in paragraph 7 below. |
| a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept. | |
| b. c. Support the war-making capacity of our forces, in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or destined for combat areas. | |
| c. d. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. | |
| 5. In order to attain the overall objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. | |
| The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. | |
| 6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept: | |
| a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. | |
| b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. | |
| c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war. or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the present war. | |
| d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas. | |
| 7. Cargo Shipping | |
| Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, and for supplies to liberated areas. Should further military demands arise for maintaining the maximum war effort which would bring about a substantial conflict with British rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, and supplies to liberated areas, the shipping situation will be examined by the two Governments at time in the light of changed conditions. |
Washington [Babelsberg], 20 July 1945
Top secret
In the past we have experienced considerable delay in travel of individuals and important official mail between the United States and Moscow. This situation is now susceptible to considerable improvement if the air connection point were shifted from Tehran to Berlin.
Experience has shown that the Russians are extremely hesitant in coming to any agreements with foreign countries regarding air travel for fear of establishing precEdents that might carry over into the postwar period. Efforts to obtain Soviet agreement to a Berlin connecting point have been made without success by both our military and diplomatic representatives.
There is a good likelihood that Marshal Stalin would accede to a personal request made by you, and it is recommended that you either send the attached letter to Mr. Stalin or discuss the matter with him along the lines indicated.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
[Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945
Top secret
My Dear Generalissimo: At the present time American air traffic between the U.S. and the USSR is accomplished via Teheran. From the United States point of view this is an extremely wasteful use of critically needed air transport, in addition to the time lost in travel.
The U.S. has now established a military transport service into Berlin for handling official U.S. traffic which could be made available for official Soviet traffic as well. I therefore seek your approval to diverting American and Soviet traffic now carried through Teheran to a route through Berlin.
HARRY S. TRUMAN