135 enemy carrier-borne planes shot down, damaged
…
Indonesian commander meets hero’s death
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Potsdam talks enter second phase
LISBON (Domei, July 19) – American President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin have now entered the second phase of their momentous talks at Potsdam, Denis Martin, Reuters correspondent, reported in a dispatch today from Potsdam.
He said it appears now that important preliminary objectives of the “three power” conference have been achieved.
The correspondent reported that main attention in Berlin is still focused on German problems, which cannot be lightly shelved as they affected Europe as a whole.
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 20, 1945)
Japans Flotte aufgestöbert
Japanische Presse diskutiert Potsdamer Konferenz
WASHINGTON, 19. Juli (OWI) – Trägerflugzeuge des britisch-amerikanischen Pazifikgeschwaders haben größere Teile der japanischen Flotte, die sich in der Bucht von Tokio versteckt hielt, erkundet und angegriffen. Es ist dies die erste Begegnung der beiden Flotten seit der Niederlage Japans in der Seeschlacht bei den Philippinen im Oktober 1944. Am fünften Tag richteten sich die amerikanischen Großangriffe der Flotten- und Luftstreitkräfte gegen Industrieziele südlich von Tokio. An diesen Angriffen nahmen zum ersten Male aus Europa nach Ostasien verlegte Bomberstaffeln teil.
Bei den zurzeit in den burmesischen Dschungeln tobenden Kämpfen haben die sogenannten patriotischen Streitkräfte Burmas einen bedeutenden Anteil an den Erfolgen errungen. Diese Guerillakrieger sind ursprünglich aus einer antifaschistischen Organisation, die sich während der japanischen Besetzung illegal gebildet hatte, hervorgegangen. Erfahrene britische Offiziere hatten sie unterstützt und ihnen Anweisungen gegeben. Die eingeschlossenen japanischen Einheiten in Burma wehren sich verzweifelt und wüten in den von ihnen noch besetzten Dörfern. Es wurden Fälle von Massen-Exekutionen bekannt. Auf Borneo ließ die Kampftätigkeit nach. Die siebente australische Division konnte trotz heftigsten feindlichen Widerstandes auf der Hauptstraße nach Samarinda vorstoßen.
Auf Neu-Guinea kämpften sich die australischen Truppen über die Hänge des Prinz-Alexander-Gebirges abwärts und nähern sich den äußeren Verteidigungslinien der japanischen Hauptbefestigungen. Hunderte von Granaten wurden auf die japanischen Stellungen im Südteil der Insel Bougainville abgefeuert. Heftige Regengüsse erschweren hier die Operationen.
Nicht zuletzt wird die Stimmung im japanischen Mutter1and durch die Potsdamer Konferenz bestimmt, die japanischen Zeitungsmeldungen zufolge auf die Ereignisse um Japan eine stärkere Wirkung als je zuvor haben Wird. Man erwartet nach Abschluss der Konferenz ein gemeinsames Kommuniqué zum Problem des Japankrieges und nimmt an, dass die, Vereinigten Staaten alle außenpolitischen Instrumente zur Vorbereitung einer Invasion der Mutterinseln spielen lassen werden. Die japanische Presse diskutiert auch lebhaft die im Zusammenhang mit dem Besuch des chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten bei Stalin eingetretene Lage. Da Stalin ein sehr realistischer Staatsmann ist, erhebt sich selbstverständlich die Frage, welche Konzessionen Tschungking in Erwiderung einer Verständigung mit Moskau eingegangen ist.
Den Philippinen wird geholfen
WASHINGTON, 19. Juli (OWI) – Senator Millard E. Tydings aus Maryland legte dem Senat heute drei Gesetzentwürfe vor, die sich mit dem Wiederaufbau der Philippinen und der Förderung der Handelsbeziehungen mit den Vereinigten Staaten befassen, sobald die Philippinen Wieder unabhängige Republik geworden sind.
Der eine Entwurf sieht die Errichtung einer Kriegsschäden Kommission zur Unterstützung der Philippinen und einen Beitrag von 100 Millionen Dollar vor, der für die Schäden aufkommen soll, die durch die feindliche Eroberung und Besetzung entstanden waren. Der zweite Entwurf befasst sich mit der Abtretung des philippinischen Kapitals, das sich nun im Schatz der Vereinigten Staaten befindet und sofort an die Generalfonds der philippinischen Schatzkammer ausgezahlt werden soll. Der dritte Entwurf sieht Vorkehrungen für die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den Philippinen und anderen Ländern vor, sobald jene ihre Unabhängigkeit erlangt haben werden.
Potsdamer Konferenz tagt
BERLIN, 19. Juli (MCC) – Unter Vorsitz von Präsident Truman fand am Mittwochnachmittag die zweite Sitzung der Potsdamer, Dreimächte-Konferenz statt. Alliierte Korrespondenten melden in ihren Berichten, dass die Ergebnisse der Besprechungen bis zum Schlusskommuniqué der Konferenz Wahrscheinlich geheim gehalten werden. Wichtige politische Entscheidungen werden von den führenden Staatsmännern persönlich getroffen. Die Ausarbeitung der Einzelheiten wird den alliierten Fachausschüssen überlassen.
Offiziell wird heute bekanntgegeben, dass sich die „großen Drei“ regelmäßig treffen. Auch die drei Außenminister – Byrnes, Eden, und Molotow – halten regelmäßige Zusammenkünfte ab und arbeiten nun Tagesordnungen für neue Besprechungen aus.
Präsident Truman gibt heute Abend im „Weißen Haus“ ein offizielles Festessen für Stalin und Churchill. Die einzelnen Regierungen werden von je fünf Personen vertreten sein.
Präsident Truman hat General Omar Bradley nach Potsdam berufen, um dessen Ernennung zum Chef der Verwaltung für Veteranenangelegenheiten zu besprechen.
Die Alliierte Kommandantur in Berlin hielt heute erneut eine Sitzung ab. Der russische Vertreter führte den Vorsitz. Zur Beratung dürfte die endgültige Ausarbeitung von Plänen über die ersten interalliierten Treibstoff- und Lebensmittellieferungen nach Berlin gestanden haben Gegenstand der Beratungen war vermutlich auch die Einsetzung von Unterausschüssen zur Behandlung weiterer Verwaltungsfragen.
L’Aube (July 20, 1945)
Élaborées à Potsdam et transmises par l’URSS –
Des conditions de paix seraient fixées au Japon
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Le Sénat américain ratifie les accords de Bretton Woods
Washington, 19 juillet – Le Sénat vient de ratifier les accords de Bretton Woods portant sur la création du fonds monétaire de stabilisation et d’une banque internationale, par 61 voix contre 16.
U.S. State Department (July 20, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
JCS 199th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Jamison | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Lincoln | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Esposito | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Captain McDill | |
| General Somervell | Captain Stroop | |
| Lieutenant General Hull. | Captain Oster | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | Colonel Dean | |
| Rear Admiral Gardner | Colonel Donnelly | |
| Major General Gross | Colonel Stone | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Riggs | |
| Major General Norstad | Colonel Cary | |
| Brigadier General Cabell | Lieutenant Colonel Woodward | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Moore |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policies
GENERAL MARSHALL presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff certain proposals by Lord Leathers for amending CCS 877, the United States Chiefs of Staff paper on this subject.
ADMIRAL LEAHY read out the proposed changes and these were compared with CCS 877.
ADMIRAL LEAHY read a paragraph in regard to shipping which General Somervell proposed for inclusion in CCS 877.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that Lord Leathers would probably accept as a part of the basic objectives the proposal made by General Somervell but he thought that it might better appear as a commentary on the basic objectives rather than as an integral part thereof.
ADMIRAL KING pointed out that Lord Leathers’ paper in fact involved a change in national policy, and therefore, in his opinion the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not consider it.
GENERAL SOMERVELL asked if his paragraph would be accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister.
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not approve the paragraph outright at the present time but he was sure they viewed it in a favorable light. The other Chiefs of Staff concurred.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Authorized General Somervell to inform the British Minister of War Transport that the proposed amendments to the basic objectives were not acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.
b. Informed General Somervell that they viewed in a favorable light his memorandum of comment on the basic objectives.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Air Transport Route Between the United States and Moscow
GENERAL ARNOLD recalled that it had taken one year to get air transport operations established with Russia via Teheran. Attempts had been made to shorten the route via Turkey, and although Turkish acquiescence had been obtained, the Russians had not agreed to the adoption of this shorter route to Moscow.
Mr. Harriman had informed General Arnold that since the capture of Berlin he had endeavored to arrange with Mr. Molotov for an air route to Moscow through Berlin but he had found it impossible to complete such arrangements. Mr. Harriman had asked General Arnold to submit two memoranda for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this connection.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum to the President enclosing the message to Generalissimo Stalin as presented by General Arnold.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Commanding General, Army Service Forces to the British Minister of War Transport
Potsdam, 20 July 1945
Secret
Dear Fred: In accord with your request, the U.S. Chiefs were shown a copy of the amendments to basic undertakings informally submitted by you and the substitute dictated during our conversation.
They state they cannot accept your proposal. Though also unwilling to accept the substitute as a part of basic undertakings, their reaction now is to view in a favorable light, its inclusion in the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister with the words “Isles” for “Commonwealth of Nations,” and “civil requirements” in lieu of British “rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.”
Cordially,
BREHON SOMERVELL
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 877/4
Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies
-
We have considered the latest proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 877/2. In the attached schedule we have set out in one column the document as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with the amendments which we should like to see introduced. In the right-hand column we set out our comments.
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The document, as far as paragraph 6, covers presently known military requirements. Against the possibility that additional military requirements may emerge which might conflict with presently accepted civil shipping programmes, it is considered desirable to add a further paragraph in the terms set out in paragraph 7.
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We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff adopt the basic objectives, strategy, and policies as amended in the attached, and incorporate them in the final report of the TERMINAL Conference.
[Enclosure]
Top secret
| Memorandum by U.S. Chiefs of Staff with Proposed Amendments by British Chiefs of Staff | Comments by British Chiefs of Staff |
|---|---|
| I. Over-all objective | |
| 1. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. | |
| II. Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war | |
| 2. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria. | We fully agree that the first priority should be given to the main operations against the Japanese Islands. We trust, however, that other operations in the Outer Zone, which will achieve the secondary object of evicting the Japanese from all occupied territories, will receive the fullest possible consideration. |
| 3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese occupied territory if required. | |
| III. Basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war | |
| 4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war: | The wording of paragraph 4b. as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff does not allow for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of such countries as Canada, India or Australia, all of which are making an important contribution towards the prosecution of the war. War-making capacity cannot be confined solely to that required for the defeat of Japan since it is also necessary to meet the requirements for military control of Germany and Austria as stated in the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war. If first priority is given only to the support of the war-making capacity of forces in the combat areas, this might lead to the withholding of priority from the forces destined to relieve or support them. For example, the forces in India are required for maintaining the forces in active operations and providing reinforcements. As is known many installations supporting the operations in Southeast Asia Command are outside those areas which can strictly be termed combat areas. Unless these requirements are recognized, the war-making capacity of forces in combat areas will be jeopardised. |
| a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth. | |
| b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Isles insofar as it is connected with the prosecution of this war. | The present wording would appear to limit this assistance strictly to those forces which can take part in the war against Japan. We feel, however, that the necessity for the maintenance of world order, particularly in Europe, must be recognised. Having brought about the liberation of Europe, it would be illogical to allow unrest to occur owing to lack of forces in the liberated areas to keep order. The last sentence of paragraph 6c. is unnecessary as it is now dealt with in paragraph 7 below. |
| a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept. | |
| b. c. Support the war-making capacity of our forces, in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or destined for combat areas. | |
| c. d. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. | |
| 5. In order to attain the overall objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. | |
| The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. | |
| 6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept: | |
| a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. | |
| b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. | |
| c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war. or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the present war. | |
| d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas. | |
| 7. Cargo Shipping | |
| Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, and for supplies to liberated areas. Should further military demands arise for maintaining the maximum war effort which would bring about a substantial conflict with British rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, and supplies to liberated areas, the shipping situation will be examined by the two Governments at time in the light of changed conditions. |
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President
Washington [Babelsberg], 20 July 1945
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
In the past we have experienced considerable delay in travel of individuals and important official mail between the United States and Moscow. This situation is now susceptible to considerable improvement if the air connection point were shifted from Tehran to Berlin.
Experience has shown that the Russians are extremely hesitant in coming to any agreements with foreign countries regarding air travel for fear of establishing precEdents that might carry over into the postwar period. Efforts to obtain Soviet agreement to a Berlin connecting point have been made without success by both our military and diplomatic representatives.
There is a good likelihood that Marshal Stalin would accede to a personal request made by you, and it is recommended that you either send the attached letter to Mr. Stalin or discuss the matter with him along the lines indicated.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin
[Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945
Top secret
My Dear Generalissimo: At the present time American air traffic between the U.S. and the USSR is accomplished via Teheran. From the United States point of view this is an extremely wasteful use of critically needed air transport, in addition to the time lost in travel.
The U.S. has now established a military transport service into Berlin for handling official U.S. traffic which could be made available for official Soviet traffic as well. I therefore seek your approval to diverting American and Soviet traffic now carried through Teheran to a route through Berlin.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Mr. Clayton | Sir Walter Monckton | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Pauley | Sir David Waley | Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Murphy |
Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany
[Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945
The following is an exposition of ideas submitted by Messrs. Maisky and Sobelev:
-
The main task of the Control Council is the elimination of the German war potential.
-
For purpose of [blank] war potential in the future, the general policy which will be carried out uniformly in all zones of occupation will be in preventing recovery of those parts of the economy which are the basis of the heavy industry and at the same time giving Germany a free hand in agriculture and in light industry.
-
Guiding ideas for the Control Council and for the German administration: (1) Reparation obligation according to plan which will be established, and (2) Meeting needs of occupying armies. (Russians try to establish that “first” general principle governing the Control Council will be reparations).
(MAISKY) It would be undesirable politically to say that imports have priority over reparations. Everybody would say that reparations come first and imports after because we have suffered so much – capitalists want to have profits from foreign trade and don’t care about reparations for those who suffered. Also when Germans know about it they will try to prove that without very considerable imports they can’t live and can’t export. Same as after last war and there is no reason to believe they won’t repeat same joke again as after last war.
German economy after this war will be a very strictly regulated economy, otherwise she couldn’t pay reparations etc. This regulated economy should provide the necessary means. It should be quite feasible to guarantee reparations and necessary imports. On (?) of principle we have a conviction that if there is a conflict between reparations and imports, then imports must give way. Political repercussions.
MONCKTON says political objectives are met by
-
Imports approved by Government’s consent[.]
-
Pauley said we are not going to consider that this will be a charge against once for all deliveries (capital assets, etc.).
CLAYTON – American people will not again, as they did after last war, finance Germany. That was President Roosevelt’s position. Germany has very little in way of natural resources except coal, potash, and some poor quality iron ore.
MAISKY suggests also that question of economic regime in Germany and machinery which will regulate this economy – proposes that in postwar period economic life of Germany should be regulated by comprehensive program on annual basis by Control Council and reparations authorities which we should have soon --(?) by Control Council and German authorities. Naturally supervisory power lies – with Control Council to approve and German authorities to execute.
This program should include (1) production, (2) distribution of goods, including unified system of rationing taking into account local conditions, and (3) program of exports and imports, (4) currency, (5) railroad communications and water transport. These are main items.
MAISKY also pointed out that pre-war Germany lived on a very high scale as compared with other European countries. Now he said we must visualize quite another Germany whose level will be that of “Middle” Europe which is very much lower. Therefore imports will be much lower and we will be able to use German iron ore and not Swedish.
CLAYTON said he was thinking of principle of minimum standards of living only and Reparations. Bankers will not finance.
MAISKY said question is theoretical.
WALEY – This is not a school debating society. This is practical.
CLAYTON suggests that we report this as one principle on which we cannot agree.
No – Approval of new paragraph 12.
No – Approval of new paragraph 13.
U.S. Delegation Working Paper
[Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945
Proposed Text
- A primary purpose of occupation is to obtain reparation for the damage and injury caused Allied countries by German aggression. To accomplish this purpose some importation of raw materials and other items will be necessary. The Control Council shall formulate as soon as possible a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. With full recognition of the principle that the cost of imports must be met from the proceeds of exports from current production or stocks responsibility for the procurement and financing of approved imports for Germany as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. Reimbursement for any initial net outlays made in connection with the provision of supplies for Germany shall be a first charge against the German economy.
U.S. Delegation Working Paper
[Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945
Proposed Text
- One of the primary purposes of occupation is to obtain reparation for the damage and injury caused Allied countries by German aggression. To accomplish this purpose some importation of raw materials and other items will be necessary. The Control Council shall formulate as soon as possible a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. Responsibility for the procurement and financing of approved imports for Germany as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. Reimbursement for all net advances made for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of any exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods.
U.S. Delegation Working Paper
[Undated]
Memorandum
With reference to the “Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period, Text as Submitted to the Foreign Secretaries by Economic Sub-Committee,” the following recommendations are made:
Economic Principles
Paragraph 13: Proposed alternative substitute for first sentence:
During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit and the Allied Control Council shall have authority to issue directives to insure the consistent application of this principle in all zones of occupation.
During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit except in those instances as the Allied Control Council shall otherwise determine.
Paragraph 13: There shall be added a further sub-section upon which common policies shall be established in Germany during the period of occupation, as follows:
(g) finance, transportation, and communications.
Paragraph 14(d) on page 3, should either be stricken or amended to read as follows:
Except with the approval of the Control Council or except where determined by the Government concerned to be required for the payments of necessary imports, no grant or credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or Governments shall be permitted.