Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

Third plenary meeting, 4:05 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov
Mr. Harriman Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pauley Major Birse Mr. Gusev
Mr. Dunn Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Matthews Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

Bulgarian-Greek Frontier Incident

MR. CHURCHILL said he wished to refer to a point which Stalin had raised at the previous meeting concerning an incident on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier. He had made inquiries. The British Government had heard of no fighting. These people did not like each other very much and he did not doubt but that there had been some sniping. There was no Greek field division in northern Greece, however. The British knew this, as they had their own people there. There were seven thousand Greek guards on the Albanian and Yugoslav frontiers. They were there for purposes of internal order. On the other side of the frontier there were 30 thousand Albanian, 30 thousand Yugoslav and 24 thousand Bulgarian troops. He only mentioned this because this Conference of the Great Powers should make clear that there should be no marauding attacks and that frontier questions should be settled by the peace conference. It should be indicated that those who try to violate frontiers are likely to prejudice their own claims.

THE PRESIDENT said he had never heard of this and that he did not hear it mentioned at the previous meeting. He agreed that frontier matters should be settled at the peace conference.

STALIN said there had been some misunderstanding. He had not raised this matter at the previous meeting but in a personal talk with Mr. Churchill. This did not affect the fact that this Conference could consider the matter and he might wish to raise the matter at a later date.

CHURCHILL agreed that it was not raised at the meeting, although it had been brought up at this table. He agreed with Mr. Stalin that it could be raised at the Conference.

THE PRESIDENT then proposed that Mr. Eden submit his report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN said that the United States Secretary of State said this morning that he wished to submit an amendment to the redraft of paragraph 3 of the document on the Council of Foreign Ministers. This had been referred to a drafting committee.

German Political Question

The second point examined at their meeting was the German political question. The Foreign Ministers had considered the economic and political principles that were to guide the Control Council of Germany. Preliminary consideration had been given to this matter by the Heads of Government at a previous meeting. The Foreign Ministers were now submitting a redraft of the political section of the document on this question. In addition to redrafting, they had added some new material. They suggested that when the economic part had been agreed upon, they would consider it and refer it to the meeting of the Heads of Government.

The political section of the document was approved as revised.

Poland

MR. EDEN said that the British had submitted a new draft to replace the paper submitted by the Soviet Delegation on the Polish question at the previous meeting. The Foreign Ministers had had a useful discussion on this subject and had submitted it to a drafting committee. They hoped to present it tomorrow.

CHURCHILL observed that when the drafting committee had finished its work, they would discuss it.

THE PRESIDENT and STALIN agreed.

MR. EDEN said that apart from the two subjects already mentioned, the Foreign Ministers proposed the following subjects as the agenda for the present meeting:

  1. German Merchant and Naval Fleet.

  2. Spain.
    MR. EDEN pointed out that the Russians had submitted a memorandum on this subject.

  3. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.
    MR. EDEN stated that the United States Delegation had circulated a memorandum on this subject.

  4. Yugoslavia.
    The United Kingdom had submitted a paper on this.

  5. Rumania.
    EDEN said that the British had prepared a memorandum on the removal of oil equipment as trophies.

EDEN commented that as the meeting of Heads of Government had finished their previous session at an early hour, a long list had been prepared for the present meeting.

Disposition of German Merchant and Naval Fleet

THE PRESIDENT said that with respect to the first question, the disposition of the German fleet, the first thing to consider was, what is reparation and what is war booty. The merchant fleet was to be classified as reparations, as he thought it should; the matter would eventually have to be referred to the Reparations Commission. He said he was interested in the merchant fleet because the United States wanted it to operate under the present control in the Japanese war zone.

STALIN said that war material taken by armies in the course of a war is booty. Armies that laid down their arms and surrendered, turned in their arms and these arms were booty. The same thing applied to the navy. It was stipulated in the military proposals put forward by the Three Powers that the navy be surrendered. It was therefore, booty. It was possible, however, to discuss the question whether the merchant fleet was booty or reparations. Regarding the navy, there was no question about the matter. He recalled the case of Italy in which both naval and merchant fleets had been treated as booty and no question had been raised.

MR. CHURCHILL said he did not want to approach this matter from the juridical standpoint.

THE PRESIDENT said he held the same view.

CHURCHILL said he wanted to reach an agreement on this matter between the three powers as a part of their general agreement at the Conference. In saying this, he was speaking only of the German war fleet. He said that they had the whole of the German merchant fleet in their keeping at the present time. Should a general agreement be reached at this Conference and a friendly settlement of their problems be achieved, he would not be opposed to a division of the German fleet. He felt that the question of the Italian fleet could better be discussed in connection with the settlement with Italy. He went on to observe, however, that replacement of losses was relevant to this matter. The British had had immense naval losses in the war. Speaking from memory, they had lost about 10 capital ships and aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers and literally hundreds of destroyers, submarines and various kinds of small crafts. The question of U-Boats stood on a somewhat different footing. These U-Boats had a limited legal use. The Germans had used them in contravention of the international agreements on this subject. As many of them as possible should in his opinion be destroyed. The latest German U-Boats, however, might contain valuable information for the future and that should be reasonably shared by the three Powers. He did not look at the matter solely from a naval point of view. He was aware of the tremendous sacrifices which the Russians had made in the field. He suggested that there should be no final discussion today but he thought that the bulk of the U-Boats should be sunk and the remainder shared equally. With respect to the other naval vessels he thought that they should be divided equally, provided a general agreement was achieved at the Conference and that they parted amicably from this meeting. He had no objection to the Soviet proposal that the German naval fleet be divided. He did not feel that a nation as great and mighty as Russia should be denied this. It should have its flag welcomed. As it took so long to build new vessels, these vessels would be a means of developing a Russian navy and training personnel and would facilitate showing the Russian flag on the ocean.

With respect to the German merchant fleet CHURCHILL said he felt that while the Japanese war continued, all captured ships should play their role to the full and contribute to the ending of that war. The limit of the conduct of the Japanese war was shipping. They had sufficient men, planes and naval ships but merchant ships were needed for the movement of men and materials. There was also the difficulty in feeding the British Isles and liberated Europe. Every ton was needed in this critical period. They had all placed all of their shipping in the shipping pool. He would be sorry if this German fleet was not used to conclude the war with Japan.

He pointed out that the Finns had had a merchant fleet of some 400 thousand tons which had passed into the hands of their Russian ally. Two Rumanian ships, from available troop ships, had also fallen into Russian hands. If the German fleet was to be divided by three, the Rumanian and Finnish fleet should also be divided.

STALIN interrupted to state that the Russians had not taken a single merchant ship from Finland and had taken only one ship from the Rumanians which was used for carrying wounded troops.

CHURCHILL replied that he was speaking of the basis of the question. He went on to say that there were others besides the three at this meeting. The Norwegians had suffered terrible losses. Their oil tanker fleet had been very valuable and it had been made use of freely. Other Powers not at the meeting had suffered heavy losses. Perhaps the German fleet should be divided into four and the fourth part might be used for the other Powers not represented at this meeting. He only threw out these suggestions which he thought should be considered.

THE PRESIDENT said he would be agreeable to a three-way division of the German merchant and naval fleets but he should like it to be done after the Japanese war. We needed these ships not only for the conduct of the war but also to haul food and supplies for rehabilitation of Europe, to our great ally, Russia, Greece, and others.

THE PRESIDENT said that we will need every bomb and every ton of food.

STALIN said what about the navy?

THE PRESIDENT said he was ready to dispose of them now. He added that when the Japanese war was over, the United States would have merchant and naval ships for sale but he did not want to upset our war against Japan now.

STALIN inquired, “Are not the Russians to wage war against Japan?”

THE PRESIDENT replied that when Russia was ready to fight Japan, she would be taken in the shipping pool the same as the others. He added that we wanted them in the pool.

STALIN said he was interested in the question of Principle.

CHURCHILL suggested that the vessels could be earmarked, if they had any ears when the Japanese war was over; if any were damaged they could be made good from our general resources. He said he must avow himself as a supporter of the request of Marshal Stalin that the Russians receive a share of these war and merchant vessels. The only alternative was the sinking of the naval vessels. This would be a harsh procedure, when one of our trusty allies has a desire for them.

THE PRESIDENT observed that they were not apart on this question.

STALIN inquired what sort of ships were meant. Was it merchant ships?

CHURCHILL replied that he referred to merchant ships.

STALIN said that of course it was not possible to depict the Russians as having the intention to interfere with the war against Japan and the matter could not be put in a way to imply that they were to receive a gift from the Allies. They were not after a gift.

CHURCHILL interrupted to state that he did not mention that.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had not either.

STALIN continued that he should like for the matter to be cleared up as to whether Russia was to have the right to claim one third of the German merchant and naval fleet and that what they would receive they would receive by their right; if his colleagues thought otherwise, they should say so.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not think otherwise.

STALIN said that if the principle were recognized, the Russians would be satisfied. With regard to the use to which the merchant fleet would be put, including the one third to be handed over to Russia, of course they would raise no obstacles to the use of their third in the war against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT said he had no objection to this proposal.

STALIN said then he agreed that this matter be settled at the end of the Conference as suggested by Mr. Churchill. There was one thing he should like to see accomplished, however. His people were not allowed to see the German fleet. The Russians had set up a Commission to deal with this question but they were not allowed to see the fleet nor were they even given a list of the vessels. Was it not possible to list them and to allow this Commission to inspect the ships and to find out what ones were there?

CHURCHILL replied that it was quite possible but the British would want reciprocal facilities to be given them to see German installations in the Baltic. He believed that the Russians had obtained 45 German U-Boats in Danzig. They could arrange an exchange.

STALIN observed that these submarines were out of use but said that they could agree to Mr. Churchill’s request that the exchange of facilities be mutual.

CHURCHILL said that all they were asking for was fair play and equality.

THE PRESIDENT said that so far as the United States zone was concerned, the Russians were at liberty to see anything they wanted, only we would expect that this would be reciprocal.

CHURCHILL said he had made a distinction between U-Boats and other ships. He knew that Marshal Stalin would appreciate the sensitiveness of an island power which grows only two-thirds or less of its own food. They had suffered much from the U-Boats and the submarine was not consequently a popular form of naval vessel in Great Britain. He strongly suggested that the bulk of them be sunk. Great Britain had very nearly perished from them twice. Those who live with a large population on a small island do not welcome any nations of the world extending their construction of submarines. His consent was conditioned on further discussion of how many are divided and how many are sunk, but he agreed that they be divided equally. In this war, German submarines had damaged them severely and had eaten up a large part of their war making capacity.

STALIN stated he was also in favor of sinking a large proportion of the U-Boats.

THE PRESIDENT then said he thought that was sufficient discussion on this subject.

The Spanish Question

MR. EDEN said that the next question on the agenda was that of Spain.

STALIN said the Soviet proposals had already been submitted and he had nothing to add.

CHURCHILL said that his Government had a strong distaste for General Franco and the government of his country. He had been misrepresented as having been friendly to this gentleman. All he had said was that there was more to Spanish policy than drawing rude cartoons of Franco. The taking out of jail prisoners who had been in jail for years and shooting them for what had happened long before indicated that Spain was not a democracy in accordance with British ideas on that subject. Therefore, when Franco had written him a letter proposing that he and Churchill organize the western states against that terrible country, Russia, he had, with the approval of the British Cabinet, sent him a chilly reply. Mr. Molotov would remember that he had sent him a copy of this reply and a reply [copy? ] had also been sent to the President. British feeling was against the Franco regime.

STALIN stated that they had received the copy of the British reply.

CHURCHILL said that he saw some difficulty in Stalin’s proposal, particularly in the first paragraph concerning the breaking off of all relations with Franco Spain. It seemed to him that taking such a step in regard to a nation having a character like that of Spain, which was proud and touchy, might rally around Franco those elements now deserting him and making his position more precarious. The breaking of relations was not a satisfactory process. It would be a pleasure to do so but after that they would have no contact. Ambassadors were needed most of all in times of difficulty. If they took such action as this it would be a shock.

The result might strengthen Franco’s position. He has an army although it was not very good. If this action resulted in strengthening him, it would be necessary to consider whether to take a rebuff or to intervene with force. He was against the use of force. He was against interfering with countries which had a different regime unless we are molested by them. In the countries which we control, we have, of course, set up democratic governments. Insofar as the liberated areas are concerned, we cannot allow a Fascist regime to be set up. With respect to the countries which have not taken part in this war, however, there should be no exchange of cannon fire. His Majesty’s Government would have to give prolonged consideration to Stalin’s proposals to break relations with Spain. He was prepared to take every measure by all proper diplomatic means to speed the departing guest.

The breaking of relations with a state because of its internal conduct of affairs was a dangerous principle. He added that he would greatly deplore anything which would lead Spain to civil war. Spain had suffered terribly from its civil war in which two million people had been killed. The British would be sorry to intervene as a government in an active manner in the Spanish affair at this juncture. Forces there were working for a change for the better.

He pointed out that the World Organization which had just been agreed upon at San Francisco had a provision against interference in domestic affairs. While they were preparing to ratify the charter drawn up at San Francisco, it would be inconsistent to resort to action which would be prohibited under it.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had no love for Franco. He had no desire to have any part in starting another civil war in Spain. There had been enough wars in Europe. He would be happy to recognize another government in Spain but he thought that Spain itself must settle that question.

STALIN observed that this meant that everything would be unchanged in Spain. In his opinion, the regime of Franco was gaining strength. It was feeding semi-fascist regimes in other countries. Reference had been made to internal affairs. This was not an internal affair. The Spanish regime had been imposed on the Spanish people by Hitler and Mussolini whose regimes they were in the process of destroying. He believed that his colleagues had no love for Franco but this should be proved in deeds. He was not proposing military intervention nor that civil war be let loose, but he wished the Spanish people to know that the three Governments had taken a stand on the side of the democratic forces among the Spanish people and that the Spanish people should have ground to believe that they were against Franco. There was a diplomatic means of showing that they were against Franco and that they were for the democratic Spanish people. He said that suppose they assumed that the means of breaking relations was too severe. Was there not a more flexible means of letting the Spanish people know that the three Governments are in sympathy with the Spanish people and not with Franco. It was dangerous to let the Spanish regime remain as it was now. Public opinion in Europe and in America was not in sympathy with Franco and if the three Governments were to pass by in silence this cancer in Europe, it might be considered that they sanctioned Franco. That would be a grave charge.

CHURCHILL observed that the Soviet Union had no relations with Spain now.

STALIN replied that he had the right to raise and settle this question. Why should they be silent. People presumed that the Big Three could settle such a question and he was one of them just as Mr. Churchill was. Must they keep silent about what was going on in Spain, as well as to refrain from action against Spain which was giving shelter to Fascists? They could not shut their eyes to the grave danger of Franco Spain.

CHURCHILL said that individuals were not enjoined by governments from expressing opinions. Also the press, to which Marshal Stalin had referred, spoke very freely on this matter in the Soviet Union as did the British and sometimes the American press. His Majesty’s Government had spoken very frequently to Franco and to his Ambassador. They did not like, however, to break relations.

CHURCHILL referred also to the valuable trade relations which Britain maintained with Spain. Spain sent them many useful products and received British manufactured goods in return. This was an old and well-established trade. Unless he were convinced that it would bring about the desired result, he did not want this trade stopped. He fully understood the feeling of Marshal Stalin. Franco had had the audacity to send a Spanish Blue Division to Russia. Russia was in a different position, having been molested. Insofar as the British were concerned in this war, they had refrained from taking action against the British at a time when such intervention could have been disastrous.

CHURCHILL continued that during the Torch operation merely opening fire on the ships and Air Corps concentrated in the area of Gibraltar would have done them great harm.

STALIN interrupted to say that the Spaniards were afraid. They would have been doomed if they had dared to take such action.

CHURCHILL continued that they had not been specifically injured by the Spaniards. No one doubted that Marshal Stalin had no love for the Franco regime and he had no doubt that the majority of the English people shared this view. Churchill said he only intended to emphasize that the Russians had been injured in a way in which others had not.

STALIN said he thought that Great Britain had also suffered from Spain, which had provided bases on its shores for German submarines. He considered that all Allied Powers had suffered in this way. He did not wish, however, to look at the question from this point of view. What was important was the danger to Europe. This should be remembered. Some steps should be taken even if the breaking of diplomatic relations was too severe. They should say that they thought that the aspirations of the Spanish people were just. They had only to say this and nothing would be left of Franco. He considered that the Foreign Ministers should consider whether a milder statement could not be agreed upon.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed.

CHURCHILL said he was opposed. The matter must be settled at the meeting of the Heads of Government.

STALIN pointed out that it would be settled by them. The Foreign Ministers would only give it preliminary study.

CHURCHILL said he did not think this was advisable. It was a question of principle. To interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries was very dangerous. He might not like some things in the United States, but he did not consider it wise to attempt to intervene.

STALIN said that this was not a question of a domestic affair. The regime of Franco was of external origin.

CHURCHILL rejoined to state that anyone could say this about any country.

STALIN replied that no other country in Europe had such a regime.

CHURCHILL observed that Portugal might be accused of being under a dictatorship.

STALIN replied that it was not the dictatorship that mattered. The regime in Portugal resulted from internal developments, whereas the regime of Franco resulted from intervention by Hitler and Mussolini. Franco’s behavior was provocative. He gave shelter to Nazis.

CHURCHILL said he was not prepared that any government in which he participated should interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This has always been their policy. Moreover, to push things might make matters worse. He would be very glad, although he knew this idea would not be received with enthusiasm, if the regime were overthrown and replaced by a constitutional monarchy with free democratic principles, elections, etc. If, however, he or any British Government pushed this proposal, all would turn against it in Spain. No country likes to be told how it is to be run. There was intervention on both sides in the Spanish civil war. The Soviet Union intervened on one side and then Hitler and Mussolini came in on the other. But that was already long ago. Action taken at this meeting was more likely to rivet Franco in his place. The British Government did not give the slightest support to Franco Spain other than trade, which they have always carried on.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he would be happy to have the matter sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if agreement could not be reached.

STALIN said he also fully appreciated the British difficulties, but felt that this matter could be facilitated by action here. He proposed that they prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including observations made by Mr. Churchill on the trend of developments in Spain. This would be one of the items in the declaration to be made on Europe. He assumed that they would have some sort of declaration on the results of their work. This statement on Spain should be included in them. It would not be binding on the British Government. It would be a short statement on the situation in Spain which would make clear to public opinion that their sympathies were with the Spanish people. This was a most mild form – milder than the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia and Greece. He suggested that they let the Foreign Ministers consider what form this declaration could take.

CHURCHILL replied that he had not agreed to any declaration on Spain and he gathered that the President had also not agreed.

STALIN said it was not a question of a declaration on Spain alone, but on all countries.

CHURCHILL said that the line he had taken was that in all countries involved in this war that they should not interfere in their domestic affairs. This was a question of principle. There were many things in regard to Yugoslavia and Rumania which he did not like. They were involved in the war which gave us greater freedom there. He repeated that there was great danger in the intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. If there were to be a declaration of the principles on which democratic governments were founded – he personally had always liked the statement in the American Constitution – and a statement on what governments had not fulfilled these principles, he could consider it, but he pointed out that many governments in Europe now do not fulfill these principles. He did not know what the Spanish people thought. There were many shades of opinion in Spain. Most of them would doubtless like to get rid of Franco without interference from outsiders.

THE PRESIDENT said there appeared to be no chance for agreement at the moment. He suggested that they pass on to something else upon which they could reach a decision and that they come back to the Spanish question at a later session.

STALIN suggested that it be referred to the Foreign Ministers to consider.

CHURCHILL said that this was the point on which they were not in agreement. He did not suggest an adverse decision but merely that they leave it for the moment.

THE PRESIDENT said that they could return to it at any time.

STALIN said that he agreed.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

THE PRESIDENT said that the document on this matter had been submitted at the first session.

STALIN suggested that discussion of this question be put off as the Soviet Delegation had another document on this question which they wished to submit.

This was agreed to.

Yugoslavia

EDEN pointed out that the British Delegation had submitted a document on this question.

STALIN said that he thought they could not discuss this question without having the Yugoslavs present – at any rate they would be unable to achieve any results without them.

EDEN pointed out that they had agreed upon a declaration at Yalta although no Yugoslavs were present.

STALIN replied that Yugoslavia was an Allied country and that it was not possible to settle this matter without the Yugoslavs. When they had met at Yalta there had been two Yugoslav governments which could not reach agreement. Now there was one legitimate government and he proposed that the representatives of that government be called in.

CHURCHILL inquired if he meant Tito or Šubašić.

STALIN said they could call in anyone.

CHURCHILL said, however, that the Yugoslavs were in extreme disagreement.

STALIN said this was the first time he had heard of it. He proposed that they verify this and let the Yugoslavs tell them all about it.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Prime Minister’s information was serious enough to warrant sending for the Yugoslav representatives.

CHURCHILL replied that it was a very serious matter and pointed out that at Yalta they had reached an agreement on this subject which had not been carried out; there had been no elections; the assembly (AVNOJ) has not been re-organized; juridical procedure has not been restored; Tito has imposed a strict party organization with police control and with the press almost as strictly controlled as in fascist countries. Yugoslavia has not in any way borne out the hope we had entertained at Yalta. We gave arms and support to Tito. We could not give much as we were heavily engaged but we gave all we could. He was very disappointed at the way things had turned out at the present time. The British proposal was a very modest one to restate what had been set at Yalta.

STALIN said that Mr. Churchill had passed to a discussion of the substance of the question but he had not answered whether he considered it worthwhile discussing the matter. If the President desired, he could make a statement on the substance of the question.

THE PRESIDENT asked him to do so.

STALIN said that the information given by Mr. Churchill in regard to the infringement of the Crimean decisions was unknown to us and does not agree with our information. Perhaps he is right; perhaps not, but he, Stalin, thought it would be useful to give the Yugoslavs a chance to reply to this accusation.

CHURCHILL pointed out that he had not made an accusation, but a complaint.

STALIN said I can agree to a discussion of the subject, but it is not possible to try the Yugoslav state without hearing its representatives.

CHURCHILL then stated that he had had time to think the matter over and that perhaps it would be useful to hear both sides – Tito and the other side separately. Perhaps they would be able to settle their difficulties. He inquired if Stalin thought they would be willing to come.

STALIN said he did not know but they could inquire of the Yugoslavs.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was here as a representative of the United States to discuss world affairs. He did not wish to sit here as a court to settle matters which will eventually be settled by the United Nations Organization. If we do that, we shall become involved in trying to settle every political difficulty and will have to listen to a succession of representatives, de Gaulle, Franco, and others. He did not wish to waste time listening to complaints but wished to deal with the problems which the three Heads of Government had come here to settle. If they could not do that their time was wasted.

STALIN said that this was a correct observation.

CHURCHILL said he wished to observe with great respect that the United States was very interested in the carrying out of the Yalta agreement. Great allowances had to be made for Tito, in view of the recent end of the war and the great disturbances in that country. The British memorandum merely expressed the wish that there be carried out the decisions which were made at the Crimean Conference. The President’s predecessor had attached importance to this matter and, if I recall correctly, much of the drafting of this declaration had been done by the Americans.

THE PRESIDENT said he desired to see the Yalta declaration carried out. “Insofar as the United States is concerned, I intend to carry it out to the letter.”

STALIN said that according to their information the Yalta agreement was being carried out.

THE PRESIDENT observed that complaints had also been received by his government. He thought that they could be passed on without the Yugoslavs.

CHURCHILL said that as the British paper had not met with support, he was prepared to withdraw it.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that it be postponed for a session or two.

CHURCHILL said that he wished to thank Stalin for his patience. If they could not settle their affairs here, where could they settle them?

STALIN replied that they could be settled here but that they should hear those who were concerned.

CHURCHILL said he was agreed but the President was opposed.

STALIN said that the matter must then be dropped for the time being.

British and American Oil Equipment in Rumania

CHURCHILL said that the British had submitted a paper on this subject which they thought the Foreign Ministers could discuss and perhaps reach agreement. They would, in any event, benefit from the discussion between the Foreign Ministers. He observed that it was a rather detailed question.

STALIN said he thought this was a trifling matter which could be settled through diplomatic channels without raising it at this conference. Since it had been brought up, however, he wished to rectify one misstatement. No British property had been taken by the Soviet Union in Rumania. The property of some of these oil companies had been obtained in Germany. The Germans had captured it and had used it against the Allies. We removed some quantity of this type because the Germans destroyed our oil industry. He had no objection to the question being referred to the Foreign Ministers, but it would be better to handle it through the usual diplomatic channels in order not to trouble the conference.

CHURCHILL stated that this was not a trifling matter. It was true that the Germans had stolen their pipe, which they had obtained from Germany, but they had paid for it. The British view was that if this pipe which was taken by the Soviet Union was considered as reparations, Rumania should reimburse the British for it. He inquired whether it would be agreeable if the Soviet and British representatives here got together to settle the matter.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the United States was also interested. There was a similar situation with regard to the Standard Oil Company and the Shell Company. Why would it not be possible to let the Foreign Ministers discuss the matter.

This was agreed to.

Meeting adjourned.

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 5 p.m.

CHURCHILL: One point Marshal Stalin raised [was] that there was some trouble on the Greek-Albanian frontier. I made inquiries. We have heard of no fighting but people don’t like one another very much and there is no [some? ] sniping. There is no field division in northern Greece at all. There are many more troops on the borders in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria than there are in Greece (citing certain figures). We should make it clear to small states we will not tolerate marauding parties across frontiers and the frontiers will be settled by the Peace Conference.

TRUMAN: These are matters to be settled by the Peace Conference – not by direct action.

STALIN: I did not raise the question at this meeting but privately, and I will explain my views on other [another?] occasion.

EDEN: At the beginning of our meeting Secretary Byrnes said that he wanted to propose revision of [the document on] the Council for [of] Foreign Ministers and this was referred to the drafting committee.

The second point examined was the political principles for Germany. We submit a revised draft.

CHURCHILL: We agree to revised draft.

STALIN: I agree.

TRUMAN: It is accepted.

EDEN: The Polish question is next. We hope to have a draft ready for meeting tomorrow afternoon.

CHURCHILL: We are agreed that the Polish question shall be discussed as soon as drafting committee settles its work.

EDEN: Following additional items for the agenda today: (1) German Navy and merchant marine; (2) Spain (3) Yalta declaration on liberated Europe; (4) Yugoslavia; (5) Rumania (removal of industrial material as booty).

TRUMAN: First question is disposition of German fleet and marine[.] [There] must be decision as to what is war booty and war reparations, and if war booty then how we are to share the booty. I am interested in German fleet because I want that to continue under present control until the Japanese war is over.

STALIN: Any weapons taken in the course of the war by army represents booty. Armies surrender to those to whom they surrender. The same applies to the navy. The navy had to be surrendered. Therefore it is booty. It may be possible to discuss whether merchant fleet is booty. In case of Italy both battle and merchant fleet were placed in the category of booty.

CHURCHILL: I do not want to approach this matter from a juridical standpoint.

TRUMAN: I do not either.

CHURCHILL: I hope we may solve these problems by agreement. We have the whole of these vessels in our hands. We are not opposed in principle to the division of the German fleet. I am not speaking of the Italian fleet. Of course in these matters the replacement of losses is relevant. We have had tremendous losses. The questions of U-boats stand on a different footing. They have a limited legitimate use. The way they were used by Germany was prohibited by treaty. These vessels should be sunk. The latest U-boats contained valuable information on future construction. That knowledge should be shared. But the bulk of U-boats should be sunk and the remainder divided equally. The surface ships should be divided equally. We are not opposed in principle to Russia’s demand for one-third of the German fleet. Her flag should be welcomed on the seas by her allies. As to merchant ships, until the war with Japan comes to an end, these should be fully utilized. The prosecution of the war is limited by shipping. The transport of men and the feeding of civilians is limited by shipping.

There is another point. The Finnish fleet has passed into the hands of our Russian Allies. The Rumanian fleet, containing two very valuable troop ships, has fallen into their hands. It would seem that the three fleets should be shared.

STALIN: We have not taken a single ship from Finland and only one troop ship from Rumania, which is being used to carry the wounded.

CHURCHILL: There is also a question of others. The Norwegians have suffered terribly. The oil fleet was a great part of the nation’s strength. It is a question whether the merchant fleet should be divided into four parts and the fourth part given to those not represented here. I should deprecate a hasty treatment of this subject.

TRUMAN: The subject [is] most interesting from our point of view. I should be very happy to make a division of the merchant fleet, but we must use these ships for the war and relief for liberated areas and the carrying of goods to our Russian Ally.

STALIN: What about Navy?

TRUMAN: I am ready to dispose of it at any time. Further, when the Japanese war is over, the United States will have merchant ships and navy ships for sale. But until the war is over, I don’t want to disturb the situation.

STALIN: Are the Russians not interested in the Japanese war?

TRUMAN: Of course, and I desire to see Russia in the shipping pool with us.

CHURCHILL: But we all have our difficulties. Ships could be earmarked before being put into the pool. The advance of the Russians along the Baltic makes untenable the German harbors. I want to support the Marshal’s request that Russia should in principle receive her share of war and merchant vessels. The only alternative is sinking and this seems wrong as long as one of our Allies desires the war vessels.

TRUMAN: We are not apart.

STALIN: What ships will be earmarked?

CHURCHILL: The merchant ships.

STALIN: Of course it is not possible to treat Russia as having the intention of interfering with the war against the Japanese. Nor can it be considered that this is a gift from the Allies. The matter should be cleared up. Have the Russians a right to receive a third of these ships? They want only their right. If my colleagues think otherwise, let them say so and I will obey. I want only clarity. The Russians are satisfied if their right to a third is recognized. If one-third is allocated to Russia, we will raise no objection to their use against Japan. So I suggest that the matter be settled at the end of the Conference as suggested by Churchill. One thing I should like. Our people are not allowed to see the fleet and are not given a list of them. Would it not be possible to lift this ban so that a Russian Naval Commission can inspect these ships?

CHURCHILL: You seized a number of U-boats in the Baltic. We could make an arrangement for an interchange of inspections[.]

STALIN: All the U-boats are damaged but we can arrange for you to see them.

CHURCHILL: All we want is reciprocity.

STALIN: Your people can see them.

TRUMAN: So far as the United States is concerned we are willing to exchange inspections, but we want it reciprocal.

CHURCHILL: I made a distinction between U-boats and surface fleets. The Marshal will appreciate the sensitiveness of an island power producing only two-thirds or less of its food about U–boats. I would argue that the bulk be sunk, the balance divided. My consent is conditioned on discussion of U–boats’ disposition. I must ask pardon because of our special position.

STALIN: I am also in favor of sinking a large proportion.

TRUMAN: That seems enough discussion. Let us proceed. The next subject is Spain.

STALIN: Our proposals have been submitted.

CHURCHILL: His Majesty’s Government and past government have strong distaste for General Franco and the government of Spain, All I said for Franco was that there was more in Spanish politics than drawing cartoons of Franco. But I view with disgust the killing of people for what they did five or six years ago. When Franco asked me to line up against the menace of Soviet Russia, I sent him a most chilling reply and I sent correspondence to Marshal Stalin and the President. We all detest the Spanish regime.

The difficulty with the Marshal’s proposal is with the breaking off of relations with Spain. It may cause them to rally to his support. Breaking off relations breaks your influence. Ambassadors are needed particularly in time of difficulty. The course suggested would strengthen Franco’s position, and he has an army. Should we take a rebuff or use force? I am against that. I am against interfering in the internal affairs of a country which has not molested us. I would greatly regret embroiling ourselves in their internal affairs. At the present time Franco’s powers are undermined. We should speed the parting guest. But breaking off relations because of its internal conduct is a dangerous principle in this war. Nor would I like to see a renewal of the Spanish Civil War.

The San Francisco Charter has a provision against interfering in internal affairs.

TRUMAN: I have no love for Franco. I have no desire to get into a Spanish Civil War. We would be most happy to recognize another government. But Spain must settle it.

STALIN: That means everything remains unchanged in Spain.

TRUMAN: No. Franco is weakening.

STALIN: Franco is gaining strength. He is encouraging Fascism elsewhere. I believe you have no love for Franco, but you must prove it by acts. I do not propose a civil war, but I wish the Spanish people to know that we are on the side of the democratic forces of the Spanish people and against the regime of Franco. There are diplomatic means of showing this to the Spanish people.

Let us assume breaking relations too severe. There must be more flexible means. We should not pass by this cancer. Otherwise we sanction it. It is presumed that the Big Three can settle such questions. Are we entitled to keep silent? We cannot shut our eyes to the dangers that the Franco regime holds out for all Europe.

CHURCHILL: We cannot favor breaking relations. We have valuable trade relations and could not interfere unless we were certain of success. I appreciate how the Marshal feels as they sent the Blue Brigade against him. But they refrained from using arms when we went into Africa when they could have done us great harm.

STALIN: I suggest that the foreign secretaries try to find some means of making it clear that we are not in favor.

TRUMAN: I agree.

CHURCHILL: I should deprecate this. The question should be decided by the Big Three.

TRUMAN: I urge the Prime Minister to let the foreign secretaries discuss the question.

CHURCHILL: It is a matter of principle against interfering with internal affairs.

STALIN: It is not a matter of internal affairs. No such regime exists in any country of Europe.

CHURCHILL: Portugal might be considered a dictatorship.

STALIN: Portugal’s government arose from internal forces; Spain from foreign forces. I do not place on the same level Spain and Portugal.

CHURCHILL: Franco is moving to his finale. He came to power many years ago. The Russian government as well as the fascist government[s] took part in the civil war.

STALIN: The foreign secretaries should prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including the sentiments express[ed] by Mr. Churchill. This will not bind the government of Great Britain. I suggest [a] most mild form of influence – less than we applied to Greece and Poland.

CHURCHILL: I am not agreed in principle to making any Allied declaration and I did not understand that the President was.

STALIN: Statement need not be in reference to Spain alone but to all Europe.

CHURCHILL: Our action in other countries is because of their involvement in the war. Of course if you wish to make a declaration of general principles regarding governments which have not achieved those principles, that is different. That declaration is in the American Constitution. We can’t improve upon it. I don’t know what the Spanish people think but I feel that they do want to be rid of Franco.

TRUMAN: There seems to be no chance of agreement. Let us pass on and come back to this question later.

STALIN: But let us refer this matter to the foreign secretaries. Perhaps they can find a formula.

CHURCHILL: That is the very question we are debating. I suggest we leave the question without decision for the moment.

TRUMAN: Let us consider the declaration on Liberated Governments. I recommend discussion of paper submitted by me at first meeting.

STALIN: I suggest we defer this as we have written another document to submit on this.

TRUMAN: The next question is Yugoslavia.

STALIN: We can not consider this question until we hear the Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia is an Ally.

CHURCHILL: The two sides (Tito and Šubašić) are in disagreement.

STALIN: I have no such information. Let us verify this. Let us summon them.

CHURCHILL: The Tito-Šubašić agreement has not been carried out. Tito has imposed a partisan organization. Yugoslavia has not realized the hopes we entertained at Yalta. We supported Tito, and are grieved and disappointed at the way things have turned out. Our proposal is very modest.

STALIN: Mr. Churchill has passed to the discussion of this question in substance without answering the President’s question whether the question is worth discussing. The information which Mr. Churchill has given is not known to us. Perhaps Mr. Churchill is right but his information may not be correct. It would be just to hear the Yugoslavs on Mr. Churchill’s accusations.

CHURCHILL: I made complaints, not accusations.

STALIN: It is not a matter of words. I cannot agree to substitute complaints for accusations.

CHURCHILL: I must think over this. But it might be well to have Tito and Šubašić come here. Do you think they would be willing to come?

TRUMAN: I am here to discuss world affairs with Soviet and Great Britain government[s]. I am not here to sit as a court. That is the work of San Francisco. I want to discuss matters on which the three heads of government can come to agreement. I did not come to hear Tito, de Gaulle, and Franco.

STALIN: That is the correct observation.

CHURCHILL: I thought that this was a matter in which the United States was very interested, particularly in view of their Yalta papers.

TRUMAN: That is true. I want to see the Yalta agreement carried out.

STALIN: According to our information, Tito is carrying out the Crimea decisions.

CHURCHILL: Our paper is a repetition of what we have already said.

TRUMAN: Let us drop it.

CHURCHILL: It is very important.

TRUMAN: We are dropping it only for the day as we did with Franco.

CHURCHILL: I had hoped that we could discuss these matters frankly.

STALIN: But we must hear the Yugoslavs first.

TRUMAN: We turn to the British paper on Rumanian oil property taken as booty.

CHURCHILL: I suggest that this be discussed by the foreign secretaries.

STALIN: I think that these matters can be settled by the usual diplomatic channels. But since the question has been raised, I should like to correct an inaccuracy. No British property was taken in Rumania. There were tubes purchased by the British before the war. The Germans captured them and used them. We took these tubes because Germany devastated our wells in the Caucasus. The Conference should not be troubled by this trifling matter.

CHURCHILL: This is not a trifling matter. Our people paid for these tubes. We have made no progress through diplomatic channels. Perhaps the British and Russian foreign secretaries could settle it.

EDEN: The United States is interested too.

TRUMAN: Why not let the three foreign secretaries see what they can do?

STALIN: No objection.

Adjourned.

Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Mr. Attlee Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman Lord Cherwell Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pauley Major Birse Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Davies Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen

The Pittsburgh Press (July 19, 1945)

Truman uses ‘horse trading’ on Big Three

Wants aid in Pacific in return for cash
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Editorial: Potsdam blackout?

Editorial: More Jap peace feelers?

Simms: What do Reds want in China and Far East?

Discussion is certain at Big Three session
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Barrows: Not just visiting

By Nat A. Barrows

Youngstown Vindicator (July 19, 1945)

End of war? Late in 1946

U.S. State Department (July 19, 1945)

740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-1745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy

Washington, July 19, 1945 — 4 p.m.
Secret
1205

Dept has not yet received British concurrence (urtel 2010, July 17) in appointment of Douglas as Chief Commissioner of AC.

GREW
S[AMUEL] R[EBER]

740.00119 PW/7-1945 Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 19, 1945
Top secret
69

Rumors are increasingly current in the press and on the air that we propose to issue a statement elucidating unconditional surrender for Japan. Most prevalent rumor is that formulation of our position was taken by President to Berlin for discussion with Stalin and Churchill and that statement will issue as result of meeting. Another rumor has it that our “terms” to Japan will include agreement not to invade. Question submitted to the Department today by the Associated Press and the International News Services reads as follows: “Is it true that plans for the handling of Japan’s unconditional surrender have been fully formulated and that President Truman has taken them to the Potsdam Conference?” A second question asks whether the United States has “any unilateral definition of unconditional surrender for Japan.”

Seems to us desirable, for reasons affecting domestic situation as well as situation in Japan, to quiet these rumors insofar as possible. Would you approve a reply to the questions in following terms:

The policy of this Government on unconditional surrender by Japan has been repeatedly stated. Elucidations of this policy were issued by the President on May 8 and on June 1. Papers on this subject as well as on a number of other matters of present importance have been supplied to the President, but no plan altering the policy already announced has been formulated by this Government. The implementation of the announced policy will depend, of course, on the situation as it develops. The treatment to be accorded the Japanese under the unconditional surrender terms as defined by the President will depend upon the circumstances under which the surrender occurs. If the Japanese surrender now, before we invade their main islands on our inevitable march to Tokyo, it is logical that the situation thus created should call for treatment which would be different in character and degree from the treatment that would be required if the Japanese delay surrender or if they fail to surrender. The longer the period of the fighting, and the greater the loss of American lives and of the lives of the fighting men of other United Nations, the more severe must be the treatment accorded the Japanese under the announced terms. The reason for this is clear: the longer Japan resists the more certainly shall we know that the military war lords are still in firm control and the more drastic will be the measures required to rout them out and to insure their complete permanent downfall and elimination. We have declared our firm purpose to eliminate the forces in Japan which have made it a threat to the peace of the world, and that purpose we mean to carry out. In order to carry it out, we shall unquestionably be obliged to occupy Japan and to occupy it by an effective, not by mere token force. In the light of the sacrifices already made by the United Nations, it is unthinkable that we should pause or be deflected from the full attainment of our objectives.

In reply to the second question whether the United States has any unilateral definitions of unconditional surrender for Japan, I would say this.

The United States has never considered the possibility of unilateral action against Japan in fighting the war. Neither has it considered, nor will it consider, unilateral action in deciding upon the future of Japan following the war. It will continue in the future, as in the past, to act jointly with other nations concerned.

It will be necessary to reply in the near future to these questions posed by the Associated Press and the International News Services. Failing satisfactory answers I fear that the steadily mounting public clamor for a statement of our proposed terms for Japan will be harmful to the Administration and will create in Japan the impression that we are weakening in our determination to see the war through to unconditional surrender and final victory. This can only retard any movement in Japan to force the leaders to accept unconditional surrender before our invasion. Hope for your instructions as soon as possible.

[GREW]

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Thursday, July 19:

1000: [Assistant] Secretary McCloy and Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay (Staff of General Eisenhower) called at the Little White House and conferred with the President.

1300: Lunch at the Little White House. First Lieutenant James M. Vardaman, AUS (Captain Vardaman’s nephew), Colonel Howard A. Rusk, Medical Corps, AUS, and Sergeant Truman were guests.

The President and party left the Little White House at 1545 for Cecilienhof. The third session of the conference was called to order by the President at 1605. The meeting adjourned at 1655 when the President and party left for the Little White House. Mr. Stalin invited the President to stay for a buffet lunch, but the President declined. We reached the Little White House at 1710.

At 2030 the President entertained at a State Dinner at the Little White House in honor of Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill. Present were: The President, Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Attlee, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Vyshinski, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Gromyko, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Pauley, Mr. Davies, Mr. Sobolev, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Pavlov, and Major Birse.

Mosely-Vyshinsky conversation

Present
United States Soviet Union
Mr. Mosely Mr. Vyshinsky
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2045: Telegram

The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Babelsberg, July 20, 1945
[Extract]
Secret

Victory 115

From Mosely at Babelsberg to London for Winant and State Department at Washington for Grew.

Vyshinsky informed Mosely today Soviet Government has approved agreement on additional requirements except new title and new first paragraph; he expects latter will be cleared shortly.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Syonan Shimbun (July 20, 1945)

Potsdam talks enter second phase

LISBON (Domei, July 19) – American President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin have now entered the second phase of their momentous talks at Potsdam, Denis Martin, Reuters correspondent, reported in a dispatch today from Potsdam.

He said it appears now that important preliminary objectives of the “three power” conference have been achieved.

The correspondent reported that main attention in Berlin is still focused on German problems, which cannot be lightly shelved as they affected Europe as a whole.

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 20, 1945)

Japans Flotte aufgestöbert

Japanische Presse diskutiert Potsdamer Konferenz

WASHINGTON, 19. Juli (OWI) – Trägerflugzeuge des britisch-amerikanischen Pazifikgeschwaders haben größere Teile der japanischen Flotte, die sich in der Bucht von Tokio versteckt hielt, erkundet und angegriffen. Es ist dies die erste Begegnung der beiden Flotten seit der Niederlage Japans in der Seeschlacht bei den Philippinen im Oktober 1944. Am fünften Tag richteten sich die amerikanischen Großangriffe der Flotten- und Luftstreitkräfte gegen Industrieziele südlich von Tokio. An diesen Angriffen nahmen zum ersten Male aus Europa nach Ostasien verlegte Bomberstaffeln teil.

Bei den zurzeit in den burmesischen Dschungeln tobenden Kämpfen haben die sogenannten patriotischen Streitkräfte Burmas einen bedeutenden Anteil an den Erfolgen errungen. Diese Guerillakrieger sind ursprünglich aus einer antifaschistischen Organisation, die sich während der japanischen Besetzung illegal gebildet hatte, hervorgegangen. Erfahrene britische Offiziere hatten sie unterstützt und ihnen Anweisungen gegeben. Die eingeschlossenen japanischen Einheiten in Burma wehren sich verzweifelt und wüten in den von ihnen noch besetzten Dörfern. Es wurden Fälle von Massen-Exekutionen bekannt. Auf Borneo ließ die Kampftätigkeit nach. Die siebente australische Division konnte trotz heftigsten feindlichen Widerstandes auf der Hauptstraße nach Samarinda vorstoßen.

Auf Neu-Guinea kämpften sich die australischen Truppen über die Hänge des Prinz-Alexander-Gebirges abwärts und nähern sich den äußeren Verteidigungslinien der japanischen Hauptbefestigungen. Hunderte von Granaten wurden auf die japanischen Stellungen im Südteil der Insel Bougainville abgefeuert. Heftige Regengüsse erschweren hier die Operationen.

Nicht zuletzt wird die Stimmung im japanischen Mutter1and durch die Potsdamer Konferenz bestimmt, die japanischen Zeitungsmeldungen zufolge auf die Ereignisse um Japan eine stärkere Wirkung als je zuvor haben Wird. Man erwartet nach Abschluss der Konferenz ein gemeinsames Kommuniqué zum Problem des Japankrieges und nimmt an, dass die, Vereinigten Staaten alle außenpolitischen Instrumente zur Vorbereitung einer Invasion der Mutterinseln spielen lassen werden. Die japanische Presse diskutiert auch lebhaft die im Zusammenhang mit dem Besuch des chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten bei Stalin eingetretene Lage. Da Stalin ein sehr realistischer Staatsmann ist, erhebt sich selbstverständlich die Frage, welche Konzessionen Tschungking in Erwiderung einer Verständigung mit Moskau eingegangen ist.

Potsdamer Konferenz tagt

BERLIN, 19. Juli (MCC) – Unter Vorsitz von Präsident Truman fand am Mittwochnachmittag die zweite Sitzung der Potsdamer, Dreimächte-Konferenz statt. Alliierte Korrespondenten melden in ihren Berichten, dass die Ergebnisse der Besprechungen bis zum Schlusskommuniqué der Konferenz Wahrscheinlich geheim gehalten werden. Wichtige politische Entscheidungen werden von den führenden Staatsmännern persönlich getroffen. Die Ausarbeitung der Einzelheiten wird den alliierten Fachausschüssen überlassen.

Offiziell wird heute bekanntgegeben, dass sich die „großen Drei“ regelmäßig treffen. Auch die drei Außenminister – Byrnes, Eden, und Molotow – halten regelmäßige Zusammenkünfte ab und arbeiten nun Tagesordnungen für neue Besprechungen aus.

Präsident Truman gibt heute Abend im „Weißen Haus“ ein offizielles Festessen für Stalin und Churchill. Die einzelnen Regierungen werden von je fünf Personen vertreten sein.

Präsident Truman hat General Omar Bradley nach Potsdam berufen, um dessen Ernennung zum Chef der Verwaltung für Veteranenangelegenheiten zu besprechen.

Die Alliierte Kommandantur in Berlin hielt heute erneut eine Sitzung ab. Der russische Vertreter führte den Vorsitz. Zur Beratung dürfte die endgültige Ausarbeitung von Plänen über die ersten interalliierten Treibstoff- und Lebensmittellieferungen nach Berlin gestanden haben Gegenstand der Beratungen war vermutlich auch die Einsetzung von Unterausschüssen zur Behandlung weiterer Verwaltungsfragen.

L’Aube (July 20, 1945)

Élaborées à Potsdam et transmises par l’URSS –
Des conditions de paix seraient fixées au Japon

La nuit de Potsdam

par Maurice Schumann

U.S. State Department (July 20, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

JCS 199th Meeting

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill
General Somervell Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull. Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Donnelly
Major General Gross Colonel Stone
Major General Deane Colonel Riggs
Major General Norstad Colonel Cary
Brigadier General Cabell Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policies

GENERAL MARSHALL presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff certain proposals by Lord Leathers for amending CCS 877, the United States Chiefs of Staff paper on this subject.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read out the proposed changes and these were compared with CCS 877.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read a paragraph in regard to shipping which General Somervell proposed for inclusion in CCS 877.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that Lord Leathers would probably accept as a part of the basic objectives the proposal made by General Somervell but he thought that it might better appear as a commentary on the basic objectives rather than as an integral part thereof.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that Lord Leathers’ paper in fact involved a change in national policy, and therefore, in his opinion the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not consider it.

GENERAL SOMERVELL asked if his paragraph would be accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not approve the paragraph outright at the present time but he was sure they viewed it in a favorable light. The other Chiefs of Staff concurred.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Authorized General Somervell to inform the British Minister of War Transport that the proposed amendments to the basic objectives were not acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

b. Informed General Somervell that they viewed in a favorable light his memorandum of comment on the basic objectives.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air Transport Route Between the United States and Moscow

GENERAL ARNOLD recalled that it had taken one year to get air transport operations established with Russia via Teheran. Attempts had been made to shorten the route via Turkey, and although Turkish acquiescence had been obtained, the Russians had not agreed to the adoption of this shorter route to Moscow.

Mr. Harriman had informed General Arnold that since the capture of Berlin he had endeavored to arrange with Mr. Molotov for an air route to Moscow through Berlin but he had found it impossible to complete such arrangements. Mr. Harriman had asked General Arnold to submit two memoranda for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this connection.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum to the President enclosing the message to Generalissimo Stalin as presented by General Arnold.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .