Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

5

Japs worried by Russia’s future move

Papers speculate on Big Three action

SAN FRANCISCO, California (UP, July 14) – Jap newspapers today speculated uneasily upon the future role of Russia in East Asia and predicted most of the “time and effort” of the forthcoming Big Three conference would be to decide upon Russia’s course in Asiatic affairs.

The Tokyo Yomiuri Hochi, in an editorial which was broadcast by Radio Tokyo, said:

The powers cannot be balanced among the three nations of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union… in Europe alone. In regard to this problem, Asia cannot be absolutely ignored. The interest held by the Soviet Union toward East Asia is very energetic.

Puzzled by Russia

Aside from the problems of ideology and territory, the Soviet Union’s attitude is as before a dark cloud and a puzzle.

It can be assumed, therefore, that the greater portion of the time and effort will be spent in puzzling out this great dark cloud of the Soviet Union and it is the solving of this problem that will determine whether the United States and Britain will have been successful in the conference.

Domei News Agency in another broadcast quoting what it said was a Stockholm dispatch, said the visit of China’s premier, Dr. T. V. Soong, to Moscow was “closely related” with the recent visit to the Kremlin of Harry Hopkins, former special envoy of President Truman.

Manchuria cited

Yomiuri Hochi alleged, according to Domei, that the United States and Britain were “pushing for a settlement of the Manchurian fortifications issued with the intention… of nailing the Soviet Union’s accumulated total strength on the border of Japan and thereby alleviating Soviet pressure against Europe.”

The Domei dispatch said Yomiuri Hochi also quoted a London dispatch saying that “prospects are bright” at the Big Three meeting for Russia “to abandon her hitherto passive attitude and adopt an aggressive one toward Japan.”

Yomiuri Hochi, according to Domei, interpreted this dispatch as “showing clearly” that the United States and Britain “were endeavoring to persuade Premier Joseph Stalin into aggressive intervention against Japan.”

‘Cancer’ of policy

The Jap newspaper called the “uncertainty of the Soviet Union’s policy toward Japan the ‘cancer’ of the Anglo-American policy vis-a-vis the disposal of Germany and other European people.”

Yomiuri Hochi quoted what it called another Allied dispatch as declaring that plans for dealing a “crushing blow to Japan will constitute the subject of chief discussion” at the Big Three meeting.

Domei said Yomiuri Hochi had claimed that the Allied dispatches referred to were only “efforts on the part of the Anglo-Americans to intimidate Japan, paralleling American bombing and reparations for invasion of Japan from the north and south on the one hand, and inducing the Soviets to participate in fighting Japan on the other.”

6

Moscow parleys please Chinese

Soong, Stalin will review talks later

LONDON, England (UP, July 14) – Chinese quarters in Moscow are satisfied with preliminary results of the conversations between Chinese Premier T. V. Soong and Premier Marshal Joseph Stalin, it was reported today.

The talks, now adjourned because of the Big Three Berlin conference preparations, are expected to resume in about three weeks.

Soong left Moscow for Chungking early today after being guest of honor at a Kremlin banquet given by Stalin. The banquet was one of unusual cordiality, a Moscow dispatch said.

The talks between Soong, Stalin, and other Chinese and Soviet leaders had lasted for almost two weeks.

Because the talks began before the Big Three meeting, London observers had speculated that they had covered subjects requiring the consideration of the Big Three powers. Some suggested that this might mean Russia’s active military participation in the war in the Far East.

The fact that they will resume after the Big Three meeting, however, is taken as an indication that the talks concerned Russo-Chinese future relations rather than any critical, immediate problem.

7

Youngstown Vindicator (July 15, 1945)

Expect Big Three to rush plans, meet tonight

Where Big 3 will meet

map.potsdam.0715
Map locates Potsdam, outside Berlin, where President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin will meet. Sessions will begin Monday or Tuesday.

LONDON, England (UP, July 14) – President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin converged on the shattered German capital of Berlin tonight.

They will confer there amid the ruins wrought by their armies in search of the means of an enduring world peace.

The advance guard of their top advisers were arriving at the closely-guarded capital. The three leaders themselves are expected to confer for the first time at suburban Potsdam Sunday night, opening a historic 10-day conference which will seek agreement on an intricate maze of political, economic and military problems. Detailed discussions official party will enter waiting automobiles for a 45-to-60-minute drive to Brussels where they will board the presidential C-54 plane for the two-and-a-half-hour flight to Potsdam, near Berlin. Sawyer will accompany the party as far as Brussels.

The route from Antwerp to Brussels will be guarded by American troops. The conference will begin Monday.

Last-minute preparations in the sealed-off conference area of Hohenzollern palaces and woodlands at Potsdam set the stage for the meeting. A freshly-painted green and white barrier guards the road into the forbidden zone. Green-capped Russian troops manned the barrier and stood guard at 50-yard intervals along the highway.

All visitors barred

All visitors, including newspapermen, were forbidden to pass the barrier. Marshal Stalin of Russia was host as he was at Yalta. Potsdam is in the Russian occupation zone.

A small airfield in the British zone of Berlin has been isolated, and it is probable that Prime Minister Churchill will arrive there by plane from his vacation castle at Hendaye.

Dispatches from Berlin said President Truman and Marshal Stalin were expected to arrive in the United States and Russian sectors respectively. The Big Three probably will greet each other for the first time in the vast Potsdam Palace set aside for the conference.

The first important arrivals set down at two secret areas a few miles from Berlin early this evening. Their identities and the areas where they landed could not be disclosed, as the whole meeting is surrounded with comprehensive security precautions.

Americans reach Gibraltar

Dispatches from Gibraltar said a huge American transport plane landed there early Saturday, loaded with Americans. Names of those aboard and their destination were matters of secrecy. The plane left almost immediately.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill was still at Hendaye early Saturday, but dispatches from Berlin during the day said he was expected to arrive “in the most imminent future” together with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Labor Leader Clement Attlee.

Prime Minister T. V. Soong of China left Moscow for Chungking at dawn Saturday after more than a week of discussions with Stalin and prominent Soviet leaders.

Will be resumed

These discussions were only interrupted by the Big Three meeting, Moscow dispatches said, and will be resumed in about three weeks. The British press speculated that Soong had asked Stalin to join China’s allies in the war against Japan.

Resumption of the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow will be paralleled by Anglo-American talks in London, where preparations are already begin made to receive President Truman after the Big Three conference. British officials planning for his reception are working on a tentative arrival date of July 25. The American President is expected to say at Buckingham Palace for three days as the guest of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth.

8

U.S. State Department (July 15, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Sunday, July 15:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1004: The Augusta moored (port side to) to the municipal dock (Compagnia Maritime dock) at Antwerp. (Total distance traveled, Newport News to Antwerp – 3837 miles.) The Philadelphia tied up astern of the Augusta.

Waiting on the dock to welcome the President were a delegation of Belgian officials, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, AUS (the Allied Supreme Commander), Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe), Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, AUS (Commanding General, Communications Zone, European Theatre), Major General G. Surtees (Commanding General, British Base and Lines of Communication), Brigadier General E. F. Koenig, AUS (Commanding General, Chanor Section), Ambassador Charles Sawyer and Mrs. Sawyer, Major DeWitt Greer, Supervising Agent Anheier, Agents Rowley, Waters, Holmes, Campion, Torina, Boring, Kauffman, and Behn. …

1110: The President, accompanied by his party, left the ship…

1115: The President and party embarked in waiting motor cars and departed for Brussels. There were approximately forty automobiles in the long motor car caravan. Riding with the President were Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Sawyer.

1230: The President and party arrived at the Brussels-Evere airport (B-58), several miles northwest [northeast?] of the city of Brussels. (Approximate distance traveled, Antwerp to airfield – 35 miles.) General Eisenhower, Admiral Stark and General Lee accompanied the President to the airfield.

Awaiting us at the field were Supervising Agent McGrath and Agents Barry, Gorham and Walker.

The President was accorded honors here by a band and 400 picked men of the 137th Infantry Regiment. He then reviewed the honor guard. Each man in the guard was a “five-star” combat man. The President spoke with some of them before boarding his plane.

Plane No. 2 (a C-54 – Major Jesse Hayes pilot) was the first to take to the air and departed Brussels at 1245. Passengers were: Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Brigadier General E. S. Hoag, AUS (ATC representative), Lt-Colonel A. M. McIntire, AUS (ATC liaison), Commander Tyree, Lieut. Elsey, Lieut. Edelstein, Lieut. Rigdon, Captain Graham, and Secret Service Agents Anheier, Hipsley, Torina, Waters, Holmes, McGrath and Boring.

At 1300 the President’s plane (C-54, the “Sacred Cow”, piloted by Lt-Colonel Henry T. Myers) departed for Berlin. Passengers were: The President, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, Captain McMahon, Captain Vardaman, Mr. Canfil, and Secret Service Agents Maloney, Drescher, O’Driscoll and Rowley.

At 1315 plane No, 3 (C-54) departed Brussels for Berlin. Embarked were: Ensign Fleener, Ship’s Clerk Hoying, Chief Pharmacist’s Mate Preston C. Taylor, USN (of the Augusta, who accompanied us to the Conference as Captain McMahon’s assistant), Chief Photographer’s Mate Belknap, Chief Stewards Prettyman, Abiba, Bautista, Calinao, Custodio and Estrada, and Chief Cooks Floresca, Olivares, Ordona, Orig, Palomaria and Licodo, Sergeant Philler, Secret Service Agents Behn, Kellerman, Gorham, Barry, Haman and Weir, and Lieutenant C. D. Sherman (ATC liaison).

Our baggage was transported in two C-47s. A third C-47 was dispatched to Tempelhof Airport, Berlin with the seven White House newspaper correspondents and photographers accompanying the Presidential party. They proceeded on to Berlin despite the knowledge that, by agreement between the Big Three, they were not to be permitted to enter conference area.

The route followed by our flight was from Brussels to Liege, thence to Frankfurt, to Kassel, to Magdeburg and to Berlin (Gatow airport). We picked up a fighter escort (P-47s) at Frankfurt that accompanied us on to Berlin. Twelve fighters covered the President’s plane and four each, planes No. 2 and No. 3. From Frankfurt to Berlin we were over Kussian-controlled territory and were required to stay within a ten-mile air corridor.

Plane No. 2 arrived at Gatow at 1558. (Distance traveled, Antwerp to Berlin, 460 miles.) Plane No. 1 arrived at 1613. Plane No. 3 arrived at 1628.

The President disembarked at once and was greeted here by a large delegation including Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy, Assistant Secretaries Clayton and Dunn, Ambassadors Harriman, Pauley and Murphy, Fleet Admiral King, Minister Lubin, Lieutenant General Clay, Major General Floyd Parks (Commanding General, Headquarters Berlin District), Soviet Ambassador Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Gusev.

Honors were accorded the President here by a detachment from the Second Armored Division (“Hell on Wheels”). The President then inspected the honor guard.

At 1630 the President and party departed Gatow for his quarters in Babelsberg, approximately 10 miles distant. Secretary Byrnes, Ambassador Pauley, General Vaughan and Captain Vardaman rode in the car with the President.

We passed through a section of Potsdam en route from Gatow to Babelsberg. Part of the route was guarded by American and British troops, but the greater part of the route was patrolled by green-capped Soviet frontier guardsmen as this was a Soviet-controlled area. The American and British delegations to the conference were housed in Babelsberg in little territorial “islands” within the Soviet-occupied zone [sector] of Greater Berlin.

1700: The President and party arrived at his assigned quarters in Babelsberg. Babelsberg is a suburb of Berlin, about 12 miles southwest of the city, between Berlin and Potsdam. It lies along winding Griebnitz Lake and is in a thickly wooded area. It has a pleasant climate at this time of the year, with an average mean temperature in the low 60’s. The town was quite popular with the Germans as a summer resort and was also the seat of Germany’s movie colony.

The President’s quarters at No. 2 Kaiser Strasse (called the “Little White House”) was a three-story stucco residence which was formerly occupied by the head of the German movie colony, who is now with a labor battalion somewhere in Russia. It is right on Lake Griebnitz and is surrounded on three sides by groves of trees and shrubbery forming a very beautiful garden that reaches down to the lake. The house was stripped of its furnishings during the war but had been refurnished by the Russians. It was nicely furnished during our stay but, like most European homes, the bathroom and bathing facilities were wholly inadequate. Nor was it screened, so that the mosquitoes gave us a “working over” during our first few nights there until the weather had cooled somewhat.

The President occupied a suite on the second floor (north side), consisting of bedroom, sitting room, office and breakfast room. He also had a private sunporch outside his office. Secretary Byrnes occupied a suite (bedroom, sitting room and office) on the first floor. Also in residence here were Admiral Leahy, Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, Captain McMahon, Captain Vardaman, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Matthews, Lieutenant Rigdon, Ensign Fleener, Ship’s Clerk Hoying and Chief Warrant Officers Caldwell and Stoner.

The President maintained his own mess at Babelsberg, employing Filipino cooks and stewards brought from the Potomac. Messing with the President were Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, Captain McMahon and Captain Vardaman. Food supplies and bottled water were brought from Washington and from the Augusta. Additional supplies were obtained through the Army Mess Officer at Babelsberg. Other members of the party messed in various Army officer messes in the area.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department parties also lived in Babelsberg in close proximity to the Little White House.

A map room and communications center was installed in the President’s house with direct wire service to Frankfurt and Washington. The center was staffed by Colonel Bowen, Commander Tyree, Major Greer, Lieutenant Elsey, Captain Graham, Ship’s Clerk Hoying, Warrant Officers Caldwell and Stoner and Sergeant Philler. The White House party had its own telephone exchange (“Amco”). The switchboard was set up in the basement of the President’s house and was operated by WACs, Cpl. Alma Bradley, Cpl. Mary Whiteus, Cpl. Charlotte Szostek, and Cpl. Eleanor Moynihan, of the WAC Detachment, Headquarters Command, USFET (Main).

The Prime Minister lived at 23 Ringstrasse in Babelsberg – about two blocks from the Little White House. His was a similarly large house but perhaps a bit better furnished than the President’s. Generalissimo Stalin also resided in Babelsberg, about one mile from the Little White House, on the route from the White House to Cecilienhof where the conference meetings were held. This arrangement required that the President and the Prime Minister make a three-mile drive for each session of the conference, while the Generalissimo had a much shorter distance to travel.

The Filipino messmen went into action immediately on arrival at the Little White House and at 1800 dinner was served the President and his party. Mr. Cohen, Mr. Matthews and Mr. Bohlen dined at the Little White House as guests of the President. Mr. Maloney, Mr. Drescher and Mr. Rowley were subsisted from the President’s mess during our stay at Babelsberg. They ate in a separate dining room, however.

After dinner, Ambassadors Harriman and Pauley called on the President.

Having had a full day, the President and most members of the party retired early this evening. It was still light at midnight, as this country has but about four hours of darkness each night at this time of the year. This was not conducive to much rest as one seemed to forget to go to bed until it was dark.

9

The Syonan Shimbun (July 16, 1945)

Truman, Churchill in Potsdam

LISBON (Domei, July 15) – American President Harry Truman and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill have arrived at Potsdam for their conference, according to a Berlin dispatch. There are no indications, however, that Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, who has left Moscow, has yet arrived in Berlin.

The conference is expected to get formally underway tomorrow.

The American President, accompanied by James Byrnes, American Secretary of State, Admiral William Leahy, presidential adviser, and other staff members, earlier today arrived at Antwerp aboard the American cruiser Augusta. The party motored to Brussels, where a special plane was waiting to take them to Potsdam.

Churchill left Chateau de Bordaberry, near Hendaye, where he has been vacationing, for Bordeaux by car today to board a special plane which took him to Potsdam.

10

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 16, 1945)

Potsdam unter günstigen Vorzeichen

Neue liberal-demokratische Partei Deutschlands gegründet

LONDON, 15. Juli (Reuters) – Churchill und Truman trafen heute nach einem Reuters-Bericht aus Berlin in Potsdam ein, um die vorbereitenden Besprechungen zur historischen Konferenz abzuhalten. Auch Generalissimus Stalin ist auf der Fahrt nach Berlin. Montag soll die Konferenz beginnen. Churchill kam von Bordeaux, während Präsident Truman zusammen mit General Eisenhower von Antwerpen nach Berlin geflogen war.

„Alle Anzeichen deuten auf einen Erfolg der Dreierkonferenz hin,“ schreibt der Philadelphia Record in seinem Leitartikel. Die Zeitung führt weiter aus: „Schon vor dem Zusammentritt der Konferenz ist eine Reihe von wichtigen, grundsätzlichen Abkommen zwischen den großen Alliierten getroffen worden.“ Am 13. d.M. fand das erste Treffen der Spitzen der Viermächteverwaltung Berlins statt. Die Vertreter der Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritanniens Russlands und Frankreichs einigten sich in allen Punkten und die Verhandlungen gingen in einer sehr freundschaftlichen Atmosphäre vor sich.

General Eisenhower erließ eine Verordnung mit dem Inhalt, dass Angehörigen der amerikanischen Besatzungsmacht in Deutschland in Zukunft der persönliche Umgang mit Deutschen auf der Straße und an öffentlichen Orten gestattet ist. In der Verordnung heißt es:

Die alliierte Politik der Austilgung des Nationalsozialismus und Entfernung prominenter Nationalsozialisten aus verantwortlichen Stellen des deutschen öffentlichen Lebens hat große Fortschritte gemacht. Es erscheint wünschenswert und an der Zeit, allen Angehörigen meines Verbandes zu gestatten, sich auf der Straße und an öffentlichen Orten mit erwachsenen Deutschen zu unterhalten.

Die Milderung des Umgangsverbotes für britische Soldaten wurde in einem Befehl bekanntgegeben, der heute vom Hauptquartier Feldmarschall Montgomerys erlassen wurde. Der Wortlaut des Befehls deckt sich mit dem General Eisenhowers.

BERLIN, 15. Juli (OWI) – Eine Reihe von Neuernennungen im alliierten Kontrollrat für Deutschland und in der britisch-französischen Besatzungszone werden nach der Auflösung des alliierten Hauptquartiers im Westen und unmittelbar vor dem Zusammentritt der Dreimächtekonferenz bekanntgegeben. Zum französischen Vertreter im alliierten Kontrollrat wurde General König ernannt. General König war vor der Befreiung Frankreichs Oberbefehlshaber der französischen Freischärlerverbände. Er ist jetzt Nachfolger des Generals Lattre de Tassigny, der Generalinspekteur der französischen Armee wird. In der amerikanischen Sektion des alliierten Kontrollrates wurde zum Leiter der Heeresabteilung „Erdtruppen“ Generalmajor Barker ernannt, zum Leiter der Marineabteilung Kommodore

In Berlin wurde die neueste politische Organisation Deutschlands, die liberal-demokratische Partei gegründet. Sie richtete einen Aufruf an das deutsche Volk in allen Besatzungszonen. Die liberal-demokratische Partei ist gemäßigt du steht politisch rechts von den Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten. Sie hat acht Programmpunkte, die vor allem die Achtung vor den Rechten des einzelnen ohne Unterschied des Alters, der Rasse und des Geschlechtes fordern. Ferner enthalten sie das Verlangen auf die Wiederherstellung des deutschen demokratischen Lebens, die uneingeschränkte Unterstützung aller Bewegungen, die sich für friedliche Beziehungen zwischen den Völkern einsetzen und Deutschland als Mitglied der Völkerfamilie sehen wollen. Ein weiterer Programmpunkt ist der Verzicht auf Militarismus und die Formel, dass Macht Recht schaffe. Der Aufruf ist von Waldemar Koch als Parteivorsteher, von Wilhelm Külz, früheren Oberbürgermeister von Dresden, dem deutschen Innenminister Dr. Eugen Schiffer und Prof. Dr. Paul Hoffmann unterzeichnet.

Der Berliner Gemeinderat beschloss, das Eigentum aller Personen, di sich aktiv a der nationalsozialistischen Propaganda beteiligt haben, zu beschlagnahmen und nicht nur jenes der Parteimitglieder oder solcher Personen, die den verschiedenen angegliederten Organisationen angehört haben.

11

U.S. State Department (July 16, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill
General Somervell Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Stone
Major General Gross Colonel Cary
Major General Norstad Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Brigadier General Cabell
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret
[Extracts]

Plan of Joint Chiefs of Staff for TERMINAL Meetings (JCS 1422 and Memorandum by the Secretaries)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that JCS 1422 expressed the idea that the Russians should bring up the subjects they wish to discuss and that they should take the initiative in the conversations with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there were some subjects which we might wish to bring up also and that it was his understanding that we were not restricted to subjects proposed by the Russians.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, ADMIRAL KING said that we should not commit ourselves to completing work with the British before undertaking our discussions with the Russians.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Secretaries inform the British Secretaries that it would be necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet with the Russians at the convenience of the latter and that this might interfere with meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved:
a. The arrangements and attendance for conference meetings recommended by the Secretaries.

b. The memorandum for the President in the Enclosure to JCS 1422.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Proposed Agreement Affecting the Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations (JCS 1013/7 and 1013/8)

ADMIRAL LEAHY read the recommendations in the subject papers and said that he considered it wise to get the Combined Chiefs of Staff reaction in regard to the employment of the French troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the French had offered the troops to the United States for use in the Pacific and expressed the view that if this question was discussed with the British, the question of overall command might arise.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said, in connection with the use of the French troops in Indo-China, that that area was considered under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the use of the French troops involved the question of shipping and the quality of the troops. In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, he stated that the troops were armed but additional equipment would have to be supplied.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandums in Enclosures “A” and “B” of JCS 1013/7 and agreed that the memorandum for the Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States should be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment or concurrence before any further action on JCS 1013/7. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 895)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chairmanship of Conference Meetings

GENERAL MARSHALL brought up the question as to who would preside at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in view of the fact that neither U.S. nor British members were in their home territory.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he might not always be able to be present and might have to leave before a meeting was finished. He suggested that if he were not present that Field Marshal Brooke should be asked to preside.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the British and United States Chiefs should alternate in presiding.

ADMIRAL KING’S view was that when Admiral Leahy was not present Field Marshal Brooke should preside.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed the view that the British and U.S. members should alternate in presiding. He thought that in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Russian Chiefs of Staff the Russians should be asked to preside and that in tripartite meetings the Chiefs of Staff of the three nations should preside in turn.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. To propose that for meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Terminal, the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff should preside alternately.

b. To invite the Soviet Chiefs of Staff to preside at any meetings with the United States Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL.

c. To propose that, for tripartite meetings at TERMINAL, the chiefs of staff of each participating nation preside in turn.

Interpretation of the Presidential Policy on Lend-Lease

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had discussed with the President the recent policy established in regard to Lend-Lease since he had been informed that it was impossible to provide British and French forces employed in the occupation of Germany under the terms of the President’s policy. The President stated that there was no objection to using Lend-Lease for the redistribution of forces to the zones of occupation. He had tried to get the President to interpret his directive to cover this movement but the President had not desired to do this formally since a paper had been presented by the civilian agencies concerning the use of Lend-Lease for “proportional reconversion” by the British. The President had declined to approve this paper. He had said, however, that there was no objection to the use of Lend-Lease for the redistribution of forces to the zones of occupation.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the question was not only that of redistribution to the zones of occupation but involved also the use of French and British service units for the redeployment to Japan.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said this would continue for general items until 1 September and for petrol, oil and lubricants until 1 October. He said that General Eisenhower was attempting to get the French to provide for themselves by 1 August by loan or credit in place of Lend-Lease.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the idea of the President in establishing the Lend-Lease policy was to prevent the provision of arms and ammunition through Lend-Lease unless such equipment was to be used for the war against Japan.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that Admiral Leahy take up with the President as soon as possible the question of Lend-Lease to Russia.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the question of Lend-Lease to Russia was involved with the date that Russia might enter the war against Japan and that the date might not be determined at this conference since it might depend upon agreement between Russia and China.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note that Admiral Leahy would consider the memorandum on this subject presented to him by General Marshall, with a view to presenting to the President the memorandum contained therein.

Relations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with the Chiefs of Staff of Nations Participating in the War Against Japan

GENERAL MARSHALL brought up the question of the command relationship in the Pacific as regards the British and inquired as to the views of the Joint Chiefs.

ADMIRAL KING stated that there should be no change in status in regard to the Pacific Theater, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control all operational matters in that area.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 
740.00119 PW/7-1645

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Washington, July 16, 1945

Aide-Mémoire

On July 15th the Foreign Office received the following message from the United States Embassy:

The State Department was recently told by the Italian Ambassador at Washington that Italy had decided to declare war on Japan and that her declaration would be published on July 15th. The State Department would accordingly announce on July 17th (Tuesday) the intention of the United States Government to support officially Italy’s admission in due course to the World Security Organization. The United States Embassy was instructed to inform the Foreign Office and to express the hope that His Majesty’s Government would feel able to support the United States decision.

After considering the matter, the Foreign Office that afternoon made the following oral communication to a member of the United States Embassy.

The State Department’s communication had created a somewhat unfortunate impression both as regards method of procedure and substance.

As regards method of procedure, Italy’s intention to declare war on Japan had been known for several weeks. There was therefore no reason why the State Department should present His Majesty’s Government with this statement of their intentions at such short notice and on a more or less take it or leave it basis, to expect [basis. To expect] His Majesty’s Government to give a snap decision on an important question of principle at a time when the Prime Minister and Secretary of State were known to be out of the country was bad enough. It was even worse when a matter concerning Italy was at stake. His Majesty’s Government had always been at pains to try to co-operate most closely with the United States Government on all questions of principle concerning Italy, and they thought that in view of all Great Britain had had to put up with from Italy during the war, they were entitled to more consideration from the United States authorities.

As regards the substance of the State Department’s proposals it seemed in the first place that they were attaching altogether too much importance to Italy’s declaration of war on Japan. In the second place, the question of Italy’s admission to the World Security Organisation was closely connected with the question of making a peace treaty with Italy. His Majesty’s Government had consistently maintained in their discussions with the United States Government that it would be a mistake to make a preliminary peace treaty, merely giving Italy all the jam and none of the powder. They were still of this opinion and were convinced that it would be most unfortunate to make any definite concessions or promises to Italy about her future status until it was possible to agree among the Allied Governments on the complete peace treaty. His Majesty’s Government therefore saw serious objections to giving Italy a formal undertaking here and now that her candidature for admission to the World Security Organisation would be supported by the Allied Governments.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

His Majesty’s Government hoped, therefore, that the State Department would agree to take no further action in the matter until the question had been discussed at TERMINAL and until it had been decided whether any statement would be issued there on the subject of the conclusion of the peace treaty.

The Foreign Office would inform the United Kingdom Delegation at TERMINAL of the position and hoped that the United States Delegation might be similarly informed by the State Department.

740.00119 PW/7-1645

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Washington, July 16th, 1945
[Extract]

Aide-Mémoire

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government were as anxious as [the] United States Government to proceed to the conclusion of the Italian peace treaty as soon as possible. They were also disposed to think that a public statement by the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments at TERMINAL that they were in favour of the early conclusion of a Peace Treaty would be desirable and have a useful effect in Italy and intended to recommend this course to the other interested Allied Powers. His Majesty’s Government had, therefore, already suggested that in any tripartite discussions on Italy at TERMINAL, the United Kingdom Delegation should propose that some such statement should be issued at the end of the Conference. We felt, however, that it was highly important that any such statement about the desirability of the early conclusion of an Italian peace treaty should be made in the names of all three Governments and that any unilateral statement by one of the Governments – and a fortiori any unilateral statement on the lines suggested by the State Department – would be most unfortunate.

His Majesty’s Government hoped, therefore, that the State Department would agree to take no further action in the matter until the question had been discussed at TERMINAL and until it had been decided whether any statement would be issued there on the subject of the conclusion of the peace treaty.

The Foreign Office would inform the United Kingdom Delegation at TERMINAL of the position and hoped that the United States Delegation might be similarly informed by the State Department.

13 
500.CC/7-1645 Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 16, 1945
Secret
32.

London’s 7146, July 15 reports Eden is to discuss with you our proposed announcement of support for Ital admission to World Security Organization (our 16, July 11), Brit meanwhile urging we withhold announcement until Ital status discussed at Big Three meeting.

We still feel that it is important both here and abroad to announce our support as soon as possible after Ital declaration of war on Japan (officially announced yesterday). Moreover in the light of SAC’s report (Caserta’s 2964, July 15) on Brit FonOff position re Italy … we believe it even more necessary to issue following statement without awaiting Big-Three discussions.

Begin Statement. The Govt of the US is convinced time has come to recognize new democratic Italy – allied with UNations in war against Germany and now in war against Japan – as member of family of nations. It therefore intends to support Italy’s admission to World Security Organization as soon as that Organization is in position to consider this application for membership.

This decision does not spring from the consideration that Italy has already paid heavily – and will long continue to pay – for the fascist crimes conceived on Ital soil. It is motivated by conviction that cause of world freedom, peace, and progress requires bringing into World Security Organization the energies of every nation as soon as it can prove dedication to that cause; and it is based on spirit and achievements of Ital people in this sense during past two years of grave moral and material suffering. The people of Italy have thrown off Fascism, established democratic laws and procedures, formed a representative govt, fought courageously and well against Germans, joined in struggle against Japan. They merit the recognition of the UNations for their contribution as cobelligerents and the support of the UNations in their earnest efforts to build a sound democratic pol and econ order so that they will not again be brought through confusion into totalitarianism. End Statement.

Do you approve of issuing this statement July 18? We would likewise inform the other permanent members of the Security Council of our proposed announcement.

[GREW]

14 
740.0011 PW/7-1645

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret
[Extract]

Memorandum for the President

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Trusteeship for Korea
I understand this matter was not the subject of a formal agreement at Yalta although the matter was discussed orally.

It was the late President’s view, I am informed, that there should be an international trusteeship of Korea, pending such time as the Koreans are prepared to govern themselves.

The Russians, I am told, have agreed to a four-way trusteeship but no further details have been agreed upon. I understand that. Stalin has urged that no foreign troops be stationed in Korea.

The Russians, I am also informed, have already trained one or two divisions of Koreans, and, I assume, intend to use them in Korea. If an international trusteeship is not set up in Korea, and perhaps even if it is, these Korean divisions will probably gain control, and influence the setting up of a Soviet dominated local government, rather than an independent one. This is the Polish question transplanted to the Far East.

My suggestion is that the trusteeship be pressed. I suggest also that at least a token force of American soldiers or marines be stationed in Korea during the trusteeship.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

15

The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania to the War Department

[Bucharest,] 16 July 1945
Top secret
priority

Top secret. M 1240. AFHQ pass to AGWar for War OPD info to ComGenMed, ACC Hungary and ACC Bulgaria from Schuyler Rumania.

In my M-1227 of 13 [14] July, I outlined certain additional rights and privileges which I feel this delegation should be authorized to exercise if we are to be able to carry our full share of duties and responsibilities as US Representatives on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

It is earnestly hoped that some definite agreement with respect to these rights and privileges will be arrived at during the course of the Berlin Conference. On the basis of my 8 months experience here and in view of the uncooperative attitude which has been exhibited by the Russians throughout that period, I feel that specific and detailed agreement on the highest levels is absolutely essential to the proper continuance of our work here.

It must be remembered that the Allied Control Commission, as it now operates, is the supreme authority in Rumania; it is a policy making body and an executive agency as well; it exercises complete and autocratic control over all phases of Rumanian national life; hence, even though we may secure certain concessions which result in a broadening of the present Rumanian Government so as to render it more nearly representative of all parties, nevertheless such concessions might and probably would be completely nullified by actions of the Allied Control Commission unless we could assume ourselves a suitable executive role on that body.

For these reasons, the importance of securing for this delegation the minimum additional rights and privileges set forth in my M-1227 cannot be overemphasized.

16 
740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7-1645: Telegram

The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs to the Director of European Affairs

[Washington,] July 16, 1945
Secret
34

For Matthews from Reber.

New “order of procedure” for ACC Hungary in second period set forth in Voroshilov’s note to Genl Key meets main point of our proposals (Deptels 1168 May 28 and 1391 June 23 to Moscow) by providing for tripartite agreement on ACC directives on “principal questions” and tripartite participation in meetings of various ACC subdivisions (Retels 281 and 286 July 13 from Budapest). Other minor points we proposed are also included, (such as frequent and regular meetings, free movement of our personnel in Hungary, rapid clearances for entry of planes and couriers) but the wording of these clauses is not entirely satisfactory. Reference in clause 2 to mixed commissions is not understood, as this phrase appears neither in existing statutes nor in our suggested revision.

We believe Soviet note offers real basis for agreement on reorganized ACC. However, since original statutes were negotiated by three Allied Governments, their revision should be result of further negotiation and agreement of all three and not of decision of Soviet Govt alone. If agreement in principle on truly tripartite ACC, which seems possible on basis of Soviet proposals, can be reached at Potsdam, we think detailed working out of statutes might well take place at Moscow after Conference or at Budapest.

Dept is suggesting to Schoenfeld that he and Key send you any further comment they may wish to make after further study of the Soviet note.

17 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1645

Draft Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission

[Babelsberg,] July 16, 1945

Memorandum for the Secretary

Creation of a Separate Rhineland-Ruhr
There are several proposals for special treatment of the Rhineland-Ruhr. They have in common the assumption that control by the Western powers of the economic resources of this area, whether by political or economic means or by a combination of them, will provide a means of assuring our security interests in the European settlement.

All these proposals raise a number of complicated questions, which are bound to be advanced by the other Governments. Before approaching our Allies with this proposal, we need to consider what answers we will give to those questions.

  1. If the pattern of use of the Ruhr iron, steel, coal, and chemicals remains unchanged and these resources undergo final fabrication in many other parts of Germany, what especial benefit will be derived from “controlling” the raw material and crude manufacturing resources of the Ruhr?

  2. If the Rhine-Ruhr is to be drawn away from the rest of the German economy and oriented toward the West, what adjustments would the Western countries, including ourselves, have to make in the pattern of their manufacturing and trade in order to accommodate this important area, even on a reduced scale of production, within the western orbit? In controlling this area the Western powers would be drawn between two conflicting objectives: 1, the desire to prevent or restrict a competition of this powerful area against relatively high cost areas in France and Britain, and 2, the need to provide sufficient export markets in Western Europe and overseas to make the Rhine-Ruhr an economically workable area.

  3. If Germany east of the Oder or Oder-Neisse is cut off, if the Rhine-Ruhr is given a special status and if ten or twelve million Germans are dumped into the rump Germany which would be left in the middle, what economic adjustments would be necessary in that middle area? The middle area is a highly industrial area specializing in machinery and electrical equipment and fabricated consumer goods. To maintain even a minimum subsistence this area would have to become dependent on whatever countries would accept these products in exchange for foodstuffs and raw materials. The most likely market would be found in Eastern Europe because Western European countries and America have highly developed and competitive industries of the same type.

  4. If as the result of creating a separate Rhine-Ruhr state, Germany falls apart, will a Western German state of some sixteen million be able to withstand the pull exerted by a differently organized German state of some fifty million? Both economic and patriotic forces would tend to pull the smaller Western Germany, over the long run, to rejoin the much greater Eastern German state.

  5. If a Rhine-Ruhr state is created, what powers will control it? It is more than doubtful that France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, even in combination, are competent to control this area and to work out the adjustments necessary to make it a workable unit. Britain would suffer many disadvantages if she accepted the creation of a continental bloc of this nature outside her own control. If Britain joins in underwriting and controlling this bloc she will be taking a long step toward establishing a west-European bloc which will inevitably come into rivalry with Russia. For this and other reasons the Soviet Union will either oppose the creation of such a bloc outside her control or will insist on a strong voice in controlling and directing it. If, in order to overcome British and Russian opposition, they are brought into the controlling body, the control over the area would basically be in the hands of the same four powers which are already committed to controlling and policing Germany jointly. The British and Russians would then ask: why introduce the great complication of a separate political unit when they have already agreed to control Germany on a four-power basis?

  6. If this plan is proposed to our Allies, they will ask whether the United States is prepared to underwrite it and, if so, for what period of years and with what commitment of military force and financial contribution. Will such a plan reduce or increase our commitments in Europe and will it present those commitments in a form palatable to the American public and compatible with the purposes with which it entered the war? Will it be able to obtain from Congress the large appropriations which will be necessary to enable the population to subsist during the long period which must elapse before an economically workable adjustment has been made. We must assume that neither France or Britain is able to undertake such an economic commitment on their own resources.

18 
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1745

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
[Extract]
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dismemberment of Germany
In speaking of Germany, I refer of course, to that part of the country which it is intended will eventually return to her sovereignty. I would be disposed to grant to Poland some areas on her western boundaries which would tend to compensate her for the territory to be ceded to Russia. I feel however, that the burden is upon Russia to show that suitable provisions will be made to care for the millions of Germans now in those areas. We must make it clear that they cannot be shunted to American responsibility. I would not be disposed to grant sovereignty to France over all the left bank of the Rhine, although certain provisions respecting fortifications and military installations in this area in favor of France would be desirable. No final conclusions on this subject will, I imagine, be reached without consultation with the French.

I would not go further in the dismemberment of Germany, as I believe in modern times it will require the full resources of the remaining area to make possible any reasonable recovery.

As a part of the demilitarization of Germany I would suggest that a thorough study be made by the experts of the three Powers, and submitted to the three governments, of the practicability of a plan for the international ownership and control of the products and resources of the Ruhr and the Saar. I would not approve either a wholesale destruction of these resources or a territorial annexation of the area by either another country or a condominium of countries.

I have just heard the proposal that the Ruhr and the Rhineland should be severed from Germany, and placed as a protectorate under the management of France, Belgium, and Holland. I understand that the proposed severance from Germany is to be complete, except for a customs Verein.

The reasons why I fear any such attempted remedy of the problems which we are facing in the Ruhr, are as follows:

  1. It at once takes out of the heart of Germany many millions of people of complete German race, and severs them from all political ties with the remainder of Germany. The proposed severance is the most drastic kind of dismemberment, far worse than any severance involving territory where there are mixed nationalities. It is likely to cause the most violent political reactions and the political revolutionary attitude and activity known as irredentism.

The history of Europe during the past one hundred and fifty years proved the correctness of the theory of racial self-determination put forward by the Allied Powers at the close of the last World War. During that period we have constantly seen the evolution of homogeneous racial groups and the dissolution of heterogeneous groups. The development of Italy from 1859 to 1870 was an example of the first kind of trend toward racial amalgamation; the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was a prominent example of the severance of badly combined national groups. The mistake after the last war was not the emphasis on self-determination, but the failure to deal properly with economic realities.

  1. The proposed severance of the Ruhr would, I believe, be a mistake not only in ethnic and political matters but also in the economic field. The cutting of the political and economic ties between Germany and the severed provinces will impair the capacity of both the areas to sustain a reasonable peacetime economy. A protectorate of a foreign race and nationality, will not lead to an effective operation. In the light of the great need for production throughout the European area this let down would be a serious blow to any prompt rehabilitation of Europe. Moreover, by reason of the inability of the remaining portion of Germany to obtain the economic benefit of the Ruhr and Rhineland, great impairment of the economy of the remaining portion will result. Europe as a whole will inevitably suffer.

  2. I believe that the severing of the Ruhr from the main portion of Germany will tend to drive the industries which formerly were dependent upon the Ruhr and the Rhineland to look to eastern Germany and Poland. I think there would be a strong tendency to drive Germany toward the east in her economic affiliations and outlook. I do not think that is in the interests of either western Europe or the United States.

The objections I have stated to the proposed severance of the Ruhr would not inhere in even the most drastic kind of international control to prevent the production of war munitions. The study I have proposed would disclose the advantages and disadvantages of the international control which I have suggested.

It is this road rather than the road of political severance I believe we should follow.

HENRY L STIMSON

19 
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1745

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
[Extract]
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

… I would be disposed to grant to Poland some areas on her western boundaries which would tend to compensate her for the territory to be ceded to Russia. I feel however, that the burden is upon Russia to show that suitable provisions will be made to care for the millions of Germans now in those areas. We must make it clear that they cannot be shunted to American responsibility.…

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

20 
740.00119 Control (Germany) /7-1745

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
[Extract]
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dismemberment of Germany
In speaking of Germany, I refer of course, to that part of the country which it is intended will eventually return to her sovereignty. I would be disposed to grant to Poland some areas on her western boundaries which would tend to compensate her for the territory to be ceded to Russia. I feel however, that the burden is upon Russia to show that suitable provisions will be made to care for the millions of Germans now in those areas. We must make it clear that they cannot be shunted to American responsibility. …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

21

Truman-Churchill meeting, 11 a.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan

According to Truman: “No business of the conference was discussed. I did tell the Prime Minister that I had an agenda which I would like to present at the meeting and asked him if he had one. He said, ‘No, I don’t need one.’ Then we talked briefly about the latest news in the Pacific.”

22 
740.0011 PW/7-1645

The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State

Potsdam, 16 July 1945
Top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am enclosing herewith the original and a copy for your files of a memorandum to the President relating to the conduct of the war with Japan. It relates to a subject which I think is of supreme importance at the moment, and I would very much like to see the President with you about it at your earliest convenience.

On another matter in which the War Department is greatly interested, namely the administration of Germany, I also have some thoughts which I should like to submit to you and the President. They will be in written form the first thing in the morning.

Faithfully yours,
HENRY L STIMSON

23 
[Enclosure--Extract]

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The conduct of the war with Japan
With the great needs of rehabilitation both domestically and abroad facing us, we still find ourselves engaged in war with a major Pacific power. The length and limitation upon our lines of communications to the Pacific combat areas aggravate the strains upon our resources which the wastes of war always impose. The Japanese soldier has proved himself capable of a suicidal, last-ditch defense; and will no doubt continue to display such a defense on his homeland. Yet we have enormous factors in our favor and any step which can be taken to translate those advantages into a prompt and successful conclusion of the war should be taken. I have already indicated in my memorandum to you of 2 July 1945, the reasons which impel me to urge that warnings be delivered to Japan, designed to bring about her capitulation as quickly as possible. While that war is going on, it will be most difficult politically and economically to make substantial contributions to the reestablishment of stable conditions abroad. The longer that war progresses, the smaller will our surpluses become, and the more our overall resources will be strained.

Warning to Japan
It seems to me that we are at the psychological moment to commence our warnings to Japan. The great marshalling of our new air and land forces in the combat area in the midst of the ever greater blows she is receiving from the naval and already established Army forces, is bound to provoke thought even among their military leaders. Added to this is the effect induced by this Conference and the impending threat of Russia’s participation, which it accentuates.

Moreover, the recent news of attempted approaches on the part of Japan to Russia, impels me to urge prompt delivery of our warning. I would therefore urge that we formulate a warning to Japan to be delivered during the course of this Conference, and rather earlier than later, along the lines of the draft prepared by the War Department and now approved, I understand, by both the State and Navy Departments. In the meantime our tactical plans should continue to operate without let up, and if the Japanese persist, the full force of our newer weapons should be brought to bear in the course of which a renewed and even heavier warning, backed by the power of the new forces and possibly the actual entrance of the Russians in the war, should be delivered.

Whether the Russians are to be notified of our intentions in advance in this regard, would depend upon whether an agreement satisfactory to us had been reached with the Russians on the terms of their entry into the Japanese war.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

24

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

CCS 193rd Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson
General Somervell General Ismay
Lieutenant General Hull Lieutenant-General Macready
Vice Admiral Cooke Major-General Laycock
Major General Norstad Major-General Hollis
Captain McDill
Captain Oster
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Program and Procedure for the Conference (CCS 880/9 and 880/10)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 880/10.

Estimate of the Enemy Situation (CCS 643/3)

Sir Alan Brooke referred to the last sentence on page 10 of the paper where the survival of the institution of the Emperor was mentioned. He asked whether the United States Chiefs of Staff had given any thought to the question of the interpretation of the term “unconditional surrender.” From the military point of view, it seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff that there might be some advantage in trying to explain this term to the Japanese in a manner which would ensure that the war was not unduly prolonged in outlying areas. If, for instance, an interpretation could be found and communicated to the Japanese which did not involve the dissolution of the Imperial institution, the Emperor would be in a position to order the ceasefire in outlying areas whereas, if the dynasty were destroyed, the outlying garrisons might continue to fight for many months or years. If an interpretation on these lines could be found an opportune moment to make it clear to the Japanese might be shortly after a Russian entry into the war.

The United States Chiefs of Staff explained that considerable thought had been given to this subject on the political level. One suggestion was that some form of agreed ultimatum might be issued at the correct psychological moment, for example, on Russian entry into the war, the idea being to explain what the term “unconditional surrender” did not mean rather than what it did mean.

Admiral Leahy suggested that as the matter was clearly a political one primarily, it would be very useful if the Prime Minister put forward to the President his views and suggestions as to how the term “unconditional surrender” might be explained to the Japanese.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the estimate of the enemy situation in CCS 643/3.

b. Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of asking the Prime Minister to raise with the President the matter of unconditional surrender of Japan.

Progress Reports on Operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia Command (CCS 892 and 893)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the only area not dealt with in these two reports was the China Theater. The British Chiefs of Staff would welcome a report of progress in this theater.

General Marshall described certain features of the operations in the China Theater, particularly as to the effectiveness of Chinese troops when properly equipped. He further stated that a report of operations in the China Theater would be prepared and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. Of the progress report on operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia Command in CCS 892 and CCS 893.
b. That the United States Chiefs of Staff would submit later a report on operations in China.

Development of Operations in the Pacific (CCS 880/4)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the memorandum on the development of operations in the Pacific in CCS 880/4.

Report on Army Air Operations in the War Against Japan (CCS 894)

General Arnold commented in detail on certain aspects of the report.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the report on Army air operations in the war against Japan in CCS 894, and of General Arnold’s explanatory remarks.