The Sunday Star (September 8, 1946)
Russian policy due in part to fear
Suspicion of Western nations and desire to safeguard sea outlets and industrial heart bring extreme demands for concessions
By Percy Black
Col. Percy Black was assistant and acting military attache in Berlin from 1937 to 1939. During these critical years he had an unequaled opportunity to study at first hand the strategy of European power politics. He was on Gen. Patton’s staff in the landing operations in French Morocco in World War II. During the last year of the war he served as chief German specialist in the Military Intelligence Service.
To many Americans, the dynamic power politics which the Soviet Union is apparently pursuing in the swift unfolding of the panorama of international affairs appears inexplicable. Why do the Soviets oppose participation of the Western Democracies in supervision of the elections in Poland? Why did Gromyko walk out of the Security Council of the United Nations over the question of Iran? What motive have the Soviets for their attacks on Gen. MacArthur? There is a definite strategic plan behind each move of the Kremlin. The pattern is not haphazard, nor is it new. It has little or nothing to do with political ideology. It is the logical development of Imperial Russia over the centuries.
Shaded area contains vital Russian industrial region which now lies within easy reach of airbases in countries outside the Soviet zone of influence, explaining anxiety.
To evaluate correctly where this development will lead and how it will affect us in America, we must carefully examine from the Russian point of view the strategic objectives which lie behind the present Soviet military policy.
Distrust a major factor
The Soviet military psychology is a curious mixture of arrogance, ignorance and fear. Above all, the Soviet General Staff profoundly distrusts England and the United States. It cannot forget the loss of its Polish and Bessarabian territories after World War I, nor that the British fought the Bolshivik armies on the shores of the Caspian and the Black Seas. It remembers the Allied occupation of Vladivostok and Archangel in which American troops participated. It remembers that it was American support of Japan which brought about the Treaty of Portsmouth and the loss of Korea and Manchuria.
The present Soviet strategy is based upon the lessons of the past. It is primarily defensive. Twice invaded from the west and once from the east in the course of a single generation, Russia is attempting to build a ring of buffer states around her frontiers. She is seeking to secure her vital communications with the outside world and to protect the heart of the homeland from attack by land, sea or air.
In his report, delivered before the Supreme Soviet, March 15, 1946, Nikolai Voznesensky, chairman of the State Planning Commission, declared: “In the east and west the historical boundaries of the Soviet Union have been restored. From now on, in the east, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will no longer serve as a means of isolating the Soviet Union from the ocean or as a base for Japanese attack on our Far East, but as a means of direct access of the Soviet Union to the ocean and as a base for the defense of our country from Japanese aggression. From now on, the free and independent Polish State is no longer a base for German attack on our western frontier, but our ally in defense against German aggression.”
Buffer states established
Along her western frontiers in Europe, the Soviet Union has already established a ring of buffer states which she is determined shall be tied to Russia politically, economically and militarily. The Soviet High Command is even now engaged in the creation of satellite Soviet armies in these border countries. Armies of from 12 to 15 divisions, trained by Soviet officers, equipped with Soviet weapons and, therefore, dependent upon Soviet industry, are now in the process of formation in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Russian interest in these countries is not new. To the Russians, incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Russian sphere of influence seems only the logical sequence to a victorious war.
This attitude accounts for the Soviet opposition to participation of Great Britain and the United States in supervision of the elections in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.
To the Soviet General Staff, Southwestern Russia must seem the Achilles heel of Soviet security. Here, in the Stalingrad-Melitopole-Kharkov triangle, north of the Black Sea and in the great Magnitogorsk-Ufa industrial complex, in the Southern Urals, 75 percent of Soviet heavy industry as well as most of the Soviet oil, which lies south of the Caucasus Mountains and along the shores of the Black Sea and the Caspian, are within effective bomber range of British and American controlled air bases in Italy and the Middle East. To any general staff, the obvious answer to this potential menace would be the extension of military power to exclude potential enemies from such bases, particularly if this could be accomplished without resort to war. The Soviet penetration of the Middle East, which is now in progress, can, therefore, be considered, at least from this aspect, as the implementation of a defensive strategy.
Russian interest traditional
Aside from the defensive aspect of this strategy, however, there are other deep-rooted historical objectives in this area. For over two centuries Russians, Turks and Persians have been fighting in the Caucasus and along the shores of the Black Sea and the Caspian. The 19th century is a story of the struggle between Russian southward expansion and the rising influence of the British Empire. The present controversy over Iran merely marks a resumption of Russian policy interrupted by the weakness of Bolshevik Russia after the revolution. Soviet strategic aims in the Middle East embrace political, economic and military control of Asia Minor.
Once the autonomous state of Azerbaijan has been firmly established, Soviet control will inevitably spread through the northern provinces of Iran along the Caspian where Soviet influence is already strong. These northern provinces produce practically all of the food upon which Iran is dependent. Consequently, with Soviet influence dominant in the north, no government in Teheran could survive without con sent of the Kremlin.
To the west of Azerbaijan, the provinces of Kars, Atvin and Ardahan, which the Soviets are now demanding from Turkey, have enormous strategic value. It not only dominates the approaches to the trans-Caucasian oil fields of Russia from Turkey, but it is the military gateway to Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
Seek Kurd autonomy
Southeast of the Kar Plateau, the Soviets are also promoting an autonomous Kurdish republic to be carved out of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. With Iran subservient to the Kremlin and Soviet control firmly established over this area, the USSR will be in a military position to dominate the Middle East, while Soviet political penetration will advance in rapid strides in the Moslem world where might is right and the path of expediency leads to the strong.
To the Soviet general staff, the stakes involved in this conquest of the Middle East must appear far beyond the fondest dreams of the Czars. The prize is oil. With the oil reserves of the Western Hemisphere fast diminishing, denial of this oil to the western democracies would seriously cripple the operation of the British fleet, prevent the use of this oil to keep Western Europe independent of Soviet economic domination and hinder the United States in the accumulation of a strategic oil reserve.
The reasons behind the Soviet demands that Trieste and the Italian province of Venezia Guilia be given to Yugoslavia are both economic and military. Inclusion of the port of Trieste in the satellite state of Yugoslavia would materially assist in the development of the economic unity of Eastern Europe within the sphere of Soviet economy. The rail net which connects Trieste with Budapest, Vienna and Prague provides a continuous transportation link from Stettin on the Baltic to the Adriatic and a direct connection via the Danube with Romania and Russia. Internationalization of the port of Trieste would be contrary to the policy of closed economy which the USSR is pursuing, and fail to satisfy the defensive psychology of the Soviet general staff.
Soviet demands that the province of Venezia Guilia be incorporated in Yugoslavia is another defensive measure based on fear and distrust of the Western democracies. By acquisition of this territory, Yugoslavia would be in possession of the famous Isonzo line along which the inferior Austrian armies were able to hold off greatly superior Italian forces until the final collapse of Austria in World War I. Possession of the Isonzo line of Yugoslavia would insure protection of the Ljubljana Gap, vital link in the communications from Trieste to Budapest.
The traditional Russian urge for access to the open sea has been the keystone of Russian foreign policy. This is understandable. It derives from the same feeling of encirclement which has driven the German people to their struggle for lebensraum. The geographical position of Russia compels her to continue the age-old struggle between the land-locked and the sea-borne nations.
One aspect of this problem was mentioned by Mr. Voznesensky in his report when he spoke of Southern Sakalin and the Kurile Islands. Security of the approaches to Russia’s already existing ports is one of the most pressing of Soviet strategic problems. While the exits from Vladivostok to the Pacific are now firmly in Soviet hands, security of the entrance to the Barents Sea route to the ice-free port of Murmansk must seem equally important to the Soviet general staff. During the war this lifeline was nearly severed by the German submarine and air blockade, operated from Norway. To guarantee security of the Barents Sea route to Murmansk for the future, the USSR must have air and naval bases either on the mainland of Norway or on the Spitzbergen Archipelago which lies athwart the entrance to the Barents Sea. In addition the Soviets should be reluctant to see any other power occupy Iceland. This attitude undoubtedly accounts for the apparently unrelated objection, voiced by the USSR, to the possibility of United States bases on Iceland and to her insistence on the immediate withdrawal of United States troops.
Would be naval power
As a result of this urge for access to the sea, Russia has always aspired to become a naval power. In the past, first Sweden and then Germany in the Baltic and Britain in the Mediterranean have blocked her. With Russian military power at its peak, this inspiration now seems capable of fulfilment. Stalin has already declared his intention to build a fleet.
Today Russia is mistress of the Baltic. The great ports of Riga, Koenigsberg, Danzig, Gdynia and Stettin are under her control. Mastery of the Baltic, however, still does not given access to the open sea. To dominate the exits from the Baltic to the Atlantic, the USSR must be assured of the co-operation or neutrality of Sweden and Denmark, have a naval base in the Western Baltic and military control of the Kiel Canal. Through the economic pressure which she can now exert as a result of her acquisition of the coal and oil of Eastern Europe, as well as by direct military threat from Finland, she is assured of the neutrality of Sweden, at least. The island of Rugen, which she now occupies, affords a naval base in the Western Baltic. When the question of the Kiel Canal is raised, she will probably be able to obtain favorable concessions from England and the United States such as joint military control of a canal zone.
This same urge for access to the open sea is the key to Soviet strategy in the Mediterranean. Fundamentally strategic needs are simple. Reduced to elementary terms, they are: Military control of the exits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, a port on the Adriatic, neutralization or destruction of British sea power, neutralization or control of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.
The war has demonstrated that mere physical possession of the Dardanelles does not insure egress from the Black Sea. For three years the Germans successfully blockaded the Black Sea by occupation of the Aegean Islands. To support this occupation, the Germans were compelled to hold the ports of Salonika and Pireous and to control the communications thereto. So important did the Germans consider this blockade, that they sacrificed an army in Yugoslavia and Greece to maintain it to the last. To the Soviet General Staff, therefore, the question of bases on the Dardanelles must sink into insignificance when compared with the importance of military control of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, without which Russian access to the Mediterranean can never be assured.
Even with British sea power driven from the Mediterranean, Russia will not have access to the open sea until the fortress of Gibraltar is taken or neutralized. Directly opposite Gibraltar on the North African coast of Spanish Morocco, is the fortified city or Ceuta. The guns of Ceuta and the airfields of Spain already dominate the straits. To gain political control of Ceuta and, if possible, to oust the British from the Rock is therefore, one of the primary motives behind the present Soviet attempt to overthrow Franco and set up a Communist regime in Spain. This same military motive was behind the demands of the USSR for a voice in the administration of Tangier, the one Atlantic port in Spanish Morocco from which Ceuta can be successfully attacked.
Aspirations in Far East
In the Far East, Soviet strategic aims combine a continuation of Imperial Russian policy with larger aspirations made possible by the destruction of Japan. On her southern and southeastern frontiers in Asia, Russian penetration into China has been in progress for the past 20 years. The destruction of Japanese military power and the weakness of the Central Chinese government have now made possible an acceleration of this program. Chinese recognition of Outer Mongolia Republic, forced on Chungking by the Big Three at Potsdam, will lead directly to the inclusion of Tannutha and Inner Mongolia into the Union of Soviet Republics and to the eventual absorbtion of Sinkiang.
In addition to her occupation of Southern Sakalin and the Kurile Islands, Russia, by the acquisition of Port Arthur, has once more obtained a warm water naval base on the Pacific. In the Japanese-Russian War, Port Arthur fell because of its isolation. History has shown, therefore, that Port Arthur is of no military value unless Manchuria and the Manchurian railways can be held. Hence to the Soviet General Staff, control of Manchuria and the Manchurian railways must seem necessary to the re-establishment of Russian sea power in the Pacific. Conversely, it is to the interest of the Soviet General Staff to place every obstacle in the path of the acquisition by the United States of bases in Japan, on the mainland of China and in the Western Pacific area.
In the past, it has been the military power of Japan that has stood in the way of Russian expansion. In the past, American foreign policy has not hesitated to take advantage of this fact to further American interests in the Far East. To an already suspicious Soviet General Staff, Gen. MacArthur must appear, therefore, as the symbol of Yankee imperialism, bent upon the restoration of Japan as a tool of American diplomacy.
Army presents problem
The USSR has another military problem which cannot fail to effect the tempo of her foreign policy. Like the other nations which have just concluded the war with Germany, the Soviet Union is faced with tremendous problems of reconversion and reconstruction. Unlike the other nations, however, she is also faced with the problem of the newly acquired political power of an army which is challenging the heretofore undisputed authority of the Politburo, an army which she is economically unable to demobilize or to support. This purely domestic problem of the Red Army explains the Soviet reluctance to withdraw her troops from occupied territories where they are living off the land.
Soviet military strategy is already crystal clear. Daily, from Iceland to Korea, we see its implimentation. The question uppermost in the mind of every American is: Will we have to fight Russia? If her strategy is purely defensive, the answer is no. In this case, once the security, real or imaginary, of the USSR is assured to the satisfaction of its leaders, the Soviet general staff will be willing to compromise. If, on the other hand, her military strategy is to be used as a springboard for aggression, war is inevitable.
The greatest danger to world peace lies in ignorance, suspicion and fear, a mental condition which could unwittingly plunge Russia and the world into a fresh catastrophe.