It’s something I often see poping up with people using today russian army mistakes as proof for WW2 related myths. For me they’re not, it’s not the same army with the same materials and generals. I wonder if russian propaganda isn’t partly responsible since they like using the WW2 red army (especially the flags.imagery and songs/march).
Thanks for your answers!
I agree with you and the war they are fighting is totally different than WW2. Not just in why they are fighting(aggressive war) but also the weapons they are using like drones.
Agreed. The Russo Ukrainian war re-wrote Montgomery’s book of warfare.
Rule 1a. If you are Russia do not march on Kyiv.
(Rule 1 do not invade Russia.)
Rule 2 do not invade China / Do not go fighting with your land armies in the mainland of Asia.
All some people know of the Russian Army is WW II. When if anything a better historical comparison might possibly be Afghanistan.
This is the reason why you always see the comparison to World War 2.
At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Army could field a core frontline force of 56 Tank Divisions, 147 Motorized Rifle Divisions, 7 Guards Airborne Divisions, 35 Artillery Divisions, 10 Air Assault Brigades, and 4 Airmobile Brigades within 100 days of mobilization with a total mobilized strength of 7,798,000 men. Due to the massive size of the Soviet Army, the Soviet Army relied very heavily on Military Journals (i.e. Military magazines) to keep the officer corps appraised and informed on tactics and doctrine on the battlefield. It was very easy in the Cold War to obtain copies of these published Military Journals. These journals were translated and published by Jane’s Information Services (the largest civilian intelligence agency in the world) as Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army which was continuously updated.
Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army included all known Soviet military equipment and detailed Soviet Army doctrine on the company, battalion, regimental, brigade, and division level. You would be shocked if you compare the Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army with the published detailed historography of the Soviet Army from 1943 to 1945 by authors like David Glantz, Jonathan House, Michael Jones, Prit Buttar, Steven Zaloga, and Anthony Beever. All the editions of Weapons and Tactics would describe in detail how a Soviet officer would set up a defensive layout of forces with either a motorized rifle company or motorized rifle battalion. This defensive layout literally matches verbatum the orders given to the defensive layout of frontline Guards Rifle companies and Guards Rifle battalions in the 6th and 7th Guards Army facing the upcoming onslaught of Field Marshal Von Manstein’s Panzertrüppen in Operation Citadel.
The vast majority of Soviet Army doctrine remained unchanged between 1944 to 1992 with only the weapons having a longer range and greater lethality. The two major changes to Soviet doctrine were with the use of artillery and helicopter transported infantry. Artillery was assigned the primary mission of suppression of anti-tank missile teams which lead to the mass production of self-propelled 2S1 SO-122 mm and 2S3 SO-152 mm howitzers. Battalions of 18-howitzer self-propelled artillery would use time-on-target artillery strikes to suppress defending anti-tank missile teams. The second was with the deployment of air assault and air landing brigades to seize bridges and major road junctions to expedite a Soviet offensive. The use of these brigades reserved the Guards Airborne to longer range operations in imitation of Operation Market Garden or a decapitating strike to topple an enemy government and high command. Since all of the successor state armies are still armed with Soviet equipment specifically built to implement the doctrine, military analysists are left with three questions: