The Evening Star (December 7, 1945)
Marshall questioned on delay due to sending final warning through commercial channels
General testifies he thought fastest method was used
By J. A. O’Leary and Carter Brooke Jones
Gen. George C. Marshall was unable to explain today to the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee why his last warning to the Hawaiian command, on the morning of the Japanese attack, went by commercial telegraph and radio and was delayed several hours, arriving after the harbor had been bombed and the fleet wrecked.
The wartime chief of staff said he did not order it sent by commercial means and assumed the War Department message center would use the quickest means available to get it to Maj. Gen. Walter Short, Hawaiian commander.
Can’t recall time
Gen. Marshall explained that he wrote the message to Hawaii, the Philippines, the Caribbean Command, the West Coast Command, reading the 14-part Japanese note to Secretary of State Hull, which had been intercepted and decoded. This occurred at an hour the general said he assumed to be, from what others said, sometime after 11 a.m. December 7, 1941, though he himself had no recollection of the time.
Gen. Marshall said he read the long Japanese note twice after being called out of a shower at home by an urgent summons to the War Department. He had taken his usual Sunday morning horseback ride, he said, and was getting ready to go to his office.
Dewey letters to go in record
Chairman Barkley announced at the noon recess that the two letters Gen. Marshall wrote to Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York during the presidential campaign last year would be placed in the record, probably this afternoon.
The committee had held an unexpected closed committee meeting this morning, reportedly to discuss the possible deletion of portions of the correspondence, but Sen. Barkley had no comment, telling reporters he would make a statement when the letters are presented.
The sending of the letters was revealed several months ago in an article in Life Magazine. They were described as appeals to the Republican nominee not to disclose in any discussion of the Pearl Harbor disaster that this country had cracked the Japanese code. Gov. Dewey refrained from discussing the Pearl Harbor attack during the campaign.
William D. Mitchell, the committee’s chief counsel, pressed Gen. Marshall for details about the warning to field commanders.
“Did you give instructions as to the means of transmitting it to Hawaii?” the attorney asked. “No, sir,” said Gen. Marshall, adding that it was the business of the message center to use the most expeditious means possible.
Wrote it in longhand
“I decided not to have it typed,” the general added. “I wrote it in long hand on an ordinary ruled sheet, and it was carried in that form by Col. Bratton, I believe” (He referred to Col. Rufus L. Bratton, head of the Far Eastern Branch of Army Intelligence).
Gen. Marshall, who was criticized by the Army Pearl Harbor Board for failure to get Hawaii on the special telephone on his desk with its automatic “scrambling” device, was asked whether anything was wrong with this telephone.
“I don’t know,” Gen. Marshall replied, “I did not ask the question. I did not ask whether I could get Hawaii on the phone.”
“There was a statement in the report of the Army Board,” Mr. Mitchell recalled, “that you did telephone the Philippines.”
“No, sir,” said Gen. Marshall firmly. “I didn’t telephone anywhere.”
Gen. Marshall said he asked Col. Bratton to find out from the message center how long it would take to get the message to Hawaii.
“I don’t recall what he reported,” the general added. “I have a faint recollection of being told it would take eight minutes to get it there. The record will show what Col. Bratton reported.”
Notice instructions on time
Gen. Marshall said the first he knew of the final Japanese note breaking off negotiations was when he arrived at his office In the War Department that Sunday morning.
“I read it over twice,” he added, explaining that on the second reading he noticed the special message from Tokyo to the two Japanese envoys in Washington instructing them to deliver the note to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m. that day.
“It indicated to me and to all the other officers present,” Gen. Marshall recalled, “that the Japanese planned some very definite action after 1 p.m.”
Gen. Marshall said the Japanese note and its prescript “was all rather unusual.” He added:
“I wrote about the message, and then I got Adm. Stark (Adm. Harold R. Stark, then chief of naval operations) on the White House switchboard and read him the message. He felt it might confuse the field commanders, because we had already placed them on the alert.”
Gen. Marshall referred to a message which had been sent them November 27 warning them that negotiations with the Japanese appeared near an end and due precautions should be taken.
“I wrote the message in long hand,” Gen. Marshall added. “I think Adm. Stark called me back. Anyway, I told him I was sending the message, and he asked me to add, ‘Show this to your naval officer.’”
Gen. Marshall told the committee he did not know until later that the message had been sent to Hawaii by Western Union Telegraph to San Francisco and by RCA wireless to Honolulu.
“Adm. Stark tells me,” the general supplemented, “that he asked me if I wanted it sent by naval communications and I told him no.”
On stand for second day
Gen. Marshall said of the news that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor: “I don’t remember whether I was at my office or at home when I was notified. The secretary of the general staff tells me I was at my office. Others tell me I was at home. I have no independent recollection. At any event, I was at my office in a few minutes.”
Gen. Marshall beginning the second day of his testimony on the fourth anniversary of Pearl Harbor started his recital of the events on the morning of December 7, 1941, by relating: “I had my breakfast about 8. I said at a previous inquiry into Pearl Harbor that I probably rode horseback until 8:30.
Rode for hour or less
“Since then, talks with my order lies and others leads me purely by deduction – for I can’t remember to say I must have ridden later. I don’t know how long. Probably after breakfast I read the papers, then went out riding.”
Describing his usual route of Sunday morning rides between the approaches to Memorial Bridge and portions of Rock Creek Park, he added: “The probability is I rode for an hour or less – certainly not longer.”
Gen. Marshall went on: “I think I was taking a shower or had just left it when I was notified there was something important for me at the War Department.”
He guessed that he got there in 10 minutes or less after leaving his home at Port Myer, Virginia.
“I don’t know the exact time I arrived,” Gen. Marshall said. “I started reading the Japanese note.”
Asked what he did on the evening before, Gen. Marshall said he had no clear memory, but from other evidence, including Mrs. Marshall’s recollection, believed they stayed home that night.
“It is highly probable we stayed home,” the general added.
Went to office quickly
After describing what was done about the warning message to the field commander, Gen. Marshall said: “The next information I had was the notification of the actual attack. I don’t remember whether I was at home or at the War Department. The secretary of the general staff tells me I was at my office. Others say I was at home. I don’t know where I was. Anyway, I was quickly at my office.
“There were many reports at that time – reports and rumors. It was reported that a Japanese landing was being attempted, and I asked the facts about that. I was told that Short had gone into the field and was not able to talk to me directly.”
Gen. Marshall told Mr. Mitchell he did not recall any discussion Sunday morning of what the corresponding time would be in Hawaii, Panama or other points when the Jap note was delivered at 1 o’clock here.
Orderly left on phone
Gen. Marshall explained that in those busy days of building up the Army before Pearl Harbor, about the only place he ever went was to the movies and at such times an orderly was left on the telephone who could locate him.
Asked by Mr. Mitchell if anyone had authority to send warning messages if he could not be located, the general said the deputy chief of staff would have that authority. The authority would not go on down the line, he added.
Mr. Mitchell asked if Gen. Marshall had any meeting with the President on Saturday, December 6, pointing out that the White House call list showed only Justice William O. Douglas of the Supreme Court and Budget Director Smith.
“No, sir, I have no recollection of contact with him that day,” Gen. Marshall replied.
Mr. Mitchell then went back to the question of whether an air attack on Pearl Harbor could have been prevented. He asked the general if it was not a fact that it would have taken more than double the number of planes then available at Pearl Harbor to maintain air reconnaissance in all directions and far enough out to spot the Jap carriers before an attack. Mr. Mitchell also asked if it was a fair conclusion from these facts that reconnaissance could have been conducted only in sectors to be patrolled.
Gen. Marshall said that was roughly the case.
Mr. Mitchell then asked if the alternative defense would have been to get the fighter planes in Hawaii up in time to meet the attacking planes.
Other factors mentioned
Gen. Marshall agreed, but explained there would be other factors, such as what degree of alert was in effect. Mr. Mitchell broke in to say that all his questions were based on the assumption of a complete alert. The record shows, however, that the islands were alerted only against sabotage at the time.
Mr. Mitchell recalled all of the correspondence early in 1941 about strengthening Hawaii, then asked the general if he could throw any light on why “after all that stir, when it came to the last critical days, some at least thought the danger of air attack had faded away.”
Gen. Marshall said he did not think the fear of an air attack had faded. The point was, he said, that from the time the new commanders arrived in Hawaii early in 1941 until August, everything possible was being done to meet what were regarded as their urgent needs. By August, he said, it was felt they had been reasonably provided for, and attention was turned to helping Gen. MacArthur in the Philippines.
Gen. Marshall reminded the committee that quantity production of war supplies was just beginning in August 1941. He explained that the plan which contemplated 180 B-17 bombers at Hawaii could not be fulfilled before the attack because at the time we had only 148 B-17s altogether.
Gen. Marshall testified late yesterday that be believed in November of 1941 that the Hawaiian command had sufficient men and material “to prevent a landing, to successfully resist an air attack and to defend the naval base.”
He made this statement after Mr. Mitchell had spent most of the day developing on the record the voluminous correspondence throughout 1941 between Hawaii and Washington and between officials here over the strengthening of Pearl Harbor and other outposts.
Asked about impressions
“Now, general, with all these documents in the record, showing your contact with Hawaii, I want you to cast your mind back to late November 1941, and tell us what your impression was as to the capacity of the forces there to resist an air raid,” Mr. Mitchell directed.
Gen. Marshall pointed out that the Army there was still short of bombers and some types of anti-aircraft weapons, but had been built up in fighter aircraft. He said it also had the portable radar sets and ample troops to guard against a landing.
“The military forces on Hawaii in numbers and equipment were more nearly up to desired standards than any other installations in the Army,” the general continued. “My impression was it was sufficiently organized to prevent a landing, to resist successfully an air attack and to defend the naval base.”
Mr. Mitchell indicated he meant what its defensive capacity was, assuming the available facilities were utilized, and the general reiterated he thought it had sufficient men and material.